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Abstract 
 
In an increasingly globalised world, dominant social group representations become highly 
influential agents in the sustenance or impediment of constructive intercultural relations on 
both a national and international level. Throughout the past decade, Muslims as a social 
group have been constantly thrust into fierce public debates and discussions stemming from 
a stream of diverse political and socio-cultural conflicts. This resulted in an amplified 
presence on various media outlets, developing serious concerns regarding their 
representation as a social group. In fact, a large body of media and social research argue 
Muslim representations as leaning towards negative and hostile depictions, emphasising a 
continued presence of an Orientalist ideology. 
In addition to exploring the existence of dominant representations, rooted in the study of 
discourse, this research is primarily interested in the linguistic construction of these 
ideological discursive representations, relating them to the wider socio-political context. 
This was done by conducting a comparative discourse analysis of articles related to major 
Muslim news events in quality newspapers in the UK and the less explored Arab English 
language quality press published in the Persian Gulf region.  
Through a specifically tailored qualitative/quantitative methodological approach, the 
research describes how these dominant representations are translated in the text by 
highlighting the various linguistic constructions and strategies adopted and utilised. By 
relating the textual findings to reader interpretation and production processes, as well as, 
the various socio-political contexts, a more comprehensive understanding of the production 
and interpretation of dominant social meanings was developed. 
Anchored in positive self and negative other presentation and utilizing similar micro/macro 
discursive strategies, both contexts revealed dominant ideological representations of Islam 
and Muslims with diverging and at times directly antagonistic meanings. Past dominant 
meanings are argued to persevere, exhibiting new recontextualised forms, while various 
social and institutional processes are argued to determine and shape the dominant 
discursive representations proliferating media texts. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Say not, ‘I have found the truth’, but rather, ‘I have found a truth.’ 
                                                                                                  Gibran Khalil Gibran 
 
In the final days of writing this thesis, two unrelated events taking place a few weeks and 
thousands of miles apart saturated the news media worldwide, be it the morning papers, 
the evening news or our twitter timelines. Unrelated as they may be, the Boston marathon 
bombings and the murder at Woolwich have one glaring common thread, those responsible 
declare themselves Muslims. These events come in the wake of a long series of Muslim 
related news events that have dominated news media in the past decade or what some may 
refer to as the post 9/11 era. One recent study on the representation of Islam and Muslims 
in the British press between 2000-2008 has reported that coverage of Muslim related 
stories in 2002 is nearly 5 times higher than it was in 2000 and coverage in 2004 doubled the 
coverage in 2002 (Moore et al., 2008). Similarly, as a consequence of coalition led wars in 
predominantly Muslim Afghanistan and Iraq, notably tagged worldwide as the ‘War on 
Terror’, stories related to these events were of direct concern to media based in the Middle 
East. Just as there is a clear rise in the coverage of Muslim related stories, there are growing 
concerns and many questions over how Islam and Muslims are being depicted with many 
expressing their apprehension of the misrepresentation of Muslims in Western media. 
Various Western outlets have been at the centre of constant criticism accused of being 
racist, ideologically driven and assisting in the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims. 
These concerns are amplified further by the substantial increase in transnational media 
flow, a key component of globalisation processes, outstretching the amount of existing 
permanent foreign correspondents reporting back to various news organisations (Nohrstedt 
& Ottosen, 2004). Accordingly, this implies the possibility of a transnational media oligopoly, 
and thus an imminent risk of particular discourses dominating global news flow.  
16 
 
Indeed, in this high tech age, the power of the media today is undeniable with news and 
information about the world crossing continents in a matter of seconds. Its potential 
influence is equally ascertained by the record $4 million dollars spent on a 30 second 
advertisement shown during the 2013 Super Bowl (Konrad, 2013) and by the U.S. 
government led multi-million dollar launch of a series of broadcast programs in the Middle 
East as part of an official public diplomacy bid to improve its image and the views on 
American foreign policy in Middle Eastern societies, e.g. Television Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa 
(El-Nawawy, 2007: 119). The media connects people with the rest of the world and relays 
information about the world on a national and international level. Described as an 
important “social institution” (Bell, 1998: 64), it plays a pivotal role in constructing the 
images, perceptions and core assumptions about politics, various cultures and societies and 
therefore, the identity of individuals belonging to those societies and cultures. As Cotter 
(2001: 416) explains, the media “encodes values and ideologies that impact on and reflect 
the larger world”.  Thus, through discourse, media may produce, reproduce, sustain, change 
and manipulate power relations, views and ideologies. Reinforcing the powerful effects of 
the media, Fairclough (1989: 54) describes media discourse as being able to “exercise a 
pervasive and powerful influence in social reproduction because of the very scale of modern 
mass media and the extremely high level of exposure of whole populations to a relatively 
homogenous output”.  
News Journalism and the press, which will be the media type focused on in this research, 
form one of the oldest types of media today and are consumed daily by millions around the 
world, whether electronically through the internet or in traditional print form. Although 
quality newspaper circulations have been witnessing a general downward trend, the 
influence of newspapers should not be underestimated. Newspaper analysis segments, for 
instance, remain a regular daily feature of major television news channels, reflecting their 
prominent position in society. In fact, print media in the Middle East is currently described 
as being healthier than it is in other world markets, experiencing increasing circulation 
figures in general, and a further 2.3% forecasted increase by the end of 2013 (Dubai Press 
Club and Value Partners, 2010). The UK quality newspaper circulation figures remain 
significant as well. In January of 2010, for instance, the Times distributed 508,250 copies 
while the Daily Telegraph was found to have distributed 691,128 copies (Tryhorn, 2010). 
17 
 
More importantly, although traditional newspaper circulation may have been generally 
declining in response to various factors, not least being the loss of readers to the digital 
revolution, it is this digital migration that may ultimately keep newspaper establishments in 
business. Newspaper internet sites (which carry much of the same content of the daily print 
newspapers) have been witnessing a clear and steady rise; in January 2010 alone, on 
average, the gaurdian.co.uk had 1.9 million unique users per day and the telegraph.co.uk 
was visited by 1.7 million unique users, while the Timesonline.co.uk reached 1.1 million 
unique users (Sweney, 2010). So successful, some UK based newspapers have launched 
monthly subscriptions for online users, i.e. The Times, with others planning to follow suit 
later in 2013, i.e. The Daily Telegraph and The Sun (“The Sun joins”, 2013). 
As a consequence of the influential nature of media discourse, including the discourse of the 
press, they are bound to become a chief site for the investigation of how ideologies, beliefs 
and perceptions are constructed and shaped in today’s society. Research in this area is of 
great significance, as it can “articulate a better understanding of the news media, the 
unique handling of language and text, and the impact on thought and culture” (Cotter, 
2001: 430). Moreover, it is safe to say negative depictions of Islam and Muslims in the media 
can have negative effects on opinions, views and attitudes towards Muslim communities 
around the world. This as a result can further polarize the cultural and social groups 
involved, leading to continuous conflict, hostile relations and global unrest. More direct and 
severe consequences can affect the growing number of Muslim minorities living in Europe 
and beyond, marginalizing and alienating them from mainstream society. This, in turn, can 
generate sentiments of social inequality and racism, among many other social related 
predicaments. 
With that being said, it is quite evident how analyzing media discourse can assist in 
developing an understanding of the dominant discourses and meanings of Islam and 
Muslims disseminating in society today. More importantly, it can be fundamentally 
important in raising awareness of any social inequality and individual misrepresentation, 
ultimately calling for change. This forms the key motivating force behind this discourse 
analysis research which aims to explore the ideological discursive representation of Islam 
and Muslims in the press by conducting a comparative discursive analytical study of 
18 
 
newspaper reports covering Muslim related stories in major UK and Arab English language 
quality newspapers. 
 
1.1   Research Rationale 
The study will examine the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
UK and Arab English language quality press by investigating the reporting of major and 
controversial Muslim related news events that have and continue to attract opposing views 
and extensive media coverage worldwide. In doing so, the study aims to:  
(1) Explore the existence of dominant representations of Islam and Muslims in the UK 
and Arab English language press. 
(2) Uncover the linguistic constructions and strategies used in the dominant ideological 
representation of Islam and Muslims in newspapers in different contexts. 
(3) Consider the differences and similarities in the representation of Islam and Muslims 
in newspapers published in the different contextual discourses. 
(4) Examine whether the dominant ideological discursive representation found in the UK 
press is reproduced, resisted or rejected in the Arab English language press, 
highlighting the linguistic constructions and strategies used in the process.  
(5) Explore reader interpretation processes of newspaper articles and analyse these 
interpretations in relation to the researcher’s discursive analytical findings and the 
various implicit and explicit ideological discursive meanings that may be represented 
in the text.   
 
1.2    Significance of Study 
A large body of research has been done on the representation of Islam, Muslims and Muslim 
practices in the media and various social outlets of discourse. These have generally been 
based on predominantly Western contexts and have argued and described Muslim social 
representations as leaning towards negative and hostile depictions (Poole & Richardson, 
2006; Richardson, 2004; Poole, 2002; Karim, 2003; Runnymede Trust, 1997; Said, 1997; 
Oktem, 2009; Baker, 2010; Baker et al, 2013; Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Rosenberger & Sauer, 
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2012; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2004). Although the area being examined has attracted much 
research attention and some studies have substantiated a dominant and at times negative 
representation of Islam and Muslims in the media, the current multidisciplinary research is 
of significance based on the following features: 
(1) Most studies conducted on Muslim representation in the media have approached 
the media content from a media research perspective. This research is primarily 
rooted in the study of discourse, examining not just the existence of dominant 
representations, but how these dominant representations are constructed 
linguistically, relating these representations to the wider socio-political context.  
(2) Excluding a few, most studies depend on quantitative content analysis of manifest 
meanings in large amounts of media texts or involve non-systematic qualitative 
analysis. In contrast, this study examines media texts from multiple perspectives by 
combining both quantitative and detailed qualitative analytical approaches, allowing 
for the uncovering of both manifest and covert underlying meanings in the texts.  
(3) Although Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (the qualitative analytical approach 
applied to texts in this study) emphasises the importance of exploring reader 
interpretation processes as part of the overall analysis of meanings in discourse, very 
few studies actually explore this area in addition to the researcher’s analysis of the 
text. In this study, reader interpretation processes form another important 
perspective of which meanings in media texts are explored.  
(4) As mentioned earlier, studies on Muslim representation have largely focused on 
‘Western’ media outlets. In addition to examining the UK press, a major member of 
‘Western’ media, this study will conduct a comparative discourse analysis of the Arab 
English language press, a genre of newspapers that has attracted very little research 
attention. Moreover, in adding the comparative element and examining texts 
produced in predominantly Muslim nations, the analysis may illustrate interesting 
differences, revealing meanings and discursive constructions in the UK press that 
may have otherwise not been considered significant. That is, meanings in the texts 
are not necessarily exposed by what is included in texts, but are equally revealed by 
what is not. 
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(5) Finally, analyses of Muslim representation is frequently found to relate to state and 
political conflicts, i.e. war reporting and acts of terrorism (9/11 attacks, Madrid and 
7/7 bombings, Iraq war, among others). This is somewhat expected, since these type 
of stories tend to be regarded as having the value of ‘impact’ in news journalism and 
they are indeed relevant as events. This research has purposely avoided such stories 
and instead opted to focus on major events of opinion conflict arising from social, 
cultural and religious differences that may inherently exist between various social 
groups. Such events attract debates that delve into understanding and creating the 
‘Other’, and thus, their representation.  Arguably, reporting on such events can have 
far reaching consequences on intercultural relations on both a national and 
international level. 
By distinguishing itself with these features, the research hopes to add further insight to the 
current growing highly relevant scholarly debates on the representation of Islam and 
Muslims.  
 
1.3   Scope and Methodology 
To achieve the aims and objectives set forward, the research conducted quantitative and 
qualitative discourse analysis on newspaper data made up of British and Arab English 
language quality newspaper news reports and opinion pieces on the following two events, 
forming two separate analytical projects: 
- Event A: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban 
- Event B: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy 
These events have been selected since they both took place post 9/11 and produced a 
conflict of cultural and political views, creating an “Us” vs. “Them” dichotomy between the 
social groups involved. In the past decade, the world has witnessed countless examples of 
such conflicts that are primarily of a social or cultural nature, for instance, the banning of 
minarets in Switzerland, the Quran burning controversy in Florida and the latest debacle 
over an immature YouTube video mocking the Muslim Prophet in 2012.  Both events 
selected for analysis in this study exemplify this form of conflict at its most extreme.  Not 
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only do these events echo past conflicts and controversies, i.e. reactions to Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988 and the French ‘l'affaire du voile’ between 1989 and 1994, 
they subsequently resulted in multiple cultural, social, political and legal events and conflicts 
that continue to this day. This in combination with the heated debates and discussions they 
propelled and which were extensively played out in media worldwide would most likely 
have a significant effect on some of the general readers’ perceptions and understanding of 
Islam and Muslims.  
To analyse the articles collected in relation to these events, the research developed a 3 
levelled analytical framework drawing on qualitative and quantitative discourse analytical 
approaches. The analysis began by applying the qualitative methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) on a selection of newspaper texts. This was followed by the analysis of a 
much larger sample of newspapers texts drawing on the quantitative methods of Content 
Analysis and Corpus Linguistics (CL). The analysis also shed some light on reader 
interpretation processes by conducting reader focus groups, examining the interpretation of 
meanings on the representation of Muslims in some of the newspaper articles analysed by 
the researcher using CDA.  
 
1.4   Research Outline 
The research is comprised of two volumes. Volume one presents the main body of research 
and is made up of seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. Volume two is 
solely dedicated to supplementary materials and data in the form of appendices.  
Chapter one is an introductory commentary opening with a description of the context of the 
study which concurrently highlights its relevance and indicates its purpose, which the rest of 
the chapter delves into. Following a discussion of the research rationale which sets forward 
its main aims and objectives, the significance of the study is highlighted. The chapter also 
gives a general overview of the scope of the study and methodology used to achieve the 
aims and objectives set forward by the research. The chapter ends with a brief outline of the 
organisation of the thesis and the remaining chapters. 
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Chapter two presents the literature review of the various disciplinary areas contextualising 
the research. Beginning with a historical overview of the representation of Islam and 
Muslims, the chapter narrates key historical theories and events that have shaped this 
representation, while highlighting some key studies that have been carried out in the area. 
Theories on ideology in relation to discourse and how it defined in this study are discussed 
next. The chapter also sheds some light on journalistic discourse and the various relevant 
institutional and social processes that are argued to affect newspaper news reporting and 
production processes in both the UK and Arab context.  
Chapter two ends with an extensive discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the main 
discourse analytical approach adopted in this research. This includes the definition and 
approach to discourse in CDA, its aims and objectives and the methodological approach in 
relation to this particular study. Discussion on CDA also highlights some of the criticisms it 
frequently receives as a discourse analytical approach, demonstrating how these were 
addressed in the current research through a specifically developed analytical framework.  
The methodology adopted to achieve the research aims and objectives is the focus of 
Chapter three. This chapter begins by presenting the research questions followed by a 
detailed description of the research design and analytical framework. The chapter also 
provides detailed description of the data that was examined and the data collection and 
sampling processes.  
Chapters four, five and six are dedicated to presenting the analytical findings. The analysis of 
articles related to the ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ story are presented in chapter four, while 
the analytical findings related to the ‘2005 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ story are the focus 
of chapter five. In both chapters, the analytical exploration begins with a general 
quantitative analysis of the UK and Arab corpus of articles on each news event, describing 
their contents in terms of the frequency of articles, the genre of news reporting they fall 
under, and the frequency patterns of bylined sources. This is followed by the detailed 
analytical findings of the critical discourse analysis of selected articles from the UK and Arab 
English language press. Both chapters end with a quantitative analysis further examining 
some of the critical discourse analysis findings on larger corpora of articles. Finally, chapter 
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six is dedicated to presenting the analytical findings of the reader interpretation study in the 
UK and Kuwaiti context, followed by a general discussion of the findings. 
Chapter seven is the final chapter and begins by a discussion of the findings presented in 
chapters four and five in relation to the main aims of the study and the relevant literature 
presented in chapter two. Key findings related to the reader interpretation analysis will also 
be highlighted in this final discussion. The chapter will then turn to highlighting some of the 
short comings and limitations of the research, ending with suggestions for future studies.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1   Islam and Muslims: Constructing an Image 
The relation between what is known as the ‘Muslim World’ and what is known as the ‘West’ 
has always been a complex one. What constitutes the ‘West’, ‘Islam’ and the ‘Muslim world’ 
can be up for extensive debates and discussions as well. Indeed, as Ahmed (1992: viii) 
explains, “the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ are shorthand expressions for complex and mobile 
formations, the boundaries of which are not given, but rather are political in nature and 
sites of constant struggle”. Therefore, no expression should be viewed through an 
essentialist perspective, each reflecting one monolithic entity. Accordingly, the use of these 
labels in the current thesis primarily serves analytical purposes. Nevertheless, it is still vital 
to define what meaning they will carry in the proposed research. The ‘Muslim world’ is 
defined as representing nations and communities around the world where Islam is the main 
religion practiced. The ‘West’ is defined following Malek and Wiegand’s (1995: 201) 
definition, whereby it is viewed as comprising all nations who possess dominance as a result 
of their economic, military and ideological superiority, which are primarily made up of 
European nations and the United States.  
 
In order to comprehensively analyze and understand how Muslims are depicted and 
perceived in the West today, an exploration and discussion of key historical events and 
developments, as well as various socio-political theories that have been argued to have 
influenced the formation of the perceptions of the Muslim world should be reviewed. This 
will be the focus of the following sections. 
 
2.1.1   Historical Background: Orientalism 
The formation of the perceptions of Islam and the Muslim world in the West began 
centuries ago when the earliest encounters between Islam and the West developed as 
religious scrutiny of Islam from the Christian West (Poole, 2002: 33); the “long standing 
distrust between Muslims and Christians has defined the pattern” (Malek & Wiegand, 1995: 
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203).  Malek and Wiegand explain this further by describing how in the West, even prior to 
the Middle Ages, Christianity was formed to be the ideal and honourable way of living, as 
opposed to the life reflected by Islam. They explain this conflict in relation to religion by 
giving examples of how the Prophet Mohammed was described during the Crusades, some 
of which include, as stated by Ahmed (1991: 30) : “false prophet, a sower of discord, a 
sensualist, a hypocrite, and agent of the devil” (cited in Malek & Wiegand, 1995: 203). 
Moreover, as a result of the Islamic conquests in Europe during the Ottoman period, further 
negative attitudes towards Islam as a religion developed. As Watt (1991: 90) explains, 
advances such as the one made by the Ottomans were viewed as a renewal of Muslim 
aggression, which reaffirmed the European West’s preconceived idea of Islam as a religion 
of violence to be ultimately feared.  As Turner (1989) explains, the clash between 
Christianity and Islam paved the way for the development of theories of otherness, where 
‘the Other’ is formed and perceived as corrupt morally and ontologically (cited in Poole, 
2002: 33).  
Another major determining force in the development of the image of Islam and Muslims 
was the European colonial expansion through colonial and imperial conquests into the East 
and primarily in Muslim regions in the 19th century. It is during this period where the idea of 
an ‘Orient’, ‘Oriental scholars’ and ‘Orientalism’ as a field developed, bringing with it large 
bodies of texts describing the Orient. With the colonial expansion, religious factors were not 
the only area of interest that affected the writings of Orientalist Scholars; political and 
economical factors in relation to Islam came into play as well. Orientalism, how it is defined 
and what it encompasses as a field adopted various descriptions and definitions as the field 
itself developed.  Originally, the term Orientalism did not carry any negative connotations; 
Orientalism was simply an academic label describing disciplines that studied “Eastern 
societies, histories and languages” (Sayyid, 2003: 31). However, this view towards the field 
soon changed. With the development of opposition towards colonial power in the Indian 
subcontinent, questions, ideas and theories regarding the true intentions of Orientalists and 
their work towards the Orient began to develop, and criticism towards the field escalated 
even further following the Second World War and the decolonization of the East 
(Richardson, 2004: 6).  
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Edward Said’s pioneering critical work, “Orientalism” (1978), has been seminal in 
highlighting and developing this divergent and increasingly negative perspective towards 
Orientalism and the work it had produced on the East. In this book, where Said analyses 
various 18th and 19th century academic texts and writings that describe the Orient and its 
people, Said questions the validity and neutrality of these works. Said views Orientalism as a 
“style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 
‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the occident’” (1978: 2). In this relationship, the power 
is viewed as unequal, where the Western culture and people are viewed as superior to the 
people and culture of the East. According to Said (1978: 3), Orientalism can be described 
and analyzed as: 
 
 the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, 
ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient. 
  
 
Therefore, Orientalism is viewed as an exercise of power and knowledge by the Western 
power over the Orient or the Eastern part of the world. Orientalist writings are argued to be 
the discursive means by which a stereotypical East was created, an East inferior to the 
superior West, giving the European West the ability to assert their power and domination at 
the time. Furthermore, as Poole (2002: 33) explains, “comparisons of Europe with the 
Middle East were based on European definitions of modernity and religion as a personal 
belief, and this allowed ideas of superiority to circulate”.  
 
Central to Said’s work on Orientalism are Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1971) and 
Foucault’s notion of discourse and power (1972). Works produced by Orientalism are 
viewed as discourse that assisted in understanding how “European culture was able to 
manage and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically and imaginatively” (Said 1978: 7). The discourse and production of knowledge 
could be viewed to have been used to express and exercise power on the Orient by the 
colonizing Western political forces. In regard to Gramsci’s hegemony, Said (1978: 7) 
explains, that it is the working of cultural hegemony that in effect has kept Orientalism, its 
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strength and influence ongoing. Furthermore, according to Sayyid (2003: 31), Said argued 
that Orientalism developed as a result of Imperialist control and expansion in the Muslim 
and Eastern world, while concurrently it is Orientalism itself that made this expansion 
possible. Orientalism dictated and reasserted the need for Western colonial powers to 
further extend their military, political and economic dominance and control of the East.  
 
The Orient encompasses various regions of the Eastern part of the world, however, Said 
pays particular attention to the depiction of Muslim regions of the Orient, which he referred 
to as the ‘near Orient’. He explains that “only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe 
with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time economic levels” 
(1978: 74). As a result, much of Orientalism reflected various negative attitudes towards 
Islam and the Arab regions in particular. Said (1978: 301) explains that descriptions of Arabs 
and Islam in studies can be reflected by four main dogmas or themes:  
 
One is the absolute and systemic difference between the West, which is rational, 
developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, underdeveloped, 
inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient ... are always 
preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. The third dogma 
is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself... A forth dogma 
is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared ... or to be controlled... 
 
In addition, Richardson (2004: 6) explains, the most influential effects of Orientalism 
according to Said, has been the development of the perception of the Orient as one. The 
Orient is depicted as a ‘single Orient’, suggesting that the Muslim Middle East can be viewed 
and analysed as one entity. This as a result, as Richardson explains, has the effect of 
essentializing “an image of an archetypal (and usually male) ‘Oriental’, unchanging in ‘His’ 
primitive, culturally specific beliefs and practices” (ibid). Therefore, Islam is constructed to 
reflect a static and unchanging religion. Indeed, as Watt (1991: 107) explains, Muslim 
scholars themselves have called out on Orientalists over this idea of Islam as a static 
religion. Laroui (1976: 44) argues that Islam, in contrast to Orientalist depictions, is not 
static, but should rather be viewed as in a continuous process of renewal (cited in Watt, 
1991: 107). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier and emphasised throughout this thesis, 
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whether it be Islam, the Muslim World, the West or the Western World, adopting a view of 
any of these social constructs as representing one monolithic entity, neglects the internal 
differences, the multi layered realities and the internal complex dynamics within these 
regions of the world. Acquiring this view allows for irrational sweeping generalizations of 
hundreds of millions of people who admittedly may share some commonalities, but in fact 
are living within very different nations, societies, communities that are specific in their 
internal socio-political and economical circumstances and realities. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that during the time Said wrote the book ‘Orientalism’ (1978), he 
argued that unlike other parts of the world that have been on the receiving end of 
Orientalist scholarship, such as Africa and East Asia, who in the 1960’s produced a vast 
amount of work revising, refuting and challenging ‘Orientalist’ scholarship, Islamic and Arab 
scholars have done very little in this regard.  
 
In the post-colonial era, new forms of representation of the Orient and Muslims in particular 
began taking shape, “a new typology of images emerged to categorize Islam in a way that is 
altogether different – aggressively militant, intrinsically fundamentalist, ideologically anti-
modern and socially repressive” (Brasted, 2009: 62). These forms of representation can be 
viewed to carry on the classic Orientalist perspective, however, they were also the 
consequence of complex social and political realities and happenings, in both, the Muslim 
regions of the world and the West. The following section will tackle some of these aspects 
that have been seen to influence the continuous formation of the representations of Islam 
and Muslims today. 
  
2.1.2  Orientalism: Modern Day 
In the last 50 years, attention towards the Arab Muslim world has grown considerably. In 
the years following the early 1970s, many events concerning the Arab and Muslim world 
gained worldwide attention, some of which include, the oil crises, the Iranian revolution, the 
civil war in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Gulf War, among others. This attention 
escalated even further with the devastating effects of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the 
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various terrorist attacks that followed around the world and the politically coined ‘War on 
Terror’ that continues today.  
 
The rise of political Islam or the Islamist movement in the 1970’s in various Islamic nations 
played a major part in the drawing of attention to Muslim communities. This swift sudden 
up rise was so profoundly noticed that as Sayyid (1997: 18) explains, by the 1980’s, 
approximately 200 books a year were published discussing the reasons for this Islamic 
resurgence.  One of the primary and most vocalised causes for this resurgence, as explained 
by experts and by Islamists themselves, was the growing and widespread feeling of a loss of 
Islamic identity among various Muslim communities (Watt, 1991; Sayyid, 1997).  Another 
often discussed cause refers to the failure of secular elites who were instituted by the 
Western colonizing regimes prior to their departure and who promoted Western models of 
power and modernity to achieve the hopes and aspirations of the general public (Sayyid, 
1997; Ahmed, 1992).  In turn, members and supporters of various Islamist movements 
across various Muslim nations claimed that their policies would improve the current reality 
of Muslim communities at the time. Also, as Sayyid (1997: 21) explains, the rapid economic 
growth, i.e. oil industry, and the consequential changes it had on the traditional way of life 
in the region was another factor leading to the resurgence, according to some theorists. 
These changes brought along feelings of uncertainty, which in some cases compelled some 
to return and reaffirm their traditional ways of life, which the Islamist movements so 
popularly advocated and offered.  
 
Nevertheless, Sayyid (1997) argues that reasons such as the ones discussed above explain 
the failure of old regimes rather than the reasons for the successful emergence and 
popularity of Islamism. He explains their popularity as “due to the way in which they are 
able to combine the deconstructionist logic of the post modern critique of modernity with 
an attempt to speak from another centre, outside the orbit of the West” (Sayyid, 1997: 120). 
 
The Rushdie Affair is argued as the event that brought this developing resurgence of Islam 
into full scale worldwide attention (Watt, 1991). The consequential ‘fatwa’ or death 
sentence issued as a response to the publication of the Satanic Verses, by then Iranian 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, highlighted a clash between Western views towards 
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basic principles of the modern world, e.g. freedom of speech, and views of similar concepts 
displayed by some in the Muslim world. This brings us to some theories brought forward by 
scholars which claim that various types of rhetoric, events and actions taking place and 
resulting from Islamist movements in several Muslim communities have assisted in the 
establishment of Islam as the next villain (after the Communist Soviet Union); Islam was 
‘Othered’ and viewed as a threat that the West would have to ultimately deal with.  
 
With the rise of the Islamist movements, leaders, members and speakers of these 
movements vocalised their extreme rejection and desire to fight off Western values related 
to secularism and democracy and the ‘Western’ way of life in general, i.e. equality of the 
sexes and of religions. They also asserted the idea of one unchanging essential Islam. These 
ideas coincided with the developing view of Islam as a threat to the West and the 
democracy it advocates, reasserting Western views of what Islam allegedly stands for. 
Consequently, both, the opponents and proponents of the Islamic movement seemed to 
agree on an essential Islam that is historically unchanging (Halliday, 1996: 111), an Islam 
supposedly dictating the attitude of all Muslims from very different Muslim societies 
towards all sorts of social, political and fundamental issues regarding life in general. This 
ignores the fact that within various Islamic communities, there are internal political and 
religious conflicts. Various other political parties who form large numbers in Muslim 
societies and who are rarely reported on in Western writings and the media, are 
continuously struggling and competing with Islamists for political positions and majority 
seats in parliaments, e.g., Kuwait. Each community is defined by various realities. Various 
movements exist in Islamic societies and as Bennet (2005: 22) explains, Islamic societies 
include radical revisionists, neo traditionalists, traditionalists and modernists or progressive 
thinkers who agree or disagree on varying social, religious and political issues and concerns, 
and these vary from one society to the next. Nevertheless, Islamist rhetoric seems to be the 
centre of attention in the West and as Poole (2002: 35) explains, there is “agreement that 
the global events that are associated with it have been formulated as a threat in current 
Western discourse”. 
 
As a result, many ideas developed by authors reflect Islam as a threat polarized from the 
West and all it stands for. Orientalists, such as Bernard Lewis (1990), have stated that “the 
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Muslim world is again seized by an intense – and violent – resentment of the West. 
Suddenly America has become the arch-enemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic 
opponent of all that is good, and specifically for Muslims, of Islam” (cited in Richardson, 
2004: 12). Amos Perlmutter (1992), another Neo-Orientalist, states, “Is Islam, fundamental 
or otherwise, compatible with liberal, human rights-oriented Western style representative 
democracy? The answer is an empathetic No” (cited in Hunter, 1998: 72). Islam is viewed as 
incapable of co-existing with the West or adapting to Western values and thus, any form of 
modernity.  
 
Polarization of both regions was advocated further by various scholarly theories and works, 
such as, Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” thesis (1993, 1996). According to Brasted 
(2009: 63), Huntington drew on an image of Islam developing an aggressive fight against the 
form of civilization the West represents. This worked to form an image of Islam as a 
dangerous force against the West and all it stands for, and ultimately values of both 
civilizations are predicted to collide. 
 
For some analysts, Huntington’s predictions proved right with the events of 9/11 and Al-
Qaeda’s rhetoric and the ‘War on Terror’ that followed, thus, resulting in what is considered 
a war between Islam and the West (Bennett, 2005: 11). However, Bergen (2001: 242) argues 
against such a conclusion, explaining that the war following 9/11 is not the result of a clash 
of cultures, rather, the conflict is primarily related to political issues regarding America’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East and the political decisions it has taken regarding various 
issues and conflicts in the region. Halliday (1996) adds to this argument by explaining that 
historically, differences between civilisations had rarely caused conflict internationally. In 
support of this, he cites conflicts that have had no relation to such differences, such as, the 
Japan/US Conflict, the Oil Conflict and the international nuclear weapons disputes. Said 
(1996) described theories such as Huntington’s, as having the effect of prolonging and 
perpetuating conflicts as well as polarizing both sides of the conflict even further. In 
addition, Beinin and Stork argue that such a theory “promotes a metaphysical concept of 
cultural unity and ahistorical notion of fixed civilisational blocs” (1997: 20). This reductionist 
view by which civilizations are divided into separate entities creates collective identities that 
can in no way represent the diversity and multilayered realities of the nations and people 
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that belong to these civilisations. Indeed, such scenarios belie the existing complex realities 
of the world today (Karim, 2003). Moreover, the potential threat posed by ‘political Islam’ 
can arguably be questioned based on the fact that it encompasses more than one political 
group or movement with extremely varying ideals, i.e. the ideological and political 
differences, as well as, the economical realities of Al Qaida (Wahabi based) and Hezbollah (a 
Shiite movement), arguably weakens any possibility of a real threat to the West.   
 
Moreover, some theories developing from both the ‘Islamic world’, as well as the ‘West’, 
advocate the idea that following the Cold war, a “threat vacuum” was created (Esposito, 
1992), which needed to be filled by a “new enemy” after Communism. Muslim nations are 
argued to have been substituted by the West as the next enemy or subordinated ‘Other’, 
reviving the old historical conflict between both regions (Halliday, 1996: 109). Some 
advocates of this view support their claims by explaining that this is the result of the West’s 
need to maintain hegemonic power over the rest of the world, although this idea has been 
contested by many as well. In addition, Hippler (1995) explains, Western foreign policy in 
the Middle East is mainly shaped by their economic and power interests. The Middle East 
with its vast oil reserves forms a major part of these Western interests. Therefore, the use 
of the ‘threat of Islam’ can work to justify any negative action or activity taken by Western 
governments to accomplish their interests in the region.  Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, and this is more evident post 9/11, key figures and followers of various organised 
movements in Muslim societies have affirmed the idea of an eternal Islamic threat and 
conflict between the two regions, by positioning themselves as ‘speakers for Islam’ and all 
Muslims, who primarily exist to fight the West and actually commit various devastating acts, 
e.g. 9/11 and 7/7, which in fact defy anything that is ‘Islamic’. Halliday describes this 
supposed Islamic threat and eternal confrontation as a constructed myth. This supposed 
threat by Islam obscures the reality that the majority of Muslims around the world do not 
support such movements or the concept of political Islam (Halliday, 1996: 107).  
 
Although there are varying scholarly disagreements on the theories mentioned above, there 
is general agreement that the Muslim world today is widely perceived as posing an 
ideological and physical homogenous threat to the ‘West’. This subsequently creates an ‘Us’ 
vs. ‘Them’ scenario.  As Said explains in the preface of the 2003 edition of Orientalism, the 
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general understanding of Arabs, Muslims and the Middle East has not improved to a great 
extent. This, he explains, is exemplified by demeaning generalizations and continuous 
attacks on Arab contemporary societies for “their backwardness, lack of democracy, and 
abrogation of women rights” (1978: xiv). More importantly, he explains that each historical 
phase, from Napeleon’s invasion of Egypt to more recent times, has produced different 
themes and images of the ‘Other’, adapting to the specific interests of West in each 
individual situation. Indeed, social and media research have emphasised the growing and 
continuously changing stereotypical social representation of Islam and Muslims in general, 
and this will be the focus of discussion in the following section. 
     
2.1.3 The Role of the Media 
As a result of some of the incidents described earlier, Islam, Muslims and the Middle East 
have received much media attention. This naturally developed concerns on how Islam and 
Muslims are depicted in Western media. Consequently, research on this depiction got much 
scholarly attention from various academic fields (Said, 1997; Ahmed, 1992; Karim, 2003; 
Poole, 2002; Farouqi, 2009; Richardson, 2004; Poole & Richardson, 2006; Morey & Yaqin, 
2011; Baker et al, 2013, Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2004; Hakam, 2009).  
 
Said (1997: xii) argues that most coverage of Islam in Western media, which he believes 
escalated dramatically with the events of the 1979 Iranian revolution, have been hostile, 
highly exaggerated and stereotypical. He describes this hostile negative coverage as 
displaying a revival of classic Orientalist ideas and themes in the depictions of Islam. Unlike 
other cultures and religions, depictions of Islam and Muslims contain racial and religious 
misrepresentations, which Said describes to have “become the last acceptable form of 
denigration of foreign culture in the West” (1997: xii). Such misrepresentations are argued 
to have become naturalized features of the media, thus, not questioned or criticised. 
Ahmed (1992), who throughout his work accentuates the fundamental role media plays in 
the postmodern world, describes media as defining dominant global civilisations today. He 
explains that currently the media is a primary source by which Islam is defined to be the 
enemy or villain. In fact, Ahmed (1992: 223) goes so far as to argue that in the history of 
relationship and conflict between the West and the Islamic world, Western media has posed 
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the greatest threat to Islam and Muslims. The criticality of the threat, he argues, is 
emphasised further by Muslims’ inability to fend for themselves against the relentless 
continuous attacks on Islam in Western dominated media. Indeed, various forms of Western 
media have been accused of an over reliance on extreme oriented sources and speakers 
who claim to represent Muslim communities (Poole, 2002: 44-45). This again, gives a very 
narrow view of Islam and reflects one interpretation, which tends to reaffirm Western 
misconceptions of Islam and Muslims as one unified unchanging entity. Moreover, Oktem 
(2009: 31) argues that the lack of sufficiently qualified experts and required finances in the 
Middle Eastern foreign reporting departments of many dominant Western news agencies 
can result in the media being “susceptible to public relations of governments and to 
propaganda”, rather than sound representations of events.  
 
Although a dominant negative representation is argued to exist, it is by no means assumed 
that the media or journalists deliberately and consciously depict Islam or any other issue in a 
particular way, either negative or positive, or drawing on a particular dominant ideology. 
Rather, as Hall (1979) explains, it is an unconscious process by media encoders, since the 
dominant discourses they are surrounded by and select from to depict events in the media 
appear to be the sole form of discourse available. That is, through the hegemonic processes 
in society, the discourse of the elite or the dominant ideology is the most prominent, and 
thus becomes a universalized and naturalized form of discourse that media encoders are 
faced with and consequently select from. This, for instance, can be exemplified by the 
selection of the term ‘fundamentalist’ instead of ‘Islamist’ to describe an Islamist 
movement. As Karim (2003: 6) explains, this is especially the case with mainstream media, 
since it is primarily owned by the dominant socio-economic elite and/or political groups and 
they are crucial methods by which hegemonic communication functions to attain public 
consensus.  Furthermore, news reports worldwide are highly dependent on Western based 
news agencies. According to Karim (2003: 14), the Western based “transnational mass 
media, which have sophisticated hardware and organizational systems, are much more 
effective than Muslim sources in creating globally dominant interpretations”. Although this 
may be true, the real challenges posed by various forms of new media towards these 
traditional cultures of information cannot be overlooked. In the past 20 years, the Arab 
predominantly Muslim media has developed a dominant information culture of its own, be 
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it by the multiple proliferating non-state controlled news satellite channels ,e.g. Al-Jazeera 
and Al-Arabiya or by the populist approach to news displayed by various outlets of new 
media, i.e. Twitter, Facebook and the internet in general.  As Seib argues, both, the Arab 
state controlled media and Western broadcasting agencies are finding themselves ‘at a 
significant competitive disadvantage’ (2007: xiii). This disadvantage may be increasingly felt 
by the Western media, since for some, they are not considered as credible as media 
developed from within the region and more importantly, by media professionals of shared 
cultural and social backgrounds. Having said that, the majority of the press in the Arab 
nations, specifically, the English Language press, which will form part of the data focused on 
in the current research, depend highly on Western and ‘Euro-centred’ news agencies for the 
flow of international news (Hafez 2001: 15). This consequently formed the interest for the 
current research to explore the issue of dominant global interpretations and ideologies by 
investigating the less known discourse of the Arab English language press and whether 
dominant discourses produced in the UK are reproduced or resisted in the Arab based 
discourse of news reports on particular foreign and international events. 
 
Karim (2003) who investigated how the transnational Western media depicts Islam and how 
it constructs events between the West and Islam, from the mid 1980’s to 2000, argues that 
the transnational media follows and is directed by the dominant Western discourse on 
Islam. He argues that historical and stereotypical images of a violent Islam have continued 
to have presence in the contemporary media depictions, while no distinction is made among 
Muslims. In addition, the idea of terrorism is continuously attached to the coverage of 
Muslim societies and rarely to any other religious societies that may use violence in the 
name of their religions (Karim, 2003: 175). He also argues that most main stream reporting 
is presented utilizing polarized frameworks, such as, Islam vs. West and Fundamentalism vs. 
Modernity, while the reporting is predominantly in favour of the West. This bi-polar framing 
of events has continued post 9/11, as Karim explains, where “most media proceeded to 
conduct their reporting within the broad parameters of this discourse” (2003: ix). Indeed, as 
Poole (2002: 2) explains, “Us” and “Them” were created in varying forms across the globe. 
Poole supports this further by describing how the “Us” vs. “Them” dichotomy translated on 
to a political level when following the 9/11 attacks, George Bush himself stated that “you 
are either with us (the democratic world) or with them (the terrorists)”. This dichotomy is 
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reflected in the press “along a series of binary oppositions in which the West stands for 
rational, humane, developed and superior, and Islam for aberrant, underdeveloped and 
inferior” (Poole, 2002: 43).   
 
In the British context, which is of primary interest in this research, a few important and 
influential studies have been conducted. The Runnymede Trust (1997), established by the 
commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, published a report, which was highly 
influential, as it was one of the first of such reports which highlighted the growing 
misinterpretation of Islam and the discrimination and exclusion suffered by British Muslims 
in various fields. It also highlighted the significant role of the media in reinforcing this 
misrepresentation. The report presented a framework of representations divided in terms 
of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam. The ‘closed’ views and discourse would include viewing 
Islam as, monolithic, static, separate, manipulative, and as a threatening ‘enemy’. 
Furthermore, it is characterised by discourse where Muslim criticisms of the West are 
rejected, hostility towards Islam is used to justify discrimination, and Islamophobia is viewed 
as natural. Therefore, using media as an example, the more ‘closed’ views reflected in any 
given report, the more Islamophobic the report is. The report argues that while these 
‘closed’ views may be applicable to some ‘Islamist’ movements, they should not apply to 
Muslims in general. Many of these ‘closed’ views coincide with Said’s main themes of 
Orientalist representation of Islam and the Middle East discussed earlier. Therefore, this can 
arguably be viewed as a reaffirmation that the Orientalist ideology indeed does continue 
today, albeit taking different discursive forms. Although the report was paramount in 
highlighting the growing presence of the misconception of Islam while advocating change, 
the report and its concept of Islamophobia has received much criticism. Robin Richardson 
(2009), for instance, argues that the term Islamophobia, implies an illness or mental 
disorder involving a minority of people, failing to capture the significance of the social 
phenomenon and its effects. Moreover, Halliday (1999) argues that it is Muslims who are in 
fact the target of any existing hostility rather than Islam as a religion, thus, a more accurate 
reference would be Anti-Muslimism. Similarly, Richardson (2009) suggests anti-Muslim 
hostility as a better reference to the phenomenon, since the hostility witnessed is not 
hostility towards the Muslim religion and practices per se, but rather hostility towards “an 
ethno-religious identity within western countries”. He argues that the Runnymede (1997) 
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definition of Islamophobia suggests that the hate and hostility towards Islam as a religion 
prompts the feeling of fear and hate towards the people that practice it, when in fact, a 
more accurate view of the term is that it is “a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of 
all or most Muslims – and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam”. 
 
A few other more recent studies focusing on media outlets in particular and their depictions 
of Islam (post 9/11) include a study published by the Greater London authority (GLA, 2007) 
and a study developed by the Cardiff School of Journalism (Moore et al, 2008). Both studies 
highlighted the continuing presence of negative depictions of Islam and Muslims. Coverage 
is viewed to have increased significantly since 2000, with the majority of reports covering 
terrorism related events and stories (Moore et al, 2008). In addition, the lack of alternative 
views and understandings in presenting Muslim related events is argued as likely to trigger 
insecurity and suspicion by non-Muslims, while causing a sense of alienation by Muslims. It 
is also argued that news reporting frequently uses hostile language in describing Muslims, 
who are depicted as a threat to British values (GLA, 2007). In fact, according to Moore et al 
(2008), there is a clear growing interest in coverage related to cultural and religious 
differences between Islam and the West, with this theme overtaking terrorism related 
stories in 2008, emphasising the incompatibility of values between the West and Islam. The 
same study also argues that the majority of coverage is related to: (1) the threat posed by 
Muslims and terrorism, (2) a problem in relation to cultural differences, and (3) Muslim 
extremism; with the most common nouns used regarding British Muslims being “terrorist, 
extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant” (2008: 3). 
 
Poole (2002), similar to the focus of the proposed research, investigated the representation 
of Muslims in British press discourse in particular. Poole sees Muslim related coverage as 
depending highly on the international relations perspective, influenced by the 
American/Western policy and what it dictates. Moreover, the study argued that Orientalist 
discourse continues to be a hegemonic force, yet taking various forms. In this particular 
case, it worked in constructing discourse regarding the “internal other”, British Muslims. 
This form of Orientalism functions in allowing “the other to be managed and promotes an 
agreed sense of national identity at the others expense in order to protect and maintain 
social systems and structures” (Poole, 2002: 251). These finding again seem to confirm 
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Said’s hypothesis discussed earlier, where Orientalism is viewed to be a continuous 
discursive force, yet taking various forms to fit the interests of a particular situation or 
context.  
 
Through a large scale detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the discursive 
representation of Islam and Muslims in UK quality newspapers, Richardson’s (2004) analysis 
is one of few that shed some light on the discursive construction of a dominant 
representation of Islam and Muslims in relation to the wider socio-cultural context. In his 
study with particular focus on the argumentation strategies used in newspapers, he 
illustrated the journalistic role in the construction and reproduction of “racist social 
systems”. Echoing earlier argued depictions, Richardson illustrated how representation of 
Islam and Muslims, depending on the context and event being reported on, revolved around 
four key prejudicial argumentative strategies that pose Muslims and Islam as a (1) military 
threat, (2) extremist threat, (3) threat to democracy in their own nations, and as a (4) social 
threat to women.  In relating some of the findings to the broader socio-cultural and political 
context, Richardson argued the social conditioning of British quality newspapers as money 
making businesses and as catering mainly to the middle and upper class elite 
(predominantly White and non-Muslim), ultimately determined the content of coverage 
related to Islam and Muslims. Anchored in a ‘white outlook’ these newspapers are argued to 
distance ‘Them’ from ‘Us’ by their approach in writing ‘about’ Muslims, instead of for them 
(Richardson, 2004: 229).   
 
As illustrated in this review of some of the relevant studies on the depiction of Islam and 
Muslims in the media, the role of the media in the misrepresentation of Muslims and the 
continued presence of an ‘Orientalist’ ideology in the British media has been thoroughly 
argued and substantiated. Having said that, most of these and other studies conducted on 
Muslim representation have been predominantly comprised of media and socio-cultural 
studies, exclusively examining ‘Western’ based media outlets. This comparative analysis 
rooted primarily in the study of discourse and examining newspaper texts produced in 
varying contexts, will hopefully add to the current literature by exploring and highlighting 
the discursive constructs and strategies used in the production of any dominant ideological 
representations of Islam and Muslims. 
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2.2   Ideology  
As the main focus of the current research is the discursive ideological representation of Islam 
and Muslims, it is important to shed some light on ideology as a concept and in relation to 
discourse. From a vast literature on theories of ideology, the following sections will define and 
describe ideology as it is approached in this research. 
2.2.1    Defining Ideology 
Since the term ideology was first coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 in reference to a ‘Science 
of Ideas’, it has been defined, used and contested by various social theorists and thinkers 
from a wide range of academic fields. Throughout the years, it has gone through a series of 
transformations, developing various compatible and incompatible definitions and meanings 
that were acquired from extremely different perspectives. 
The most common understanding of ideology can be found in the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary, which defines ‘ideology’ as: 
a: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture b: a 
manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture 
c: the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical 
program  
 
Another commonly accepted understanding in the literature discussing ideology, directly  
relates ideology to ‘legitimating’ the influence of a social group or class considered to be of 
significant dominance at any given time (Eagleton, 1991: 5). Thompson advocates this view, 
which he labels as “a critical conception of ideology”, where it is described as “being used to 
refer to the ways in which meaning serves, in particular circumstances, to establish and 
sustain relations of power which are asymmetrical” (1990: 7). Therefore, ideology is viewed 
as “meaning in the service of power” (ibid.). This serving of power depends significantly on 
the use of various forms and outlets of discourse in society, one of which would be the 
media, including newspaper discourse (the main data analyzed in this study). This is 
especially since media is often controlled by the dominant elite groups in society. 
Furthermore, dominant groups legitimate and justify their dominance by spreading and 
promoting their beliefs and values (ideologies), therefore, “naturalizing and universalizing 
40 
 
such beliefs so as to render them self evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas 
which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought ...” (Eagleton, 1991: 5). 
This view of ideology is in conflict with the more recent movement in political and social 
literature to develop a more neutral definition of ideology, which Thompson (1990) believes 
has removed the long standing negative connotations that come along with it as a concept. 
Here, ideology is viewed as “purely a descriptive term”, it is not related to any particular 
influences or effects; it is seen as merely a system of thoughts and beliefs that are a product 
of social and political practices. 
2.2.2   Ideology and Discourse 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is the discourse analytical approach adopted in this 
research, seems to employ the more critical perspective described by Thompson (1990) 
towards defining ideology. Wodak (2002: 10) states, “ideology in CDA is seen as an 
important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations”. This again is 
seen as achieved primarily through the use of various discursive structures in society. 
Similarly, Fairclough explains that unlike the ‘descriptive’ views of ideology that define it as 
beliefs and perspectives of social groups minus any reference to power and domination 
between these social groups, ideologies are “representations of aspects of the world which 
can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of 
power, domination and exploitation” (Fairclough, 2003: 9). The media, for instance, can 
illustrate particular representations (ideologies) of, e.g. women, Arabs and Jews, that 
ultimately may establish, contribute to or change their social realities in relation to power 
and domination.  
Fairclough also classifies ideologies as “propositions that generally figure as implicit 
assumptions in text” (1995b: 140). As assumptions, they are implicit and are taken for 
granted, becoming naturalized in the text; they are viewed as common sense. To explain 
this further, the concept of hegemony, which is closely related to ideology, should be 
explained. Neo Marxist, Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony is “a way 
of...conceptualizing power and the struggle for power in capitalist societies, which 
emphasizes how power depends on consent or acquiescence rather than just force...” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 218). Therefore, the governed and dominated social classes willingly 
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accept the domination of the ruling class through naturalised persuasion and without the 
use of force; it is viewed as leadership rather than domination. Hegemony can be viewed as 
successful when “the ruling class can implant its values with the minimum of force since the 
ruled acquiesce to the power and political legitimacy of the rulers” (Richardson, 2007: 35), 
and when “dominated groups are unable to distinguish between their own interests and 
attitudes and those of dominant groups” (van Dijk, 1998b: 102). At a later stage in the 
literature regarding hegemony, this form of domination was linked to other forms of social 
groups, such as, gender and race groups, among others in spreading their ideologies and 
beliefs (van Dijk, 1998b: 140). Fairclough (2003: 58) relates hegemony to discourse in 
explaining that having social power, control and hegemony means that the dominating 
social group has control on what is included in the ‘common ground’ they share with the 
general public, which is what makes assumptions (presuppositions) influential in ideological 
work done in discourse. These assumptions can represent what exists, what can exist and 
what is desirable and should exist, and they are highlighted by particular linguistic features 
in the text.  By making assumptions, the text is indirectly stating what should be viewed as 
reality or as ‘a given’ and therefore, the representations (ideologies) in the discourse are 
naturalized. Therefore, “seeking hegemony is a matter of seeking to universalize particular 
meaning in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance, and this is ideological 
work” (ibid.). This study explored the existence of naturalized dominant ideologies in regard 
to the representation of Islam and Muslims by analysing the discourse of newspaper press. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note, that the general public is not viewed as without 
control, and public consent to the dominance of the ruling class “is always partial, 
precarious and fragile state of affairs” (Jones and Collins, forthcoming cited in Richardson 
2007: 36), and this would apply to the effects of ideological discourse. In reference to media 
audience, for instance, interpretations of a text depend and are shaped by multiple social 
variables (see section 3.5.2).  
Teun van Dijk (1998a & 1998b) also developed a comprehensive understanding and 
framework of ideology which presents a detailed discussion of how ideologies are formed, 
used and produced. Van Dijk believes that the established fact that ideologies form a 
‘system of ideas’ naturally implies that they are ultimately related to human thought and 
beliefs; and therefore include cognition, a dimension that has not received much attention 
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in the literature regarding the understanding of ideology. In order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of ideology, van Dijk argues, it should be viewed through a 
multidimensional perspective that includes, cognition, society and discourse: 
Ideologies are both cognitive and social. They essentially function as the 
             ‘interface’ between cognitive representations and processes underlying  
             discourse and action, on the one hand, and social position and interests 
             of social groups, on the other hand. (1995: 18) 
 
Therefore, ideologies are socio-cognitive, they are cognitively present in individuals as well 
as being socially shared beliefs of particular social groups. These shared beliefs form the 
basis of the development of these social groups. Discourse and language use are one of the 
primary methods by which these ideologies are reflected and articulated, and thus, 
reproduced. In addition, as ideologies are viewed to form the social beliefs shared by a 
social group, they consequently organize and control the social group’s opinions and 
attitudes in regard to the various facets of life, society and other social groups.  Therefore, 
ideologies make up the social representations that form the social identity of a social group. 
 
Regarding the social functions of ideology, similar to Fairclough, van Dijk agrees ideologies 
can function to legitimate dominance and power. However, it is important to highlight that 
ideologies are viewed as not being limited to legitimating dominance of a social group, since 
ideologies may be present in the ‘dominated’ groups as well, for resistance purposes among 
other functions (van Dijk, 1998a). Therefore, for instance, in two opposing groups of a 
conflict, where one is dominating and the other dominated, both groups would posses and 
reflect different ideologies. So, rather than describing ideologies as having positive or 
negative connotations, they should be viewed as being “effective in promoting the interests 
of a group” (1998a: 24). These groups can involve and be represented through institutions, 
organizations and other structures in society. In regard to this study, Arab and British 
newspapers may represent different social groups that advocate different and sometimes 
opposing ideologies through their discourse. Therefore, they may produce, reproduce or 
resist ideologies depending on the social and political interests of the newspaper 
establishment, which is of primary interest to this discourse analytical study.  
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In addition, ideologies are viewed to have the social function of organizing and coordinating 
the social practices (including discourse) of the individual group members belonging to 
various social groups, in aim of protecting its particular interests and achieving its goals (van 
Dijk, 1998a & 1998b). A feminist ideology, for instance, may organize and control the 
attitudes of its group members regarding inequality at the work place. To explain further 
using newspapers as an example, an ideologically liberal or conservative newspaper 
reflecting its ideologies in the opinion pieces of its paper, may function in persuading its 
readers to adopt the ideologies and views that are shared by members of the social groups 
behind the newspaper (liberal or conservative). Accordingly, their interests and ultimate 
goals of spreading their beliefs and persuading readers to adopt them may be realized and 
fulfilled.  
 
In regard to how ideologies are played out through discourse structures, van Dijk (1998b: 
263) emphasizes that no particular discourse structures can be characteristically labelled as 
serving ideological functions, or be viewed as ideological expressions. Instead, any linguistic 
structure could be utilized for ideological purposes, depending on the context. More 
importantly, a particular discursive structure may have ideological implications in one 
context and not another. However, there are typical structures that have shown to have 
served ideological purposes, depending on the contexts.  One significant concept regarding 
how ideologies may be structured and organized (cognitively) and later reflected by 
discourse is the ‘polarization schema’ (van Dijk, 1998b: 69) or the ‘ideological square’ 
(Richardson, 2004: 55).  Van Dijk explains, as “ideologies are typically used as foundation for 
domination and resistance; that is, they represent social struggle” (1998b: 68) between 
different opposing social groups, and as ideologies are viewed as self serving principles of 
each social group, this implies that they are polarized. That is, they are organized in an  Us 
vs. Them polarization, with positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, e.g. 
in environmental ideology, ‘Them’ = producers of pollution, and ‘Us’ = protectors of the 
environment against pollution. This is evidenced in discourse, in all levels of text and talk, 
“interactional, pragmatic, semantic and stylistic strategies that select or emphasize positive 
information about Us, and negative information about Them” (van Dijk, 2000a: 98). This 
concept was central in the analysis conducted in this study, as the Us vs. Them dichotomy 
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frequently characterised the newspaper discourse covering Muslim related events in both 
contexts examined.  
 
2.3 News Media: Newspaper Discourse 
In news reporting, journalists have the responsibility of relaying stories from around the 
world and they do not merely develop articles, they in fact, “write stories-with structure, 
order, view point and values” (Bell, 1998: 64), which shape ideas and perceptions of the 
social realities of the world today. There is a professional ethos applied to all news media, 
including journalism, obligating them to report news stories in a neutral manner and 
without bias (Fowler, 1991: 1). Indeed, journalists try and proclaim to be in line with this 
professional ethos, although in some instances, as with opinion pieces and editorials, it is 
generally accepted and in fact expected for opinions to be clearly expressed (van Dijk, 
1998a: 21). These opinions will generally express the various ideological underpinnings and 
assumptions of a newspaper. Nevertheless, whether in opinion pieces, news articles or any 
other form of media discourse, Fowler (1991: 1) maintains that “Language is not neutral, but 
a highly constructive mediator”. That is, since news reporting institutions are usually 
“socially, economically and politically situated, all news is always reported from some 
particular angle” (Fowler, 1991: 10). Different newspapers relate to their own institutional, 
social and economic stance. These would of course vary from one context to the next, and 
indeed, between different newspapers published in the same context. 
News discourse as a genre is also characterised by features and a culture that are particular 
to it as a discourse. In January 2010, Kurt Westergaard, one of the cartoonists behind the 
series of cartoons involved in the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’ (one of the events 
analysed in this research), was the subject of a serious attempt on his life by an intruder in 
his home in Denmark. He currently remains under special police protection. As Richardson 
(2007: 76) explains, news discourse, unlike other forms of discourse can and have attracted 
such extreme reactions by various parties towards the producers or journalists producing 
newspaper texts; being bullied, harassed and threatened are some of these more negative 
reactions. Such reactions, Richardson convincingly explains, highlight one of many aspects 
that characterise the distinctive nature of news media. As described by Fairclough (1995b), 
mass media are made of communicative events characterised by specific properties that 
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make them distinct from any other form of communication. The communicative events in 
the media are distinguished by their time and space parameters, where the decoding and 
encoding, in most cases, take place at different times and contexts, and the production of 
media content is also usually ‘spatially and temporally disjoined’ (Fairclough 1995b: 37). In 
this process of media production that can take place over different periods of time, the 
media content to be published go through a series of discursive and journalistic practices 
and processes that ultimately shape the end product, or in the case of this research, the 
newspaper article. In agreement with various researchers and the CDA approach to 
discourse, the analysis of news media texts should be approached in consideration of these 
various social and discursive processes and practices involved in and around their 
production. This is in addition to considering the unique format and linguistic structure of 
newspaper articles.  
Having stated the importance of examining these processes, it is worth mentioning that 
although media discourse as a product has received extensive research interest by discourse 
analysts, the discursive processes and practices directly involved in news production and 
consumption have not attracted as much attention (Cotter, 2010; Bell & Garrett, 1998). 
Thus, despite scholarly emphasis on the importance of examining these processes in the 
analysis of discourse, a significant gap in the literature for future research in this area 
remains. This applies to the literature on the institutional, editorial and journalistic 
processes related to the Arab media, and specifically, the foreign language Arab media to a 
much greater extent.  
Nevertheless, general key aspects related to newspaper production, regarding media 
sources, news values, economic influences and ties, media ownership and censorship have 
been discussed extensively. The following sections will attempt to give a brief overview of 
the UK and Arab English language quality press, discussing the various institutional, 
professional and production processes that may affect news journalism in both contexts, 
relating where possible how this may in turn guide and shape news reporting on Muslims 
and Islam.   
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2.3.1   British Quality Press 
Despite predictions of their demise in the face of fierce development of alternative media 
choices, British newspapers remain an extremely relevant and influential media force 
(Seymour-Ure, 1996), with the majority of papers continuing to be profitable enterprises 
(McNair, 2003: 15). Although all UK newspapers, including the quality papers examined in 
this study have been witnessing a decline in circulation figures, their relevance is arguably 
sustained further by their online versions, which have provided media platforms catering to 
a much larger and far reaching audience base. As McNair (2009: 2) explains, at one point in 
2009, the Guardian had a print circulation of 310,000 in the UK, while the online version of 
the newspaper, Guardian.co.uk, was attracting more than 25 million regular users globally, 
in effect diminishing traditional market boundaries. 
The process of news production in the UK context is influenced and shaped by a multitude 
of social, structural and professional processes. The factors highlighted and discussed here 
form just a few of those that may directly or indirectly influence the representation of Islam 
and Muslims. 
2.3.1.1   Economic Ties and Profit 
Since the ‘Gazette’, a single sheeted weekly on military and political news from across 
Europe sold in the streets of Venice in the 16th century (Allan, 2004: 10), newspapers were 
produced as a commodity targeting potential consumers. As Fowler (1991: 20) explains, 
some of the key influences on the output of the press are the need to make profit, the 
institution’s economic organisation and its external commitments and relations with other 
industries. These influences can have very real constraints on the contents of what is finally 
published in the newspapers.  
Liberal pluralists assert the role of mass media as the protector of citizens’ freedom of 
speech and the sustainers of the democratic process by offering the public a plurality of 
viewpoints of which they can make informed political and economic choices (McNair, 2003: 
23). However, despite this position’s ‘saliency’ in public debates, it has come under criticism 
from various parties over the years (Allan, 2004: 48). Modern political economists, for 
instance, adopting Marx’s theories regarding the detrimental effects of the capitalist ruling 
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class and the reproduction of their dominant ideas and views in society, beg to differ.  They 
base their argument on the premise that mass media institutions are generally owned and 
controlled by members of the ruling elite (mainly white males), whose ideas and beliefs 
tend to take centre stage as the commonsensical truths of the masses. One way the liberal 
pluralists negate these claims is by arguing that “economic ownership of the media has 
become increasingly separated from managerial control due to the growing dispersal of 
share ownership” (Curran, 1990: 143), thus unlikely to affect newspaper editorial processes. 
Having said that, political economic theorists, supported by several examples from the UK 
press argue that the profit oriented journalistic institutions and their financial connections 
and obligations do ultimately constrain and shape news output (Richardson, 2004; McNair, 
2003; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Curran & Seaton, 1997).  McNair (2003: 56) lists several 
such cases, citing examples of major media moguls, such as, Rupert Murdoch and Robert 
Maxwell intervening in the editorial practices of their media institutions in the interests of 
their political and business relations. It is worth noting, however, although some of these 
examples on media proprietors are seen as credible, they are often described as anecdotal 
(McQuail, 2000: 260). Finally, the excessive pressure placed upon newspaper editors by 
various financial aids and partners, i.e. stockholders and bankers, to focus on ‘the bottom 
line’ is another example of external forces having real influence on news production (Allan, 
2004: 53).  
A profit seeking press also dictates that newspapers publish what their identified consumers 
would like to read in their daily paper in aim of securing the highest sales. The identified set 
of media consumers or the ‘gratification set’, as McQuail (2000: 373) describes them, are 
sets of individuals with no mutual ties who share ‘a particular need or type need’ (ibid.) 
fulfilled by a particular media outlet. The “recognition of such a market engaging in the 
same consumer behaviour, in turn, encourages the creation and proliferation of options to 
satisfy these preferences” (Richardson, 2007: 78). In reference to the British quality 
newspapers examined in this research, according to various media surveys, the majority of 
consumers have continually been found to be of middle and more elite upper classes. This is 
illustrated for instance in the readership survey (National Readership Survey, 2012) results 
of some of the UK quality newspapers analysed in this research and presented in table 2.1. 
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Quality Paper Total % ABC1 % C2DE % 
The Guardian 1050 2.1 943 3.5 107 0.5 
The Independent 490 1.0 392 1.4 99 0.4 
The Times 1358 2.6 1147 4.2 164 0.7 
Daily Telegraph 1346 2.7 1167 4.3 178 0.8 
             Table 2.1 UK newspaper national readership class survey figures for 2012 
 
These figures reflect readership patterns for the year 2012, clearly illustrating the 
predominant popularity of quality press between members of the upper and middle class 
(ABC1), while working and lower class (C2DE) are reflected as much less interested towards 
this particular genre of newspapers. The majority of middle and upper class members are 
assumed to be of high educated background with stable economic and professional 
positions.  The journalistic content of these quality papers would be expected to meet the 
powerful status and preferences of such readers, as swaying away from these preferences 
may mean a decline in sales.  Muslims, the social group focused upon in this research, do 
not form a particularly large percentage of the middle and upper class groups in the UK. As 
Richardson (2004: 36) explains, they “are over-represented in the poorer, less well 
educated, disempowered sections of British society”, and this ultimately  may lead to less 
interest by the quality press to ‘appeal’ to this particular audience in their news reporting.  
Moving on, a discussion of the economic influences on media output would not be sufficient 
without highlighting some of the possible implications of advertising revenues on 
journalistic processes. It does after all form one of the two main sources of income for 
media institutions (the other being, newspaper sales revenues).  More importantly, not 
adopting advertising as a source of revenue for newspapers in today’s market is argued to 
extensively reduce their chances of survival as media publishing houses. 
The impact of advertising revenues on shaping media content is often argued as a fact of 
journalism in capitalist societies today (McNair, 2003; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Baker, 
1994). However, as explained by McQuail (2000: 261), illustrating how this influence by 
advertising executives directly affects editorial decisions can be rather complex. 
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Nevertheless, there are aspects advertisers are argued to be particularly fixed about, which 
in turn, may have direct influence on newspaper content, such as: (1) advertisers are mainly 
interested in high income readers because of their “purchasing power” (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988), and (2) advertisers tend to favour the avoidance of publications of a 
controversial nature or that which is not fitting with their image or the values they 
advocate, as it can negatively affect consumer activity (Bogart, 1995; Herman & Chomsky, 
1988). As a consequence of advertisers’ focus on the smaller group of high income readers 
of a much larger population and the awareness of the media institutions of this fact, in 
addition to their willingness to keep advertisers interested, news content that may attract 
or cover stories related to other less advantaged or minority groups may be neglected. As 
one may expect, this may influence quality newspapers to a much greater extent than it 
would with tabloids, as their readers tend to represent the more affluent classes of society, 
as discussed earlier.  
2.3.1.2   News Values  
‘News values’ or the set of factors that determine the newsworthiness of a story (Cotter, 
2010: 67) are one of the most influential forces in journalism in determining what 
newspapers publish and how the contents of the publications are shaped and constructed. 
Some of the values that have been found to play a significant role in this process include: 
Relevance, Timeliness, conflict, frequency, reference to elite nations and persons, negativity, 
usefulness and impact (Allan, 2004; Cotter, 2010; Galtung & Ruge, 1965a, 1965b). The more 
of these qualities the story is viewed as possessing, the more likely it will be reported.  Such 
values are imperative to journalists, as they allow them to pinpoint what would be 
considered actual news to their target audience. Although some key news values lists were 
published based on studies of the media, such as Galtung and Ruge (1965a), they have come 
under much scrutiny from various other researchers, some of whom put these values to the 
test on other newspapers and contexts (see Harcup  and O’Neil (2001) cited in Richardson, 
2007; and Brighton & Foy, 2007). The inadequacy of the values compiled was mainly blamed 
on the type of stories examined, the limited number of publications analysed and the focus 
on publications in one context. Indeed, as Allan (2004: 58) explains, news values do in fact 
change over time and vary depending on the news organisation. They are also, as 
Richardson (2007: 92) explains, highly dependent on the ‘imagined’ target audience of any 
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given news venue.  Based on this description, the news values would vary between all the 
newspapers establishments examined in this research. Differences would be expected 
between UK quality newspapers with various political underpinnings, and consequently 
their target audience. They would also differ between the various Arab English language 
newspapers published in different nations around the Persian Gulf. More importantly, 
general variations would most likely exist between quality newspapers in the UK and those 
published in Arab nations, specifically related to stories referring to Islam and Muslims, 
since both contexts vary significantly in the proportion of Muslim populations, and thus, the 
newspapers’ target audience.  
In specifically discussing the representation of minority groups in UK media, Richardson 
(2004: 49-50) gives an interesting account of some stereotypical representations of these 
groups as being part of the news values inherent of British media, whereby stereotypical 
representations of the ‘Other’ are ‘facilitated’ and ‘maintained’.  Richardson supports this by 
citing Fowler (1991), who characterises stereotypes and stereotypical anti-theses as a part 
of the news value of ‘meaningfulness’, which relates to the identification of the audience 
with a reported topic. Fowler states:  
 
‘Meaningfulness’, with its subsections ‘cultural proximity’ and ‘relevance’, is founded 
on an ideology of ethnocentrism, or [...] more inclusively, homocentrism: a 
preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself; 
[...and] with defining groups felt to be unlike oneself. 
 
                                                                                (Fowler, 1991: 16 cited in Richardson 2004: 50)  
 
This would mean that in relation to the representation of Muslims in the UK Press, topics 
and events may be divided in the discourse based on an Us and Them dichotomy, 
highlighting their bad qualities in opposition to our good ones. Moreover, as Fowler (1991: 
17) explains, certain news events may reaffirm a stereotype already existing about a social 
group, and the more this stereotype reoccurs the more newsworthy related events become. 
Based on this discussion, one can argue that these particular values may play a significant 
role in the stories related to cultural conflict, as in the topics that will be examined in this 
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research,  the ‘French face veil ban’ and the ‘Danish cartoon controversy’. In both events, 
arguments may delve into cultural, social and religious differences of the defined social 
groups, and these would differ based on context and media institution.  
2.3.1.3    Political Stance and Ownership 
The media market in the UK has long been characterised by a concentration of ownership by 
a selected few media moguls (McNair, 2003; Sparks, 1999). Accordingly, concerns naturally 
develop regarding the over representation of certain political and social view points at the 
expense of others (Doyle, 2002: 6). However, this may not certainly be the case, others 
argue that a concentrated media ownership landscape with reduced competition may offer 
newspapers “more cost effective use of resources” (ibid.), allowing them to represent a 
wide range of viewpoints.  
Nevertheless, the concentration of ownership has been argued to influence media content 
in the UK. Powerful newspaper barons in the 1980s are described by McNair (2003: 156) as 
being mainly politically centre right, in support of the conservative government and its 
policies at the time. So much so, they were accused by observers as overtly exercising 
political bias, e.g. Rupert Murdoch and The Times. Official reports on the UK press 
emphasised this further, arguing that the Labour party undoubtedly received less attention 
from the press, who clearly displayed right wing tendencies and reported unfavourably on 
the activities of the Labour movement (McGregor, 1977). However, this all changed in the 
1990’s, where a clear shift in allegiances was witnessed by previous Tory supporting 
newspapers (McNair, 2003: 159). This was exemplified for instance by The Times criticism of 
the Major government and later support of Blair’s government. Therefore, although 
newspapers are generally viewed as having particular political tendencies, these should not 
be viewed as fixed, since various factors, such as, commercial interests and reader reactions, 
can have real impact on how newspapers go by with their political relations.  
This research has examines 4 of the 5 main quality newspapers (including their sister Sunday 
papers) published in the UK, ensuring the inclusion of newspapers that are viewed to be of 
diverging political and ideological underpinnings. In general, the four quality newspapers 
examined in this research are viewed as: 
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(1) The Guardian: Centre-Left, Liberal 
(2) The Independent: Radical-Centre, Liberal 
(3) The Times: Centre-Right, Conservative 
(4) The Daily Telegraph: Centre-Right, Conservative 
 
2.3.2   The Arab Press: Arab English Language Quality Newspapers 
Media produced in Arab nations are influenced by various historical, social and economic 
factors specific to their geographical area. Despite the common features of language and a 
dominant religion, Arab nations vary extensively in their economic development, political 
systems and journalistic traditions, which ultimately determine the extent of media 
development; they have generally been viewed as comparatively slow to other parts of the 
world (Rugh, 2004; Amin, 2001;  Amin, 2010;  Kalb & Socolovsky, 1999). 
The five quality English language newspapers examined in this research are published in 
four countries around the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Qatar), frequently described as “wealthy petroleum-exporting states” (Rugh, 2004: 4). The 
economic status of these nations sets them apart in terms of the rate of media development 
compared to other Arab nations. They also have the highest rates of foreign workforce, who 
are considered the primary readers of the Arab English language newspapers, catering to 
them as the target audience (Rugh, 2004: 21).  
The following sections will explore some of the key factors that have and continue to shape 
the production of news media in the Middle East, such as, (1) low economic base and 
governmental influence, (2) censorship policies, and (3) news sources.  
2.3.2.1    Low Economic Base and Governmental Influences  
Since the establishment of the first newspaper publications in various Arab nations in the 
1800’s (Amin, 2001), through to more recent times, Arab news media and the press in 
particular have been plagued by a low economic base. As Rugh (2004: 5) explains, a 
combination of social factors, such as, high illiteracy rates, low national incomes and smaller 
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populations, led to the earlier weak economic standing of newspaper institutions. This 
naturally resulted in low publication sales and advertising revenue, the two main sources of 
income for most well established news outlets. This weak economic base has had a long 
lasting impact. In fact, one survey conducted in 1997, showed that the income of the New 
York Times, Inc., The Washington Post Co., and Dow Jones & Co. individually reached 
revenues higher or approximately equating to the total revenues of all Arab media 
combined (Khazen, 1999: 89).  Other factors argued to add to the lack of financial 
development in Arab media include, political turmoil and tensions, rigid censorship policies 
and distribution difficulties (Amin, 2001: 24). 
The divergent economic realities of various Arab countries did mean, however, that various 
regions witnessed dramatically different trends and phases in media development specific 
to their economic conditions. With the oil boom came a gleam of hope for newspaper 
establishments and journalists for the future development of news journalism in the Gulf 
States. Newspapers in this particular region (the focus of this study) witnessed rapid growth 
and development (Rugh, 2004: 5), as a result of oil wealth which meant the acquiring of up 
to date equipment and facilities. In fact, this sudden growth was met by a flood of news 
journalists from other Arab nations moving into the region in hope of better more promising 
journalistic opportunities (S. Essoulami personal interview cited in Amin, 2010). Although 
media development remained limited primarily by strict censorship policies and high 
illiteracy rates, currently, the press in the Gulf region has been described “among the most 
advanced of its Arab counterparts” (Dajani, 2011: 54). 
The low income and revenue forced many of the privately owned newspapers to turn to 
government sources for financial support. This request for financial support was welcomed 
by government officials, who recognized the importance and potential of the media in 
protecting and endorsing their political interests. After all, many of the earlier newspapers 
in the region were owned and controlled by governments and political parties, utilised as 
mouth pieces for their political policies, views and achievements (Alterman, 1998). This also 
centralised the main focus of newspapers in the Arab region, as newspapers predominantly 
characterised by regional politics. As a result of these earlier events, government 
patronization still plays a major role in Arab press today (Rugh, 2004: 9), increasing their 
editorial power and possible influence on newspaper content. The degree of governmental 
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interest in subsidizing English language Arab press in the Gulf market (the newspaper 
discourse examined in this study) is questionable though. This particular genre of 
newspapers targets foreign residents, mainly from South Asian backgrounds and the news 
values caters to their interests, such as, international events with particular focus on news 
from their home towns (Rugh, 2004: 21). Accordingly, the target readership and contents of 
these papers arguably do not directly correspond with local governmental political concerns 
and interests, thus, not attracting much of their influence on the papers’ contents. 
2.3.2.2   Censorship Policies  
Until recently, most books on Arab Media dedicate large sections of initial chapters tackling 
the concept of censorship in Arab news journalism, emphasising its power and extensive 
impact on media content. Indeed, censorship in the Arab media is described as “easily 
tolerated and even expected as a form of civic responsibility” (Amin, 2010: 39). However, 
with globalization in full swing in addition to the fast development and expansion of 
communication technology, censorship policies have been substantially challenged (Seib, 
2007; Kalb & Socolovsky, 1999; Khazen, 1999; Amin, 2010; Dajani, 2011). The utilization of 
the internet and social media to trigger and accelerate the recent ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt, 
calling for political reform, is arguably one glaring example of these existing challenges.  
More importantly, the transnational media boom in the region or what has been described 
as the “Al-Jazeera effect” (Seib, 2007: 1), has been argued to have effectively loosened the 
traditional governmental constraints, allowing for a significant increase of freedom in the 
press (Saleh, 2007: 21). Transnational media organisations can bypass government 
censorship and media control policies, since they do not fall under any particular local or 
regional political jurisdiction that national media institutions have to abide by. Discussing 
and exposing political issues and views previously controlled, these genre of news media 
have placed immense pressure on local governments to re-examine and modify their 
censorship policies, practicing more freedom in their national media outlets, including the 
press. As Fahmy and Johnson (2007: 82) explain, these developments in media have 
encouraged Arab governments to support local news outlets in adopting “a more 
professional style mirroring Western networks within a continued government monopoly”; 
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while others have developed media ‘free zones’ advocated by the government as zones 
where media can operate with no legal constraints.  
Still, other media analysts, such as Gody (2007), argue that such developments in the press 
have pushed some governments to further increase media control. Censorship remains a 
powerful force in Arab media, specifically on internal national press (the genre of 
newspapers examined in this research), and media control policies differ according to each 
region/country and the politics unique to those areas. The powerful effects of censorship 
are even experienced by the transnational media. As Jihad Khazen (1999), the previous chief 
editor of the popular London based transnational Al-Hayat Newspaper explains, ‘state 
censorship’ and more importantly ‘self censorship’ are very much alive in media, 
transnational or not. Self censorship, as Khazen explains, is driven by the sense of 
responsibility editors may feel towards the possible repercussions of running a story, for 
instance, the banning of their newspaper in a particular country/market which may have 
detrimental effects on the financial status of the newspaper establishment. State 
censorship, on the other hand, is determined by each nation’s internal social, political and 
religious dynamics and policies; what might be published and discussed in one nation may 
not necessarily be in another. Censorship also generally applies to certain religious and sex 
related topics in most Arab nations (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007: 83). This leads us to another 
important factor to take into account, the views of locals on censorship. As mentioned 
earlier, censorship is expected by some and viewed as a form of ‘civic responsibility’, and as 
Fahmy and Johnson (2007: 83) argue based on published surveys, public attitudes towards 
supporting complete freedom in the press vary significantly from one nation to the next. 
Therefore, it could also be argued that in some areas of discussion, censorship is promoted 
not just by the governments in the region, but by the majority of the public as well. One 
example was the negative reaction by the public towards the publication of the cartoons 
depicting the prophet in what is now popularly known as, the ‘Danish cartoon controversy’.  
Rugh’s (2004) classification of the Arab print media gives a clearer view of the degrees of 
media freedoms in various Arab regions. In this classification, Rugh divides the Arab media 
into: 
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(1) Mobilization press  
(2) Loyalist Press  
(3) Diverse press  
(4) Transitional Press 
Arab nations characterised as having mobilization press, such as, Iraq and Syria, are 
countries which have gone through extensive political changes, from colonization to political 
turmoil, nationalist and anti-imperialist movements, and the rise and fall of political parties 
(Rugh, 2004: 25). This led to the nationalisation of the media by the regime. Rugh (2004: 26) 
describes the mobilization press as in direct and full control by the regime, dictating their 
content, main focus and presentation style.  
The loyalist press is characterised as “consistently loyal to and supportive of the regime in 
power” (Rugh, 2004: 59). However, newspapers in these countries, which are mainly made 
up of oil producing Gulf States, have not been affected by political parties and are mainly 
privately owned institutions. Four of the English language Arab newspapers analysed in this 
research fall under this category, the Saudi Gazette and Arab News of Saudi Arabia, The Gulf 
News of the United Arab Emirates and the Qatari Gulf Times. Although all these nations 
have witnessed media reform post 1991 with governments publically pushing for increased 
freedom in response to developments in communication technology (ibid.), newspapers do 
abide by certain censorship rules in varying degrees, depending on each context. In all three 
loyalist press nations included in this study, there are official and non-official laws against 
criticising Islam, government officials and policies, and countries considered allies (Rugh, 
2004). In most contexts, editors are described as practicing self censorship, fully aware of 
their publication limits. In addition, the monitoring and censoring of foreign media and news 
by government officials are also routinely practiced (Amin 2001, Rugh 2004). The common 
political environment shared by all three nations, characterised by “no independent 
parliament, and no institutionalised political opposition” (Rugh, 2004: 79), also results in a 
non-diverse conformist press, free of political debates. Newspapers do not have a particular 
political stance or leaning. Furthermore, the prominence and strong link with culture is also 
shared by these Gulf States and has been argued to be employed to justify further media 
restrictions in the region (Hafez, 2001: 12). These restrictions are advocated as protection 
from a Western ‘cultural invasion’.  
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In the midst of these similarities, however, there are some key differences in the degrees of 
governmental control, even between these three nations. Saudi Arabia, which is considered 
by far the most conservative Muslim country in the region (Amin, 2001: 27) is argued to 
have the most controlled media system. According to Freedom’s house ranking of press 
freedoms, Saudi Arabia and Libya topped the list of countries described as having non free 
media (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007: 83). Moreover, although all newspaper institutions have to 
be private enterprises as stipulated by Saudi law, ironically, it is the government officials 
who select the newspaper’s board chairman and editor-in-chief. The government also holds 
the right to veto members from the board of directors (Rugh, 2004: 71). This arguably 
highlights the amount of direct and indirect control in Saudi media.  
The diverse press is described as “considerably less authoritarian in nature than others, it 
exhibits a clear degree of diversity and freedom of expression not found elsewhere in the 
Arab world’ (Rugh, 2004: 26). This means that government control is limited and action 
against newspapers is usually guided by a legal process. Countries such as, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Kuwait (the fourth Arab English language newspaper context examined in this 
study) fall under this category. Similarly, the political environments in these regions seem to 
fall in line with the nature of news reporting. Kuwait, often described as one of the more 
liberal states in the Gulf region (Amin, 2001: 27), enjoys certain degrees of democracy not 
practiced in the other Gulf States. Although similar to other Gulf States in being a 
constitutional monarchy, legislative control is dependent on the Emir and the Kuwaiti public 
represented by 50 elected members in Kuwait’s National Assembly. This is reflected in the 
local press, which has been described as “showing a significant degree of diversity” (Rugh, 
2004: 99). Having said that, the newspapers’ particular editorial orientations are not as 
clear, since they have been witnessed to defend and criticise the national assembly and the 
government, depending on the issue discussed. In fact, in terms of freedom of press and 
opinion, the Kuwaiti press is frequently characterised as one of the most free in the Arab 
region (Dajani, 2011; Rugh, 2004). Nonetheless, firm censorship laws against the offence of 
Islam and the Amir do exist. The Kuwait Times, the newspaper examined in this research, is 
described generally as representing a “moderate liberal point of view” (Rugh 2004: 101). 
However, as mentioned earlier, as all the English language newspapers examined in this 
study focus on expatriates as the target readership, the focus of news stories tend to be on 
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international events, rather than local news reports. Accordingly, local politics is expectedly 
less influential on this particular genre of newspapers.  
Finally, the transnational press which is mainly found in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan is 
developed and characterised by the constant change these countries have undergone for 
decades (Rugh, 2004: 121). In an environment of constant change and political instability, 
the press in these regions illustrate excessive governmental control, as well as, varying 
degrees of freedom of expression. Most of the newspapers are governmentally owned and 
are argued to be the most influential in society. However, there are others that are privately 
owned or run by political parties.  
2.3.2.3    External News Sourcing 
A final factor that may play an influential role on the contents of Arab English language 
newspapers is their predominant dependence on international news agencies in news 
reporting. As discussed earlier, catering primarily to foreign nationals in the various Arab 
nations, this particular genre is less interested in local news and instead dedicates the bulk 
of its newspaper content to international news and events. As a result, there is a 
predominant dependence on Western and ‘Euro-centred’ news agencies, or what are also 
referred to as the ‘Big Four’ (Bell, 1991): the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, Agence France 
Press (AFP) and United Press International (UPI).  
Indeed, the dependence on Western new agencies does not only include this genre of 
newspapers, but much of the locally situated Arab press in general. This is partly due to the 
financially limited comparatively smaller sized Arab local newspaper establishments, which 
do not share the rather sophisticated organisational structures of larger press houses, e.g. 
access to foreign correspondence offices. Consequently, the newspaper discourse is argued 
to be characterised by globally dominant interpretations of the news events (Karim, 2003). 
2.3.3    Quality Newspapers: Structure and Organisation 
Be it a doctor-patient conversation or a novel, discourse depending on the genre and 
context, functions under certain norms and guidelines, forming a conventional overall 
format unique to it. This overall form of discourse or ‘schemata’, as van Dijk (1991) refers to 
it, can define how a text is structured and presented in different types of discourse. Just by 
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scanning a newspaper, one immediately detects organizational and structural formatting 
specific to newspaper reporting, e.g. headlines and leads, these of course may vary 
according to context. The quality press (UK and Arab English language newspapers) 
examined in this research share most of the general journalistic guidelines and structuring 
format prevalent in ‘Western’ news reporting, and these play a significant role in 
determining how the texts are organised and ordered in the newspaper articles. Moreover, 
they are also characterised by their formal serious news reporting, as opposed to popular 
less serious press represented by tabloids.    
News reporting in these newspapers is generally divided into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news. ‘Hard’ 
news refers to up-to-date news articles covering current events; news stories designed to 
focus exclusively and objectively on the facts of the event being reported on (Cotter, 2010: 
145). In contrast, ‘soft’ news or news features are “not time-bound to immediacy” (Bell, 
1991: 14). They are usually lengthier articles involving background material on the main 
events with emphasis on broader interest, such as, human interest, and the influences of 
‘hard’ news events on society (Cotter, 2010: 145). In such articles, writers enjoy greater 
liberties in applying their own journalistic styles, as well as, ‘editorializing’ the news content 
with their own opinion (Bell, 1991: 14).  
Opinion pieces and editorials form another major component of newspapers. Articles 
characterised as such, are “generally expected to express opinions” (van Dijk, 1998a: 21). 
They form a space in newspapers where opinions and views on current and relevant issues 
can be directly expressed and discussed. Keeping in line with the objectivity value inhibiting 
news reporting, opinion articles are usually restricted to a few pages and are labelled 
accordingly (Cotter, 2010: 145). Moreover, as van Dijk (1998a) explains depending on the 
type of newspaper and its political stance, the opinions presented in these articles can vary 
quite drastically in their ‘ideological presuppositions’. Editorials are particularly revealing in 
that regard, where they are viewed as “an unsigned statement by the editorial board of a 
newspaper” (Kershner, 2012: 102). 
In terms of the structure of news stories, they are traditionally governed by a hierarchy of 
importance or the ‘inverted pyramid’ (Cotter, 2010: 140); the news aspects considered most 
important are positioned towards the beginning of the article and less important aspects 
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would follow accordingly. This applies to the newspaper as whole, i.e. front page being most 
important, as well as to individual articles; the information deemed most important is 
usually placed in the headline, lead and opening paragraph. Indeed, the headline and lead 
are commonly viewed as expressing the gist of the news report and even orienting the 
reader “to process the text in a pre-determined direction”, forming “a cognitive macro-
structure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the way readers process and 
make sense of the report” (Teo, 2000: 13-14). Also, on a cognitive level, these initial parts of 
the article are argued to trigger relevant background knowledge in readers’ memory in 
order to comprehend the rest of the article. In addition, they are viewed to contain the 
information “best recalled by the reader” (van Dijk, 1991: 50-51). This ordering of 
information, according to newsworthiness, indicates the significance of headlines and the 
opening paragraph to journalists, and thus, any analysis examining newspaper reporting. 
This is especially the case, when what is made prominent in news reports through the 
headline and opening paragraph is the result of choices made by the newspapers, possibly 
based on their own subjective interests and values.  
Furthermore, in reporting news events, journalists are expected to abide by certain 
linguistic style standardization. Therefore, the repeated use of a particular term or phrase 
may be due to standardised policies set forward by the newspaper, rather than the writer’s 
own political or ideological stance or assumptions (Richardson, 2007: 96). These policies or 
guidelines are usually offered and explained by style guides or manuals published by each 
newspaper (Cotter, 2010; Richardson, 2007), illustrating their linguistic and stylistic 
preferences, i.e. spelling and use of profanity guidelines. Generally, these guide books are 
aimed at achieving style and presentation consistency. Nevertheless, such linguistic 
preferences are arguably ideological themselves, as they alter based on the contextual 
circumstances (Cameron, 1996: 315-316, cited in Richardson, 2010), e.g. politics and reader 
reactions. This also suggests they are not time bound and do alter over time.  
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, most major newspapers have an internet 
presence today, through websites carrying the same content and fulfilling the same function 
of these newspapers in their traditional form. All newspapers analysed in this study have 
online versions, which coincidentally made the newspaper data to be collected more readily 
attainable; all the articles were collected through these websites. On newspaper websites, 
61 
 
headlines may be viewed to have an even more significant impact, where in most of these 
websites, the front page or layer is usually used solely as a platform for headlines and news 
capsules, allowing readers to scan and select what they would like to read (Greer & 
Mensing, 2006: 28). A relatively recent addition to internet newspapers in the UK and even 
more recently to the Arab online newspaper websites are news in the form of ‘blog’ posts. 
These are “explicitly authored by one or more individuals, often associated with a set of 
interests or opinions” (Hermida & Thurman, 2007: 8). Blogs have proven to be quite popular 
with more and more newspapers adopting blogs as part of their internet newspaper 
content. They provide opinions on various news events, traditionally known to be provided 
by newspaper opinion pieces and editorials. In fact, their popularity was highlighted in one 
study examining format changes in UK online newspapers between 2005 and 2006. The 
amounts of blogs featured on these websites increased from 7 to 118 in 18 months 
(Hermida & Thurman, 2007: 8). As with regular newspaper articles, blog post headlines are 
regular features on the main page of newspaper websites. Therefore, articles in the form of 
blog posts were also collected as part of the data, categorised as opinion pieces.  
 
2.4       Analysing Discourse: A Critical Perspective  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which quickly became one of the most influential and 
widely used branches of Discourse Analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000: 447), is the 
approach selected to analyse the newspaper discourse in this study. The following sections 
will explore CDA further, discussing its core principles and aims and the analytical 
framework and categorisations relevant to this research.  The discussion will end by 
highlighting some of the criticisms raised towards CDA and how these were addressed in the 
current research through a specifically developed analytical framework.  
 
2.4.1 Defining ‘Discourse’ in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
 
In order to better understand CDA, the term ‘discourse’ and what it means in CDA and in 
this study should be examined and discussed. ‘Discourse’ as a term is very popular and is 
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used quite frequently in extremely different disciplines and fields, which can make defining 
it problematic. The problematic nature of the term is reflected by the fact that views on 
what the term actually means and implies is one of the first and main subjects tackled and 
discussed in the introduction of most books discussing the study of Discourse Analysis. 
Nevertheless, there is a general understanding that it deals mainly with language, meaning 
and context (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999: XI). 
In linguistics, discourse, like most other main concepts related to language has a formalist 
and functionalist definition; each of these perspectives offers quite different views of what 
the term means. Formalists view discourse as “language above the sentence or above the 
clause” (Stubbs, 1983: 1), it is “a level of structure higher than sentences” (Schiffrin, 1994: 
26). The focus here is on form and structure and “specifically how discourse attains the 
quality of being unified and meaningful” (Richardson, 2007: 22). Analysing discourse in this 
sense would focus on the formal features in the language that work to connect and link 
phrases and sentences to form the larger units of language, and thus, meaningful discourse. 
This approach to understanding discourse, focusing purely on linguistic form, does not take 
into account how social structures and the context surrounding the discourse inform and 
add to the overall interpretation and understanding of meaning. 
On the other hand, as one may expect, the functionalist approach to discourse does just 
that. Central to the functionalist definition of discourse is that without taking into account 
the social context when analysing linguistic forms, one cannot fully or adequately analyse 
and understand discourse.  Functionalists define discourse as “language in use” (Brown & 
Yule, 1983). Therefore, the approach to the analysis of discourse cannot be viewed as 
“independent of the analysis of the purposes and functions of language in human life” 
(Schiffrin, 1994: 31). As a result, to fully analyse discourse, what it means and how it is 
formed through the language of the discourse producer, the analyst is expected to go 
beyond structural analysis by examining the socio-cultural context surrounding the 
discourse, as it forms the purposes of why the discourse was produced in the first place.  
It is this view of discourse that CDA analysts adopt and advocate. Some of definitions of 
discourse provided by key figures in CDA, describe discourse as a “social action and 
interaction, people interacting together in real social situations” (Fairclough, 1995b: 18), and 
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as “language use in speech and writing as a form of ‘social practice’” (Wodak, 2002: 7). 
Discourse is viewed as part of an action; it is viewed “as practice, not separate from it, 
therefore, it regards racist discourse as constitutive of racist practice” (Richardson, 2004: 3). 
Following this example, this implies that certain social practices surrounding the discourse 
ultimately have an effect in making it racist. The relationship between discourse and the 
context is viewed as dialectical and interdependent, where discourse is seen as reflecting 
societal realities while actively and simultaneously constructing, determining and shaping 
those very same societal realities through the discourse. Fairclough re-emphasises this by 
stating that “discourse is shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping and 
reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them” (1995a: 73).  Social practices, 
relations and processes affect the production of discourse and how it is used, and these 
processes and relations can “systematically determine variations in its properties, including 
the linguistic forms which appear in texts” (Fairclough, 1995a: 73). 
 
2.4.2 CDA: Principles and Aims 
 
CDA stretches the linguistic analysis further to include both, the immediate context of the 
discourse, in addition to, the broader cultural and socio-political context surrounding the 
discursive event and this forms the main part of the critical perspective in CDA. Therefore, 
when analysing discourse in CDA, the addition of a critical perspective is essential and this is 
done by viewing discourse from a socio-cultural and political perspective, and how these 
dimensions influence the language being analysed. As Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 449) 
state: 
CDA’s locus of critique is the nexus of language/discourse/speech and social 
structure. It is in uncovering ways in which social structure impinges on discourse 
patterns, relations and models (in the form of power relations, ideological effects and 
so forth), and in treating these relations as problematic, that researchers in CDA 
situate the critical dimension of their work. 
 
Furthermore, Fairclough (1995a) differentiates CDA from other analytical frameworks which 
he describes as predominantly producing and constituting of “descriptive work”, in that 
CDA, unlike other approaches, denaturalizes ideologies which have come to be viewed as 
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natural and “non-ideological common sense”. Through the use of analysis with a critical 
perspective, it is possible to make “clear social determinations and effects of discourse 
which are characteristically opaque to participants” (Fairclough, 1995a: 28). Therefore, 
CDA’s underlying concept is mainly concerned with “the way social power, abuse, 
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social 
political context” (van Dijk, 2001a: 352). Van Dijk describes critical discourse analysis as 
“focusing on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance” (van 
Dijk, 2001c: 300). He defines dominance here, as the social power exercised by institutions, 
elites and groups that would in turn result in political, social and cultural inequality. Through 
conducting CDA, the main aim is to uncover both explicit and implicit construction, 
reproduction and resistance of these concepts, (i.e. ideological bias, inequality, racism, 
dominance) in the language, while developing an understanding of the discursive strategies 
and structures utilized in the process. Furthermore, the historical context of the discourse is 
viewed as vital in the comprehensive analysis of discourse. Taking into consideration the 
historical context means to “take into account historical developments of discursive 
practices (change), intertexuality, and inter-discursivity” (Wodak, 2002: 12).  
With these objectives in mind, it is no surprise that CDA research begins by identifying a 
social problem (Richardson, 2007: 1),  and is “primarily interested and motivated by pressing 
social issues which it hopes to understand through discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 1993: 252). 
Indeed, CDA declares itself as pro socially and politically active research, it “sees itself as 
politically involved research with an emancipator requirement: it seeks to have an effect on 
social practice and social relationships” (Titscher et al, 2000: 147). Some example studies 
related to various social and political issues include: Richardson’s study of the 
misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims in British newspapers (2004), van Dijk’s study of 
Tamil Refugees in the Press (1987a) and Wodak’s study of anti-Semitic discourse in post war 
Austria (1991).  Similar to these studies, the current research identifies with and is 
motivated by the continuously developing socio-political hostile relations and conflicts 
between some Western regions and various Muslim communities. Conflicts that are 
arguably flared up further by the extensive media coverage they attract and continue to 
receive.  
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CDA researchers believe discourse analysis studies should lead to real concrete social and 
political purposes in actively making a change and having an effect on the social reality 
being analysed in any given study (Titscher et al, 2000: 147). This kind of hands on approach 
in aim of raising awareness in regard to social inequality and discrimination, among other 
important issues facing the world today, can have beneficial and positive implications, which 
hopefully the proposed study can be part of. The potential significance of such work is 
described by Blommaert, who argues that discourse analysis research should lead to ‘a 
heightened awareness of hidden power dimensions and its effects: a critical language 
awareness, a sensitivity for discourse as subject to power and inequality” (2005: 33). In fact, 
Toolan (1997) encourages CDA’s active role to be taken even further, where he “opts for a 
perspective stance: CDA should make proposals for change and suggest corrections to 
particular discourse” (cited in Blommaert, 2005: 25). 
As CDA is mainly motivated by social issues, extensive research has been done on various 
influential social outlets. Some of the areas CDA has particular interest in include: Media 
(Fairclough, 1995b; van Dijk, 1991; Bell & Garrett, 1998), Gender (Caldas and Coultard, 
1993) and political discourse (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Chilton & Schaffner, 2002). The 
media’s influential position as the producers and reflectors of social realities through their 
discourse naturally attracted the attention and interest of CDA analysts, since it can be 
viewed as a chief breeding ground for dominant ideological representations. This interest by 
CDA researchers has resulted in the fact that CDA has “produced the majority of research in 
media discourse during the 1980’s and 1990’s and has arguably become the standard 
framework for studying media text within European linguistic and discourse studies” (Bell & 
Garrett, 1998: 6). In relation to newspaper discourse in particular (the focus of this study), 
given its significant impact and role in society, it has also received much attention by 
researchers, where it has and continues to be scrutinized (Fairclough, 1995b; van Dijk, 
1991).  A comprehensive amount of research has been done by various pioneering 
researchers, who have profoundly added to the development of CDA in relation to media 
and others fields. A representative shortlist of these pioneers include: van Dijk (1988a, 
1988b, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 2006), Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2003) Wodak 
(1995, 1996), Reisigl & Wodak (2009), Bell (1991), and Fowler (1991). 
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2.4.3   Positioning CDA 
 
CDA is a relatively young interdisciplinary approach to analyzing discourse, considered to 
have developed as a field in the 1980’s (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 447). However, its 
foundation and core principals can be said to have originated and been drawn from various 
linguistic and social theories and disciplines.   
The earliest influences on CDA can be traced back to the 1920’s with the Frankfurt School 
and ‘Critical Theory’ (van Dijk, 2001a: 352); many of its social concepts and underpinnings 
developed from “versions of Marxism like those of Gramsci and Habermas” (Johnstone, 
2008: 54). This is reflected, for example, in the fact that “according to Habermas, a critical 
science has to be self reflective...it must reflect the interests on which it is based and it must 
take account of the historical contexts of interactions” (Titscher et al, 2000: 145). This idea 
coincides with one of the focal principals of CDA and its approach to discourse analysis. In 
fact, CDA proclaims to take “its starting-point in social theory” (Blommaert, 2005: 27). This is 
exemplified by their dependence on various social theories of power and ideology in their 
linguistic analysis, for instance, Foucault’s (1971) “orders of discourse” theory and Gramsci’s 
(1971) theory of hegemony, in the aim of understanding the mediated relationship between 
discourse and society (see section 2.2.2).   
 
As far as language and discourse are concerned, “CDA may be seen as a reaction against the 
dominant formal (often ‘asocial’ or ‘uncritical’) paradigms of the 1960’s and 1970’s” (van 
Dijk, 2001a: 352). These paradigms developed work described as not taking a critical 
perspective of analysing the discourse, in that, they primarily had “descriptive aims” 
(Jaworski & Coupland, 1999: 28). ‘Critical Linguistics’ and in particular work done by Fowler 
et al (1979) and Hodge and Kress (1979), have laid some of the foundational concepts of 
CDA, as they offer a critical perspective on language in society. They have a shared claim 
that discourse is ideological (Wodak, 2002), as well as their shared interest in the 
relationship between language, power and ideology. Furthermore, critical linguistics’ 
dependence on and use of Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics (SFL) plays a key role in 
CDA today, as it “offers clear and rigorous linguistic categories for analyzing the 
relationships between discourse and social meaning” (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000: 454). 
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More importantly, analytical frameworks in CDA are influenced by systemic functional 
linguistics’ multi-functional view of texts (Halliday, 1978, 1994), which claims that each text 
simultaneously serve three functions: ideational, interpersonal and textual. This would 
mean any given text is viewed as concurrently reflecting the wider physical, social and 
mental world (ideational function); reflecting participants attitudes, judgments and values 
and the social relations between participants and the social actions or events (interpersonal 
function); connecting parts of the text together in a coherent and cohesive manner, while 
linking the text to their direct context (textual function) (Fairclough, 2003: 26-27). Having 
said that, CDA as a discourse analytical approach has been argued to differ from critical 
linguistics in a number of ways. Fairclough (1995a: 6) highlights one key difference between 
both areas by explaining that unlike critical linguistics, with most CDA frameworks (e.g. van 
Dijk, 1988b; Fairclough, 1995a), when analysing discourse, besides focusing on the text as a 
finished product, special attention is given to the analysis of: (1) text production and 
distribution (i.e. how producers of the text organize and restructure the order of discourse), 
and (2) text consumption (i.e. the role of the audience and how they interpret the 
discourse). Indeed, analysing the text in isolation of production processes and more 
importantly, the role of audience interpretation, can lead the analyst to assume his/her 
interpretation is the sole interpretation shared by all recipients of the text in all contexts, 
thus, limiting the reliability and validity of the findings. More importantly, a comprehensive 
understanding of discursive meanings cannot be fully achieved without considering the 
various contextual processes that may impinge upon the discourse. Also, as mentioned by 
Fairclough, while discourse analysis in critical linguistics focused on detailed micro linguistic 
analysis of the features texts, it tended to “neglect or play down the discourse practice 
dimension and intertexuality” (1995a: 11). Intertexuality forms a major part of the analysis 
of discourse practices in Fairclough’s analytical framework, it deals with how texts draw 
from and are formed by other texts and social contexts. That is, discourse is viewed as 
“always related to those produced before, simultaneously and subsequently” (Titscher et al, 
2000: 148). This, for instance, can be seen in practices related to the construction and 
development of the text, e.g. editorial practices as part of the institutional processes in the 
media. This highlights the macro organizational and constructional aspects of the text, 
which according to Fairclough, play a significant role in how and why a discourse may be 
shaped.  
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2.4.4      Methodological Approach 
Although scholars working under CDA share many of the same core assumptions, principals 
and perspectives in regard to analysing discourse, CDA cannot be viewed as one 
homogenous method to analysing discourse. It does not advocate or restrict itself to one 
particular theory or methodological framework that it represents as the sole approach that 
all CDA researchers are expected to adapt. It “does not have a unitary theoretical 
framework” (Van Dijk 2001a: 353). Instead, it is viewed as a type of discourse analytical 
approach that is made up of various theories, frameworks and multiple analytical tools 
developed by scholars from differing academic and theoretical backgrounds with the 
common aim of developing an understanding of the linguistic findings in relation to the 
social context. In fact, many CDA studies take an eclectic approach, drawing on various 
theories and analytical tools developed by different frameworks that would best fit their 
research objectives and the type of data examined. This allows for the development of a 
tailored more efficient analytical mechanism. The socio-cultural approach (Fairclough, 
1995a), the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk, 1987b, 2001b) and the socio-historical 
approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) are arguably the most prominent developed frameworks 
in CDA over the years. Drawing on multi-disciplinary theories and offering analytical tools 
and categorizations, these frameworks strive to illuminate the links between the micro 
features of discourse and the macro structures it is surrounded by, which as a result, 
develops further understanding of the production and interpretation processes of the 
discourse being examined (KhasroviNik, 2010). In accordance with the eclectic approach 
advocated by CDA, although this research adopts Fairclough’s 3 dimensional socio-cultural 
framework (1992, 1995a, 2003) in shaping the general approach to the discourse analysis, it 
draws upon several concepts and widely applied analytical categorizations from van Dijk’s 
socio-cognitive approach (SCA) and Wodak’s discourse-historical approach (DHA). 
Fairclough’s work has in fact provided and discussed some of these analytical 
categorizations, however, van Dijk and Wodak’s extensive work, specifically on the 
ideological representation of social actors or the Self and the Other, provide analytical 
categorizations that ultimately better fit the objectives set forward in this research. In 
addition, the research draws on various social and political theories related to media 
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(section 2.3), Muslim representation (section 2.1), ideology (section 2.2), and discourse 
theories (section 2.4).  
The following sections will discuss the general CDA analytical framework adopted in this 
research, Fairclough’s 3 dimensional socio-cultural framework. It will also highlight the 
various linguistic analytical concepts and categorizations drawn from other approaches that 
are of direct relevance to social group representation and the analytical findings presented 
in this thesis. 
 
2.4.4.1     Fairclough’s Socio-Cultural Framework 
Fairclough’s work (1989, 1992) is considered seminal and is viewed as the setting stone for 
the swift development of CDA as a field. The dialectical relationship between discourse and 
social structures proposed by Fairclough is translated in the three dimensional analytical 
socio-cultural framework he developed for analysing discourse. Within this framework, each 
discursive event is viewed as made up of and thus should be analysed as, a textual practice, 
a discursive practice, and a social practice; conceptually, these three layers are embedded 
within each other. 
 
• Textual Analysis 
The first level, analysing discourse as a text is viewed as descriptive, where formal 
properties of the text are analysed. By close analysis of newspaper texts, for instance, the 
analyst explores the textual features that were used and what could have been used 
instead. Thus, as Richardson (2007: 38) explains, the analyst assumes that the textual 
content in any given script results from a ‘choice’. Linguistic choices made during the 
production of the discourse are analysed, exploring what has been included in the text and 
more importantly what was not included, as these can equally be of ideological significance. 
This process involves a micro analysis of linguistic features, focusing on lexis, syntax and 
grammar and a more macro analysis, focusing on discourse topics, over all structure, 
organization and cohesion of and within newspaper articles. Influenced by systemic 
functional linguistics’ multi-functional view of texts (Halliday, 1978, 1994), Fairclough (2003: 
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27) similarly views the text as multi-functional in the form of each text contributing 3 types 
of meaning, rather than function per se. These are: Action, representation and identification. 
Action is similar to Halliday’s ‘interpersonal’ function, where each text is seen to enact social 
relations between the participants and the social action or events. Representation is similar 
to Halliday’s ‘ideational’ function, where each text is viewed as reflecting aspects of the 
wider physical, social or mental world. Fairclough addition of identification as a meaning in 
each text is the main difference from Halliday’s multi-functionality theory which proposes a 
‘textual’ purpose, as the third function of any given text, i.e. having the function of 
connecting parts of the text together and with the social context. Fairclough includes this 
textual purpose within his Action meaning categorization. Instead, Fairclough dedicates the 
third meaning of any given text to identification, which also forms a small part of Halliday’s 
‘interpersonal’ function. Here, each text is viewed as reflecting particular judgments, 
attitudes and values. All these meanings would be available for the analysts, when 
examining parts of the texts or the texts as a whole.  
The extensive amount of textual features or linguistic categorizations that can be examined 
for ideological significance can be overwhelming for any researcher. Indeed, van Dijk argues 
that no particular linguistic features and constructs can be described as inherently 
ideologically driven; instead, textual formations can be used to serve an ideological agenda. 
With that being said, previous research on social group representation has contributed a 
comprehensive set of linguistic analytical tools and theories that assist in narrowing the 
analytical focus on in and out group representation. Some of these relevant to this research 
are discussed in section (2.4.4.2). 
 
• Discursive Practices  
The second level, analysing discourse as a discourse practice, is viewed as interpretative. It 
involves the analysis of the processes of text production, distribution and consumption 
(Fairclough 1995: 58), which are influenced by the type of discourse being analysed and the 
specific social context it is situated within. In the type of data being examined in this study, 
i.e. newspapers, a form of mass media communication, the discourse examined is 
‘institutionally based’ (Richardson, 2007: 75). Therefore, in addition to examining the news 
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discourse textually and intertexually taking into account the journalistic form and structure 
of various genres of news articles (see section 2.3.3), the various institutional factors that 
may impinge and shape news content in each context should be considered at this level of 
analysis as well, i.e. ownership, news values and censorship policies (see sections 2.3.1 and 
2.3.2). This stage of analysis would also include the analysis of reader interpretation 
processes.  
In regard to media discourse, this level of analysis is argued as the least developed in CDA 
(Cotter, 2001; Richardson, 2007); very little attention has been given to news reporting 
processes and audience interpretation. Although this study acknowledges and discusses the 
various discursive processes that may affect newspaper discourse in general (section 2.3), 
particular attention was paid to the analysis of audience interpretation processes some of 
the articles analysed, in aim of developing further understanding of these processes in 
relation to the researcher’s analytical findings of the texts examined (chapter 6). 
One concept central to Fairclough approach to analysing discourse on a discursive level is 
the concept of intertextuality, a notion of particular significance in newspaper reporting. 
Intertexuality refers to “how texts draw, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with 
other texts” (Fairclough, 2003: 17). This is viewed as an essential part of analysis, as all texts 
are made up of elements of other texts, thus can only be fully understood in relation to 
these other texts and their social context.  
The related notion of ‘internal intertexuality‘ is of particular relevance to this study. As 
Richardson (2007: 100) explains, internal intertexuality, refers to how journalists take 
elements of texts and incorporate and recontextualize them in others texts or news reports. 
In newspaper articles, this takes shape in the form of direct and indirect reported speech, 
i.e. press releases and quotes. How reported speech is framed and contextualized can 
“frame readers understandings of reported events and, in some cases, this may be 
ideological’ (Richardson, 2007: 103).  Although this study does not examine quotes in 
relation to previous texts, it does shed some light on quotation patterns, with particular 
attention on quotes by Muslim actors. 
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• Social Practices 
The third and final level, analyzing discourse as a social practice, can be described as an 
interpretive and explanatory process, which involves the critical analysis of texts in relation 
to the wider socio-political and cultural context of which the discourse is part of or 
embedded within, e.g. ideologies and power relations in society (Fairclough, 1995a: 57). This 
involves the immediate contextual surroundings, as well as, the wider historical, social, 
political and institutional contexts that form the backdrop of the discursive event. 
In relation to this study, this would involve the analysis of the immediate surroundings of 
the news reports or editorials being analyzed, (i.e. aspects in direct relation to the event 
being reported on), and the wider historical, political and ideological practices and forces 
that have influenced and shaped the journalistic depiction of Islam and Muslims (see 
discussion in 2.1). In addition, it will also involve the analysis of related ideological and 
power relations in contemporary society, i.e. hegemonic processes (see section 2.2).   
 
2.4.4.2     Social Group Representation: Analytical Categorizations  
Representation of social groups and actors has attracted particular interest by a large 
number of CDA studies (van Dijk 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1991; Wodak 1990, 1996; Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001; Richardson 2004, 2009; Atkin & Richardson 2007; KhosraviNik 2010; Teo, 
2000). Refugees, ethnic minorities, Muslims, immigrants are just some of the social groups 
whose representation in media texts have been investigated in these studies, all of which 
have added to the development of the textual analytical approach and the linguistic 
categorizations that are argued to be typically utilised in dominant representations.  
Van Dijk and Wodak’s interest in examining prejudiced ideologies and the representation of 
in and out groups have particularly added to this development. In analysing European 
parliamentary discourse on immigration, drawing on their individual approaches (DHA and 
SCA), they developed and presented several concepts and analytical categories which 
divides the analytical approach into two major levels (macro/micro), feeding into one 
another. The macro level is translated into the text by global structures, while the micro 
level is highlighted by the local structures:  
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Global structures and strategies 
• topics (macro propositions); 
• positive Self presentation and Negative Other Presentation; 
• legitimation 
             Local structures and moves 
• actor Description (Us vs. Them; categorization, descriptions, attributes); 
• rhetorical devices – metaphors, hyperboles, euphemisms; 
• indirectness, implicitness, presuppositions; 
• argumentation (topoi, fallacies, counterfactuals, causal attributes); 
                                                                                                        
                                                                    (Van Dijk and Wodak 2000, cited in KhosraviNik 2010) 
Positive in-group and negative out-group representation is seen as one key general strategy 
in discourse on the ‘Other’. Therefore, according to van Dijk (1998b: 33), discourse adopts 
the following evaluative structure: 
1  Emphasise our good properties/actions 
2  Emphasise their bad properties/actions 
3  Mitigate our bad properties/actions 
4  Mitigate their good properties/actions 
These strategies are translated across various linguistic levels of the text, and these include, 
lexicalization, syntactic structure and broader schematic structures, topics and 
argumentation. 
The following sections will highlight some of these levels, focusing on the analytical 
categorizations in relation to social representation that are of direct relevance to the 
current research. 
 
• Topics 
 
The first stage of analysis usually involves examining discourse topics or the ‘semantic 
macrostructures’ (van Dijk, 1998a: 38). Indeed, van Dijk describes topics as having the most 
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prominent effect in the construction, manipulation and control of ideologies in the text (van 
Dijk, 1998b). This argument can be justified in regard to newspaper reporting by the fact 
that the choice of topic to be included or not can manipulate the information readers are 
exposed to. It is described as a key gate-keeping process (KhosraviNik, 2010), especially in 
the case of mass media sources.  It also works to manipulate and shape the semantic micro 
structures of the rest of the article. The ‘essential gist’ of a larger amount of text reflected 
by the discourse topics tends to be highlighted in newspaper headlines and leads (van Dijk, 
1991: 72). This is mainly due the structure of newspaper reports or the ‘inverted pyramid’ 
(Cotter, 2010: 140), which typically orders information according to a hierarchy of 
importance, with the most important information positioned at the beginning of the article. 
The ideological significance of this is intensified by the fact that readers commonly use the 
initial parts of an article to guide the interpretation of the rest of the article (van Dijk, 1991: 
73); ‘if people remember anything of a discourse at all after some delay, it is the topic and 
maybe some details that are personally relevant for the recipient’ (van Dijk, 1998b: 266). 
 
• Referential and Predicational Strategies 
 
Examining the lexical items in the text forms another key component of the initial stages of 
analysis. In this stage, Reisigl & Wodak (2001) emphasise the importance of examining the 
referential and predicational strategies or what can be described as the discursive 
construction and qualification of social actors/objects/phenomena/events. Therefore, the 
naming strategies used to refer to these items and the qualities they are attributed with are 
examined. In reference to in and out group actors, this may involve membership 
categorization devices which work to associate actors with specific groups. Specific traits or 
characteristics of the item being described are brought to the forefront, becoming a 
‘representative depictor’ of that item, while arguably reflecting the social, psychological and 
political views and interests of the discourse producer (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 46-47). These 
can be positive/negative or neither and are argued to be at times closely connected to the 
broader argumentation framing the discourse (ibid.). As Richardson (2007: 50) explains, 
referential strategies do not only “project meaning and social values on to the referent, they 
also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and 
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represented”. Predicational strategies can take the form of adjectives, prepositional 
phrases, relative clauses, comparisons, similes to name a few (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 54). 
Needless to say, in accordance with the ideological square, these strategies are expected to 
fit the positive self and negative other representation. 
  
Furthermore, in this stage of the analysis, several socio-semantic analytical categories 
introduced by van Leeuwen (2008) are viewed to be particularly useful in the analysis of in 
and out groups (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).  Van Leeuwen emphasises that meanings exist in 
society, while language is utilized to transfer these meanings, reconfiguring them. 
Therefore, analysis is argued as having to begin from social constructs, and later be 
investigated against linguistic entities that indicate these meanings (KhosraviNik, 2010).  
 The Inclusion and exclusion of social actors are two such constructs. Including specific social 
actors while excluding others, van Leeuwen (2008: 28) argues, can indicate the discourse 
producer’s interests and purposes in relation to the target readers or recipients. The 
linguistic realization of this can be constructed in several ways. One typical example is 
through agent deletion, a frequently highlighted process in CDA when examining social 
actions.  
Individualisation, assimilation, collectivisation and aggregation (quantification) are other 
social constructs highlighted by van Leeuwen (2008: 37-38). Dividing social actors this way 
can again reveal particular interests of the discourse producer. Middle class newspapers, for 
instance, have been found to individualise elite actors, while assimilating others. 
Meanwhile, working class papers tend to increasingly generalise ‘ordinary individuals’ (van 
Leeuwen, 2008: 37). Furthermore, aggregation or quantifying social actors can advocate 
particular views or arguments over others, i.e. opinion polls, surveys. This form of reference 
is frequently utilised to ‘regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion’ (ibid.). 
 
• Syntactic Structure: Transitivity 
Transitivity in critical linguistics is mainly viewed as “the representation in language of 
processes, the participants therein, and the circumstantial features associated with them” 
76 
 
(Kress, 1976: 159). It “has the facility to analyse the same event in different ways” (Fowler, 
1991: 71). Therefore, it deals with the choices surrounding how the processes and 
participants taking part in the processes are being described and reported on in the 
language; simply put, who does what to whom. By examining the role taken by the 
participants (active/passive) and the processes they are involved in 
(verbal/mental/material), specific meanings in the text maybe highlighted. 
 In newspaper discourse, Fowler (1991) explains, the choice of passive vs. active 
construction and the voice in a clause can have ideological significance. Therefore, the 
active verb phrase “PC shot boy from 9 inches”, can be chosen to emphasise the agent of the 
action “PC”, thus, the agent is foregrounded; the role or responsibility of the officer in the 
killing of the boy is emphasised. He continues, when using the passive verb phrase “Boy was 
shot by PC from 9 inches”, the focus and emphasis is transferred to the “boy”, thus, 
foregrounding the boy.  Furthermore, he explains, using the same example, that by using a 
passive verb phrase, part of the clause can be erased, e.g. “robber’s son, five, killed in his 
bed”, deletes the agent “PC”; the responsibility of this action is not specified and the boy’s 
death is foregrounded. Agent omission can also be applied by transforming a process into a 
state or what is known as nominalization, “changing a process into a nominal (i.e. noun-like) 
entity” (Fairclough 1995b: 26). Fowler (1991), emphasising the possible ideological 
significance of using nominals in clauses, illustrates for instance, how using the nominal 
form “allegations” in a phrase instead of a full proposition as, “X has alleged against Y that Y 
and A...”, allows the writer to delete important information, including social actors 
responsible for these ‘allegations’.  
Therefore, in news reporting in the press, the construction of the clause, the choice of 
passive vs. active, and the deletion of the agent can signify what the news journalist wants 
to foreground or background, therefore, what he/she considers important. Patterns in the 
choice of passive vs. active (patients vs. agents), and the actions the actors are given in the 
process, i.e. negative/positive, has been instrumental in analysing ideology in the press 
(Richardson, 2007: 56). Such Patterns can highlight the more implicit meanings. Indeed, as 
van Dijk states, “minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided 
or done, for or against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal 
entry, crime, violence or drug abuse. In the latter case their responsible agency will be 
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emphasized” (2000b: 40). Nevertheless, it is important to note, as Richardson (2007: 58) 
explains, examples of syntactic structure and transitivity and their effect on meaning should 
not be overstated. That is, it is important to take into account, the contextual textual 
surroundings of such examples, since preceding or following clauses may alter or further 
clarify the meanings in these texts. Also, at times, the deletion of information in the press 
may be due to editorial decisions based on limitations in newspaper space (ibid.). 
 
• Modality 
Modality is related to features in the text which function to express judgment, attitude or 
comment in texts which are made directly or indirectly by the linguistic stance of the text 
producer (Richardson, 2007: 59; Fowler, 1991: 85).  Therefore, modality deals with 
expressing the text producer’s attitudes, opinions and views towards the situation or event 
discussed in a statement, and the producer’s attitude towards propositions declared in 
sentences in relation to their truth.  
Modality is signified by the use of modal verbs (should, may, could, will and must), their 
negation (should not, may not, etc.), and adverbs (certainly) (Richardson, 2007: 59). Fowler 
(1991) explains the comment or attitude expressed by modality can be linked to (a) truth, 
(b) obligation, (c) permission and (d) desirability. To explain further, for example, with truth 
modality, the speakers/writers can express using various modals the degree of commitment 
of truth they hold to the propositions they produce, or to predict the possibility of the event 
being described in the proposition of actually taking place (Fowler, 1991: 85). Therefore, 
truth modality could be expressed in varying degrees depending on the choice of modality, 
where with absolute certainty a statement may read as, “The conference will be taking 
place tomorrow”, while a phrase with less certainty may read as, “The conference could 
take place tomorrow”.  
Similarly, the use of obligation modality can indicate the degree of belief the speaker has 
towards the necessity of a specific decision or action happening. Thus, actions and decisions 
may be described as categorically having to take place by modals, such as, ‘must’ or in more 
cautious manner with modals, such as, ‘ought’ (Richardson, 2007: 60). In terms of 
newspaper discourse, Richardson explains that the use of modality is a common feature in 
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articles that are known to express opinions, such as, editorials and opinion pieces (ibid.). 
Therefore, they are often used in articles which are expected to pass judgment and 
evaluation in addition to reporting on an event. By analysing the choice of modals in the 
press, researchers can obtain insight into the prominent, but at times, less overt meanings, 
attitudes and ideological beliefs advocated by the text.  
 
• Presuppositions 
In analysing discourse, it is important to examine not just the explicit meanings included in 
the text, but the possible implicit meanings implied as well. An implicit or hidden meaning is 
referred to as a presupposition in the text, ‘a taken forgranted, implicit claim embedded 
within the explicit meanings of a text or utterance’ (Richardson, 2007: 63). The choice of 
particular linguistic structures can trigger such presuppositions. According to Reah (2002 
cited in Richardson, 2007), there are a few such structures which have shown to imply 
presupposed meanings. Change of state verbs, e.g. stop/begin, are one example of such 
structures, suggesting a certain movement or action to have been or to be taking place. 
Presuppositions can also be triggered by ‘wh-questions’, for instance, asking ‘why are 
women bad drivers?’ presupposes that women are in fact bad drivers.  
Richardson (2007: 64) also argues that hidden meaning can be detected by the use of 
nominal presuppositions. Here, nouns and adjectives attributing noun phrases presuppose 
particular meanings, not directly apparent in the text. To support this, he gives an example 
of the Daily Express headline, ‘Britain’s Asylum system takes new hammering’; the adjective 
‘new’, presupposes the asylum system being referred to, to have had previous hammerings 
(ibid.).  
• Disclaimers 
In discussing racist or discriminatory discourse on minorities and immigrants, van Dijk (1992) 
emphasises the importance of disclaimers as semantic strategies that socially function as 
‘face-keeping’ or/and emphasising positive self presentation when negatively describing the 
‘Other’. They can also function as a racism denial strategy. It allows for the avoidance of 
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direct ideologically driven or discriminatory discourse deemed unacceptable by the general 
social norms and values.  
According to van Dijk (2002: 151), some of these moves or ‘disclaimers’ include:  
 
Apparent Denial: ‘We have nothing against blacks but...’ 
Apparent Concession: ‘Some of them are smart but in general...’ 
Apparent Empathy: ‘Of course refugees have had problems, but...’ 
Apparent excuses: ‘Sorry, but...’ 
Apparent Ignorance: ‘I don’t know all the facts, but...’ 
Reversal: (blaming the victim): ‘Not they, but we are the real victims..’ 
Transfer: ‘I don’t mind but my clients....’ 
 
These local semantic moves ‘instantiate’ the macro or ‘global’ strategies emphasising 
positive self and negative other presentation (ibid). 
                                 
• Argumentation/ Topoi 
Analysing arguments and identifying the main topoi drawn upon in the process is an 
essential part of Wodak’s discourse-historical approach. Argumentation can be defined as 
the: 
Verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the 
acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions 
justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint. 
                                                                                              
                                                                              (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 1) 
 
Following this definition, it is expected that in newspaper discourse covering events that had 
raised conflicting views (for and against), as is the case with the discourse examined in this 
research, argumentation will be a key characterising factor. In newspaper discourse, 
argumentation strategies are particularly evident in opinion pieces, which are commonly 
viewed as platforms for opinion and debate. More importantly, in analysing these 
arguments and the particular topoi frequently being drawn upon, dominant meanings 
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related to social group representation can be highlighted. Topoi here is defined as ‘formal or 
content related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument(s) with the 
conclusion, the claim’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 110). Therefore, they work to justify the 
claims.  In researching the arguments for and against discrimination of foreigners in the 
Austrian context, for instance, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) highlight the topos of threat and 
topos of burdening as some of the topoi frequently drawn upon in arguments relating social 
problems, e.g. employment and housing shortages, to the increased presence of foreigners 
in Austria. Thus, anti-immigration arguments are built upon the premise that foreigners 
pose a growing threat and a burden upon Austrian society. 
The analysis of arguments initiates by identifying the main arguments included in each 
article and the argumentation schemes employed in the process. As argumentation involves 
the act of persuasion, Aristotle’s theory of Rhetoric is drawn upon in identifying key 
argumentation schemes or ‘modes of persuasion’ (Richardson, 2007: 159). These include 
ethotic arguments (Ethos), arguments which are supported by the good character of the 
arguer or the use of authority, i.e. a person of expertise to justify the argument. Pathotic 
arguments (Pathos) are another argumentative scheme based on the use of emotions as 
means of persuasion, e.g. fear. The final argument, logetic argument (Logos) is the 
persuasion of the audience through the logic or structure of the argument put forward. As 
Richardson (2007: 161) explains, the majority of logetic argumentation take the form of 
deductive and inductive arguments. When deductive arguments are presented in their 
complete form, “something is asserted in a number of statements, and from these 
statements there follows a valid conclusion” (ibid.). Thus, the conclusion is based upon 
premises that are made explicit in the text. However, arguments are generally presented as 
enthymemes, where the premises are not clearly stated and the audience are expected to 
fill them in themselves. In inductive arguments, “specific cases are drawn upon to support a 
general conclusion” (Richardson, 2007: 162). These arguments can take the form of: 
• Symptomatic argumentation: the argument uses an example to signify a broader 
trend or pattern by highlighting an association or a link between both.  
• Comparisons/analogy: the argument is built upon a comparative relation. 
• Causation: the argument is based upon highlighting consequences and outcomes. 
                                                                                          (Richardson, 2007: 162-165) 
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Such argumentation schemes are usually detected by the use of specific terms and phrases 
that trigger the particular relation being argued e.g. evidence of, similarly, as a result.  
Having said, argumentation to persuade, as Reisigl & Wodak (2001: 70) explain, can take the 
form of ‘rational negotiation’ or ‘strategical perversion’, i.e. manipulative arguments, 
therefore, forming reasonable or unreasonable means of persuasion. With the latter, this 
can involve the utilization of ‘non-argumentative compulsion (emotionalisation, suggestion, 
demagogy, propaganda, brainwashing, threatening and so on) force or compel to assent and 
approval by repressing the ability of rational and logical judgement and conclusion’ (ibid.).  
Argumentation theorists have developed rules and guidelines that characterise and define 
reasonable argumentation by which arguments can be analysed against. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical approach (1992, 2004) in analysing reasonableness in 
argumentation is one widely used approach, providing a set of rules (10 rules) which should 
be observed to ascertain the reasonability of arguments, and thus the resolving of 
difference of opinion. A full list of these rules is presented in appendix 12. 
Arguments featuring ideological social representations or discursive legitimisation of 
negative social representation that may include racist and discriminatory prejiduce, as 
Reisigl & Wodak (2001: 71) argue, have shown to violate many of these rules. Consequently, 
the analysis of such violations can further enhance an understanding of the ideological 
representation of social groups. A number of violations or fallacies of each of the rules set 
forward by the pragma-dialectical model can occur. A comprehensive list of such fallacies, 
some of which are related to the findings of this study is provided in appendix 13. 
 
2.4.5   CDA: Critical Reception 
As with any developing academic field, CDA has and continues to receive critical response 
from various scholars on issues regarding objectivity, methodology and ambiguity of 
concepts among other aspects. 
Widdowson by far has been the most active and vocal critic of CDA, setting the now 
infamous debate (Widdowson vs. Fairclough) that played out along a series of review 
articles (see Widdowson, 1995, 1996, 1998; Fairclough 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
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1999). Widdowson echoed some of the main and most dominant concerns some scholars 
have regarding CDA. The coming sections will discuss some of Widdowson’s and other 
general scholarly critiques of CDA and the responses to these and how some of the raised 
issues were addressed in the current research by the utilization of various methodological 
strategies. 
One of the main problems with CDA studies, according to Widdowson, is that it develops 
ideologically biased results and findings. Widdowson believes that CDA analysts “insist on 
the primacy of their own ideological position, and so derive from the text the discourse 
which fits their preconceived ideological commitment” (Widdowson, 1995: 169). CDA 
scholars are accused of reading their own interpretation into the discourse being analysed 
and promoting findings which endorse their personal and political agenda. Furthermore, it is 
also argued that “CDA does not analyse how text can be read in many different ways...” 
(Blommaert, 2005: 31). By depending exclusively on his/her own analysis and interpretation, 
the analyst is accused of implying that it is the sole interpretation possible, making the 
assumption that the average recipient of the discourse will ultimately have the same 
interpretation. Widdowson takes this further by stating that CDA “cannot provide analysis, 
but only partial interpretation” (1995: 169), and describes it as “an exercise in 
interpretation, it is invalid as analysis” (1995: 159). Schegloff (1997) also adds to this 
critique, claiming that as CDA begins with prior theorizing and assumptions about the 
context of discourse being analysed, the analyst will consequently find what he/she is 
looking for in the discourse and present it to the reader. 
In regard to the issue of biased interpretation, it is important to clarify that CDA scholars do 
not impose their analytical findings and/or claim that their interpretation of any given data 
is the only possible interpretation or analysis that can be developed from the discourse 
being examined. In fact, Fairclough himself has stated quite the opposite in much of his 
work: 
A published text can figure in many different processes of meaning making and 
contribute to diverse meanings, because it is open to diverse interpretations. (2003: 
11) 
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Texts may be open to different interpretations depending on the context and 
interpreter, which means that social meaning (including ideologies) of discourse 
cannot simply be read off from the text without considering patterns and variations 
in the social distribution, consumption and interpretation of the text.  (1992: 28) 
 
This would include recipient interpretation processes, which form a major part of 
Fairclough’s analytical framework (see section 2.4.4.1). Nevertheless, although this is 
emphasized and highlighted in CDA, in practice, admittedly, many CDA studies fail to pay 
adequate attention to recipient interpretation, which in turn and rightly so develops the 
above mentioned criticism. The current study aims to add to this analytical deficit by looking 
into audience interpretations as part of the overall analysis of the newspaper texts. 
However, it is also important to note that although many studies in CDA do depend on one 
interpretation of the text (the analyst’s) and as admittedly, this could be viewed as 
subjective at times, it is expected that any credible CDA study would systematically and 
continuously verify any textual interpretation with linguistic evidence from the discourse.   
Furthermore, the analysis of reader interpretation can be viewed as a way in which the 
analyst’s findings can be compared with the general reader of the text. As Cameron (2001: 
140) explains, “the analysis is enriched, and the risk of making overtly subjective claims 
reduced, by going beyond the single texts to examine other related texts and to exploring 
the actual interpretations their recipients make of them” (Cameron, 2001: 140). This can be 
done by the use of more than one method for data analysis, in aim of achieving 
triangulation, consequently strengthening the reliability and validity of the findings.  
One method that can and has been used widely (specifically in media research) and was also  
used in the current research is eliciting reader interpretations through focus group 
discussions, where group interaction is used to generate data (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 4). 
Focus groups were conducted with participants who have read a few selected articles 
analysed in the CDA study and the researcher (analyst) elicits and examines the possible 
interpretations made by the recipients, comparing them to her own interpretation and 
analysis of the text.  This way, this study did not only develop the important reader 
interpretation data that is required for a comprehensive understanding of meaning in 
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newspaper text and the interpretation processes involved,  it also allowed for the findings to 
be verified further and less prone to subjective conclusions. 
That being said, arguably, any researcher examining texts qualitatively may risk developing 
biased interpretations. Discourse analysts working under the field of pragmatics, for 
example, could have a particular interest in the data and make biased decisions regarding 
the analysis, and thus be accused of developing findings that correspond with these 
interests. CDA is merely explicit about its stance and objectives, which could be argued as 
one of the reasons it has been more prone to such criticism. It remains with the reader to 
decide on the study’s validity and reliability based on its methodological soundness and the 
analytical evidence provided. 
Another criticism towards CDA is raised by Stubbs (1997), who raises questions regarding 
data selection and the representativeness of findings developed from the data being 
analysed. Stubbs believes that in CDA, there is “little discussion of whether it is adequate to 
restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and whether the 
sample is representative” (1997: 7). These are important factors to consider, and they in fact 
have been addressed in CDA literature (see Titscher et al, 2000; KhosraviNik, 2009). 
Furthermore, most CDA scholars do give detailed descriptions of the data selection and 
sampling process in relation to the study’s main focus (topic/issue examined), and at times, 
in relation to a particular time frame taking into account various contextual factors, as is the 
case with this study (see 3.6.1 and 3.6.2). In regard to representativeness, as with most 
qualitative studies, the amount of data that can be manually analysed is considerably less 
then it would be in quantitative studies, which can “offer greater potential to generalize 
then do qualitative ones” (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 120-121), by revealing “reoccurring 
processes of representation that effect our values and beliefs across a large number of 
cases” (ibid.). Indeed, quantitative analysis can show the reoccurrence of certain linguistic 
features that may have analytical significance, i.e. revealing reoccurring linguistic structures 
with ideological bias. Therefore, although qualitative methods of research, such as CDA, can 
offer indispensable in-depth and detailed analysis of latent meanings in the text, the 
addition of quantitative textual analytical methods (using computer assisted software) can 
work to: (1) compliment the study by highlighting manifest meanings in the text, (2) validate 
“some” of the findings in the qualitative research data, and (3) can cope with larger 
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amounts of textual data, increasing the generalisibility and representativeness of the 
findings, ultimately achieving some statistical significance. As a result of the clear potential 
such methodologically combined studies can offer, a growing number of CDA studies have 
adopted this combined methodology (Hakam, 2009; Orpin, 2005; Baker 2012; Baker et al, 
2008; Richardson, 2004, 2009).  
This study achieved this methodological combination by adding content analysis, “a 
systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002: 
1), which is considered “by far the most significant quantitative method of textual analysis 
of the media” (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 121). By using content analysis, this study was be able 
to systematically quantify the manifest content of the newspaper texts using specific 
predetermined categories. Moreover, the study drew upon some of the methods utilized in 
corpus linguistics, which perform quantitative analysis on large bodies of ‘electronically 
encoded texts’, allowing for the detection of occurrences of particular dominant linguistic 
phenomena (Baker, 2006: 1-2). Therefore, some of the claims generated by the CDA study 
of the newspaper texts were examined and cross checked by these more quantitatively 
oriented analytical methods.  
Another critique that has been targeted towards CDA and one this research finds itself 
agreeing with strongly is raised by Blommaert regarding CDA’s “closure to particular kinds of 
societies” (2005: 35). Blommaert explains, CDA studies, so far, have been restricted to 
discourse coming from first world societies and it “takes far too much sharedness for 
granted when it comes to discourse in contemporary societies in the world” (Blommaert, 
2005: 36). Indeed, in CDA, little research has been done on discourses outside Europe and 
North America and it would be inaccurate to claim or assume that these represent the 
model discourse across the world. This focus on certain parts of the world can be 
misleading, as well as limiting when it comes to a comprehensive understanding and 
analysis of discourse. CDA is in need of studies focusing on different texts coming from 
across the world, exploring the possible differences and similarities in discourse. Such 
direction in research can be quite fruitful in developing a deeper understanding of 
worldwide discourses. This study hopes to add to this apparent void by researching the little 
known and researched discourse of Arab English language newspapers. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This research aims to conduct a comparative study of the ideological discursive 
representation of Islam and Muslims in the press by focusing on major Muslim related 
events that attracted extensive media coverage, while raising conflicting views and heated 
debates between various communities on both a national and international level. The study 
was carried out by exploring the linguistic constructs and strategies used in a dominant 
representation of Islam and Muslims in the coverage of these events in major UK based and 
Arab English language quality newspapers, relating these representations to the wider 
socio-political context 
The main source of data analysed was made up of British and Arab English language 
newspaper news reports and opinion pieces on the following two events, forming two 
separate analytical projects: 
- Event A: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban 
- Event B: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy 
These events have been selected since they both took place post 9/11 and produced 
conflicts of a socio-political and cultural nature. Both rapidly becoming highly politicised 
issues, they brought some of the chief pillars of liberal democracies, such as, gender 
equality, secularism, integration, religious freedom and freedom of speech into the 
forefront of fierce political and social debates. These debates are prone to producing 
polarised views which can in turn create an “Us” vs. “Them” dichotomy between the social 
groups involved, in this case ‘Muslims’ and the ‘West’. To clarify further, the following 
sections will provide some essential background information on each news event. 
• The 2009 French Face Veil Ban 
On the 19th of June 2009, a French parliamentary proposal was made for the establishment 
of a commission to investigate what was described as the growing practice of face veiling in 
France, which at the time was thought to possibly lead to a legislation of a law banning the 
practice of wearing the face veil in public (a law was passed in 7/10/2010 and has been in 
87 
 
effect since 11/04/2011). This was followed a few days later by a major presidential speech 
backing the parliamentary proposal, in which then French President Nicholas Sarkozy 
declared the ‘burqa’, referring to the face veil, as ‘not welcome in France’. He cited the 
practice of face veiling as conflicting with France’s secular nature, describing it, among other 
things, as a form of ‘subservience and debasement’ of women. These events echoed earlier 
highly charged controversies in French history, e.g. the 2003 Hijab affair, while 
simultaneously triggering a domino effect across borders with various government officials 
following suit by resonating similar sentiments and rhetoric. It is one of the main recent 
controversial Muslim related stories that had attracted extensive global media coverage and 
conflicting views among various worldwide communities, mainly comprised of arguments 
for and against the face veil ban. Some of the main arguments for a face veil ban centred 
around the protection of national identity, equality of women and security concerns. 
Opposing arguments mainly viewed the ban as an unjustified act impinging on individual 
freedom of choice, as well as possibly marginalising and stigmatising Muslim communities 
further. Currently, in addition to the legislation of a face veil ban law in France in late 2010, 
multiple similar laws have been issued in various parts of the world.  
• The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy 
The series of events collectively referred to and known as the ‘Danish Cartoon Controversy’ 
were triggered in September 2005, when Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper published a 
collection of satirical cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet. Accompanied by an article 
criticising self censorship, the 12 editorial cartoons included images viewed as associating 
Islam with terrorism and suicide bombings; one cartoon which received particular criticism, 
for instance, depicts the prophet as wearing a bomb shaped turban with a burning fuse. 
Although these cartoons were first published on the 30th of September in 2005, attracting 
local Muslim complaint and protest, the cartoons did not attract extensive media attention 
until early 2006. This sudden media attention was the result of the escalation in events 
related to the first publication, beginning in January 2006 with the Arab league’s official 
condemnation of the publication and later an official apology by the Jyllands-posten to 
Muslims, while defending its right in publishing the cartoons. This was quickly followed by 
other various European based newspapers publishing the cartoons, citing freedom of 
speech. The events escalated even further with worldwide Muslim protests against the 
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cartoons, many of which were violent, resulting in injury and death. On an international 
diplomatic level, the events resulted in political negotiations and the temporary closure of 
Danish and other European embassies in multiple Arab Muslim nations with some nations 
recalling their ambassadors in Denmark as a motion of discontent. The events also resulted 
in financial losses by the spread of Danish product boycotts throughout the Middle East, 
particularly in the Arab Gulf nations. Arguments for the publishing of the cartoons and 
against selective censorship mainly revolved around freedom of speech. Arguments against 
the publications of the cartoons were associated with respect of religion, primarily rooted in 
Muslim religious beliefs forbidding the depiction of the Muslim prophet, as well as 
arguments for what was described as a responsible application of freedom of speech.  
 
3.1   Research Questions  
By investigating the discourse of newspaper articles related to these events, the study aims 
to answer the following research questions: 
1. Is there a dominant ideology (hidden or explicit) constructed and reproduced in the 
discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in news reports and opinion pieces in 
the British and Arab (English Language) Press? 
 
2. How is this ideology constructed? What are the discourse features and strategies 
used to construct a dominant ideology in newspaper reports in both contexts? 
 
3. Does the Arab English Language press reproduce, resist or reject the ideology 
reflected in the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Press? 
What are the discursive strategies used?  
 
4. What meanings and understandings do readers interpret regarding the 
representation of Islam and Muslims from various articles analysed? Do the analyst’s 
analytical findings reflect reader interpretations of the texts analysed? 
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3.2   Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis 
In endeavouring to explore the research questions put forward, a 3 dimensional 
qualitative/quantitative research framework (figure 3.1) was especially designed to examine 
the newspaper data from various perspectives: (1) In-depth qualitative Critical Discourse 
analysis (CDA), (2) Quantitative Content analysis and Corpus Linguistics (CL), and (3) 
Qualitative reader interpretation analysis through focus groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
          
                                                                                                                                   
Figure 3.1 Three dimensional qualitative/quantitative analytical research framework 
 
 
This ‘mixed method research’ approach combines both the qualitative methods of CDA and 
focus groups and the quantitative oriented methods of content analysis and corpus 
linguistics. The justification and motivations behind this mixed methodological framework, 
which was mainly developed in response to some criticisms towards CDA, were discussed in-
depth in section (2.4.5). However, the main objectives for a combined methodology can be 
summarised as the following: 
 
CDA 
Content 
Analysis/CL 
 
 
Discourse 
 
 Focus 
Groups 
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(1) To explore the various facets required to form a comprehensive understanding of the 
meanings and ideologies that may be found in newspaper texts. 
 
(2) To achieve methodological triangulation, whereby using more than one method and 
source of data to explore the same social phenomenon, the findings of the study can 
be crosschecked (Bryman 2008: 700), consequently, further enhancing the validity and 
reliability of the findings.  In this case, the primary study will be the critical discourse 
analysis of newspaper texts, followed by the application of quantitative analysis on a 
larger sample of these texts, and finally conducting a reader interpretation analysis of 
some of the texts analysed using CDA. 
Therefore, the study is divided into three main studies, as table 3.1 illustrates: 
 
Study Methodology Data Analysis 
 
Study 1 
 
CDA 
Articles: 
• 2009 French face veil 
ban  
• 2006 Danish cartoon 
controversy 
 
Qualitative 
 
Study 2 
 
Content 
Analysis/Corpus 
Linguistics 
Articles:  
• 2009 French face veil 
ban 
• 2006 Danish cartoon 
controversy 
 
Quantitative/Qualitative  
 
Study 3 
 
Focus groups 
 
Reader Interpretation:  
• Articles on the 2009 
French face veil ban 
 
Qualitative 
(Quantitative) 
 Table 3.1 Description of research studies 1-3 
Each news event is treated as a separate study. Therefore, news reports and opinion pieces 
related to each news event (A and B) were collected to form two separate corpora of texts 
for each event. In addition, the large corpora for each news event were divided into two 
more corpora, a UK based newspaper text corpus and an Arab English language newspaper 
text corpus, allowing for a comparative analysis.  
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The analysis began with general quantitative analysis of each corpus to establish the genre 
of articles involved and their frequency (hard news/soft news) and the trends in bylined 
sources. The CDA analysis (study 1) was then applied to each corpus. The content and 
corpus analysis (study 2) of each corpus followed. The particular discursive and textual 
features examined and quantified in the quantitative analysis (study 2) were determined by 
the findings of the CDA study (study 1), allowing the researcher to test some of the findings 
of the CDA study, which examined a limited sample of articles in relation to a much larger 
sample of data. The focus group analysis (study 3) exploring reader interpretation of some 
of the texts analysed using CDA (study 1) was the last study carried out and was only  
applied to articles related to the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ news event. Further detailed 
description of the data examined and methods applied in each study (1-3) will be discussed 
in sections 3.3 - 3.7. 
3.3    Study 1: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
As mentioned in section 2.4.4, CDA analysis takes an eclectic approach to research, 
whereby, the analytical approach adopted in any given CDA study usually involves a 
selection process of the linguistic analytical tools and social theories to be applied in the 
analysis and interpretation of the research data. These are primarily determined by the 
topic being examined, the type of data being explored and the research questions.  
Over the years, a number of key CDA analytical frameworks have been developed. These 
frameworks offer an analytical mechanism which allows the researcher to explore the text 
descriptively by in-depth analysis of the text, followed by an explanatory analysis, whereby 
the textual analytical findings are contextualised and related to wider linguistic and socio-
political theories of relevance to the study. 
Fairclough’s 3 dimensional framework (figure 3.2) forms the main backdrop to the critical 
discourse analytical approach in this research. Each article selected for CDA analysis was 
analysed on three levels (textual, discursive and social), these levels were introduced and 
discussed in section 2.4.4.1. 
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                                 Figure 3.2 Fairclough’s 3 dimensional socio-cultural framework 
However, although Fairclough’s framework provides a clear structure for the overall 
analysis, a systemization of the analytical process was required. Ambiguities on how the 
actual text is approached analytically in practical terms and how these various levels of 
analysis will be linked needs further clarification, which is the focus of the next section. 
 
3.3.1   Textual Analysis 
Each article selected for analysis using CDA began with a macro analysis of the primary 
topics. These were determined by carefully reading each newspaper article and identifying 
the topic dominating the leading two paragraphs of each article. The selection of the first 
two paragraphs to determine the dominant topics is due to the importance placed on the 
initial parts of newspaper articles, as dictated by the journalistic ‘inverted pyramid’ (see 
section 2.3.3).  
Following the topic analysis, each newspaper article was analysed adopting a three level 
textual analytical framework (figure 3.3) adopted from KhosraviNik (2010).  This framework 
‘divides the analysis into three domains of social actor, social actions and argumentation’ 
(ibid.). 
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                                                                                            Social Actors  
  
                                                                                            Social Actions 
 
                                                                                            Argumentation                               
 
Figure 3.3 Social representation analysis: Textual analysis framework 
In analysing these three levels, various analytical categorizations introduced by van Dijk, 
Wodak, van Leeuwen, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (discussed in section 2.4.4.2) were 
borrowed. Many of these are particularly useful in analysing the representation of social 
groups and have been shown to be manifested and utilized in the reproduction of dominant 
ideological representations.                            
The textual analysis began by exploring the social actors/ objects included in the text, e.g. 
Muslims, face veiling women, protesters, face veil, how they are referred to and the qualities 
attributed to them. This was followed by an analysis of the social actions attributed to these 
actors and their roles in these actions, e.g. active/passive. The analysis then turned to 
examine the arguments presented in the text and the main argumentation strategies and 
schemes utilised, focusing on the topoi drawn upon and the presence of any fallacies. 
Therefore, the newspaper texts were approached with the following questions: 
(1) How are social actors and objects named and referred to linguistically? 
 
(2) What qualities and features are attributed to the social actors and objects? 
 
(3) What actions and roles are attributed to the social actors? 
 
(4) What are the key arguments and argumentation strategies used in the discourse? 
 
 
 
 
 
TEXT 
 The research was approached with 
i.e. social actors, social actions and argumentation
that particular linguistic features and mechani
Figure 3.4 lists only those which will be described in the CDA data analysis and findings in 
chapters 4 and 5. A more comprehensive and detailed description was provided in section 
2.4.4.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Analytical categorizations 
 
3.3.2   Discursive Analysis 
As discussed in section 2.4.4.1
social conditions and processes of text production, distribution and consumpt
research this involves the particular
production processes and procedures, 
quality press, discussed in section 2.3
Social Actors 
and Objects
Social Actions
Argumentation
general pre-assigned analytical categorizations in mind
. However, it is during the analysis itself
sms found to be salient were
and features 
, the discursive analysis examines the text in relation the 
 contextual, institutional and professional journalistic 
characteristic of the UK and Arab English language 
.  
• Naming and attributions: Referential/predicational 
strategies, aggregation, assimilation, 
individualisation/collectivisation
• Roles : passive/active, agent/patient, 
nominalisation,transactivity, modality, quotation 
patterns.
• Topos
• Argumentation schemes: Inductive /deductive, 
comparative, causation, symptomatic, disclaimers
• Fallacies
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However, the research also examined the processes of text production in relation to 
quotation patterns. This analysis initiated during the CDA study of the articles, where the 
sources quoted and the contents of these quotes were analysed and compared. This was 
supported further by applying a similar analysis using the quantitative methods of content 
analysis to a much larger corpus of articles, mainly related to the ‘French face veil ban’ news 
event. 
Finally, this part of the analysis also examined the much less explored area in CDA studies, 
the processes of text consumption. This was done by examining reader interpretation of 
some of the articles covering the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ by carrying out several focus 
groups in the UK and the Gulf region (Kuwait) (further discussion in sections 3.5 and 3.7).  
 
3.3.3   Social Analysis 
The CDA analysis will finally relate the textual findings to the immediate and wider socio-
political context with reference to some of the social and linguistic theories discussed in 
chapter two.  
 
3.4    Study 2: Quantitative Analysis 
Following the qualitative analysis of the sample of articles on news events A and B, 
quantitative analysis was applied on a much larger corpus of articles collected for each news 
event.  
The research employed the quantitative methods of content analysis, as well as borrowing 
some key analytical methods from corpus linguistics, such as, frequency counts and 
concordance analysis.  
3.4.1   Content Analysis 
Content analysis was mainly applied to develop a general profile of the publications 
covering both events. This involved coding and quantifying: (1) the articles collected (2) the 
genre of each article, and (3) the bylined sources. Adopting a formal coding procedure, 
predefined categories were applied to the newspaper articles (units of analysis). This 
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allowed the research to quantify the prominent genres of news reporting adopted in each 
corpus and patterns in the use of internal and external sources, highlighting any differences 
between the UK and Arab corpus. 
Moreover, content analysis was applied in analysing quotation patterns in the ‘2009 French 
face veil ban’ corpus. In this analysis, the first 3 actors quoted directly or indirectly were 
coded. This analysis was carried out in aim of exploring the frequency of Muslim quotations 
in the reporting of events. The analysis took a more qualitative approach in analysing the 
content of all coded quotes, exploring the framing of material being reported. Again, 
selecting the first three quotes of each article in particular is due to the relevance of initial 
parts of articles in terms of what is considered important by each newspaper, in accordance 
with the journalistic ‘inverted pyramid’ (section 2.3.3).  
 
3.4.2    Corpus Linguistics (CL) 
Corpus linguistics studies language on ‘a large scale’ using computer assisted software 
applied to large collection of texts that have been electronically encoded (McEnery & 
Hardie, 2012). The large amount of data that it can examine allows for representative 
findings and further validated claims. Although CL is quantitatively oriented it also depends 
on various degrees of qualitative analysis. That is, ‘functional (qualitative) interpretation’ is 
viewed as an essential part of corpus-based analysis (Biber: 1998 quoted in Baker, 2006: 2). 
CL is not considered as one approach, but rather an approach to analysing discourse made 
up of a set of procedures that can examine patterns in language. The two procedures drawn 
upon in this research are frequency lists and concordance analysis. 
All articles analysed quantitatively using CL were organised into a corpus representing the 
UK newspapers and a corpus representing the Arab English language press. Each corpus 
represented by an individual computer file was loaded into the corpus analysis program, 
Concordance and analysed separately.  
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3.4.2.1   Frequency Word Lists 
 A frequency word list is ‘a list of all the words in a corpus along with their frequencies and 
the percentage contribution that each word makes towards the corpus’ (Baker, 2006: 51). 
Words lists were compiled according to their frequency in the Arab and UK based corpora 
for each news event. This formed the initial stage of exploring the contents and determining 
the focus of newspaper texts in each corpus. As Stubbs (1996: 107) explains, ‘no terms are 
neutral. Choice of words expresses an ideological position’. Baker (2006: 48) supports this 
regarding the choice of terms used, adding “if people speak or write in an unexpected way 
or make one linguistic choice over another, more obvious one, then that reveals something 
about their intentions, whether conscious or not”. In the case of this study which compares 
newspaper texts on the same topics in two contexts, it was interesting to examine what 
terms are more frequently used in each corpus and the possible similarities and differences 
in the choice words used to refer to similar phenomena or concepts, e.g. actors and objects, 
and the possible connotations these choices may carry. 
As in most corpus analysis, grammatical words or function words (e.g. and, a, to, the) tend 
to form the majority of words in the top ten highest frequency words in the frequency word 
lists. However, these usually do not give major insight into the main focus of the corpus 
examined, and therefore, these terms were excluded from the frequency list presented in 
the quantitative analysis sections in this thesis. Edited top ten frequency word lists include 
only the most frequent lexical words and terms, e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives and lexical 
adverbs represented by their lemma form, ‘the canonical form of word’ (Baker, 2006: 55), 
e.g. lemma ‘women’= women, woman, women’s and woman’s. Moreover, in the case of 
frequency lists representing the UK and Arab corpora related to the ‘2009 French face veil 
ban’ news event, the lemma ‘face veil et al’ represents: burqa, burka, burkha, burkini, 
burqini, veil, niqab and their plural forms. This particular lemma was specifically constructed 
as a result of the CDA analysis, which revealed the lack of consensus in both contexts in 
terms of the referential strategies used to refer the ‘face veil’, with these being the most 
frequent in both contexts, albeit in varying degrees. 
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3.4.2.2   Concordance Analysis 
Concordance analysis is another method borrowed from CL and used in this study. Although 
this mainly involves a quantitative process, during analysis, qualitative methods maybe 
supplemented, as was done in this study and explained in more detail below. A concordance 
of any corpus would compile a ‘list of all the occurrences of a particular search term in a 
corpus, presented within the context that they occur; usually a few words to the left and 
right of the search term’ (Baker, 2006: 71).  By examining the immediate textual context of a 
search term, e.g. burqa, the researcher can detect particular linguistic patterns in the usage 
of that term which assists in identifying dominant discourses associated with it. These can, 
at times, carry negative or positive connotations. Patterns were identified and displayed in a 
table according to prominence. 
In the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ corpus, the search terms examined are burqa/burka and 
niqab. In the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’ corpus, the search terms examined are 
protester/demonstrators and Muslims.  
 
As the research deals with large corpora of texts which conjure up a very large number of 
concordance lines containing the search terms, a procedure limiting the analysis further had 
to be developed. To do this, the ‘hypothesis testing’ procedure (Hunston, 2002: 52) was 
adopted. Here, 40 random concordance lines are examined at a time; this process is 
repeated, identifying and noting any linguistic patterns. The analysis continued with these 
patterns noted and was stopped when the data did not reveal any new patterns. 
 
This study, unlike most collocation analysis, did not only take into account the few words 
surrounding the search terms, which tends to conjure up a high number of function words. 
It stretched the quantitative analysis to include any linguistic constructs and phrases that 
can be considered as attributes or predicates of the search term. These may include 
adjectives, prepositional phrases, relative clauses and infinitive clauses, among others. As 
Richardson (2009) explains, this form of analysis considers the search terms’ ideational 
meanings and the possible recurrent representations and ideas associated with the search 
term being analysed, e.g. Muslim. As expected, this process demanded more qualitative 
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attention. All patterns displayed within a 10 word span (left and right) of the search term 
were taken into account in the analysis.  
 
It is worth mentioning, in analysing the concordances, the researcher acknowledged that 
certain terms and phrases which can be characterised as attributes and found to be used 
frequently, at times, can be contextually framed with different and even contradictory 
meanings.  
For example: 
1. The burqa is oppressive. 
2. Sarkozy sees the burqa as oppressive, it is not.  
 
In examining the concordances, these instances were coded and taken into account in the 
interpretation of findings.  
 
3.5    Study 3: Reader Interpretation Analysis 
The aim of developing reader interpretation data are a twofold. Firstly, as mentioned earlier 
(section 2.4.4.1 and 2.4.5), analysis of the text consumption processes is an integral part of a 
comprehensive understanding of social meanings (including ideologies) in a text. However, 
secondly and more importantly, as one of the research objectives is to investigate whether 
the newspaper articles examined carry particular dominant ideologies in the representation 
of Islam and Muslims, exploring reader interpretations, in addition to the researchers critical 
discourse analysis would allow the examining of alternative possible interpretations of the 
text.  
This is of particular importance in relation to a CDA study, where it is argued that ideological 
discursive constructions often become “propositions that generally figure as implicit 
assumptions in text” (Fairclough 1995a: 140). They are hypothesized as becoming a 
naturalised part of the text, and thus, can be taken for granted. By eliciting reader 
interpretations of some of the newspaper articles illustrating dominant manifest and more 
importantly latent ideological meanings in the text, the researcher was able to compare her 
findings with the reader interpretations, while testing the proposed ‘naturalised discursive 
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meanings’ hypothesis. It also allowed for the verification of some of the claims made by the 
CDA analysis (study 1), further reducing the possibility of subjective conclusions. 
 
3.5.1   Reader Focus Groups 
Reader interpretations were ascertained thorough focus groups. The socially oriented 
structure of focus groups which involve readers discussing and negotiating their 
understanding of the meanings in the text corresponds with the nature of this study 
exploring social group representation.  
Participants taking part in the focus groups and the internal homogeneity of the groups 
were determined by the purpose and nature of the study. As the purpose of the study is to 
examine the representation of Islam and Muslims in the quality press published in the UK 
and several Arab countries in the Gulf, it was important to conduct focus groups in both 
contexts and compare the findings, as was done with the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the newspaper texts at the earlier stages of the research.  
The reader interpretation analysis was only carried out on articles covering the ‘2009 French 
face veil ban’ event. Four articles were selected to be analysed in the focus group sessions. 
These included two articles from the UK based newspaper corpus and two articles from the 
Arab English language newspaper corpus. The article selection process set out to include 
articles reflecting key opposing views, pro and against the legislation of a face veil ban, as 
well as ensuring the inclusion of articles from newspapers of differing political/ideological 
stances. 
In the selection process, it was also important to select articles which highlighted interesting 
findings in the CDA analysis conducted by the researcher, in terms of manifest and latent 
meanings in the text, as one of the main objectives of this study is to explore the analyst’s 
interpretation against that of other newspaper readers. Table 3.2 illustrates the articles 
selected (A-D) and the rationale for the selection of each (refer to appendix 9 for articles). 
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 Article Newspaper Headline Genre 
A Gulf News  
(GN1) 
France considering ban on burqas, spokesman 
says 
News 
report 
Rationale Argument for a ban from the (pro ban) perspective of the French government 
and politicians, excluding any anti-ban views. Highlights the topos of ‘threat’. 
B The Guardian  
(TG5) 
France searches its soul over the veil Opinion 
Rationale Mainly Illustrates arguments for a ban, did show a few examples of manifest 
and implicit ideological bias with some negative representations of the 
practice of face veiling. Draws on the topoi of ‘threat’, ‘difference’, ‘repression 
of women’, as well as, the conservative vs. moderate Muslim dichotomy. 
C The Times  
(TT4) 
Women, West Brom, the burka and me 
 
Opinion 
Rationale Against the ban and for freedom of choice, but did illustrate some implicit 
ideological representations of face veiling and face veiling women, drawing on 
the topos of ‘separateness’. 
D The Saudi 
Gazette  
(SG2) 
Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty Opinion 
Rationale Against the ban. It also showed bias towards the in-group ‘Muslims’ (in the 
newspaper context), and depicts the ‘West’ negatively, drawing on the topos 
of ‘difference’, representing them as inferior. 
 
 Table 3.2 Reader interpretation study: Article selection rationales (A-D) 
 
Participants were asked to take part in a study that was exploring the language of 
newspaper reporting, no further elaboration was given as not to affect the results. Each 
participant was given a copy of each of the 4 articles, following the same order presented in 
table 3.2 (A-D). The four samples of articles students were provided with, did not state the 
newspaper in which the article was published or any byline information. This is done with 
the aim of reducing the possibility of any influences on interpretation outside the meaning 
presented in the content (the main body) of the article. Each article was also supplemented 
with an open ended question, asking the reader to summarise the main ideas of the article.  
 
The focus group participants were also provided with questionnaires (see appendix 10). The 
main objective of these questionnaires was to verify the background information in relation 
to the participant specifications set forward. The questionnaire also explored participants’ 
individual views in regard to each article, where the questions presented resembled some of 
the key leading questions in the focus group sessions. This was done to further explore 
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individual views in comparison to shared and collective views that may develop during the 
focus group sessions. The questionnaire was made up of close ended questions (multiple 
choice questions) and open ended questions to allow for further elaboration. As the reader 
interpretation study is primarily qualitative, the number of focus group participants vary in 
each context examined and are limited in number, thus, the quantitative findings of these 
questionnaires can by no means be viewed as representative. Presenting general 
questionnaire findings within the analytical discussion of the focus group sessions in chapter 
6, is mainly done to reflect the general direction in readers’ individual interpretive positions. 
Following a pilot study, due to the length of time needed, it was decided that articles and 
questionnaires would be provided to and carried out by the participants prior to the 
discussion sessions. Participants were asked to bring in the articles and filled in 
questionnaires to the focus group session. Moreover, in the Arab context, where most 
participants consider Arabic to be their first language, they were advised to feel free to code 
switch during the sessions, depending on their language use preferences. 
 
3.5.2 Approaching and Analysing Focus Group Discussions 
 
The focus groups sessions were approached by adopting a framing method introduced by 
Krzyzanowski (2008: 170). The session topics were divided into primary and secondary 
topics. Primary topics were pre-decided by the researcher/moderator prior to the sessions 
and can be viewed as the “general topics that framed the discussions” (Krzyzanowski, 2008: 
170). These general topics were determined by the main aim of conducting the 
interpretation study represented by research question 4, presented earlier: 
 
What meanings and understandings do readers interpret regarding the 
representation of Islam and Muslims from various articles analysed? Do the analyst’s 
analytical findings reflect reader interpretations of the texts analysed? 
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In order to explore this question, the discussions were organised by four primary topics that 
were covered during each focus group session:  
(1) General understanding: This topic assists in getting the focus group discussion started, 
eliciting readers’ general understanding of the articles they read.  
 
(2) Arguments for/against: This topic gauges readers’ general identification and 
interpretation of key arguments in the articles, primarily made up of arguments for and 
against the ban.  
 
(3) Social group representation: As the discussion is expected to develop by this stage, this 
topic aims to directly explore reader interpretation of social group representation in the 
articles, focusing mainly on investigating readers’ interpretation regarding the 
representation of Muslims and face veiling women and whether they interpret any 
dominant meanings. 
 
(4) Linguistic structures: The discussion draws to an end by exploring readers’ association 
of any linguistic structures and strategies in text with any dominant representation they 
view to be depicted in the articles. 
During the focus group sessions, these topics were introduced in the form of general non-
leading questions with the aim of focusing the discussion on the main objectives of the 
research question. The researcher, who was the moderator of the focus group sessions, 
prepared a set of questions under each topic (1-4) to assist in developing the discussion, a 
copy of the discussion plan is provided in appendix 11. In most cases, all predefined 
questions were asked. However, as discussions develop naturally between the participants, 
the order may defer slightly; at times participants referred to and discussed some of the 
questions before they were asked. When it was required, additional prompts were used to 
facilitate the discussions. The secondary topics are developed by the participants themselves 
in the discussion of the primary topics and are “brought into the discourse in a manner 
which transcended the primary, structuring topic” (Krzyzanowski, 2008: 170). The analysis of 
the discussions explored the data revolving around the pre-assigned questions, as well as 
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exploring new (secondary) topics introduced by the participants and thus deemed necessary 
in relation to reader interpretations of the articles. 
The focus group discussions were recorded using an audio recorder and the discussions 
were listened to by the researcher and transcribed. As the focus of the analysis was the 
meaning interpreted by the focus group participants, a more broad approach was adopted 
in transcribing the spoken data. Speech recorded was translated into written form and 
pseudonyms were given to focus group participants.  
Following these steps, Stuart Hall’s (1980) encoding/decoding audience reception model 
was the framework selected to be applied in the analysis of the reader reception data. This 
model paved the transition from the previously dominant stimulus-response approaches to 
audience studies also known as the ‘hypodermic needle’ or ‘effects’ model,  where a 
‘narcotic’ link between the media and a passive manipulated audience is assumed (Brooker 
& Jemyn, 2003). Theories on which Hall’s (1980) semiotic model is based, rejected this 
suggested insignificant role imposed on the audience and instead, advocated an alternative 
conception of a more active audience with possible heterogeneous, selective and 
negotiated encoding or reading processes. This perception of an active audience is based on 
the theory that although ‘preferred meanings’ or dominant messages may exist in the text, 
the decoding or readings of the text is shaped by multiple social variables. Media 
institutions, for instance, encode meaningful messages adopting “a particular set of rules 
that govern the use of visual and linguistic signs within a culture” (Ott & Mack, 2010: 225) or 
what may be referred to as codes. The recipients of these messages decode them by 
utilizing codes to “decipher the messages and formulate meaning” (ibid.); hence, the 
meanings intended by the producers and the meaning interpreted by the receiver are not 
always symmetrically aligned.  
Hall’s (1980) model suggests the audience can operate their reading and interpretation of 
media texts from three different positions: 
- Dominant hegemonic position: Recipients decode the message received in 
reference to the same codes utilized in the encoding stage. Therefore, the audience 
“consciously or unconsciously accept it as true” (Ott & Mack, 2010); they accept and 
possibly reproduce the preferred or dominant readings of the text. 
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- Negotiated position: Recipients illustrate a combination of “adaptive and 
oppositional elements” towards the message received. The audience generally 
accepts the preferred or dominant reading while simultaneously illustrating 
modification and resistance patterns towards it, reflecting their own individual 
positions. 
- Oppositional position:  Recipients “decode the message in a globally contrary way”. 
The audience understand and reject the preferred reading and place themselves 
directly in opposition to the code it is characterised by.  
Preferred readings in the texts analysed are based on meanings made dominant in the 
articles, foregrounded in the headlines and lead paragraphs. The analysis of the focus group 
data examined the positions the readers adopted towards these preferred readings in the 
selected articles. It also examined the variations in these positions depending on the 
contextual and religious variables characterising the focus groups taking part.  
 
3.6   Data and Data Collection: Newspaper Texts 
 
The primary source of data investigated in this research was made up of newspaper texts 
produced by various UK based and Arab English language quality newspapers. These were 
made up of ‘hard news’ and ‘soft news’ (see section 2.3.3). The corpus also includes op-ed 
pieces, editorials and blog posts.  
The selection of newspapers to be investigated was designed to include newspapers viewed 
to be of various ideological backgrounds with the aim of exploring differences in 
representation and minimizing bias findings towards a particular or dominant ideology. The 
corpus of UK newspaper articles was collected from 4 prominent quality newspapers 
(including their Sunday sister papers): 
• The Guardian (Centre left, liberal) 
• The Independent (Centre left, liberal) 
•  The Times (Centre Right, conservative) 
• The Daily Telegraph (Centre Right, conservative) 
106 
 
Although similar to the British context, some Arabic language press in various Arab nations 
may be categorized according to particular internal and external political affiliations and 
ideologies, Arab English Language newspapers which are the form of newspapers analysed 
in this study are not as clear regarding their political affiliations and ideologies. This, as 
explained in section 2.3.2, is mainly due to this genre of newspapers catering to expats living 
in the region, whereby newspaper content is mainly made up of and influenced by 
international news, rather than local politics and opinion.  
However, with that being said, Arab media in general faces various degrees of government 
control and censorship (Hafez, 2001) (see section 2.3.2.2). Therefore, it was thought useful 
to analyse newspapers that are published in Arab nations of varying degrees of media 
freedom. Following Rugh’s (1979, 1994) classification of Arab print media, which was more 
or less echoed by Kamalipour & Mowlana (1994) and Amin (2001), this study will analyse 5 
major Arab English language newspapers reflecting nations of varying degrees of media 
freedom (focusing on the Gulf region). 
• The Kuwait Times – Kuwait  
• Gulf Times- Qatar 
• Gulf News – United Arab Emirates 
• The Saudi Gazette - Saudi Arabia (2009 French Face veil ban) 
• The Arab News - Saudi Arabia (2006 Danish Cartoon controversy) 
 
According to Rugh (1994), Kuwait is characterized as having ‘diverse press’, while the United   
Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are characterized as ‘loyalist’. However, even 
between these three nations, the amount of media control can vary (as discussed in section 
2.3.2.2). Selecting English language newspapers published in the Arabian Gulf region in 
particular is mainly due to their popularity in the area. The reason being the large amount of 
English speaking expatriates living in this particular region in comparison to other Arab 
nations, forming the target readership of this genre of newspapers. 
As one may expect, due to the form of analysis involved, the size of the corpus of 
newspapers differed significantly in the quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis 
studies. Nevertheless, in both cases, the data selection process was geared by a contextually 
sensitive approach in relation to the surrounding socio-political happenings at the time. 
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Taking into account the main events and actions surrounding each story, articles were 
collected from the date in which key events triggering the stories took place up until the 
approximate date when the newspapers selected reflected less interest in the story. 
A corpus representing the UK press and another representing the Arab English language 
press were developed for each news story. Each corpus was divided further to represent 
each of the 4 newspapers selected to be investigated in each context. The articles were 
collected from nine different UK and Arab based quality newspaper websites using key 
query terms related to the news event investigated. In the ‘2009 face veil ban’ study, all 
articles including the query terms, burqa/s and its variations, i.e. burka/s, niqab/s and veil/s 
were collected and printed out. The same criteria was applied  to the ‘2006 cartoon 
controversy’ story, where all articles including the query terms: Danish Cartoons or 
Mohammad Cartoons, Mohammad caricatures, Mohammad drawings, Mohammed 
cartoons, Mohammed caricatures, Mohammed drawings, were printed and added to the 
corpus. To exclude any passing references to these terms, articles were selected for analysis 
if the query term was allocated in the: 
- Headline,  lead 
- First paragraph, or 2 paragraphs within the text 
All articles collected were scanned manually to exclude any articles not fitting within the 
above mentioned criteria, forming the final collection of articles to be analysed. 
 
3.6.1   The 2009 French Face Veil Ban Study 
 
For the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ story articles were collected between 19/6/09 and 
26/10/10 as this period corresponds with many of the key developments related to the 
French face veil ban. These begin with the initial events which ignited press interest on the 
19th of June in 2009, followed by 16 months which represented various important 
developments, e.g. parliament and senate voting, in the build up towards the final 
legislation of a face veil ban law in France. 
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The full corpus of data collected is comprised of 550 articles. The Arab based corpus of 
newspapers was slightly higher in the number of publications, 285 articles were found to 
contain the query terms, while the UK press corpus was made up of 265 articles. However, a 
higher frequency of articles does not necessarily mean a larger amount of texts, as was the 
case in this study. Although the Arab newspaper displayed a higher number of articles, the 
UK based corpus displayed a higher word count (UK=168830 words, Arab=133902 words).  
Nevertheless, although this high frequency of articles and words corresponded well with the 
quantitative analysis, in terms of size, it was clear that the amount of articles had to be 
downsized to a manageable portion before undergoing a more detailed textual analysis, 
using the qualitative methods of CDA.  
By adopting a systematic downsizing procedure introduced by KhosraviNik (2009), the 
number of articles was reduced to a more manageable size. This was done by exploring the 
peak periods of publications for all quality papers involved in the study, which allows the 
researcher’s data sampling to be more context sensitive in regard to the “relevant socio-
political developments”(ibid.) of the particular period being investigated. This procedure 
was applied to the UK and Arab newspaper corpus separately. In addition to the procedure’s 
contextually sensitive downsizing advantages, it also assisted in focusing some of the 
quantitative analysis to key periods with a large amount of publications in each corpus. Fig 
3.5 illustrates the peak periods of publications found in UK and Arab based corpora of 
newspaper articles. 
 
       Figure 3.5 Frequency of publications in UK & Arab press 19/06/09 – 26/10/10  
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As shown above, the number of articles published varied from month to month, with 
varying peaks in publications, reaching the highest frequency of publications in July’10. This 
procedure assisted in focusing the quantitative study further; various parts of the 
quantitative analysis study focused on the 3 key peak periods taking into account peak 
periods of publications shared by the UK and Arab English language press. These reflect 
important contextual developments: 
• June 2009: Marking the period in which key initial political actions were taken, 
ultimately triggering media interest in the ‘face veil ban’ story. 
• January 2010: French enquiry on a ban continues, UK proposal for a face veil ban 
law, Egypt university ban law. 
• July 2010: Initial approval of the face veil ban law passed in France, spread of face 
veil ban proposals across various nations. 
However, as mentioned earlier, for the purposes of the more in-depth critical analysis, the 
amount of data selected was limited further.  The highest period of publications was during 
the July 2010 period, however, the total number of articles in both contexts were still too 
large to examine qualitatively. Therefore, it was decided that the CDA study will focus 
primarily on the UK and Arab newspaper publications for the June period only (19/06/09 – 
31/06/09), an important period immediately following the main event attracting media 
coverage. Table 3.3 illustrates the frequency of publications during this period: 
 
 
Newspaper 
UK Press Arab Press 
The 
Guardian 
The 
Independent 
The 
Times 
Daily 
Telegraph 
Gulf 
Times 
Kuwait 
Times 
Gulf 
News 
Saudi 
Gazette 
June 2009 7 3 6 4 6 1 10 3 
Total 20 20 
  
Table 3.3 Event A: Corpora of articles for CDA analysis  
Both the UK and Arab based newspapers showed equal interest in stories featuring 
discourse on the face veil, with 20 articles published in each context during the same period. 
These were comprised of news reports and opinion pieces. 
The quantitative analysis focused on a much larger sample of articles. However, when 
additional qualitative analysis was required, the quantitative analysis also focused its 
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attention on specific time frames. Similarly the selection of articles was context sensitive, 
focusing on periods of increased frequency in coverage. Table 3.4 illustrates the analytical 
categories examined and the quantitative methods used, as well as, indicating the specific 
articles these methods were applied to, according to the peak periods of publication 
selected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Event A: Quantitative methods and article sample time frames 
 
 
3.6.2    The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy Study 
 
Articles related to the ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ story were collected between 
29/09/05 and 31/12/06. This period takes into account the day before the key event 
triggering the controversy, the publishing of 12 editorial cartoons depicting the Muslim 
prophet in the Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper. Articles were collected until the 
amount of interest and coverage of articles with the query terms showed a clear decline. 
The full corpus representing UK and Arab newspapers was made up of 813 articles. As with 
the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ study, the Arab English language press showed slightly higher 
 
Analytical 
Categories 
 
 
Time Frame 
 
Methodology 
Genre Analysis 19/06/09 -26/10/10  
 
Content Analysis 
Byline Analysis 19/06/09 - 26/10/10  
 
Content Analysis 
Frequency Lists 19/06/09 - 26/10/10  
 
Corpus Analysis 
Concordance  
‘Burqa/s’, burka/s’, 
‘niqab/s’ 
Jun ’09, Jan ’10,  
July ‘10 
Corpus Analysis 
Quotation Analysis 19/06/09 - 26/10/10  
 
Content Analysis 
Quotation Analysis  Jun ’09, Jan ’10,  
July ‘10 
Content Analysis 
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interest with the total number of articles in the corpus reaching 426, while the UK corpus 
consisted of 387 articles.  
 
Similar to the earlier study, the frequency of coverage over the period of time the articles 
were collected was examined in aim of highlighting the peak times of coverage. 
 
 
     Figure 3.6 Frequency of publications in UK & Arab press 29/09/05 – 31/12/06 
As illustrated in figure 3.6, it was immediately evident in both contexts that the 
predominant amount of articles were published in February 2006. This period coincides with 
an increase of anti-cartoon Muslim protests across the world. The UK based newspapers 
published 273 articles, including the query terms. Thus, articles published in February 2006 
alone, made up 70.5% of the total UK corpus. Similarly, although slightly less, the Arab 
based newspapers were found to have published 260 articles in February 2006 alone, 
61.03% of the total corpus covering the 15 month period of data collection. The word count 
of each corpus were also similar, with the UK displaying a higher frequency of words (UK: 
208,136 words, Arab: 150,804 words). 
Since in both contexts, the majority of articles were published in February 2006 and as this 
period represented quite a large amount of data, the quantitative analysis in this study was 
conducted on this period alone. However, further downsizing of the corpus was undertaken 
prior to the qualitative study. Again, taking in account the socio-political context, downsizing 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Se
p
-0
5
O
ct
-0
5
N
o
v-
0
5
D
e
c-
0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Fe
b
-0
6
M
a
r-
0
6
A
p
r-
0
6
M
a
y-
0
6
Ju
n
-0
6
Ju
l-
0
6
A
u
g-
0
6
Se
p
-0
6
O
ct
-0
6
N
o
v-
0
6
D
e
c-
0
6
A
rt
ic
le
s
Month/Year
UK and Arab Quality Newspaper Articles
29/09/05 - 31/12/06
Arab Press
UK Press
112 
 
was achieved by examining the peak periods of publications of each newspaper in each 
context during the month of February 2006, as illustrated in figures 3.7 and 3.8. 
 
                  Figure 3.7 Frequency of publication for Feb ’06 in the UK press 
                 
 
                Figure 3.8 Frequency of publication for Feb ’06 in the Arab press 
For each newspaper, all articles published on the date with the highest number of 
publications were added to the corpus for qualitative analysis. Table 3.5 illustrates the 
articles examined in the ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ CDA study: 
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     Table 3.5 Event B: Corpora of articles for CDA analysis 
                       
 
As shown, the UK corpus of articles analysed qualitatively included a slightly higher number 
of articles (n=37), while the Arab English language newspaper corpus included 27 articles. 
 
The quantitative analysis will focus on a much larger sample of articles. The quantitative 
methods of analysis were applied on articles published during the February 2006 period, 
which made up the predominant amount of articles collected between 29/09/05 - 31/12/06 
in both the UK and Arab context. Table 3.6 shows the analytical categories that will be 
focused on and the methods that will be applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Event B: Quantitative methods /analytical categories 
   
 
UK Press Arab Press 
Newspaper Date No. Of 
Articles 
Newspaper Date No. Of 
Articles 
Daily 
Telegraph 
7/02/06 6 Gulf News 15/02/06 6 
Times 3/02/06 10 Gulf Times 11/02/06 11 
Guardian 6/02/06 14 Kuwait Times 8/02/06 3 
Independent 6/02/06 7 Arab News 7/02/06 7 
Total 37 Total 27 
Analytical Categories Methodology 
 
Genre Analysis 
 
Content Analysis 
 
 
Byline Analysis 
 
Content Analysis 
 
 
Frequency Lists 
 
Corpus Analysis 
 
 
Concordance – ‘Muslim/s’ and 
‘Protester/s/demonstrator/s’ 
 
 
Corpus Analysis 
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3.7   Data and Data Collection: Focus Group Discussions 
The focus group sessions were conducted in aim of highlighting the social meaning 
interpreted from the text by differentially situated social groups. These were determined by 
the variables of context and religious background. Contextual differentiation was applied by 
carrying out focus group sessions in the North of England, in the cities of York and 
Newcastle, while the sample of focus groups representing the Gulf region were carried out 
in Kuwait.  
In terms of religious background, the research was based on the variable of readers 
describing themselves as Muslim and non-Muslim readers. The Kuwait sample of focus 
groups were made up of Muslim participants, as it is the main religion practiced in the 
country. However, in the UK, participants were divided into Muslim and non-Muslim groups 
with the objective of exploring any differences in interpretation based on religious 
association. Moreover, those taking part in the Kuwait sample were Kuwaiti nationals, while 
those taking part in the UK study were British nationals. To ascertain certain degrees of 
internal homogeneity and to develop comparable data samples from each context, 
participants taking part in the study were exclusively made up of university students in the 
age group 18-24. 
Muslim groups in Kuwait and the UK were divided further taking gender into consideration. 
In Kuwait, university students are accustomed to segregated teaching environments. 
Therefore, being in a mixed gender environment may affect their comfort levels in terms of 
discussing their personal opinions and views, especially in regard to the face veil ban story, 
the focus of the articles investigated in the focus groups. Similarly, in the UK, Muslim 
participants also expressed their preference for segregated sessions.  
Moreover, the participant selection process did not set out to include members of the 
target readership of the various newspapers analysed, as the study was particularly 
interested in the effects of the religious and contextual variables on reader interpretations. 
Also, the choice of university students in the UK and Kuwait, with various possible political 
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affiliations and newspaper reading tendencies, was bound to shed some light on a wide 
variety of possible interpretations, which the study was interested in examining as well. 
However, as mentioned earlier, it was important to keep the participant groups in each 
context as internally homogenous as possible, to reduce the effect of other social variables 
in aim of focusing on contextual setting and religious background as the key variables. To do 
this, a summary of the main participant specifications set forward by the study is as follows: 
- Occupation: University students 
- Age: 18-24 
- Nationality: British (UK sample) or Kuwaiti (Kuwait sample) 
- Religion: Muslims or Non-Muslim 
Table 3.7 illustrates further details on the focus group data gathered: 
Context Kuwait UK 
Group 
Category 
Arab Muslim 
(Men) 
Arab Muslim 
(Women) 
British non- 
Muslim 
British 
Muslim 
(Men) 
British 
Muslim 
(Women) 
Frequency of 
Sessions 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Length  of 
sessions 
(min) 
 
30-60 
 
30-60 
 
30-60 
 
30-60 
 
30-60 
Number of 
participants 
 
4-6 
 
          4-5 
 
4-6 
 
4 
 
4 
Total no. 
participants 
 
13 
 
13 
 
14 
 
4 
 
4 
Context 
Total  
 
26 
 
22 
Table 3.7 Focus group sample data 
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Chapter 4 
Data Analysis: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban 
 
The following sections will present data findings of the qualitative and quantitative analysis 
examining articles related to the first news event, the ‘2009 French face veil ban’. 
 
4.1 Quantitative Analysis: Publications General Profile Analysis     
The quantitative analysis began by examining the frequency of articles in the UK and Arab 
English language corpora of articles. This also involved examining the frequency of articles 
according to genre in each corpus (news/opinion). Table 4.1 illustrates the relevant 
frequencies in each corpus.           
                                        
        Table 4.1 Event A: Genre analysis  
 
The Arab based corpus of newspapers were slightly higher in the number publications, 285 
articles containing the query terms, while the UK press corpus was made up of 265 articles. 
Both contexts also illustrated greater interest in news articles as opposed to opinion pieces. 
News articles made up more than half of the articles in the UK corpus (67.8%, N=179), and 
an even higher percentage of the total number of articles in the Arab corpus (83.5%, 
N=238). Although both contexts published a much lower number of opinion pieces including 
the query terms, the UK corpus had a higher percentage of opinion pieces (32.5%, N=86) 
than the Arab corpus of articles (19.7%, N=47). This difference in the number of opinion 
 
Categories 
UK Press Arab Press 
DT TT TG TI Total GN GT KT SG Total Total 
News 50 48 47 34 179 71 97 32 38 238 417 
Hard 45 29 31 24 129 63 87 23 33 206 335 
Soft 5 19 16 10 50 8 10 9 5 32 82 
Opinion 14 15 41 16 86 25 4 4 14 47 133 
Column 4 7 37 13 61 13 3 4 7 27 88 
Editorial 1 2 0 1 4 12 1 0 4 17 21 
Blogs 9 6 4 2 21 0 0 0 3 3 24 
Total  64 63 88  50 265 96 101 36 52 285 550 
 
 based articles suggests more opinion
Accordingly, this may result in an increased availability of argu
schemes, which are generally featured
UK corpus also included a higher number of ‘soft news’ articles (18.9%, N=50), which were 
featured less in the Arab press (11.2%, N=32). As discussed 
news reporting, e.g. news features
which mainly include up-to-date factual information about
articles covering this event and analysed in this study, please refer to appendix 1 and 2.
                                                                               
Regarding bylined sources, quantitative
corpora (550 articles) highlighted key differences between the UK and Arab English l
press, as figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate
 Fig. 4.1 Event A: UK press byline analysis       
As illustrated above, there are clear differences in the bylined sources employed in both 
contexts, where as highlighted
extensively on external sources for t
published in the Arab newspapers were based on external sources. These w
up of the ‘Euro-centred’ and US based
Agence France Presse and United Press International (UPI)
analysis). This is in direct contrast to the UK press, where external sources are found in only 
5% of the total number of articles. The majority of 
88%
5%7%
UK Press
ated discourse in the UK based 
ments and argumentation 
 in opinion based articles in the press.  Moreover, the 
in section (2.3.3), this
, can also tend to include more opinion than ‘hard’ news
 a news event
                                                                                                                                       
 analysis for the whole period covered by the 
: 
Fig. 4.2 Event A: Arab press byline analysis
 earlier, Arab based newspapers are found to 
heir articles. A predominant 68% (N=
 news agencies, i.e. Reuters, Associated Pres
 (refer to appendix 14
articles (N=232, 88%), were
Staff Writer
External
Unknown
27%
68%
5%
Arab Press
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articles collected. 
 genre of 
, 
. For a list of all 
 
anguage 
                           
 
depend 
194) of the articles 
ere mainly made 
s (AP), 
 for detailed 
 bylined by 
Staff Writer
External 
Unknown
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staff writers, which also included foreign correspondents and special guest writers. One 
explanation for this lack of dependency on foreign agencies is that UK based quality 
newspapers are quite large establishments with various resources, thus, depend heavily on 
their own staff for foreign correspondence and news. These numbers also highlight the 
amount of Arab based articles that depend on external and mainly ‘Euro-centred’ discourse 
in their news coverage, which in turn, may result in increased reproduction of dominant 
external discourses, which may differ from local discourses and meanings regarding Islam 
and Muslims.  
In the specific corpora of articles published in June 2009 period (the focus of the CDA 
analysis), the UK based newspapers echoed earlier findings. They predominantly depended 
on staff writers to source their articles; they were bylined in 18 (90%) of the 20 articles 
published in the June period, only 2 (10%) articles depended on external sources. However, 
in the bylined sources examined in the Arab based newspapers during the same period, 
unlike the findings with the full corpus of articles, a more balanced use of sources was 
revealed; the 20 articles published in June were divided equally between internal sources 
(staff writers) (N=10, 50%) and external sources (N=10, 50%). This difference in internal 
bylined sources may be explained by the newspapers’ news values, which reflected 
particular interest in reporting on local and Muslim scholarly reaction towards the face veil 
ban as was shown in the topic analysis, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section. 
 
4.2   Qualitative Analysis: CDA 
The following sections will present the qualitative analytical findings, this will be done in a 
sequential order, each stage (topic, social actors, social actions, argumentation) in the UK 
corpus will be analysed followed by a comparative analysis of the Arab based corpus of 
articles. For all articles covering event A and analysed using CDA, please refer to the 
appendix 5 and 6. Also, although throughout the analysis of the various stages, many 
examples from the texts are provided, further supplementary examples illustrating similar 
patterns are provided in appendix 16.  
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The first stage of analysis will explore the key topics dominating the articles published 
during the June period of the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ story. This is done by highlighting 
only the primary topics of each article in the UK and Arab based newspapers. 
4.2.1   Topic Analysis 
It is no surprise that this event mainly attracted topics that reflected both ends of the 
spectrum in terms of arguments resonating for and against the practice of wearing the face 
veil or the legislation of a face veil ban law. Table 4.2 illustrates the main topics found to 
dominate articles in the Arab and the UK newspapers. 
 
 
Topic 
        
 
UK Press 
 
Arab English Language Press 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Repression of women 7 35 2 10 
Face veiling and discrimination 3 15 1 5 
Face veiling and secularism 3 15 5 25 
Face veil and freedom of 
choice 
2 10 4 20 
Condemnation of face veil ban 1 5 6 30 
UK School Bans Entry with Face 
Veil 
1 5 0 0 
Sarkozy’s speech 1 5 0 0 
UK and the face veil 
 
2 10 0 0 
Face veil as a sign of modesty 0 0 1 5 
France and national 
investment 
0 0 1 5 
Table 4.2  Event A: Primary topic analysis 
At first glance, no significant differences between the choice of topics in the Arab press and 
the UK press may be apparent, most topics are shared between both contexts. However, 
differences become quite obvious when exploring the amount of coverage each of the 
shared topics had received and the genre of newspaper reporting they were covered under, 
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i.e. news report/op-ed. This can be revealing in highlighting the general attitude of 
individual newspapers, as was the case in this study. 
• Topics: UK Press 
One of the discourse topics resonating anti-face veil sentiments and which received the 
most attention was ‘Repression of Women’, which was the main focus of 7 articles (35%) of 
the UK corpus. Each newspaper published two articles on the topic, excluding the Daily 
Telegraph, where it was the primary topic in one article only. 
Articles where this topic formed the main focus were mainly made of news reports covering 
the parliamentary face ban proposal and Sarkozy’s key note speech, as made evident in 
some of the headlines, ‘Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy’ (TT2), 
‘Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban’ (TG4). This topic also formed the 
focus of two op-ed articles arguing against the practice of face veiling, ‘Veiled Threat: the 
burqa, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society’ (TT5) and ‘Sophie Morris: 
Sarkozy’s right: the burqa is a tool of repression’ (TI3). Regardless of the genre these articles 
were reported under, they generally drew on the topoi of ‘repression of women’, ‘threat’, 
‘separateness’ and ‘difference’ in the representation of Muslims and face veiling women, in 
particular. 
The other discourse topic with anti-veiling sentiments found in the UK corpus was ‘Face veil 
and secularism’. Articles focusing on this topic were mainly made up of news analysis pieces, 
‘France considers ban on full Muslim veil’ (TT1) and ‘Why not ban the full veil, says French 
government spokesman’ (TG1). They discussed the face veil ban proposal put forward by the 
French parliamentarians, arguing for a ban on the basis that face veiling clashes with the 
underlying principals of the French secular approach. These articles also drew heavily on the 
topos of ‘repression of women’, as the other motivating factor in the argument for a 
legislation of the face veil ban. In addition to a news analysis article, the Guardian also 
published an op-ed piece focusing on the same topic, ‘France searches it soul over the veil’ 
(TG5). It argued that the legislation for the freedom of practicing face veiling clashes with 
French values, while describing the face veil as purely a ‘political symbol’, drawing on the 
topoi of ‘difference’ and ‘threat’. 
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On the opposing side of the spectrum, the topic, ‘Face veil and freedom of choice’, was the 
discourse topic found arguing against the face veil ban, thus, advocating that women should 
have the right to choose how to dress. The two articles taking this topic as their focal point 
were published in The Times, both of which were op-ed pieces. ‘Niqabi, interrupted’ (TT6) 
brought forward a face veil wearer perspective, who is coincidently the author of the article, 
drawing on the topoi of ‘victimisation’. This article is one of very few articles in the full 
corpus of UK based articles that gave a direct view from a face veil wearer on the issue. 
“Women, West Brom, the burka and me” (TT4) is the other op-ed piece on the same topic 
and although it argues for the freedom of choice, the representation of the practice of face 
veil wearing and those who wear it carried a few negative connotations, drawing on the 
topoi of ‘repression of women’ and ‘separateness’, as will be illustrated in the micro 
analysis. 
‘Face veiling and discrimination’ was another topic found to be the focus of three articles 
which were mainly critical towards the ban, highlighting the victimisation of face veiling 
women, these were all published in the Guardian. Two of the articles focusing on this topic 
were op-ed pieces, ‘Brush up your Hegel Sarko’ (TG3) and ‘France’s burka barrier’ (TG6), 
while one was a news feature, headlined ‘Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter 
divisions in France’ (TG7). In the arguments critical of the ban, the articles drew heavily on 
the topos of ‘victimisation’ through the individualisation of face veil wearers and detailed 
description of negative actions face veiling women had undergone. In addition, they carried 
a critical tone towards members of the ‘in-group’ who are highlighted as the agents of these 
negative actions toward the women wearing various forms of the veil, the ‘out-group’. 
Nevertheless, although the articles presented arguments against the face veil ban, the 
representation of the face veil itself and those who wear it carried various negative 
connotations, drawing on the topoi of ‘separateness’, ‘repression of women’ and ‘threat’. 
The next topic, ‘UK and the face veil’ attracted particular attention from the conservative 
press. The Daily Telegraph paid attention to this topic in the article, ‘Why the burka is part 
of Britain’ (DT2), which debates the possible implications should a similar proposal for a ban 
take place in the UK. Interestingly, however, although the headline may be seen a prelude 
for an article supporting the face veil as being an accepted practice in the UK, this is 
somewhat misleading. The main body of the article represents the face veil negatively by 
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drawing heavily on the topos of ‘repression of women’. In the Times newspaper, the same 
topic was the main focus of the article fittingly titled, ‘Britain could never debate the burka 
like France’ (TT3). Published in what is considered a conservative paper, the article discusses 
the interest and possibility or what would be better described as, the lack of interest and 
possibility of applying an equivalent face veil ban law in the UK.  It pinpoints and argues the 
various reasons why such a law is not applicable in the UK, while drawing on the topos of 
‘difference’ between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in the representation of Muslims and Face veil 
wearers. More importantly, the article sets a platform where the face veil discourse is 
utilized for political debate, the British Liberal left are criticised as the primary reason why 
such a law would not be considered in the UK. It argued that France’s secular nature and its 
belief that banning the face veil sustains social cohesion and cultural diversity (positive 
outcome) is more in par with the British hard right, while the British liberal left are depicted 
negatively, described as “always inclined it seems, to defend the rights of liberty’s enemies” 
(TT3). In this case, ‘liberty’s enemies’ refers to the face veil wearers or those who are against 
the legislation of a face veil ban law. 
The final three topics received the least attention with each being the primary topic of three 
separate articles. ‘Condemnation of the face veil ban’ was one of those topics that had 
received minimal attention, in contrast to the Arab press, where it formed one of the main 
discourse topics covered. It was the main topic of a Daily Telegraph article headlined, 
‘Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban’ (DT3).  ‘UK School Bans Entry with Face 
Veil’ was another main topic in a news report in the Daily Telegraph headlined, ‘Muslim 
pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils’ (DT4). It reports on an individual case where 
students and teachers were asked to remove their face veils in order to enter the school 
premises, showing an interest by the paper in highlighting local related stories. Finally, the 
topic, ‘Sarkozy’s key note speech’, was the focus of a news analysis article in the 
Independent discussing the various topics covered in Sarkozy’s speech, however, only a 
small section (2 paragraphs) was devoted to Sarkozy’s comments on the face veil. This is in 
contrast to other UK newspapers in the corpus, where Sarkozy’s comments on the face veil 
dominated most of the content of the articles which covered the presidential speech, i.e. 
headline and main body. 
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• Topics: Arab Press 
The macro analysis of topics in the Arab press for the June 2009 period was quite revealing 
in exposing the overall attitude and reaction the different Arab based quality newspapers 
had towards the face veil ban. As with the UK press, the majority of articles which discussed 
the face veil presented arguments for or against the ban. However, what became 
immediately evident was the lack or complete absence of any op-ed articles arguing for the 
ban and against the practice of face veiling. Moreover, 60% (N=12) of the total number of 
articles explicitly argued against the ban.  The majority of these articles were published in 
the UAE based Gulf news, totalling in 7 articles, while 3 articles were published in Gulf Times 
and 2 in the Saudi Gazette. This was in contrast to the UK corpus which involved only 6 anti-
face veil ban articles (30%), which were generally less explicit and following a micro analysis, 
as discussed earlier, were found to be, nevertheless, quite critical of face veiling as a 
practice. 
‘Condemnation of the face veil ban’ was the most recurrent primary topic in the Arab press 
(4 news articles and 2 op-ed pieces, 30%). Most of these articles involved direct critical 
attacks towards the face veil ban, with personalised criticisms specifically targeting then 
French president, Nicolas Sarkozy. This was clearly evident in some of the main leading 
headlines: ‘Sarkozy’s burqa ban stance under fire’ (GN6), “French president’s burqa views 
leave readers fuming” (GN7), ‘Mufti Sarkozy’s ‘fatwa’ not amusing’ (SG3). The articles 
involved direct criticism of the ‘Other’, in this case, the ‘West’, ‘Sarkozy’ and ‘Western way 
of living’, drawing on both, the topoi of ‘discrimination’ and ‘difference’, in their arguments 
against the ban. 
‘Face veil and freedom of choice’ is the second most recurrent main topic with 4 articles 
arguing against the ban. These were all made up of op-ed pieces, headlines included ‘Liberte 
includes freedom of dress’ (GN10), ‘Sarkozy should be open minded’ (GN5), ‘West must 
respect the Muslim veil’ (GN8) and ‘No burqas please, we’re French’ (GN9). Similar to the 
earlier topic, ‘discrimination’ was one of the key topoi drawn upon in arguing for freedom of 
choice. However, similar to the UK press, albeit to a lesser degree, linguistic constructs 
associating women wearing the face veil with the ‘repression of women’ and a ‘threat’ were 
also identified in various parts of these articles.  
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The last two articles arguing against a ban covered two different topics. ‘Burqa and 
discrimination’ was the main topic of an op-ed article featured in the Qatari based Gulf 
Times and is actually an article originally published by the UK based Guardian. This article 
headlined, ‘Dress row opens bitter divisions’ (GT6), drew heavily on the topos of 
‘victimisation’. The other topic, ‘Burqa as a sign of modesty’, was focused on in a Saudi 
Gazette article headlined, ‘Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is a sign of modesty’ (SG2). This article also 
drew heavily on the topoi of ‘difference’ in the representation of Muslims and face veil 
wearers. However, unlike the UK press, the difference was utilised to represent Muslims and 
face veiling women (Us/In-group) positively, while attacking and representing the ‘Other’ 
(Them/Out-group) and their different way of life negatively and as inferior. The article also 
drew heavily on the topos of ‘discrimination’. 
As mentioned earlier, the Arab corpus of articles for the June 2009 period did not include 
any op-ed articles arguing for a face veil ban. Instead, all articles representing arguments for 
a ban and against face veiling were news articles reporting on the initial key political events 
that ignited the face veil ban story, i.e. Parliamentary law proposal for the face veil ban and 
Sarkozy’s key note speech. ‘Burqa and secularism’ was one of the main topics covered in 
this group of news articles; it was the second highest topic to receive attention in the Arab 
based articles (5 articles, 25%). Leading headlines mainly highlighted the actions taken by 
the French Government officials: ‘France open to banning Muslim veil: spokesman’ (SG1) 
and ‘France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says’ (GN1). 
The other main topic ‘burqa and repression of women’ included arguments for the ban 
drawing on the topos of ‘repression of women’ as represented by the French government 
officials. Again, these only involved news articles published in the initial phase following 
Sarkozy’s speech, such as, ‘Sarkozy says ‘burqas are not welcome’ in France’ (GN2) and  
‘Burqa not welcome in France’ (GT2). 
Finally, ‘France and national investment’ was another topic found in the Arab corpus and 
was covered in one news article, ‘Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task’ (GN3), 
which reported and reviewed Sarkozy’s key note speech. In regard to Sarkozy’s speech, this 
article centred its attention on Sarkozy’s comments and proposals regarding France’s 
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national economy, while a smaller section towards the middle of the article was dedicated 
to his views on the face veil. 
It is important to note that although these articles reported on the argument for the face 
veil ban and some similarities were found between the UK and Arab based articles, there 
were key differences in the overall reporting of events. These were highlighted by some 
interesting variations in quotation patterns and the referential/predicational strategies used 
in the representation of in and out group, which were revealed during the micro analysis. 
4.2.2   Social Object: The Face Veil 
The next level of analysis involves examining how key social objects and actors are referred 
to and the qualities attributed to them. The issue or object at the centre of the controversy 
is the ‘face veil’ and it is ultimately the focus of the various arguments made in the 
newspaper texts. Therefore, it was important to begin the descriptive analysis by examining 
the referential and predicational strategies used in reference to the face veil. Although there 
were some general similarities in the UK and Arab English language press, divergent naming 
and description patterns were highlighted as well, constructing a base for the macro 
differences found in the topos drawn upon in the representation of Islam and Muslims in 
later stages of the analysis, i.e. argumentation strategies. 
4.2.2.1   Referential Strategies 
In terms of the referential or naming options used to refer to the face veil in the UK based 
articles, they were found to be varied, some of these included: burqa, burka, niqab, veil. 
More general terms were also used primarily highlighting the item’s function: covering, 
dress, garment and clothing. This corresponds with the findings of the quantitative analysis 
of the full corpus of articles involved in the larger study, where newspapers were found not 
to agree on a particular lexical item or spelling to refer to the face veil, e.g. burka, burqa and 
burkha. Moreover, as with the content analysis findings, burqa/burka was the lexical item 
most frequently used in the UK newspaper corpus. The Times and Daily Telegraph also 
provided some examples of negative and derogatory references towards the face veil, these 
included: Cover-up tents, black sack, symbol of darkness and bogus symbol of Islamic piety. 
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In the Arab press, however, echoing the quantitative analysis, there was a predominant use 
of the lexical items ‘niqab’ and ‘veil’, with the use of ‘burqa’ to a lesser degree. These 
naming options may be argued to reflect the Arab papers heightened contextual awareness 
in regard to naming options available for the face veil. The ‘niqab’, for instance, corresponds 
more with the local referencing to the face veil in the Persian Gulf region. In various Muslim 
contexts, the accurate definition or function of a ‘burqa’ does not correspond with the 
meaning made prevelant in the UK newspaper discourse. Moreover, the face veil itself is  
referred to using various labels, some of which include: niqab, boushiya, bukh’naq, khimar , 
al amira, while some of the other items of clothing used as a full cover for the body are 
known as: abaya, chador, mantu.  
The preference of ‘face veil’ to refer to the clothing item in question may reflect the Arab 
newspapers’ awareness of the multiple lexical variations available in various Muslim 
contexts. The use of face veil, therefore, allows them to encompass all these variations 
under one title that describes the general function of the item under scrutiny as ‘a veil 
covering the face’. This also may be seen as a rejection of ‘a one fits all’ Orientalist theme to 
Islam, which comes with the predominant use of ‘burqa’ to refer to all forms of the face 
veils or garments that jointly veil the face and body. Other terms, e.g. ‘abaya’ and ‘jilbab’, 
which are more common in the region and may be considered more accurate references to 
the full body enclosing garment (a part of what is meant by the term ‘burqa’ in the ‘burqa 
ban’) were introduced in the text as well. Similar to the UK corpus, the face veil was also 
referred to using generic terms, such as: garment, gown, dress and attire, highlighting their 
functions as a piece of clothing. 
More importantly, some Arab based articles highlighted the semantic variation associated 
with the face veil depending on context and/or provided critical commentary on what is 
viewed as an inaccurate reference to the face veil: 
The burqa or abaya as it is known in Saudi Arabia is a body robe. What covers the 
head and face is called a niqab. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy 
meant a head to toe dress when he referred to the burqa. (SG2) 
The Guardian were found to make similar efforts to highlight the semantic variation 
associated with the face veil. This was shown in two particular articles which made attempts 
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at semantic accuracy or/and highlighting the issue of multiple labels that the face veil tends 
to attract depending on the context: 
I have no definite opinions on the voile integral – the burqa, sitar or khimar. (TG5) 
 
For a week now, the hundred or so French women who wear the sitar (a veil that 
covers the face, incorrectly referred to as the burka) or niqab have been at the heart 
of the French political debate. (TG6)  
 
4.2.2.2   Predicational Strategies  
Moving on, the qualities and traits attributed to the face veil through the use of 
predicational strategies were analysed next. These can take the form of adjectives, 
prepositional phrases, predicates and collocations. They can also be in the form of a word, 
phrase, or entire clause, which can describe the proceeding or following element in a 
sentence. One of the more general and common predicational strategies found to be used 
in reference to the face veil in the Arab and UK based articles, highlighted the amount of 
coverage the ‘burqa’ is meant to entail. This was illustrated with the use of adjectives, such 
as, full, head to toe, full body, all enveloping, among others.  
However, there were some prominent themes found in describing the face veil in the UK 
and Arab sets of articles. The reproduction of similar predicataional strategies were found in 
both contexts, i.e. negativisation. However, in many instances, diverging even oppositional 
descriptive qualities emerged in the texts analysed. It is also worth mentioning, as with the 
referential strategies, some similarities were found between the Arab English language 
newspapers and the liberally inclined Guardian in the UK corpus. 
Table 4.3 illustrates some of the key themes found in describing the face veil in the UK and 
Arab sets of articles. 
UK Press Arab Press 
1. 
 
Negativisation: 
Topos of repression of women 
Topos of difference and separation 
Topos of Threat 
1. Negativisation: 
Topos of repression of women 
Topos of threat 
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2. Disassociating Religion 2. Negativisation distancing strategies 
3. Positive attributes 
4.  Direct association with religion: 
Topos of religious obligation 
Table 4.3 Predicational analysis: Face veil 
• UK Press: Negativisation  
Unlike the referential strategies used, predicational strategies in the UK press attributed the 
face veil with predominantly negative qualities and traits, drawing on various topoi, which 
were developed further in the arguments presented in the texts. These included highlighting 
the face veil as, (1) repressing women, (2) threatening, and (3) different and separate from 
Western society and its values. 
 The following are some examples of qualities attributed to the face veil according to topos: 
‘Repression of women’ 
Symbol of submission  
Symbol of subservience and debasement  
Symbol of repression  
Moving prison  
Oppressive head-to-toe Islamic dress  
Oppressive Islamic dress that ‘breaches Individual freedom’  
Tool of repression  
Tool of oppression  
Coffin that kills the fundamental rights of women  
A symbol of servitude and humiliation  
Coffin which kills basic freedoms  
Incompatible with women’s rights  
 
‘Difference’ and ‘Separation’ 
 
The mistrust, alienation and break in communication engendered by the face veil  
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The burqa isolates women  
Visible statement of difference and separation  
‘Threat’ 
Fundamentalist dress  
We have known terrorists to try to escape wearing a burka  
Face covering for women was a fundamentalist practice  
Not an exotic symbol, but a political one  
The niqab is a deviation from genuine French Islam which is open and tolerant  
Full veil challenges official Islam adopted in France  
 
All articles analysed had numerous examples of negative predicational strategies. Some 
examples were parts of direct quotes from Sarkozy’s speech and other politicians, while 
some were attributes given to the face veil by various writers for the papers. 
• UK Press: Islamic connection? 
One interesting pattern found in the Times that was not as common in the other 
newspapers forming the corpus was the disassociation of the face veil from the Islamic 
religion. The face veil was given attributes signalling it as separate from Islam and religion, 
linking it exclusively to tradition with modifiers such as: 
Purely tribal in tradition 
Cultural tradition 
Controversial in Islam 
Not a religious symbol 
Similar modifiers were found in a few articles published in the Independent: 
Not a religious sign  
Not a religious symbol 
In the Times, these predicational strategies worked to support an argument representing 
conservative Muslim societies negatively as using the face veil to assert their power in the 
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West, drawing on the topoi of ‘threat’ (further discussion in the argumentation analysis). 
These modifiers also drew on the topoi of ‘authority’, where one of the main arguments for 
the establishment of the face veil ban was supported by the premise that various authorities 
reject the face veil having any religious foundation. The idea that it is viewed as a religious 
obligation by some is rejected, therefore concluding that as an item of clothing, it does not 
need to be worn. 
Nevertheless, other UK based papers in the corpus were also found to associate the face veil 
with Islam and religion by the use of attributes, such as, ‘Islamic’, ‘religious’ and ‘religious 
symbol’. This emphasis on a religious association was clearly highlighted in the Arab corpus 
of articles; the face veil is predominantly described as ‘religious’ and ‘Islamic’ with the 
frequent use of this association as the main premise for arguments against a ban, as will be 
seen in the coming section. 
 
• Arab Press: Negativisation/ Negativisation Distancing Strategies 
A few examples of negative predicational strategies were found in the Arab articles, drawing 
mainly on the topoi of ‘repression of women’ and ‘threat’: 
‘Repression of women’ 
Sign of subservience, a sign of debasement  
A garment they said amounted ‘to a breach of individual freedoms on our national 
territory’  
Infringement of women’s rights  
Walking prisons  
Sign of subjugation  
‘Threat’ 
Increasingly being imposed by fundamentalists  
Burqa which appears to be like the reproduction of the dress code imposed by the 
Taliban on women in Afghanistan  
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The historic implications of the burqa are those of radicalism and extremism  
Having said that, most examples of negative predicational strategies were either, (1) parts of 
quotations by Nicolas Sarkozy and other pro-face veil ban politicians, or (2) presented with 
the use of quotation marks around particular negative attributes, e.g. ‘degrading’, which 
worked to distance the paper from this particular view.  
Moreover, in most cases where negative predicational strategies are utilized, they are 
presented within a critical frame. That is, they were either preceded or followed by, (1) 
mitigation and detachment strategies, or/and (2) critical comments towards the negative 
view. 
I THINK French president Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had 
he would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by 
the nuns ‘a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement?’ (SG2) 
Sarkozy said the burqa was ‘a sign of subjugation’ and as such was ‘not welcome on 
French territory’. Whether or not one agrees with wearing the burqa, isn’t it a 
personal matter that should be left to individuals to decide upon? No government 
or leader should dictate to people what they should wear. (GN5) 
‘The burqa is a not a religious sign, it’s a sign of debasement – I want to say it 
solemnly’ he said, addressing members of both parliamentary houses gathered at the 
Palace of Versailles for his speech. You could have knocked me down with a feather: 
since when did Sarkozy become an authority on Islam? (SG3) 
The above three excerpts taken from 3 different articles illustrate how mitigation was 
utilized to frame quotes which attribute the face veil with negative qualities: ‘a sign of 
subjugation’, ‘a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement’ and ‘not a religious sign, it’s a 
sign of debasement’. In all three examples, questions are used as a form of mitigation, 
which indirectly add critical commentary on the meaning of the quote.  
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• Arab Press: Positive Attributes 
One extremely significant pattern found in the Arab corpus that was nearly absent in the UK 
corpus was the attribution of the face veil with positive qualities, specifically in terms of the 
positive feelings face veiling women share towards the face veil, and why they opt to adopt 
it. These positive qualities were also found to be attributed to another form of the Muslim 
veil, ‘the hijab’ (the headscarf). These qualities mainly accredited the various forms of the 
Muslim veil as providing women with: ‘power’, ‘identity’ and ‘freedom’. 
Burqa is a sign of modesty (SG2) 
It gives her identity (SG2) 
it provides freedom from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other 
women’s looks as well as from being sex objects for males to reject and approve. 
(GN8) 
It enables women to focus on their spiritual, intellectual and professional 
development. (GN8) 
Muslim women often talk about what the hijab symbolises: religious devotion, 
discipline, reflection, respect, freedom and modernity. (GN8) 
wearing the burqa gives them a sense of freedom due to the sheer anonymity it 
provides. (GN10) 
 
• Arab Press: Direct Religious Association 
Highlighting the face veil’s stance and direct association with Islam as religion was another 
pattern found in the Arab based articles (mainly the Saudi Gazette and Gulf Times). The 
emphasis on this relation was used to support the argument against a face veil ban and for 
the freedom of choice, where the topos of ‘religious obligation’ was drawn upon, portraying 
the face veil as a religious duty that must be practiced by Muslim women. This was partly 
translated in the text by the use of predicational strategies in reference to the face veil: 
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such a garment is undoubtedly a religious obligation (SG3) 
It is a sign of subservience – not to human beings, fickle fashion trends and social 
mores – but to the higher Wisdom of the One who decreed it an obligatory 
protection for Muslim women. (SG3) 
There is no doubt that the niqab (a face covering and loose body-length gown) is a 
mandatory dress for all Muslim women wherever they are. (GT4) 
Islamic dress code ordained by Islam. (GT4) 
The niqab is obligatory and this was confirmed in the Holy Qur’an. (GT4) 
Niqab is a controversial issue, while some scholars see it as mandatory, others regard 
it as non-obligatory. (GT4) 
However, the UAE based Gulf News also provided two examples where the face veil was 
disassociated from Islam as a religion: 
Neither the burqa or niqab is ordered by Islam ...They are local costumes, but 
Muslim women should not be forced to remove them. (GN6) 
I agree it is not a religious sign, since several non-Muslims in India also use it to 
cover themselves. I believe the main objective of a burqa is to avoid the exposure of 
body parts. (GN7) 
 
4.2.3     Social Actors: Muslims and Face Veiling Women 
In both the UK and Arab English language newspaper articles, Muslims and face veiling 
women were predominantly referred to using assimilation strategies, where they were 
presented as a group rather than individuals. Collectivisation was realized by the plurality of 
social actors described:  
Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them (TG5) 
 
             refused to talk to veiled women (GN10) 
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Collectivisation was also displayed by the use of nouns denoting groups, referring to 
Muslims as a collective entity: 
or from France’s problems with assimilating its Muslim community. (TI3) 
 
Similar to findings on predicational strategies used in conjunction with the face veil, 
qualities attributed to Muslims and face veiling women revealed interesting and diverging 
patterns in each context. Some of these patterns fall in line with and support the key 
arguments and topoi found to be dominating articles in each context in regard to the 
representation of Islam and Muslims. 
Table 4.4 illustrates some the key patterns found in the UK and Arab English articles, which 
will be discussed in further detail in the following sections. 
 
UK Press Arab English Language Press 
1 Aggregation  
• High Muslim population 
• Topos of Threat: Increase in 
the number of face veiling 
women 
• Muslim support for a ban 
1 Aggregation 
• High Muslim population 
• Low number of face veiling 
women 
• High number of women 
choosing to practice face 
veiling 
 
2 Negative Attribution 
• Topos of Repression of women 
• Topos of Threat 
2 Emphasis on Identity 
• Highlighting Muslims 
nationality or civic status in 
Europe 
3 Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim 
dichotomy 
 
Table 4.4 Predicational analysis: Muslims and face veiling women 
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• UK Press: Aggregation Patterns 
 
In the UK Press, aggregation, a form of assimilation which quantifies groups was found to be 
used highlighting the large amount of Muslims in France: 
 
France’s five million strong Muslim community (TT2) 
France has Western Europe’s largest Muslim Population, estimated at 5 million. 
(TG4) 
 
Aggregation was also utilized, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, where the practice of 
wearing the face veil and its wearers were highlighted as increasing in number, working to 
towards a negative presentation of the social actors as a growing problem. Although 
examples of this were found in all papers involved in the study, it was particularly evident in 
the Times, in addition to the Daily Telegraph, which presented numbers dramatically higher 
than any of the numbers presented in other UK dailies examined. 
 
She is alarmed by the number of women wearing veils. (TT1) 
 
They are no official figures, but around 100,000 women are thought to wear the 
burqa in France (DT3) 
Explosion in the number of women wearing the full-length veils in France (TI1) 
President Sarkozy took issue with the proliferation of women wearing the burqa in 
France. (TI3) 
As seen above, terms and phrases, such as, alarmed, explosion in the number and 
proliferation, as well as large numbers draw on the topoi of ‘threat’ in highlighting face 
veiling as a growing problem which needs to be controlled or solved. 
However, aggregation was not limited to emphasising the increasing or large number of 
women adopting the veil. The Guardian provided examples where these accounts are 
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refuted; quantifying attributes emphasised the lack of women who actually wear the face 
veil in France: 
Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so small that TV 
news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate that 
there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a 
Muslim population of over 5 million – often young French women, many of them 
converts’. (TG7) 
As shown above, this account differs quite dramatically from the accounts illustrated earlier. 
Similar aggregation patterns highlighting a low number of face veiling women in France 
were also echoed in the Arab based articles, as will be shown later in the analysis. 
The final point on aggregation patterns relates to its use in emphasising a consensus in 
Muslim views supporting the face veil ban. Again, this was mainly found in the newspapers 
commonly viewed as conservative. 
 
Measures against face cover are supported by two of the three women Muslims in 
the cabinet (TT2) 
 
Another example was found in the Daily Telegraph, which highlighted Muslim support for a 
similar ban in the UK and their criticism of the face veiling practice. Following a hypothetical 
narrative of what would take place if the Queen of England was to follow suit and re-state 
President Sarkozy’s critical views on the face veil and the desire to ban it, the hypothetical 
Muslim reaction is described as follows: 
But it would also raise cheers, not least from some members of the Muslim 
community. ‘The French president should be applauded for initiating this debate,’ Dr. 
Taj Hargey of the Muslim Educational Centre of Oxford told me yesterday. Dr. Hargey 
describes the growing belief that Muslim women should cover their head, face and 
hands as ‘doctrinaire brain-washing’. (DT2) 
The argument for a ban is supported by drawing on the topos of ‘authority’, where Muslims 
themselves are depicted as being ‘not least’ of those who would support a face veil ban. The 
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same topos and the topos of ‘threat’ are drawn upon further in the following section. A 
speaker associated with a Muslim institution is individualised and directly quoted as being 
critical of the face veiling practice. He describes the practice with an explicit negative 
attribute of being ‘doctrinaire brain-washing’, a practice that is ‘growing’ and consequently, 
posing a problem or threat to society. 
• UK Press: Negative Attributions 
There were also instances where the referential and predicational startegies used in 
reference to face veiling women highlighted negative connotations, drawing on the topoi of 
‘repression of women’ and ‘threat’.  
 
These caged women show the power of fundamentalist women to indoctrinate (TT1) 
 
These are women who are the prey of oppression, from masculine domination to 
fundamentalist Islamic Indoctrination (TI1) 
 
I also felt depressed – depressed that here was a women entirely shrouding her 
identity in public. Depressed that she was denied even the most basic social 
interaction with strangers that comes with walking down a busy street. (TI3) 
 
The sight of these imprisoned women (TG1) 
   
Negative referencing and predicational strategies, drawing on the topoi of ‘threat’, were 
also found in the naming of Muslim actors, e.g. extremists, liberty’s enemies, 
fundamentalist. 
 
• UK Press: ‘Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim’ Dichotomy 
 
Finally, as argued in previous research (Mamdani, 2004; Riley, 2009; Jiwani & Dakroury, 
2009), a binary dichotomy of ‘Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim’ is represented in the text, 
through the use of particular terms attributed to Muslim actors. As Riley (2009) argues 
based on an analysis of the Canadian press, ‘Good Muslims’ attributed with qualities such as 
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‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ are depicted as: (1) patriotically loyal to the nation they live in 
and its values, i.e. Canada, (2) aiming to protect and help what are described as ‘oppressed’ 
Muslim women, (3) being threatened by ‘Bad Muslims’. ‘Bad Muslims’, on the other hand,  
are attributed with terms such as, ‘Islamists’, and are depicted as polarised from ‘good 
Muslims’, as they are associated and linked to fundamentalism and extremism. 
 
In the Times articles analysed in this study, similar examples were found using attributes, 
such as, ‘moderate’ Muslims and ‘conservative’ Muslims: 
 
Moderate Muslims also saw full face covering as a symbol of submission (TT2) 
 
While many in France, home to more than five million Muslims, have applauded his 
stance, conservative Muslims in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his 
remarks. The burka, they insist, is a ‘symbol of Freedom’ (TT5) 
 
The burka appears to be tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been given 
dubious religious sanction by conservative societies. (TT5) 
 
As shown, Muslims who are labelled as ‘moderate’ are aligned with the argument against 
face veiling as they view it as ‘symbol of submission’. Meanwhile, face veiling which is 
highlighted as oppressive is a practice directly linked with ‘conservative’ Muslims by the use 
of ‘conservative societies’ who are depicted negatively, (hence, ‘bad Muslim’), where they 
are attributed with giving the face veil ‘dubious religious sanction’. 
 
Other similar attributes were found in the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph: 
 
Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them are protesting against the 
inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. (TG5). 
 
Modern moderate Muslims feel banning such religious clothing would prove 
counter- productive (DT2) 
 
139 
 
Generalisations are made in both examples. In the first example from the Guardian, only 
‘conservative Muslims’ are presumed to be protesting against the inquiry, as opposed to 
more liberally inclined Muslims. The second example taken from a Daily Telegraph’s sub-
heading was even more extreme, ‘moderate Muslims’ are directly associated with 
modernity (a positive quality), making 2 presumptions: (1) there are Muslims that are not 
‘Modern’ (2) only (and all) ‘modern’ and ‘moderate’ Muslims feel banning the face veil 
would prove counterproductive. 
 
• Arab Press: Aggregation Patterns 
Aggregation, the form of assimilation which quantifies groups was also found to be used in 
the Arab press, highlighting the large amounts of Muslims in France: 
France has Western Europe’s largest Muslim population, an estimated 5 million 
people. (GN2) 
Home to Europe’s largest minority (SG1)  
However, aggregation was not limited to highlighting the large number of Muslim 
communities, it was also adopted in numerous articles to emphasise the lack or low number 
of women in France who actually wear the face veil. This worked to reject the 
representation of the face veil as a significantly growing trend. 
The burqa is causing turmoil in France, although only a few dozen Muslim women 
wear it. This is a new phenomenon not seen in France before, and it is still considered 
marginal, in terms of the number of people concerned. Most French citizens have 
only seen women wearing the burqa in newspaper pictures or on television, thanks to 
photographers who watched and waited until they could photograph one of them. 
However, even if this phenomenon was insignificant considering the number of 
people involved, it is not at all a marginal topic in French society. (GN9) 
Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so small that TV 
news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate 
perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim 
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population of more than 5mn, often young French women, many of them converts. 
(GT5) 
Aggregation was also used, specifically in the Saudi Gazette to emphasise that many women 
who choose to don the face veil, willingly do so, negating the argument for a face veil ban 
based on the premise that it is a form of ‘female oppression’. 
Has he ever spoken to any of the thousands of Muslim women who willingly choose 
to wear the burqa/abaya/jilbab and asked them the rationale behind their choice of 
that garb? (SG3) 
Sarkozy chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the 
world as a sign of subservience and degradation. (SG2) 
But I suspect that a vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to 
do so for religious and cultural reasons. (GN10) 
 
• Arab Press:  Emphasis on Identity 
Arab English language newspapers were found to utilize naming and predicational strategies 
that reflect or emphasise the actor’s nationality, ‘French’ or civic status, ‘citizen of France ’, 
‘immigrants’, rather than simply labelling them merely as ‘Muslims’ or ‘women who wear 
the face veil’. This is fitting with the topos of ‘discrimination’, extensively drawn upon in the 
Arab based articles in the representation of Muslims as individuals being discriminated 
against based on their religion,  emphasising that they in fact are ‘French citizens’ who 
should be receiving equal rights: 
The commission appointed to study the issue must look at the context of personal 
choice and immigrant rights. (GN9) 
Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings or his own interpretation of other 
people's culture on citizens within a democracy born on a platform of liberty, equality 
and fraternity. (GN10) 
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Highlighting face veil wearers as ‘citizens’, who are being discriminated against is more 
explicitly presented in the next excerpt: 
I still remember my years spent in Algeria in the 1970’s, when most Algerian women 
were veiled. If young French women of North African descent are choosing to be 
covered they are simply adhering to their roots. 
And why shouldn’t they when for decades Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians have 
been treated as third-class citizens in France? (GN10) 
In the next examples taken from the texts, the reference to face veil wearers as primarily 
‘French’ is taken a step further, where  women who wear the face veil were described as 
mainly made up of ‘French converts’. This works to highlight the practice of face veiling as 
not exclusive to individuals raised as Muslims or/and to people of various ethnic descents 
who immigrated to France, i.e. ‘immigrants’. It highlights face veiling women in France, as 
mainly made up of individuals who are ‘French’ and have converted to Islam. 
Muslim groups estimate perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering 
themselves out of a Muslim population of more than 5mn, often young French 
women, many of them converts. (GT5) 
A few thousand women wear the burqa in France, many of whom are French 
converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith (KT1 and  repeated in 
SG1) 
4.2.4   Social Actions 
The next level of analysis investigates the actions attributed to the social actors (in and out-
groups) and the role they are allocated in the process. Patterns and discursive structures in 
line with van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ or positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ presentation 
have proven evident throughout the analysis on both a macro and micro level of the UK and 
Arab based newspapers. However, these structures played a particularly evident role in 
shaping the syntactic structuring of sentences. This can specifically be found with the choice 
of passive vs. active construction in a clause, which can have ideological significance, 
highlighting ‘our’ positive and ‘their’ negative attributes. For instance, van Dijk (2000: 40) 
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explains that “minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided or 
done, for or against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, 
crime, violence or drug abuse. In the latter case their responsible agency will be 
emphasized”.  
 
In the corpus representing the UK based articles for the June peak period, the analytical 
findings echoed van Dijk’s above description with some key differences. Face veiling women 
were indeed mainly allocated passive roles. However, Muslims in general were 
predominantly allocated active roles in verbal and material processes. Moreover, the agency 
of face veil wearers and Muslims in general (out-group) were not limited to negative 
actions, agency also functioned in highlighting: (1) Face veil wearers’ ‘humanization’ and 
‘victimisation’ (primarily found in an anti-face veil ban articles and the Guardian), and (2) 
Muslims’ active role in verbal processes through direct and indirect quotations supporting a 
face veil ban or being critical of the face veil wearing practice. Therefore, in addition to 
allocating roles in line with the positive ‘self’ and negative ‘other’ dichotomy, roles of 
Muslims and face-veiling women (out-group) were also found to be utilised to support the 
newspapers main arguments, drawing on key topoi, e.g. topoi of ‘repression of women’ and 
‘threat’. 
 
In the Arab context, in accordance with the ideological square, Muslims and face veiling 
women in particular (the in-group in this context) were generally allocated more positive 
active roles, and at times, presented as patients of negative action taken by various ‘out-
group’ members, i.e. Sarkozy.  The study also identified some distinct patterns in the roles 
and actions attributed to face veil wearers/ Muslim women in the various Arab quality 
newspaper analysed. In terms of social actions, the Arab press rejected the predominant 
discourse produced in the UK press, through allocating Muslim women with: 
1) Increased active roles in mental, material and verbal processes, providing the reader 
with an insider view of their experiences and thoughts. 
2) An active role in positive actions. 
3) An active role in choosing to wear the face veil. 
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4) Passive roles as patients of negative actions inflected by the ‘Out-group/ Them’; and 
positive actions by the ‘in-group/Us’. 
5) Passive roles as patients of ‘religious obligation’, highlighted by obligation modality.  
Similarly, Muslim actors were also mainly represented as agents of verbal and mental 
processes highlighting their views on the face veil ban. These views, mainly made by elite 
Muslim scholars, also supported one of the key topoi in the Arab press, the topos of 
‘religious obligation’, associating the face veil with religion 
Table 4.5 and 4.6 summarise the key patterns found in relation to the social actions of face 
veiling/Muslim women and Muslims in the UK and Arab Press. 
Face Veiling/ Muslim Women 
UK Press Arab Press 
Mainly in passive roles: 
• Patients of critical actions by ‘in-
group’ members who are presented 
positively. 
• Patients of negative actions by 
members of the ‘out-group’ (or 
‘Muslims’). 
• Patients of critical attitudes towards 
veiling and implications of previous 
bans (Guardian). 
Mainly in active roles: 
• Agents of mental, material and verbal 
processes highlighting their 
experiences and thoughts. 
• Agents of positive actions. 
• Agents in choosing to practice veiling. 
 
 
 
 
Active Role: 
• Agents in describing their 
victimisation. 
•  Agents of negative actions leading to 
their own ‘oppression’. 
Passive roles: 
• Patients of negative actions inflected 
by the ‘out-group.’ 
• Patients of positive actions by the ‘in-
group’. 
• patients of ‘religious obligation’. 
 Table 4.5 Social action analysis: Face veiling women  
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Muslims 
UK Press Arab Press 
 
Mainly in active roles: 
• Agents of verbal processes 
highlighting pro ban views and 
negative opinions on face veiling. 
• Agents of negative actions, drawing 
on the topoi of ‘threat’ and 
‘oppression of women’. 
 
Mainly in active Roles: 
• Agents of verbal and mental 
processes highlighting: 
- the religious perspective towards 
implications of a ban on face veiling 
women. 
- Critical views of the ban. 
 
Table 4.6 Social action analysis: Muslims 
Finally, it is important to note, as apparent from the discussion so far, early on in the 
analytical process, a distinct pattern in the roles allocated to face veil wearers as opposed to 
other Muslim actors became apparent. This made it necessary to conduct a more gender 
focused analysis. Accordingly, the following discussion will begin with the analytical findings 
related to the actions of face veil wearers/Muslim women followed by an analysis of the 
actions and roles allocated to Muslims in general, starting with the UK press. 
 
4.2.4.1   UK Press: The Role of the Face Veil Wearer 
 
Predominantly, women wearing the face veil were allocated passive roles in the UK press, 
appearing in the semantic category of ‘patients’, whereby something is being done to them 
or for them.  Moreover, when analysing the actions and roles allocated to face veil wearers 
in the UK press, a contrast between the representation of face veil wearers in the Guardian 
and the rest of the newspapers became immediately evident. 
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• Face Veiling Women - Passive Role 
Face veiling women in the Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Independent, were mainly 
allocated passive roles. In these papers, face veiling women were portrayed as: 
 
1) Patients at the receiving end of critical verbal and material actions taken by members of 
the ‘in-group’, i.e. Sarkozy and other authoritative figures for opting to wear the face 
veil.  
 
2) Patients of negative actions being inflected by actors associated with the ‘out-group’, 
e.g. their direct surroundings, family or the face veil itself. 
 
While the Guardian portrayed them as: 
3) Patients of negative actions taken by the in-group, highlighting the topos of 
‘victimisation’, where face veiling women are portrayed as victims of ill treatment.  
 
The following examples place face veiling women as the object of critical verbal and material 
actions activised by members of the ‘in-group’: 
(a) take action against women adopting what they called oppressive head to toe 
Islamic dress (DT1) 
 
(b) Last year, a Moroccan women was refused French citizenship after social services 
said she wore a burqa and was living in ‘submission’ to her husband (DT3) 
 
(c) Mr. Sarkozy made his attack on a small but growing number of fundamentalist 
women (TT2) 
 
The critical or negative action taken by members of the in-group towards face veiling 
women (out-group) were justified by the use of predicational strategies attributed to the 
face veil wearers, as seen in examples (a-b) from the Daily Telegraph and example (c) from 
the Times. As shown above, face veiling women are placed as the patients of action taken by 
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in-group members with processes such as ‘take action against’, ‘refused French citizenship’ 
and ‘attack’. These actions are justified by the predicational strategies attributed to the face 
veiling women, such as, ‘adopting oppressive head to toe Islamic dress’, ‘living in submission 
to her husband’ and  being ‘fundamentalist’. 
 
In the Times, the passive role of the face veil wearers (out-group) also assists in drawing on 
the topos of ‘repression of women’, where they were mainly reflected as victims of 
oppression, where actions are being done to or enforced upon them. Moreover, the ‘in-
group’ are highlighted as agents of positive actions protecting the ‘out-group’ from the 
presupposed oppression they are subjected to by their surroundings and the wearing of the 
face veil: 
 
President Sarkozy is going to address the issue in a speech on Monday and a string of 
public figures have come out largely in support of restrictions in order to protect 
women from oppression. (TT1) 
 
The measure was mainly intended to ensure the equality of Muslim girls and it has 
worked smoothly. (TT1) 
 
In both examples above, the assumption is made that Muslim women are indeed oppressed 
and face inequality, and thus, are in need of protection and help. These are offered by the 
‘out-group’, represented by ‘string of public figures’ and the ‘measure’, which refers to the 
‘2003 French hijab ban’, imposed by the French government.  
 
This is also clearly highlighted in Sarkozy’s speech, which is quoted in numerous articles: 
 
We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, 
cut off from all social life, deprived of identity 
 
The positive/negative polarization of the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ is made clearer by the 
use of the pronoun ‘we’ and the possessive form ‘our’. The in-group ‘we’ are described as 
agents of a positive action, refusing to accept and wanting to protect face veil wearing 
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women in what is described as a negative state imposed on them. The out-group ‘women’ 
wearing the face veil are passivised as victims of the face veil, referred to as a ‘netting’ with 
the presumption that they are ‘prisoners’ controlled by it, neglecting the possibility that 
wearing the face veil can be the result of individual choice. 
 
The positive depiction of actions carried out by the in-group towards the out-group was also 
evident in the following example: 
 
Sarkozy sees the clothing bans as a form of discrimination and he tries to promote 
policies to bring Muslims, many or most of whom were born in France, into the 
mainstream community. (TT1) 
 
Here, the ‘in-group’, once again represented by ‘Sarkozy’, is portrayed as the responsible 
agent of a positive action towards the ‘out-group’, ‘Muslims’. 
 
As mentioned earlier, face veiling women were also portrayed as patients of negative 
actions being inflected by actors associated with the ‘out-group/Them’, be it, their direct 
surroundings, family or the face veil itself. In all cases, face veiling women are represented 
as passive victims of oppression, as shown in the following examples from the Daily 
Telegraph: 
 
(1) Family and Surroundings 
 
Individual expression ceases to have much meaning if women are being forced into 
wearing cover up tents by male relatives or mullahs (DT2) 
 
It is not a problem that young girls may choose to wear the veil or headscarf as long as 
they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this being imposed upon them, be it 
by their families or environment. (DT1) 
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The only logical reason why he made those remarks is that he had just been to 
Afghanistan where women are oppressed (DT2) 
 
(2) The face veil 
 
The burka isolates women (DT3) 
In the Times, similar examples included: 
I don’t believe that any man should force his wife to wear the burka (TT4) 
 
Such a dismissive response seems to make these women and their opinions every bit 
as invisible as the burka does. (TT4) 
 
Both these examples were taken from an op-ed article arguing against a face veil ban. 
However, although the writer argues for the freedom of choice in regard to what an 
individual chooses to wear, the representation of face veil wearers still draws upon the 
topos of the ‘repression of women’. Face veil wearers are reflected as the passive actors of 
negative actions brought along by (1) the husband, ‘man’ repressing the women by forcing 
her to wear the burka, and (2) the ‘burka’ that makes her invisible. 
 
In the Independent, similar examples were provided with the deletion of the agents of the 
negative actions at times: 
These are women who are the prey of oppression, from Masculine domination to 
fundamentalistic Islamic indoctrination (TI1) 
If it emerged that the wearing of the burqa was imposed [on women] (TI1) 
She was denied even the most basic social interaction (TI3) 
The negative actions inflected on the women mainly drew on the topos of ‘repression of 
women’, where face veiled women were portrayed as being acted upon and under the 
control of others. 
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As mentioned earlier, there were some clear differences in the roles allocated to face veiling 
women in the Guardian, as opposed to the other newspapers examined. Like the other 
newspapers, face veiling women were mainly allocated passive roles, where they are 
portrayed as patients of actions being done to them or for them. However, they were 
portrayed as patients of negative actions arising from:  
 
1) The general critical attitude towards face veiling  
2) Implications of previous similar bans, e.g. the ‘2003 French hijab ban’.  
 
In most of the examples presented in the Guardian, the topos of ‘victimisation’ is drawn 
upon; face veiling women were individualised and detailed descriptions of the negative 
actions against them were provided: 
 
Official displays of intolerance towards what some Muslim women wear (TG3)  
This time, it is about intervening directly in the private choice of women, because 
that choice would be incompatible with living in France. (TG6)  
A year ago, a Moroccan woman who wore the niqab was refused French nationality, 
a decision blamed on her ‘submission to her husband and her religious misogynist 
doctrine’. (TG6)  
But to punish women and not think about ways to fight their male oppressors makes 
little sense; it goes against the idea that French laws must be the same for everyone. 
(TG6) 
 
Here, face veiling women are patients being subjected to negative actions. Nevertheless, in 
these examples the agents of the action are not directly specified. This was either done by 
agent deletion, which is made possible by the passive construction of the process or through 
the nominalised forms of verbs. 
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Articles did also include examples where the agency of negative actions were explicitly 
allocated to actors representing the ‘in-group’, highlighting their role in the victimisation of 
face veiling women, the ‘out-group’. 
 
Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a woman wearing niqab 
(TG7) 
Sarkozy is thus a modern-day Robespierre, proposing some women – whom he 
presumes to have been silenced by patriarchal society and whose voices he doesn’t 
want to hear – be terrorised in the name of the kind of abstract freedoms France has 
venerated for 210 years (TG3) 
• Face Veiling Women - Active Role 
Less frequent were instances involving face veil wearers in active roles. Nevertheless, in the 
few examples where the face veil wearer was represented as the agent of an action, 
representation drew on: 
 
(1) the ‘humanisation’ of women wearing the veil and their ‘victimisation’. 
 
(2)  the topos of the ‘repression of women’, where face veil wearers are represented   
               as the agents of negative actions, taking an active role in the existence  
               and maintenance of the oppression of women, by the very act of wearing 
               the face veil. 
 
The humanisation of face veiling women was mainly highlighted in the op-ed ‘Niqabi, 
interrupted’ (TT6), published in the Times. The article repeatedly represented the face veil 
wearer as an active agent of everyday activities with the use of the pronoun ‘I’, emphasising 
the normality of a face veil wearer’s daily life with an increased amount of detail in the 
description: 
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I put on my niqab, my face veil, each day before I leave the house, without a second 
thought. I drape over my face, tie the ribbons at the back and adjust the opening 
over my eyes to make sure my peripheral vision is not affected. 
 
But is that truly how people see me? When I walk through the park with my little 
ones in tow, when I reverse my car into a parking space, when I ask how to best cook 
asparagus at a market stall, what do people see? An oppressed women? A nameless, 
voiceless individual? A criminal? 
 
The same article draws on the topos of ‘victimisation’, where face veil wearers are 
represented as the victims of negative actions by various sources, motivated by the fact 
they wear the face veil. Some of these include sources related to in-group members, e.g. 
newspapers. 
 
So, three cheers for those women who make the choice to cover, in whatever way 
and still go out there every day. Go out to brave the scorn and ridicule of those who 
think they understand the burka better than those who actually wear it. Go out to 
face the humiliating headlines. Go out to face taunts of schoolchildren. 
 
The humanisation and topos of ‘victimisation’ also played a chief role in the face veil 
discourse found in the Guardian. This was done by allocating veil wearers in active roles of 
verbal, material and mental processes, presenting detailed accounts of their experience as 
victims, as well as their thoughts on the issue: 
‘I feel like I’m being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a smart 
area West of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: ‘Why don’t you go back to 
where you came from?’ But I am French. I couldn’t be more French,’ Said the 23-
year-old, who was born and raised in bourgeois Versailles. (TG7) 
‘But this week, after Sarkozy announced that full veils weren’t welcome in France, 
things have got really difficult.’ She said... ‘I am qualified childminder and get plenty 
of interviews because of my CV, but when people see me in person, they don’t call 
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back. It’s difficult in this country, there’s a certain mood in the air. I don’t feel 
comfortable walking around.’ (TG7) 
Horia Demiati, 30, A French financier who wears the standard headscarf with her 
business suits, said: ‘I really fear an increase in hatred’ (TG7) 
 
The agency of face veil wearers was also related to negative actions, by drawing on the 
topos of the ‘repression of women’. This was illustrated in a direct quotation from Gilbert 
Collard, a celebrity lawyer arguing against a face veil ban on the premise that it will result in 
the further isolation of the women wearing it: 
 
These caged women show the power of the fundamentalists to indoctrinate. They 
testify also to an odious idea of women as an object of submission to an all-powerful 
master who is the exclusive proprietor of her face. (TT1) 
 
Although face veil wearing women are represented as oppressed by the negative referential 
strategies used, where they are referred to as ‘caged women’, they are given an active role 
in this repression. That is, they are represented as active agents of negative actions 
illustrated by the process verbs ‘show’ and ‘testify’, reflecting them as actively symbolizing 
the presupposed link between fundamentalism and the face veiling practice, as well as, the 
existence  of female repression. 
 
Similar examples were found in the Independent, face veiling women were also given active 
roles, mainly highlighting their active responsibility in negative actions towards themselves. 
They are portrayed as playing a part in their own ‘oppression’ by donning the face veil. 
Here was a women entirely shrouding her identity in public. (TI3) 
Later, in the same article, this active agency of a negative action places face veiling women 
in direct conflict with the positive qualities ‘feminists’ are described to have advocated and 
‘fought for’ over the years: 
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I don’t know how many women ‘choose’ to wear burqas, but the idea they decide as 
one to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day rather 
stretches the possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have 
fought for. (TI3) 
Drawing on the topos of ‘repression of women’, the action of wearing the face veil is put in 
direct opposition with the positive qualities associated with the feminist concepts of women 
empowerment and equality. 
Finally, in the Guardian, women wearing the face veil were also portrayed as actively taking 
part in negative actions towards themselves as a result of wearing the face veil, drawing on 
the topos of ‘separateness’, distancing themselves from society: 
Increasingly, veiled women chose to look inwards, withdraw from society and 
benefit from the networks of solidarity offered by salafism, rather than fighting for 
their choice in the political sphere. (TG6) 
 
4.2.4.2    UK Press: The Role of Muslims 
In the UK based articles, actors specified as ‘Muslims’ were mainly found to be represented 
as:  
1) agents of verbal processes, voicing their pro-ban views and their condemnation of 
the  face veiling practice. 
2) agents of negative actions, at times, drawing on the topoi of ‘threat’ and/or 
‘repression of women’. 
 
Starting with the verbal processes Muslims are responsible for, in most newspapers, 
opinions for and against the ban were voiced by elite Muslim actors. However, the Times 
mainly involved Muslim actors declaring their criticism of the face veiling practice or/and 
their pro veil ban views: 
 
Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, called the president’s remarks 
‘in keeping with the republican spirit of secularism’. (TT2) 
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Moderate Muslims also saw the full face covering as a symbol of submission, said 
Boubakeur. (TT2) 
 
Measures against face covers are supported by two of the three women Muslims in 
the cabinet (TT2) 
 
Foreign Correspondents here found their home media editing out the fact that the 
school veil ban was supported by Muslims. (TT1) 
 
 
Muslim actors were also given active roles in material processes. These usually involved 
Muslims taking an active role in negative actions against the ‘in-group’ or face veiling 
women, drawing on the topos of ‘repression of women’. 
 
In the Guardian article headlined, ‘France’s burqa barrier’ (TG6), Muslims leaders were given 
the responsibility of a negative action towards the in-group’s society by not ensuring the 
integration of veiled women within the society: 
 
However, the full veil’s very existence challenges the official Islam adopted in France 
and is one of the consequences of Muslim leaders’ failure to ensure the integration 
of veiled women after the 2004 law, and to protect the Muslim community from 
many Islamophobic acts which followed. 
 
Similar examples were more frequent in the Times, as the following extracts will show. The 
following 2 excerpts, taken from an op-ed headlined, ‘Veiled threat’ (TT5), show actions 
involving Muslim actors drawing on the topos of ‘threat’: 
 
Conservative Muslims in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his remarks. The 
Burka, they insist, is a ‘symbol of freedom’ and a Western state has no business 
dictating how Muslims should dress.  
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 The Burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has 
been given dubious religious sanction by conservative societies. 
 
As illustrated, the negative action of giving ‘dubious religious sanction’ is activated by 
Muslim agents, who are referred to collectively as ‘conservative societies’. The first phrase 
which appears earlier in the article clarifies the particular religion of these conservative 
societies by referring to its members as ‘Conservative Muslims’. Furthermore, the article 
distances itself from the views of conservative Muslims towards the Burka being a ‘symbol 
of freedom’, by the use of quotation marks. 
 
Too often extremists try to exploit this bogus symbol of Islamic piety to create Muslim 
ghettos where they assert their own personal power. Too often the issue is a deliberate 
provocation to challenge the values and mores of Western Society. 
 
Similar to the above example, in addition to the use of the negative naming ‘extremists’ to 
refer to Muslims, they are allocated with the agency of the negative process of ‘exploiting’ 
the face veil for their own power gaining agendas. The idea of the threat posed by the out-
group, ‘extremists’ is made clearer by allocating the in-group, ‘Western Society’, as the 
patient of the negative action, whose values are challenged and threatened by the out-
group.  
 
Another example of the agency of a negative action which does not draw on the topos of 
‘threat’, but nevertheless is negative, was found in the op-ed headlined, “Britain could never 
debate the burka like France” (TT3). 
 
When Jack Straw dared to state the obvious in 2006 by saying that the burka and the 
niqab were ‘visible statements of separation and of difference’ before asking politely 
that women visiting his constituency surgery consider removing them, it provoked 
angry protests from Islamic associations and the British liberal-left, always inclined, 
it seems, to defend the rights of liberty’s enemies. 
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As shown in the above example, although Jack straw’s comments were critical of burqa 
wearers, his action as an in-group member are described positively; his action ‘asked’ is 
attributed with a positive adjective ‘politely’. On the other hand, the out-group, who are 
referred to collectively as ‘Islamic associations’ are linked with a negative action described 
as ‘angry protests’. Furthermore, Jack Straw’s actions are justified and the writer’s stance is 
made clearer by describing his actions as stating the ‘obvious’. 
 
 
4.2.4.3   Arab Press: The Face Veil Wearer - A More Active Role 
Generally, there was a clear higher presence of active roles allocated to women wearing the 
face veil in the Arab based press. They were portrayed as agents of actions, and it was the 
type of actions they were attributed with that proved to be quite revealing. Face veiling 
women were given the agency of: 
1) verbal and mental processes, illustrating their feelings and views on the 
experience of face veiling. 
2) positive material processes 
3) the material process of choosing to veil 
Starting with the first frequently found pattern, active verbal and mental processes mainly 
focused on unveiling the face veil wearers’ reasoning behind adopting the face veil, as well 
as, exploring their emotions in relation to the practice of face veiling. This was marked in the 
text through direct and indirect quotations, in addition to, general descriptions. 
Consequently, Muslim women and women who wear the face veil are given a more 
prominent presence and voice in the texts. To explain further, the following section will 
provide some examples. 
In the op-ed, “French president’s burqa views leave readers fuming” (GN7), a face veil 
wearer is allocated with the agency of a verbal process, where she is directly quoted. She is 
also given an active role in a mental process, illustrating how she feels as a woman 
practicing face veiling: 
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Jamie Watson, an American expatriate, was upset by the French President’s 
comments. She said: ‘He obviously does not understand the concept of a burqa, since 
he is not a Muslim. It is not up to the people outside the religion to decide what is 
appropriate for us. And what does he mean by a ‘religious sign’? A burqa, to me, is 
as relevant as a cross’. After having embraced Islam a few years ago, Jamie realised 
how ‘comfortable’ she felt when covered from head to toe. 
Other similar examples of Muslim women and women wearing the face veil in active roles, 
include: 
Many say that wearing the burqa gives them a sense of freedom due to the sheer 
anonymity it provides. (GN10) 
They think that Western fashions force women into uncomfortable and undignified 
outfits and, often in the name of liberation, actually turn them into sexual objects as 
reflected in modern media and movies. (GN8) 
Women who wear the scarf point out that women of many other cultures and 
religions - Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women and Catholic 
nuns – often wear head coverings. They ask why these women are not viewed as 
being oppressed. (GN8). 
The active role given to Muslim women and women wearing the face veil also highlights 
them as agents of positive actions, and associating the veil with positive connotations: 
Muslim women often talk about what the Hijab symbolises: religious devotion, 
discipline, reflection, respect, freedom and modernity. (GN10). 
Whether veiled or not, majorities of Muslim women – even in some of the most 
conservative societies – support equal rights. In sharp contrast to their popular 
image as silently submissive, socially conditioned women who readily accept second-
class status, majorities of Muslim women in virtually every country surveyed say 
women should have the same legal rights as men. (GN10) 
These examples correspond with van Dijk’s ideological square, where the ‘in-group’ which 
represent ‘Us’ or ‘Muslim women’, are represented as agents of positive actions. They are 
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reflected as active and vocal members of society promoting equal rights, instead of women 
oppressed by their surroundings. In addition, it is worth noting, the term ‘conservative’ as 
an attribute to Muslims or Muslim societies does not carry any of the negative connotations 
it was found to be associated with in the some of the UK based papers. However, the use of 
the term ‘even’ prior to the phrase, ‘in some of the most conservative societies’ in the above 
example, can be viewed as making a presupposition that ‘conservative’ Muslim societies do 
not in fact advocate equal rights.   
Another clear pattern found in a few of the Gulf News and Saudi Gazette articles, is the 
allocation of veiling women as agents of the mental process of ‘choosing’ to wear the veil in 
all its forms. This draws on the topos of ‘freedom of choice’, where it is emphasised that the 
practice of veiling in general is actually adopted based on personal freedom and choice, 
rather than being an enforced practice. 
But I Suspect that the vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to 
do so for religious and cultural reasons. (GN10) 
If young French women of North African descent are choosing to be covered they 
are simply adhering to their roots. (GN10) 
Of course, this isn’t the first time that Western politicians have attempted to interfere 
in the way Muslim women choose to dress. (GN10) 
The action of freely ‘choosing’ is also reflected indirectly in the following example: 
Many young Muslim women have adopted Islamic dress to symbolise a return to 
their cultural roots and the rejection of Western traditions that in their view shows 
little respect to women. (GN8) 
In this example, instead of using the verb ‘choose’, Muslim women are represented as 
agents of the verb ‘adopted’ followed by another verb ‘to symbolise’, which provides a 
personal reason for their adoption of the ‘Islamic dress’. This automatically eliminates the 
possibility of the practice being enforced upon them. 
The Saudi Gazette provided even more similar examples. However, in addition to allocating 
face veil wearers the role of actively ‘choosing’ to wear the face veil, predicational strategies 
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were used, associating face veiling women with positive qualities. Furthermore, some 
examples drew on the topos of ‘victimisation’, where although face veil wearers are 
portrayed as active agents of various processes, they were faced with negative and critical 
actions brought forward by the ‘out-group’, ‘Them’, e.g. Sarkozy. 
Sarkozy chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the 
world as a sign of subservience and degradation. (SG2) 
The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives her an 
identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of boldly 
following her choice amidst a howl of protest. (SG2) 
Has he ever spoken to any of the thousands of Muslim women who choose to wear 
the burqa/abaya/jilbab and asked them the rationale behind their choice of that 
garb? (SG3) 
Women of high moral values prefer to cover for modesty. (SG2) 
A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French 
converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith (SG1) 
 
• The Face Veil Wearer – Passive Role 
As with the UK press, Muslim women and face veil wearers were allocated passive roles in 
some of the actions presented, taking the semantic roles of ‘patients’, where an action is 
done to them or for them. However, fitting with the ideological square in the ‘Arab context’, 
the syntactic structure utilized, emphasised the ‘out-group’ in a negative light, while the ‘in-
group’ or ‘face veil wearers/Muslim women’ are associated with positive and neutral 
connotations. Muslim women and face veil wearers were either positioned as: 
(1) patients undergoing negative actions activised by the ‘out-group’, e.g. Sarkozy, 
drawing on topoi of ‘victimisation’ and ‘discrimination’  
(2) patients and beneficiaries of positive or neutral actions activated by an ‘in-group’ 
source, mainly represented by various sources associated with the Islamic religion.  
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(3)  patients of ‘religious obligation’. 
Although this syntactic construct was found in various Arab based newspapers, it was 
particularly evident in the Qatar based Gulf Times. 
In the article, “Dress row opens bitter divisions” (GT6), which is an article originally published 
in the UK based Guardian, the construct of veiled women as victims of negative and at times 
discriminatory actions were highlighted in several sections throughout the article: 
1) As it is, people sometimes shout ‘Ninja’ at me. 
 
2) Women in standard headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving 
lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from 
university classes and in one case, a women in a bank was not allowed to withdraw 
cash from her own account at the counter. 
 
3) From our figures, the biggest discriminator against Muslim women is the state and 
state officials. 
As illustrated above, veil wearers are portrayed as victims. This is done by positioning them 
on the receiving end of negative actions. In the first two examples, the agents of the 
negative actions are suppressed, where very little detailed information, if any, is given 
regarding the agents responsible for the negative actions. This is done through the use of 
the general lexical item ‘people’ in example 1, and the passive construction of processes in 
example 2, allowing for agent deletion and thus the exclusion of agents responsible for the 
negative actions. However, as the third example shows, which is taken from the following 
section in the same article, the actors blamed for such discriminatory actions towards 
‘Muslim women’ are clearly highlighted as the ‘state and state officials’, realized by 
circumstantialization through the use of the prepositional phrase ‘against’. 
Other examples clearly position ‘out-group’ actors as the agents of negative actions against 
‘Muslim women’ or ‘veiled women’, who are given passive roles: 
Here is France mustering all capacity, mobilising all her institutions and organising 
her ranks to wage a perfidious new war against our sisters who wear the niqab (SG2) 
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That Sarkozy has had to take recourse to the marginalisation of Muslim women in 
his attempt to defend the French ideal of ‘an open mind’ is an irony (SG3) 
And earlier, in 2001, Laura Bush and Cherie Blair led a brief assault on the burqa 
worn in Afghanistan, which is still being worn out of choice today. (GN10) 
Some of the negative actions attributed to the ‘out-group’ (e.g. ‘France’, ‘Sarkozy’, ‘Laura 
Bush and Cherie Blair’) involve, waging a ‘new war’, the ‘marginalisation of Muslim women’ 
and ‘a brief assault on the burqa’. 
As mentioned earlier, Muslim and face veiling women were also passivised in processes 
activated by various sources associated with Islam as a religion. However, the actions 
attributed to these sources were mainly positive. Examples of this pattern were mainly 
found in the Saudi Gazette and Gulf news: 
First, he Sarkozy does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds 
women in high regard. (GN6) 
Muslim and veiled women were also found to be represented with the use of obligation or 
Deontic modality, drawing on the topos of ‘religious obligation’. Modal verbs and their 
negations are used to highlight in categorical terms the religious obligations women have to 
abide by. This highlights the direct connection (to some) between religious obligations and 
the practice of face veiling. This representation differs quite drastically from the findings in 
the UK based press, where the denial of such a connection formed one of the premises why 
the face veil should be viewed as a political statement that poses a threat, and thus, should 
be banned. The following examples illustrate the use of some these obligation modal verbs: 
However, another Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning 
the face veil in France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, should leave the 
country if it was outlawed by the government. ‘As long as you accepted to be a 
French citizen, then you have to comply with the laws of the country in which you 
stay. Muslim women in France should even give up their citizenship and return to 
Muslim countries if they found themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. 
If they have to choose between the face veil and their citizenship, they have to go 
[sic] the face veil and return to Muslim countries’ (GT4). 
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But women in France who don it should not remove it just to comply with the 
proposed ban since Muslims should not comply with any law that is violating the 
Islamic teachings (GT4) 
 
4.2.4.4   Arab Press: The Role of Muslims 
Similar to the representation of Muslim women and face veil wearers, in the majority of 
articles included in the Arab corpus, Muslim actors were mainly given active roles, where 
they were agents of actions. However, the actions were limited to verbal and mental 
processes, which mainly involved individualised elite actors in various Arab contexts. More 
importantly, unlike the UK press, these actors were mainly made up of religious elite and 
Islamic scholars who: 
(1) provided their thoughts and comments on the face veil ban and the possible 
implications for Muslim women from a religious perspective.  
(2) provided their critical comments towards the ban, emphasising the negative and 
discriminatory actions carried out by the ‘out-group’, ‘Them’ towards the ‘in-group’, 
‘Muslims’ or ‘face veiling women’.   
(1) Example of a comment on implications of a ban: 
Shaikh Fayez al Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is 
permissible for a Muslim woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing the 
burqa, not to wear it. ‘It would suffice her wear the Hijab...he told Gulf News if a Muslim 
woman wants to travel to such a country, which imposes a ban on wearing the burqa, for 
educational or treatment purposes, then she should respect the regulations of the 
country by simply wearing the Hijab. (GN6)  
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(2) Example of a critical comment towards the ban : 
 
About the remarks made by Sarkozy in which he described the niqab as ‘subservience of 
women’, Sheikh Helal said such statements were mainly triggered by ‘Islamophobia’ 
trend. ‘Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women’s rights. It is 
just a disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European 
politicians speak out against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe,’ he added. (GT4) 
 
4.2.5   UK Press: Argumentation  
 
This part of the thesis will highlight the key argumentation strategies used in the UK based 
newspapers articles, followed by a comparative discussion of the main argumentation 
strategies used in the Arab corpus of articles. 
 
In the UK based articles, most of the argumentation strategies drew upon topoi introduced 
earlier in the thesis, manifested in the newspaper texts through various micro strategies 
used in reference to key social actors/objects and their social actions. However, the 
argumentation strategies take these topoi further, enhancing the chief argument for the 
general reader. 
Overall, face veiling women and Muslims were mainly represented drawing on the topoi of 
‘threat’, ‘difference’, ‘repression of women’ and ‘separateness’. That is, as a direct 
consequence of wearing the face veil, they are predominantly portrayed as: 
(1) Threatening towards the ‘in-group/Us’ society and its values. 
(2) Different to the ‘in-group/Us’, its norms and what it is accustomed to. 
(3) Objects of oppression and subjugation. 
(4) Separate, promoting seclusion from main stream society. 
These were found to run across the series of articles analysed for this study, with no 
significant variation in regard to frequency or intensity between the newspapers of varying 
ideological and political underpinnings.  Also, more importantly, it was noted that although 
some articles overtly argued against a face veil ban, drawing on the topos of ‘victimisation’ 
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in the representation of Muslims or/and Face veil wearers, they leaned towards a negative 
representation of the practice of face veiling, drawing on some of the negative topoi 
mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning again, argumentation strategies were not exclusive to 
negative representations of face veiling women and Muslims. In some articles 
(predominantly found in the Guardian), face veiling women were also represented as 
victims of ill treatment, drawing on the topoi of ‘victimisation’, at times highlighting the ‘in-
group’ as the agents of discriminatory aggression towards them. However, rather than the 
use of explicit argumentation strategies, this was mainly translated in the text through the 
actions, roles and predicational strategies attributed to face veiling women, as pointed  out 
earlier in the analysis. 
4.2.5.1    Topos of ‘Threat’ 
A key topos that was drawn upon in arguing against the face veil was the topos of ‘threat’ 
represented by face veil wearers or/and Muslims towards Western society (in-group/Us) 
and its values. The very practice of wearing the face veil is directly linked to extremist views 
and thus is reflected negatively as a threat towards the west. As shown earlier in the paper, 
the referential and predicational strategies used lay the foundation on which the topos of 
‘threat’ is built upon. However, as the following sections will show, the argumentative 
strategies used crystallised the idea of threat in relation to the face veil even further. 
 
The threat is referred to explicitly in some of headlines leading the articles analysed. One 
such example is an op-ed in the Times headlined, “Veiled Threat: The burka, a symbol of 
repression, has no place in a free society” (TT5). The veil is directly associated with a threat 
by the use of a homographic pun with the term ‘veiled’, where the same term may reflect 
two different interpretations. The first interpretation views ‘veiled’ as a metaphor attributed 
to the term ‘threat’, a non-human entity which is personified with the specific characteristic 
of face veil wearers (physically covering themselves), as being ‘veiled’. Thus, face veil 
wearers are reflected as a threat, covering themselves with the veil. Following a micro 
analysis of the article itself, a second interpretation can be made, which associates the 
‘threat’ with ‘extremists’. Here, ‘veiled’ is used to describe the ‘threat’ as being deliberately, 
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but indirectly posed by ‘extremists’ towards Western society by their promotion of the face 
veil wearing practice. Although the example presents two interpretations, in both, the veil is 
reflected as ‘threatening’. 
 
The idea of ‘threat’ is developed further in the article itself: 
 
Too often extremists try to exploit this bogus symbol of Islamic piety to create 
Muslim ghettos where they assert their own personal power. Too often the issue is a 
deliberate provocation to challenge the values and mores of Western Society. 
 
In addition to negative explicit referential and predicational strategies, where Muslims are 
labelled as ‘extremists’ and the face veil is described as a “bogus symbol of Islamic piety”, 
the excerpt commits a pathetic fallacy (argumentum ad baculum). The writer uses non-
argumentative means of persuasion by appealing to the readers emotions in raising fears 
and concerns by describing face veiling as a product of an extremist ideology which poses a 
threat by the ‘deliberate provocation to challenge’ the values of Western society. In 
addition, a logical fallacy is committed by a hasty generalisation, where ‘the issue’ or the 
face veiling practice is generalised as mainly being practiced to challenge Western values, 
neglecting any other possible motivation behind the practice, whether it be, personal, 
traditional or religious. 
 
In another Times article, the argument highlighting a threat also takes the form of an 
inductive argument through the presentation of a causal relationship between the spread of 
fundamentalist doctrines and the increase of women wearing the face veil. 
 
Niqabs and burqas – the head to toe costumes that cover all or most of the face --- 
are said to be spreading as fundamentalist doctrines gain hold among a small 
minority of France’s five million Muslims. (TT1) 
 
The use of ‘as’ suggests a causal relation, where a presumption is made that a 
fundamentalist ideology is in fact gaining popularity and face veiling is on an increase as a 
consequence. Face veiling is framed as a direct negative consequence of the spread of 
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fundamentalism. This argumentative scheme produces a false cause fallacy (Cum Hoc, Ergo 
Propter hoc), where the cause and effect are described to take place simultaneously, and 
thus, are established to be directly related. The argument connects face veiling as a direct 
and exclusive effect of the spread of fundamentalism, ignoring the fact that an increase in 
face veiling maybe related to other factors, not linked to any fundamentalist ideology. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the referential and predicational analysis, a polarisation between 
‘moderate’ and ‘conservative’ Muslims was made, where ‘conservative Muslims’ are 
portrayed with negative connotations, while ‘moderate Muslims’ carried more positive 
connotations. In the following passage taken from the Times, the topos of ‘threat’ is 
enhanced by linking face veiling exclusively to ‘conservative societies’ who promote the 
practice by giving it ‘dubious religious sanction’. 
 
“The burka, however, is different. Not only does it divide European liberals; it also is 
controversial within Islam. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no Koranic 
foundation in the demand that a women should hide her face. The Koran only enjoins 
modesty in appearance and clothing, and subsequent injunctions that a woman 
should cover her hair with a scarf or her face with a veil are derived solely from the 
Hadith, the body of sayings attributed to the prophet. The burka appears to be purely 
tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been given dubious religious 
sanction by conservative societies.” (TT5) 
 
Here, a symptomatic argumentation (an argument of authority/topos of authority) or what 
can be described as rhetorical ‘Ethos’ is used. This is done by using the statement ‘as many 
scholars have pointed out’ to support the claim arguing the face veiling practice as having no 
Koranic foundations. Based on this claim, face veiling is concluded to be exclusively linked to 
tribal practices by the use of ‘purely tribal’, with no religious underpinnings, but instead is 
given ‘dubious religious sanction by conservative societies’, linking it to ‘conservative’ 
Muslims in particular. However, the argument can be considered fallacious on two levels. 
 
Firstly, it commits the fallacy of ‘an appeal to an unidentified authority’, where the claim is 
asserted as true because it is supported by ‘many scholars’, yet the scholars are left 
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unidentified, leaving their expertise unverified. Consequently, this makes the claim 
questionable. 
 
Secondly and more importantly, the argument can be considered a fallacious appeal to 
authority (argumentum ad verecundiam). That is, the claim made is regarded acceptable 
because it is stated by an authoritative source, ‘scholars’, although the claim itself is 
questionable. To clarify this, some background information on the sources of Islamic 
teachings is necessary. 
 
From a Muslim perspective, Islamic practices and obligations are derived from two sources 
which are considered divine, the Quran, the words of Allah (God), and the Sunna, the 
sayings and practices of the Muslim prophet. These two sources are viewed as 
complementary in achieving a full and comprehensive understanding of the teachings of 
Islam and its practices. The Sunna is often used to develop a more precise interpretation of 
the Quran and it is here where disagreements between scholars may occur. Accordingly, 
individuals may follow different interpretations depending on their own personal beliefs and 
convictions. With that being said, the subject of veiling in Islam has raised similar 
disagreements based on various interpretations between scholars and indeed, between 
members of the general public.  
 
Going back to the above argument of authority, while there are ‘scholars’ arguing that the 
veil has no ‘Koranic’ basis, there are other scholars arguing against this claim. Thus, arguing 
that the face veil is ‘purely tribal’ on the premise that relies on authority involving some 
‘scholars’ can be considered an inappropriate use of symptomatic argumentation. 
 
Moreover, a similar pattern of drawing on the topos of ‘authority’ was also used as the 
premise for a reoccurring argument in articles published in the Daily telegraph. The 
argument for a ban is built on the premise that various accredited sources have denounced 
the face veil or disassociated the practice of face veiling with Islam as a religion. This was 
translated in the text either through, (1) Muslim actors verbalising this argument through 
direct or indirect quotations, or (2) Other actors arguing against the ban by using various 
authorities to support their argument. 
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Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of Paris Mosque, supported an inquiry, saying that face 
covering for women was a fundamentalist practice originating in Afghanistan that 
was not prescribed in Islam. (DT1) 
In addition to negative predicational strategies describing the face veiling practice as 
‘fundumentalist’, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, it is symptomatically argued by a Muslim 
actor, ‘rector of Paris Mosque’, to be associated exclusively with Afghanistan as a country. 
This is indicated by the phrase ‘originating in Afghanistan’, rather than having a religious 
basis.  
Ending this section on the topos of ‘threat’ are two examples taken from the same article, 
‘France searches its soul over the veil’ (TG5), published in the Guardian. In this article, the 
face veil and the practice of wearing it are described as the following: 
In France, women who wear the voile intergral do it by choice, not by obligation. This 
isn’t an exotic symbol, but a political one.  
Here, in addition to the sweeping generalisation that all women in France wear the face veil 
by choice, we have an example of an enthymeme, where there is an unexpressed premise 
that women who decide to wear the face veil by choice are symbolizing a political stance. 
However, while some women may choose to adopt the face veil with the aim of making 
political statements, others may do so, based on various religious, cultural and personal 
motivations.  
This description of women wearing the face veil and the motivation behind this practice 
forms the basis of an interesting argument presented further on in the article, which again 
draws on the topos of ‘threat’. A claim is made that a legislation of the face veiling practice 
would pose a threat to ‘social cohesion’. 
Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of 
racial hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how 
to deal with a different type of situation. An Algerian chef whose sister died when 
extremists cut her throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman 
wearing a niqab, because she saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered 
her sibling. Today, her attitude could send her to court for racism and refusal to serve 
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a client on discriminatory grounds. If the burqa was legitimised, there would be no 
reason to permit one political discourse and not two, something which would risk 
out social cohesion. 
In the above extract, a false analogy is committed and a causal argumentation scheme 
produces unreasonable argumentation. Firstly, the comparison between the act of a chef 
not willing to serve a customer based on their choice of dress and a women choosing to 
wear a burqa, as both being forms of political discourse is unjustified. That is, although the 
chef may be taking a political stance, one which may be considered racist, not all women 
choosing to adopt a face veil do so with the aim of making a political statement. More 
importantly, the act of covering ones face cannot particularly be described as an act of 
discrimination or racism towards others.  
Based on this comparison, a causal relation is presented claiming that legitimizing the face 
veil would mean that other forms of political discourse would have to be permitted, 
whether racist or not, i.e. the racist discourse of the chef, and this would consequently pose 
a threat to ‘social cohesion’. However, as the argument is based on a false analogy, this 
argument is unjustifiable.  
 
4.2.5.2   Topos of ‘Difference’ 
The topos of ‘difference’ is another topos drawn upon in the arguments against the face 
veiling practice, similarly developing a negative representation of face veiling women. Face 
veil wearers are represented as ‘different’, where the act of face veiling is depicted as being 
in contrast and indeed, counter to the values, beliefs and way of life people are accustomed 
to in Western society. This topos was mainly detected in the Times and the Guardian. 
 
In the Times, examples where this was highlighted were found in an op-ed article headlined, 
“Veiled Threat: The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society” (TT5). The 
sub-heading foregrounds this topos by placing the face veil ‘burka’, negatively described as 
‘a symbol of repression’, as being in conflict with ‘free society’. The following passage found 
in the article develops the topos further: 
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Among European liberals the burka is seen as a symbol of female subservience. And 
the freedom to opt for such a deplorable status runs counter to other liberties 
regarded as more important in the hierarchy of freedoms: openness, transparency, 
equality and opportunity. Within Western society, the covering of the face negates 
all such fundamental rights. 
 
Through a hasty generalisation, ‘Among European liberals’, the wearing of the veil is 
contrasted with the concept of liberalism associated with the ‘Western society’, where it is 
associated with ‘female subservience’ and described as a ‘deplorable status’. This view of 
the face veil is held in direct contrast to positive qualities attributed strongly to ‘liberalism’, 
such as, ‘openness, transparency, equality and opportunity’. Therefore, a presumption is 
made that face veiling women are different in that they do not hold these positive qualities, 
which are held to be of great importance in Western society. 
 
Further down in the same article, the writer states: 
 
There are also, in Western society, practical objections to any garment that hinders 
movement, impairs trust or conceals identity. A woman in a burka cannot properly 
drive a car, clear a security check, teach pupils, practice medicine, enter a jewellery 
shop or carry out a host of mundane activities. 
 
Similar to the earlier example, women wearing the face veil are placed in direct contrast to 
the principles held by ‘Western society’. This is done through the presumption that the face 
veil holds the negative qualities of garments that the ‘western society’ has ‘practical 
objections’ to. Therefore, the face veil is seen as not fitting in Western society, as it is 
unacceptable garment. Moreover, a standpoint is made with no mitigation that face veiled 
women cannot effectively conduct certain activities and tasks, without any sufficient 
conclusive support. Not only does the first statement not qualify as conclusive support for 
the standpoint taken, it commits the fallacy of ambiguity, where it is not clear how or using 
what criteria one can judge a garment to hinder movement, impair trust, or conceal 
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identity. More importantly, ambiguity also takes shape of referential indifference, where 
one may ask, what and who can be constituted as ‘Western society’ in this case? 
 
This representation of the difference between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ is also highlighted in the op-
ed, ‘France searches its soul over the veil’ (TG5), focusing on the same topic of ‘secularism 
and the Face veil’. 
This isn’t an exotic symbol, but a political one. We’re used to showing our faces on a 
daily basis as part of our identity: picking up a parcel at the post office, collecting 
children from kindergarten. But what then, for women whose face cannot be seen? In 
what case would a political position, even one stemming from religious conviction, 
put someone above the law. 
The difference between the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ is highlighted by a contrast of 
characteristics related to the identity of each group, which is mainly differentiated by the 
covering of the face. The ‘in-group’ represented by the aggregated ‘we’re’ and ‘our’ are 
assigned with the characteristic of showing their face during daily activities (which are 
described in detail) and this is contrasted with the ‘out-group’ who are represented as 
‘women who cannot be seen’. The contrast based on this characteristic highlights the 
difference between both groups. Moreover, the question, ‘in what case would a political 
position, even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law’, 
highlights the contrast between both groups even further. The question does not only make 
a generalised assumption that face veiling is the result of a ‘political position’, but also 
triggers a negative presupposition that women who dress differently, in this case, ‘veiled 
women’, are in fact in conflict with the law. 
Further down in the same article, the difference is enhanced further using a metaphor 
which contrasts face veiling with the qualities of ‘French society’. 
In other words, women wearing the burqa aren’t asserting their right not to be 
discriminated against – they’re asking for specific rights. 
If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to 
look at changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a herbal 
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infusion: the flavours of many different plants are present, but by blending together 
they create harmony of sorts. It’s possible that we could choose to make our tea by 
singling out some of those leaves for different treatment – We’ve never tried it, but 
why not? It would, however, mean that we’d be moving from universality to 
separatism.  
Using a metaphor centring around the concept of tea making, the French society, a ‘herbal 
infusion’, is placed in contrast with face veiling women who are reflected as ‘leaves’ that 
require ‘different treatment’. More importantly, face veiling women are described as 
actively wanting to be treated differently, signalled by their active role in ‘asking for specific 
rights’. Giving them these rights, ‘singling out these leaves for different treatment’, would 
instigate a change to the existing structure of French society, one attributed with 
‘universality’ and the positive attribute of having ‘a harmony of sorts’ to a society attributed 
with the qualities of ‘separatism’. Face-veiling women are represented as ‘different’, while 
also drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, since this difference would cause a change to the 
internal structure and the positive qualities or ‘harmony’ of French society today.  
 
4.2.5.3    Topos of ‘Repression of Women’ 
Although this topos was highlighted in most of the articles making up the corpus by the 
referential/predicational strategies and social actions attributed to Muslims and face veil 
wearers, in terms of argumentations strategies, examples were mainly found in the 
Guardian and the Independent. Here, the face veil is argued to cause the repression of 
women wearing it.  
For instance, in a Guardian news analysis article on the French parliamentary proposal for 
the face veil ban, the following presupposition is made: 
government spokesman Luc Chatel said it was important to establish to what extent 
women’s rights are being compromised by the garments. (TG1) 
As shown, a presupposition is indicated by a wh-question, where to ‘what extent’ presumes 
that women’s rights are in fact compromised by the face veil. 
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Another example was found in the Independent: 
But banishing the burqa from public life will not have the knock-on effect of 
banishing everything Sarkozy does not like about it from the lives of women who 
wear it, or from France’s problems with assimilating its Muslim community. More 
likely, some of these women will be kept from public life altogether. (TI3) 
In this excerpt, the writer expresses his uncertainty about the positive outcomes of a face 
veil ban, where he argues that it could lead to further presupposed repression of face veiled 
women. This causal relation is highlighted by the phrase ‘more likely’, and the use of the 
modal verb ‘will’ removes any form of hedging, portraying the truth of them being cut off 
from society as absolutely categorical. This may be argued as an example of a slippery slope 
fallacy, where the example suggests that by taking a particular course of action, the 
situation is guaranteed to go from bad to worse. In this case, it will result in a continued and 
more extensive version of the oppression supposedly experienced by face veiling women, 
an unjustified presumed conclusion. 
The topos of ‘repression of women’ is drawn upon again towards the end of the same article 
through the use of a disclaimer: 
I do not know how many women ‘choose’ to wear burqas, but the idea they decide 
as one to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day rather 
stretches the possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have 
fought for. 
The form of disclaimer used here is what van Dijk labels as ‘apparent ignorance’. The first 
part of the excerpt highlights the writer positively by pointing out her willingness to accept 
that there are in fact women who choose to wear the face veil, although this is questioned 
by the use of quotation marks around the verb ‘choose’, distancing the writer from this 
view. This is followed by the disclaimer signalled by ‘but’ and a negative description of the 
‘out-group’, the ‘face veiling women’, who are presented in direct contrast or as a challenge 
to the positive features, ‘individual, and equal, expression’, feminists fought for. 
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4.2.5.4   Topos of ‘Separateness’ 
Finally, the topos of ‘separateness’ was also drawn upon, where face veil wearers were 
represented as separate from society. In fact, they are represented as wearing the veil with 
the motivation of distancing or separating themselves from mainstream society. This topos 
was highlighted in all the newspapers included in the corpus. This argument may work to 
support European political discourse emphasising the limitations of multiculturalism and 
insisting on assimilation and integration. 
 
In the Times, interestingly, this representation was actually depicted in an op-ed article 
arguing against a face veil ban, ‘Women, West Brom, the burka and me’ (TT4). Although the 
writer argues against the ban, the representation of the face veil and the women who wear 
it carried negative connotations in line with the Orientalist ideology depicting Muslims as 
‘separate’, as illustrated in the following passage: 
 
‘Come photograph No50 I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was truly 
a liberating experience and it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women 
are reluctant to give up the veil. It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the 
outside world with no obligation to smile or look interested – hidden in your own 
secret place’ 
 
Here, the writer argues for the face veil by using a false analogy as an argumentation 
scheme. Wearing the veil is compared to wearing a mascot costume, which the writer 
personally experienced during a football game. The writer adopts the standpoint that some 
face veil wearers adopt in arguing for the wearing of the face veil, describing the practice as 
‘liberating’. However, the falseness of the analogy results from, (1) poor grounds for a 
comparison between the two items of clothing, and (2) the insufficient argument presented. 
 
In regard to the poor grounds of comparison, the comparison cannot be justified, as there 
are stark differences between a mascot costume and the face veil and their meaning to their 
wearers, making them incomparable. Although they both share the quality of physically 
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covering one’s face, they are quite different on a conceptual level. The mascot costume is 
usually worn for a particular job, typically for entertainment purposes and for specific 
periods of time. However, viewing the practice of face veiling in the same light would 
neglect the various intrinsic, personal, traditional or/and religious motivations, as well as, 
the lifelong commitments veil wearers adopt in following the practice.  
 
Furthermore, the argument itself can be considered insufficient, where the presumption is 
made that the face veil is essentially worn to limit interaction with the society and to allow 
the wearers to be ‘hidden’ in their ‘own secret place’, drawing on the negative connotations 
of separateness in the representation of women who practice face veiling. This again, 
overlooks the various other religious, traditional and personal motivations they may have in 
adopting the practice. 
 
Moving on, the Daily Telegraph had a similar example, drawing on the topos of 
‘separateness’, as the following example shows: 
 
Douglas Murray, director of the think tank, the Centre for Social Cohesion, is one of 
them. ‘People shouldn’t have the right to hide themselves away in society’ he says, 
‘Cutting yourself off from society is threatening when we have known terrorists to 
try to escape wearing a burka. Men who said they had to wear balaclavas would be 
very unlikely to be allowed into banks or to travel on most public transport. Ask 
yourself this: can you imagine asking the time or for directions from a woman in a 
burka?’ (DT2) 
The above excerpt begins with face veiling women being attributed with the action of 
‘hiding away from society’, drawing on the topos of ‘separateness’ in their representation. 
The topos of ‘threat’ is drawn upon next with the use of a symptomatic argument arguing 
that women wearing the face veil pose a direct threat to society. However, the argument 
commits a hasty generalisation, where based on a few instances where ‘terrorists’ were 
known to try to escape wearing a face veil, a more general point is made regarding women 
who cover themselves. The face veil, in general, regardless of who it is worn by, is depicted 
as threatening, as it is described as a characteristic of the way terrorists appear. This can be 
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considered as an example of an unreasonable argument, since the supporting premises are 
not representative or sufficient, (1) not all individuals who cover themselves are terrorists 
trying to escape, and (2) covering one’s self is not characteristic of the way terrorists appear 
in public. The excerpt ends with presupposition triggered by a question which reasserts the 
topos of ‘separateness’, ‘Ask yourself: can you imagine asking the time or directions from a 
woman in a burka?’ Here a presumption is made that asking a face veiling woman for 
directions or for the time is something people may have a problem imagining or doing, 
highlighting her separateness and incompatibility with society’s regular daily happenings. 
At the end of the same article, another example was found in which the same topos is 
drawn upon: 
If it takes a foreign politician to prompt a Muslim to articulate this view, there is 
something to be said for an attack on the burka. At least it gets Muslims and non-
Muslims talking, not just among themselves, but maybe even to one another. 
The separateness between  the ‘out-group’ and ‘in-group’ is clearly highlighted in the 
analysis which follows a direct quote voiced by a Muslim actor, ‘Ahmed Versi’, praising the 
UK as ‘heaven compared to France’ in regard to integration and tolerance towards Muslims 
and the face veil. The writer initiates the analysis of the quote by a presupposition signalled 
by a change of state verb ‘prompt’, which makes the assumption that Muslims rarely or 
never articulate positive views of the UK. This negative description of ‘Them’ is followed by 
a positive framing of the critical action taken by Sarkozy towards the veil, stating ‘there is 
something to be said for an attack on the burka’; the negative action ‘attack’ by Sarkozy (in-
group member) is described as having a positive impact. The positive impact is emphasised 
further in the next part of the excerpt by the use of another change of state verb, ‘gets’, 
which presupposes an interaction dilemma, where Muslims and non-Muslims are assumed 
as not interacting or voicing opinions on the topic among themselves or one another. 
Furthermore, the use of the adverb ‘even’ in the phrase, ‘but maybe even to one another’, 
functions as an intensifying strategy, emphasising the separateness and unlikelihood of 
these two social groups interacting. 
The independent also provided similar examples. In the article “Sophie Morris: Sarkozy’s 
right: the burqa is a tool of repression” (TI3), which as mentioned earlier, argues against the 
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practice of face veiling, the topos of ‘separateness’ was drawn upon heavily.  The face veiled 
woman is argued and represented as being separate and as a non active or engaging 
member of society as a result of wearing the face veil.  
The article presents us with a narrative to establish a relationship between face veiling 
women and society, which predominately emphasises the separateness and exclusion of 
face veiling women from mainstream society. This is done by individualising and describing a 
face veiling woman and her surroundings as she is coming down a crowded high street on a 
Sunday afternoon, in detail: 
 
I was stuck in a slow lane behind a pram when I noticed a women coming in the 
opposite direction, who was getting absolutely nowhere, shoved to the back not just 
by the onwards traffic but by those coming from behind her and from all sides too. I 
remember her because she was wearing a burqa. 
She wasn’t getting anywhere because, if anyone noticed her, they weren’t treating 
her as part of the scrum. Pushing your way through the crowd required a degree of 
engagement with those you’re pushing against – impossible if you cannot make eye 
contact. As her skirt was so long and roomy, who knew whether she had one foot in 
front of the other, a stance that signals you’re about to start moving, or not? 
 
As shown in the above excerpt, the face veiled women is portrayed as separate from her 
surroundings as a consequence of wearing the face veil. This is mainly illustrated by the use 
of causal argumentation and a simile. 
The women wearing the face veil is described as being separate from her surroundings and 
thus being treated differently from others in the crowded street; she is given a passive role, 
where actions are being done to her, without her involvement or control. She is being 
‘shoved to the back’ and the crowd are ‘not treating her as part of the scrum’. This 
difference in treatment and experience is due to (indicated by ‘because’) features that 
enhance her separateness, one being her lack of eye contact and the other being the 
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inability of others to see the movement of her feet, both of which are consequences of 
wearing the ‘burqa’, as it is understood in this particular context. 
Further on in the same article, the topos of ‘separateness’ is highlighted even more 
explicitly: 
How rubbish it must be to be stuck inside such heavy black clothing on one of 
Britain’s few sunny days, with the world swirling around you as if you were a lamp 
post, for that’s about the level of interaction she could have with passers-by without 
engaging them in a conversation. 
The writer begins with the use of negative predicational strategies in reference to the face 
veil, referring to it as, ‘heavy black clothing’, which is put in juxtaposition with a British 
sunny day. This is followed by the use of a simile, highlighting the ‘separateness’ face veiling 
causes, where the face veiled woman is compared to a ‘lamp post’, an object lacking any 
form of movement, interaction or life as opposed to the ‘world swirling’ around her. 
 
4.2.6 Arab Press: Argumentation 
Many of the topoi drawn upon in the Arab press were highlighted extensively in the 
referential, predicational and social actions analysis discussed earlier. It was also noted, 
comparatively speaking, that the UK displayed a more extensive application of 
argumentation strategies than those employed in the Arab corpus of articles. 
In terms of argumentation strategies, reproduction of arguments presented in the UK press 
were minimal, with a few examples of arguments against the practice of face veiling, 
drawing on the topos of ‘threat’. However, in the arguments against a face veil ban, three 
key topoi were introduced that were not as evident in the UK corpus, the topoi of 
‘discrimination’, ‘difference’ and ‘religious obligation’. Some of these topoi, at times, 
worked to directly reject and oppose the dominant representations of Muslims and face 
veiling women found in the UK press. 
The topos of ‘discrimination’ was drawn upon quite extensively in many of the articles 
analysed. Here, the argument against a ban is built upon the explicit premise that a ban 
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would be a discriminatory act against Muslims. Therefore, in addition to reproducing the 
topos of ‘victimisation’, drawn upon in a few UK based articles, the Arab press takes the 
argument further by paying more widespread attention on argumentative strategies 
persuading the reader that the proposal for such a ban is in fact an act of discrimination 
specifically targeting Muslims. Muslims are not merely represented as victimised, but their 
victimisation is reflected as being sourced by discriminatory motivations. 
As was shown earlier (see section 4.2.5.2), the topos of ‘difference’ was drawn upon in the 
argument for a face veil ban in various UK based articles. The same topos was drawn upon 
in the Arab press, however, the social meanings and actor roles were reversed. To explain 
further, in the Arab press, this topos was drawn upon in the argument against a face veil 
ban rather than for a ban. The argument is built on the premise that face veiling is a positive 
practice and should not be banned. The positive implications of face veiling is supported by 
emphasising the ‘difference’ between Muslim women who wear the face veil, ‘Us’ and 
women in the West, ‘Them’. Unlike the UK press, this ‘difference’ is positively framed, 
highlighting Muslim women or the ‘in-group’ as superior to the ‘out-group’, possessing 
positive qualities, as a result of opting to don a face veil. 
Finally, the topos of ‘religious obligation’ was drawn upon in the argument for a ban, 
representing face veiling women as under the religious obligation to practice face veiling. 
Similarly, this is another example of a dominant representation of face veiling women that 
directly rejects and opposes dominant meanings highlighted in the UK press. Meanings 
which frequently emphasised the disassociation of the face veiling practice from religion, at 
times, in support of arguments highlighting the practice as a form of social threat.   
  
4.2.6.1    Topos of ‘Threat’ 
As mentioned earlier, the Arab press was mainly found to produce its own key topoi in the 
representation of Muslims and face veiling women. However, the topos of ‘threat’ was one 
topos found to be utilised in the UK press and reproduced in the Arab based articles, albeit 
to a lesser degree. Again, similar to many of the examples in the UK press, this topos was 
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mainly drawn upon in the arguments for a ban, based on what are viewed as various social 
threats posed by the face veiling practice. 
In the article, “No burqa please, we’re French” (GN9), which actually argues for the freedom 
of choice in regard to the practice of face veiling, there were a few examples in which the 
face veil itself is negatively represented, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’.  
Yet, the reality of the matter surpasses the burqa itself. This is seen clearly in the fear 
that swiped France in reaction to the burqa, which appears like a reproduction of 
the dress code imposed by the Taliban on women in Afghanistan 
As illustrated above, veiling in France is portrayed as the exclusive consequence of a 
practice ‘imposed by the Taliban’, a political group linked with extremism, as well as, the 
‘women of Afghanistan’. The causal relation is signalled by the phrase, ‘which appears like a 
reproduction’. The causal relation between the practice of face veiling and the idea of a 
‘threat’ is emphasised further in the following section of the same article: 
The historic implications of the burqa are those of radicalism and extremism, thus 
the stir is not an expression of racism against Muslims, as some claimed, but simply a 
fear of a drift towards sectarianism.’  
Following a direct link made between the ‘burqa’ and ‘radicalism and extremism’, this is 
explained as the reason a conflict has risen against face veiling, which is ‘feared’ to  possibly 
lead to ‘sectarianism’, a term commonly associated with violence and conflict. Therefore, 
through a causal relation indicated by a ‘drift towards’, face veiling is portrayed as a practice 
to be feared, since it can threaten and harm the relations between various communities in 
French society. 
However, in this example, the ‘slippery slope fallacy’ is committed, where the exclusive link 
of face veiling to the ‘Taliban’, ’women in Afghanistan’ and ‘radicalism and extremism’ is 
portrayed as the reason why face veiling may be a threat to community relations in France. 
The assumption that the face veil is associated with the ‘Taliban’ and ‘radicalism and 
extremism’, does not substantiate that the French society will face ‘sectarianism’ as a result 
of some women practicing face veiling. Moreover, by linking face veiling exclusively to the 
‘women of Afghanistan’, who are forced to wear it by the ‘Taliban’, a ‘hasty generalisation’ 
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is made on two levels. It is implied that all women who wear the face veil are either, (1) 
living in Afghanistan, or/and (2) are following the dress code advocated by the ‘Taliban’. This 
clearly neglects the thousands of women wearing the face veil around the world, as a result 
of various cultural, traditional, religious and personal motivations. 
 
4.2.6.2.   Topos of ‘Discrimination’ 
One of the most recurring topos drawn upon in the Arab based articles is the topos 
‘discrimination’. Articles argued against the face veil ban based on the argument that such a 
ban is a discriminatory act specifically targeting Muslims; Muslim actors were repeatedly 
represented as the victims of not just ill treatment but targeted discrimination. This topos 
was mainly translated in the newspaper texts through the use of analogies as the method of 
argumentation. 
if he is so worried about women’s ‘subjugation’ to male demands then why single out 
the burqa? There are many symbols pertaining to women’s loss of dignity that are 
deserving of his attention. He could begin with the pimps and their scantily clad 
prostitutes on display around the country, which offend 64% of participants in a 
telephone survey who agreed that prostitution was a ‘degrading practice for the 
image and dignity of the women’. He could crack down on the trafficking of women, 
outlaw breast augmentation which has no medical benefits, ban pornographic 
magazines from newsstands, or even control magazines which idealise the female 
form and thus inspire anorexia and bulimia in young girls. On that principle he could 
even attack the bridal veil, the traditional nun’s habit or the custom followed by 
Hassidic Jewish women who shave their heads upon marriage. But, he prefers to 
focus his ire on a harmless piece of cloth. (GN10) 
In this argumentative attack, which specifically targets then French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy on his actions, Sarkozy’s argumentation for a face veil ban on the premise that face 
veiling women are the objects of male ‘subjugation’ is portrayed as an act of discrimination 
against women wearing the face veil in particular. Face veiling women, therefore, are 
portrayed as ‘victims of discrimination’. The writer initiates the argument by using quotation 
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marks around the term ‘subjugation’, which indicates his disassociation with Sarkozy’s 
stance. Moreover, through the use of the question, ‘why single out the burqa?’, a 
presupposition is made that Sarkozy is in fact singling out the face veil as a form of male 
subjugation. This is followed by an argument that Sarkozy is in fact discriminatory by the use 
of comparative argumentation, where various forms of what are described as ‘symbols 
pertaining to women’s loss of dignity’, are listed as being part of the French community, yet 
fail to attract Sarkozy’s attention, e.g. ‘pimps and prostitutes’ and ‘breast augmentation’. 
Moreover, more directly related traditional, religious and cultural symbols are listed, such 
as, the ‘bridal veil, ‘nun’s habit’ and the ‘custom followed by Hassidic Jewish women’. The 
section ends with a positive description of the face veil, as a ‘harmless piece of cloth’, which 
is the object of negative actions ‘prefers to focus his ire’ taken by Sarkozy, a member of the 
‘out-group’. 
A similar form of argument takes shape in another article published in the Gulf Times 
headlined, “Dressing down” (GT4): 
Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women’s rights. It is just a 
disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European 
politicians speak against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe. 
As with the earlier example, Muslims are portrayed as the target of negative actions carried 
out by ‘out-group’ members, represented as ‘European politicians’. Face veil wearers are 
compared to ‘Sikhs donning the turban’ and it is argued that they have not been targeted 
for their clothing, as Muslim women have. 
However, this argument can be considered an example of a false analogy, since the 
comparison cannot be justified. Here, the argument is built against the face veil ban on the 
basis that a ban has been proposed on the premise that face veiling violates women’s rights. 
The writer attacks this as a ‘disguise for hatred of Muslims’ by ‘European politicians’. 
However, based on this argument, face veil wearers cannot be compared to ‘Sikhs donning 
the turban’, as the turbans are worn by males and the argument for a ban is based on the 
protection of ‘women’s rights’, which does not apply to Sikh ‘men’, who wear the turban. 
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Another example of this form of argumentation was found in the op-ed article, ‘Mr. Sarkozy, 
burqa is sign of modesty’ (SG2): 
I THINK French president Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had 
he would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by 
nuns ‘a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement? ” 
Once again, by using comparison as a form of argumentation, women wearing the veil are 
represented as being discriminated against based on what they wear.  
As seen in most of the above examples, the existence of discrimination against Muslims and 
face veiling women was mainly argued using comparative argumentation. However, in most 
of these cases, it can be argued that false analogies are being committed, since in most of 
the analogies, the items being compared are characterised by one crucial difference. The 
face veil or ‘burqa’ is being objected to on the basis that it conceals the face, a feature not 
shared by the items it is being compared to, such as, the ‘bridal veil’, the ‘dress worn by 
nuns’ and the ‘turban’ donned by Sikhs. This, as a result, leads to unjustifiable comparative 
arguments. 
Finally, the topos of ‘discrimination’ was also drawn upon in the article, “Liberte includes 
freedom of dress” (GN10), which argues that one of the issues that a face veil ban stems out 
of is the fact that ‘many Westerners have a visceral dislike of traditional Muslim attire’; 
hence, criticism towards face veiling is in fact the result of discriminatory motivations. 
There are a number of angles to this story – not least that many Westerners have a 
visceral dislike of traditional Muslim attire, reflected by a host of editorials in 
American and Canadian dailies in agreement with Sarkozy’s argument. For instance, 
a headline in the Calgary Herald reads ‘No sane, free person would choose to wear 
the burqa’.  
The topos of ‘discrimination’ is drawn upon through the use of symptomatic argumentation, 
where a direct association is made between the ‘editorials in American and Canadian 
dailies’ and the feelings of ‘Many Westerners’, signalled by the phrase ‘reflected by’. Based  
184 
 
on the premise, (1) a ‘host of editorials in American and Canadian dailies’ are ‘in agreement 
with Sarkozy’s argument’, and (2) a headline in the Calgary Herald that is critical of face 
veiling and people who wear it, a conclusion is made that there is a ‘visceral dislike’ felt by 
‘many Westerners’ towards traditional Muslim attire, thus, forming one of the main 
motivations behind the face veil ban proposal. 
However, the argumentation scheme has been incorrectly applied, committing a hasty 
generalisation or a ‘pars-pro toto’ synecdoche; properties of parts are transferred to a 
whole. The point of views of some editorials published in America and Canada are 
transferred and reflected as the point of view of ‘many Westerners’, emphasising their 
active role in a negative action, ‘visceral dislike’, towards an item of clothing associated with 
Muslims. The actions of some Western editorials is insufficient as a premise and cannot be 
considered representative of how ‘many Westerners’ feel towards the ‘traditional Muslim 
attire’.   
 
4.2.6.3   Topos of ‘Difference’ 
One of the topoi found to be drawn upon in the representation of Muslims and veil wearers 
in the UK press was the topos of ‘difference’. Arguments for a ban were developed on the 
premise that face veiled Muslim women and the culture and beliefs they adhere to are in 
direct contrast with the norms and way of life people are accustomed to in ‘Western’ 
countries , such as the United Kingdom and France, thus, posing a form of ‘social threat’. 
This argument worked to enhance the polarisation between the out and in-groups (Us vs. 
Them). 
In the Arab press and particularly in articles published in the Saudi Gazette, a similar topos 
was detected, however, in this case the stand point taken was against a face veil ban. The 
discourse declaring face veiled women as ‘different’ found in the UK press is acknowledged, 
even advocated, but with a re-contextualization of this preconceived ‘difference’.  This 
‘difference’ which places face veiling women in a positive light is in fact what forms the 
premise for an argument against a ban. Here, the roles are reversed and the ‘difference’ 
which is primarily identified by the ‘wearing of a face veil’ attributes face veiling women (In-
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group/Us) with attractive attributes. They are described as having positive effects on society 
in general as opposed to ‘Western’ women, nations and life style (Out-group/Them), which 
are represented  negatively as morally inferior. Based on this description, an argument is 
made against banning women from practicing face veiling. 
One example where this topos was drawn upon was found in the op-ed, “Mr. Sarkozy, Burqa 
is a sign of modesty” (SG2): 
The debate here is on two counts: the issue of morality and freedom of choice. Who 
is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini? 
Those who are  brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not 
maintain that they are mere objects of desire and enticement and mannequins for 
public display, will say a women in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up 
seeing scantily-clad women around them, will find the women in a burqa 
objectionable. So it boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral 
values. 
The article argues against a face veil ban based on two premises, (1) individuals should have 
the right of freedom of choice, and (2) face veiling women are moral. This particular excerpt 
tackles the issue of morality by drawing on the topos of ‘difference’. The writer initiates a 
‘difference’ by making a distinction made between ‘a burqa clad women’ and ‘one in a 
bikini’, in terms of, (1) ‘indecency’, and (2) ‘spoiling public morals’. This ‘difference’ is 
triggered by a ‘wh-’ question, which presupposes that one of them is in fact indecent and 
has a negative impact on public morals. The writer proceeds to answer the question in the 
following section, asserting face veiling women as morally superior. This is done by placing 
women wearing the bikini as negatively in conflict with individuals attributed with positive 
moral values that promote ‘respect for women’, and view women as ‘not mere objects of 
desire or enticement and mannequins for public display’. Meanwhile, individuals described 
negatively as growing up ‘seeing scantily-clad women around them’ are put in conflict with 
face veiling women. Therefore, fitting with the ideological square, the presupposed 
‘difference’ represents women in a bikini (out-group/Them) negatively in opposition to the 
qualities of positive moral values, while highlighting face veiling women (in-group/Us) in 
conflict with negative qualities. In addition, individuals (out-group/Them) that view face 
186 
 
veiling women as a problem are highlighted as morally inferior, ‘So it boils down to your 
perception which a result of your moral values’. Later in the same article, this argument is 
set forward more explicitly, where the writer declares ‘Women of high moral values prefer 
to cover their modesty’ and ‘covered women do go about their daily chores unhindered. 
Hindered are those who look at the burqa as a symbol of subservience’. 
In another example taken from an op-ed titled, “Mufti Sarkozy’s ‘fatwa’ not amusing” (SG3), 
the argument against a ban similarly, highlights a ‘difference’ between the in-group, ‘face 
veil wearers’ and the out-group, ‘France as a nation’, which are represented with various 
negative qualities. 
As the head of a nation that is self-confessedly proud of its ‘laissez-faire attitude 
towards casual sex’ and all the debauched trappings that go with it, one would 
expect him to be better acquainted with ‘debasement’. A visit to just one among the 
thousands of proudly advertised, government licensed ‘adult only entertainment 
spots’ in France would suffice for him to write a detailed dissertation on human 
debasement and what it comprises. Debasement is the trading in the bodies of 
women, displaying them and using them as a means of provoking and gratifying 
unnatural biological urges in strangers. Debasement is the deliberate, systematic 
dehumanization of women and their relegation to being sexual toys in the hands of 
profiteers – not the covering of a woman’s body in public, that protects her precisely 
from such predators. 
This excerpt is part of an argument made by the writer against a face veil ban. The writer 
argues against a ban that is being proposed by the French authorities on the basis that face 
veiling is a form of ‘debasement’. The writer rejects this claim by highlighting the difference 
between what the face veil promotes and what France as a ‘nation’ promotes. The veil or 
‘the covering of a women’s body in public’, which is associated with the ‘in-group/Us’, is 
attributed with positive qualities of protecting women from ‘predators’. Meanwhile, France 
as a ‘nation’ is attributed with a list of negative attributes that exemplify what the writer 
views as ‘human debasement and what it compromises’, such as, France’s proud attitude 
towards ‘casual sex’ and the ‘thousands of proudly advertised, government licensed ‘adult 
only entertainment spots’’. 
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4.2.6.4   Topos of ‘Religious Obligation’ 
As illustrated in earlier analysis, the Arab press made a frequent association between the 
face veil and religion, through predicational strategies and the individualisation of elite 
Muslim scholars to support this religious link. Using these strategies, the face veil, at times, 
was not just highlighted as a religious practice, but as ‘religious obligation’. Some of the 
arguments against the ban in the Arab press were built upon the premise that the face veil 
is a ‘religious obligation’, which Muslim women are required to abide by, making the ban a 
violation of individual freedom. This argument introduces the representation of Muslims, or 
Muslim women in particular, as individuals under certain religious obligation and 
jurisdiction.  
One example of such argument was found in the op-ed, ‘Mufti Sarkozy’s ‘fatwa’ not 
amusing’: 
Has he read the verse of the Qur’an (Surah Ahzab, Verse 59) which explicitly enjoins 
believing women to wear an outer garment when outdoors, so that they are 
identified as Muslim women and not harassed? If so, how is he qualified to offer a 
different conclusion from centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars who affirmed 
that such a garment is undoubtedly a religious obligation? (SG3) 
In this article, which was highly critical of Sarkozy’s negative stance on the face veil, one 
strategy the writer uses in the argument against the ban was extending a series of questions 
aimed at then French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Through posing these questions, a 
symptomatic argumentation, drawing on the topos of ‘authority’ (or rhetorical ‘Ethos’) is 
presented. The writer supports the claim that the face veil is obligatory based on the 
authority of a ‘verse of the Qur’an’ and ‘centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars’ who 
dictate this to be a fact. 
However, as with similar examples found in the UK press, drawing on the topos of 
‘authority’ to support a disassociation of the face veil from religion, the argument commits a 
couple of fallacies. One fallacy, for instance, is the fallacious appeal to authority 
(argumentum ad verencundiam). The claim made by the writer is regarded as acceptable 
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based on an authoritative source for Muslims, the ‘Qur’an’ or the holy book of Islam. The 
reasonableness of the argument is questioned, since as explained in section 4.2.5.1, 
interpretations of verses of the Quran can differ between various Muslim scholars; 
interpretations are and will continue to be a source of scholarly debate. The argument also 
commits a populistic fallacy (argumentum ad populum), where the argument is justified 
based on the claim that many authorities, signalled by the use of ‘centuries of Muslim 
scholars and exegetes’, dictate the face veil a religious obligation.  
Another similar argument was found in the Gulf Times article headlined, “Dressing Down” 
(GT4): 
Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude of the French president, saying it was ‘violating 
the personal freedom of Muslims’. ‘There is no doubt that the Niqab ...a mandatory 
dress for all Muslim women wherever they are. So France or any other nation has no 
right to bar Muslim women from complying with the Islamic dress code ordained by 
Islam’ he said. 
Here, the article individualises a local Muslim scholar, Sheikh ‘Al –Maraikhi’, who is quoted 
arguing against the ban based on the premise that it violates individual freedom. The 
speaker supports his argument by committing a fallacious appeal to authority (argumentum 
ad verencundiam). The argument against the ban is based on premise that it would not 
allow Muslim women to follow their obligatory Islamic duty of wearing the face veil, which 
is ordained by ‘Islam’, the authority utilised to support this argument.  As with the previous 
example, the presumed mandatory status of the face veil is a source of continuous debate.   
 
4.3 Quantitative Analysis 
The following section presents the quantitative analysis exploring the larger corpora of 
articles covering the ‘2009 French face veil ban’. The findings are presented mainly in the 
form of charts and diagrams, further details on the data are provided in appendix 14. 
Similar to the initial stages in the qualitative analysis, the quantitative analysis began by 
examining referential strategies. The qualitative analysis illustrated a lack of consensus on 
the lexical items used in reference to the ‘face veil’, with the terms, veil/s, niqab/s and 
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burqa/burka/burkha/burkini/s being the most prominent. Moreover, there were examples, 
mainly in the Arab English language articles, where the use of ‘burqa’ and how it is defined 
in the ‘French face veil ban’ discourse is attested to and viewed as problematic. The 
quantitative analysis began by examining the frequency of these three key labels: veil/s, 
niqab/s and burqa/burka/burkha/s in the UK and Arab corpus. 
 
 
       Figure 4.3 ‘Face veil’ reference frequency analysis 
 
As Figure 4.3 illustrates, ‘veil/s’ is used most frequently in the Arab based articles (0.75%, 
N=1006) and to a lesser degree in the UK corpus (0.45%, N= 765), ᵪ² (1, N=302732) = 114.15, 
P≤0.1. ’Burqa’ is found to be the most prominent term in the British articles (0.61%, n=1040) 
and used slightly less frequently in the Arab corpus (0.60%, N= 808). The more frequent use 
of the generic term ‘veil’ to refer to the clothing item may be argued to highlight the Arab 
newspapers’ heightened awareness of the existing semantic variations in different contexts 
in reference to the face veil, thus, preferring to use a term encompassing all these 
variations. ‘Niqab’ is also found to be more frequent in the Arab articles, 0.55% (N=740) of 
the complete corpus, while forming a reduced 0.29% (N=505) of the UK corpus of articles, ᵪ² 
(1, N=302732) = 117.18, P≤0.1. As mentioned in section 4.2.2.1, this may be argued to be 
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due to the particular popularity of the ‘niqab’, one form of the face veil, in the Arab Gulf 
region. 
The quantitative analysis continued by examining the top most frequent lemmas in both the 
UK and Arab corpora of articles. 
UK Press Arab Press 
Lemma Frequency Overall 
Proportion 
% 
Lemma Frequency Overall 
proportion% 
Face veil et al 2386 1.41 Face veil et al 2669 1.99 
Islam 1548 0.91 Islam 1697 1.26 
Woman 1319 0.78 Woman 1389 1.03 
France 1118 0.66 France 1311 0.97 
Ban 1052 0.62 Ban 1201 0.89 
Wear 1017 0.60 Wear 998 0.74 
Full 921 0.54 Face  735 0.54 
Face 693 0.41 law 680 0.50 
Public 553 0.32 Public 468 0.34 
Religion 511 0.30 Religion 453 0.33 
Table 4.7 Event A:  Keyword  frequency analysis 
 
Table 4.7 illustrates the frequency of the top 10 lemmas in both contexts, in terms of the 
highest first. As shown, the UK and Arab corpus are characterised with similar key lemmas, 
highlighting the discourse as revolving around the face veil et al (including burqa, burka, 
burkha, burkini, burqini and niqab), Islam, Woman, France and a ban. However, frequencies 
of each lemma varied in each context, with most of the lemmas representing a higher 
percentage in frequency in the Arab context in proportion to the full corpus. This may be of 
particular significance with lemmas associated with religion (lemmas: religion and Islam), 
with words, such as: Islam, Islamic, Muslim/s, Religion/s and religious etc. The Arab corpus 
reflected a higher usage of such terms, where they made up 1.59% (N=2150) of the 
complete corpus, while making up 1.21% (N=2059) of the UK corpus of articles. The ᵪ² in this 
case being, (1, N=302732) = 81.16, P≤0.1. This increased association with religion in the Arab 
context corresponds with the qualitative findings, where the face veil was related to religion 
and religious obligation on the macro and micro levels of analysis, including referential and 
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predicational strategies, as well as, drawing upon the topos of ‘religious obligation’, using 
various argumentation schemes.    
This discursive association with religion in the Arab corpus was more apparent when 
examining the concordance patterns associated with the terms burqa/s and niqab/s in both 
contexts. The following table shows the main descriptive qualities attributed to 
burqa/niqab/s in the UK and Arab texts. This involved examining the total number of 
concordance lines including these words (UK: 1545 Arab: 1548). 
 
 
   Figure 4.4 Burqa/Niqab attribution frequency analysis 
As fig. 4.4 illustrates, echoing some of the earlier qualitative findings, the Arab based 
discourse was found to relate the ‘niqab/burqa’ directly to religion, with attributes, such as, 
‘religious’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘is obligatory and was confirmed in the Quran’ occurring in 148 
instances (9.5%) of the total concordance lines examined. This religious association was 
found much less frequent in the UK based articles, with only 32 instances (2.07%) linking the 
face veil directly to religion or describing it as a form of religious obligation. The difference is 
significant with ᵪ² (1, N=3093) = 79.14, P≤0.1.  
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However, although the Arab based discourse was characterised by relating the face veil to 
religion, it also reflected discourse contesting this religious association, albeit to a lesser 
degree. Attributes disassociating the face veil from religion, such as, ‘not a sign of religion’ 
or ‘has nothing to do with Islam’ were found in 91 instances (5.87%). The UK Press, also re-
emphasising the qualitative findings were found to more frequently (n=85, 5.50%) distance 
the face veil from religion, than highlight it as having any religious connection.  
In both the UK and Arab corpora of articles, the most frequent pattern in descriptive 
attributions was found to be negativisation, attributing the face veil with negative qualities. 
However, as with the qualitative analysis discussions, although the Arab press was found to 
reproduce some of these negative attributions in relation to the veil, this pattern was found 
to be more prominent in the UK Press (UK=N:340, 22%, Arab=N:222, 14.34%). The degree of 
difference is confirmed statistically, ᵪ² (1, N=3093) = 30.54, P≤0.1. The following chart lists 
the most frequent negative qualities attributed to ‘niqab’ and ‘burqa’ in the UK and Arab 
corpus. 
 
 
   Figure 4.5 Burqa/Niqab negativisation theme analysis 
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The majority of negative attributes were similar to those discussed in the qualitative 
analysis. These include describing the face veil or the practice of veiling as being a form of 
oppression, as different from the norm, as resulting in separating Muslim women further 
from main stream society, and as posing a social threat. However, negativisation was not 
exclusively limited to these categories, but also took shape of ‘other’ general negative 
predicational strategies with adjectives, such as, ‘inhuman’, ‘ugly’ and ‘absurd’. These 
general negative attributes were also presented in the form of negative feelings the authors 
experience towards the face veil, for instance, it is described as causing them to feel 
‘depressed’, ‘sad’ and ‘uncomfortable’. This form of negativisation was found more 
frequently in the UK corpus (N=77, 4.98%) than in the Arab English language corpus of 
articles (N=22, 1.42%), ᵪ² (1, N=3093) = 31.63, P≤0.1. The Arab corpus also highlighted the 
negative effect of the face veil on various levels, in relation to university security (N=11, 
0.71%), which can be argued as another form of security threat, e.g. ‘identity disguise’ 
during exams. This was mainly found in articles covering a possible face veil ban at 
universities in Egypt and these negative attributions highlighted the motives of some of 
those proposing a ban.  
Quotation patterns were examined next, this was done by examining the first three 
direct/indirect quoted sources in each article collected in the total UK and Arab corpora. As 
the focus was mainly on the representation of Muslims and face veiling women, it was of 
interest to examine the frequency of quotations by ‘Muslim’ actors and ‘women who 
practice veiling’. Actors were coded as Muslims only if they were referred to as: (1) 
‘Muslims’ or (2) as representing ‘majority Muslim governments’ and ‘Islamic associations 
and groups’. Women who practice veiling were only coded if they were described as women 
wearing any form of the ‘veil’.  Moreover, although all others sources coded are labelled as 
‘non-Muslims’, this merely serves an analytical purpose and does not suggest that all of the 
other sources are in fact non-Muslim, they are just not indicated as such, following the 
above described criteria.  
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As the fig. 4.6 illustrates, the amount of Muslim sources and veiled women quoted were 
quite similar in both the UK and Arab based corpus.  
 
  
                    Figure 4.6 Muslim quotation frequency analysis  
 
Muslim sources and women who practice veiling in all its forms were far less quoted in the 
first three quotations of each article than other sources. In the UK press, Muslim sources 
made up 14.37% (N=92) of the total number of actors quoted. Veiled women were quoted 
even less, making up only 5% (N=32) of the total quotes examined. Statistically, the 
difference in frequency is very significant, ᵪ² (2, N=640) = 652.55, P≤0.1. Similarly, in the 
Arab articles, Muslims were found to be quoted far less than other actors in relation to the 
total number of quotes examined, forming 19.36% (N=135) of the quotes. Veiled women 
also received minimal coverage in the Arab press, in terms of quotations, with only 6.88% 
(N=48) of the actors being quoted being described as women who wear the veil. Again, 
statistically, these differences are shown to be significant, ᵪ² (2, N=697) = 528.49, P≤0.1. 
These low numbers in Muslim and veiled women sources is particularly revealing taking into 
account the general topic being covered as one being closely related to Islam and Muslims. 
More importantly, those who would be directly affected by a ban, the veil wearers, would  
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have been expected to be given a more prominent voice. Although the Arab press does 
illustrate giving Muslims a slightly higher number of quotes than the UK based articles, this 
may be argued to be due to the fact that these newspapers are published in predominantly 
Muslim nations. However, the fact that they are, may also result in the actors not being 
described as ‘Muslim’, since they form the majority of the population, unlike the UK context.  
Nevertheless, the extremely low number of veiled women being quoted in the quotations 
examined is quite significant in exposing the amount of discourse available that reflect their 
views on veiling and the ban in either context. Although veiled women may have been 
quoted in later sections of the articles (not in the first 3 quoted sources), as discussed 
earlier, following the journalistic ‘inverted pyramid’ approach, the earlier the information is 
included in an article, the more important it is regarded by the newspaper. Thus, their 
exclusion from the initial quoted sources in each article may also be argued to further reveal 
the increased suppression of their voices in newspaper reporting.  
These findings also support the qualitative data, where Muslims and face veiling women 
were mainly referred to collectively. Individualisation of these social actors, although not as 
frequent, was predominantly limited to elite Muslim actors representing various Muslim 
associations in the UK press, and religious Muslim scholars and sheikhs in the Arab English 
language articles. In both cases, they were mainly positioned as active agents of vocal 
processes utilised, at times, to support key arguments and opinions for or against the ban, 
which will be the focus of the next part of the quantitative analysis. 
Analysing quotations in terms of the balance of opinions for and against the ban was also 
interesting to examine. This was done by analysing the first 3 sources quoted in each article 
and the opinions revealed in these quotations in all articles published in the June ’09, Jan ’10 
and July ’10 periods. The following chart reveals the opinions expressed in all the quotes 
examined. These were either (1) for a ban or/and critical of veiling (2) critical of a ban 
or/and for the practice of veiling (3) neither or unknown. 
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                    Figure 4.7 Opinion quotation frequency analysis 
 
As illustrated in fig 4.7, quotes in the UK press were quite unbalanced in opinion, with 
opinions for a ban or critical of veiling making up 52.08% (N=150), just above half of the 
total quotes examined. These were much higher than quotes expressing opinions critical of 
a ban or for the practice of veiling (25%, N=72), while the remaining quotations did not 
reflect an opinion either for or against (22.91%, N=66). These findings were found to be 
statistically significant, ᵪ² (2, N=288) = 45.75, P≤0.1. The Arab press also included a higher 
number of quotes expressing opinions for the ban or critical of veiling (40.81%, N=100), 
while opinions criticising the ban or being for the practice of veiling were expressed in 
32.65% of the quotes (N=80). Comparatively, however, the difference or imbalance was not 
as large as in the UK articles. The remaining 65 quotes (26.53%) did not lean particularly for 
or against the ban. In the Arab based articles, the difference in the frequency of quotations 
revealing opinions was also found to be significant, ᵪ² (2, N=288) = 4.45, P≤0.5, albeit not as 
significant as the contrasting frequencies revealed in the UK corpus. 
Focusing on the Muslim quotations in particular, the analysis examined the opinions 
expressed by Muslim sources in the same UK and Arab corpora, during the same period.  
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                  Figure 4.8 Muslim opinion quotation frequency analysis 
 
As fig 4.8 shows, the differences were quite revealing and more importantly echoed some of 
the main qualitative findings. When Muslims were quoted in the UK press, they mainly 
expressed views arguing for the ban or critical of the practice of face veiling (45.45%, N=20). 
This was highlighted often in the UK based arguments for a ban in the qualitative analysis, 
for instance, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’. Muslim actors were utilized to vocally support 
a ban on the premise that the face veil has no association with Islam and instead is being 
deliberately used by particular Muslim parties to assert their power in Europe. Nevertheless, 
as shown in the chart, Muslim sources in the UK press also included comparable views 
against the ban (36.36%, N=16). Having said that, statistically, these numbers may be argued 
insignificant in showing a particular dominancy in views (for/against), ᵪ² (2, N=44) = 2.14, 
P≥0.5.  
However, in the Arab articles examined, the imbalance in frequency of opinion, for or 
against the ban as expressed by Muslim sources was quite substantial and was shown to be 
statistically significant. Muslims quoted predominantly expressed opinions and arguments 
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17.76, P≤0.1. Again, this echoes earlier CDA findings examining the Arab articles published in 
the June period. Muslims, mainly religious scholars, were repeatedly found positioned in 
active vocal roles against the ban, drawing on the topoi of ‘religious obligation’ and 
‘discrimination’. Moreover, these findings are somewhat expected, since as the qualitative 
analysis illustrated on a macro level, there was a clear lack or near absence of any articles 
explicitly arguing against the veil or for the face veil ban. 
More importantly, the lack of balanced opinions expressed by Muslim quotes in the UK and 
Arab press, with each context leaning towards one view more than the other (for vs. against 
the ban) was found to be statistically significant. Muslims quoted as being for the ban 
and/or critical of veiling were far more frequent in the UK press (45.45%, N=20) than the 
Arab Press (16.98%, N=9), ᵪ² (1, N=97) = 9.21, P≤0.1. Meanwhile, when Muslims were 
quoted as being critical of the ban and/or for veiling this was more likely to appear in the 
Arab press (60.37%, N=32) than the UK press (36.36%, N=16), ᵪ² (1, N=97) = 5.51, P≤0.1. This 
supports earlier qualitative findings by revealing the clear diverging, and at times, opposing 
lines of argument found and argued to be practiced in the UK and Arab newspaper 
discourse. 
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Chapter 5 
Data Analysis: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy 
 
The following sections will present the data findings of the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis examining articles related to the second news event to be explored in this thesis, 
the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’. For a complete list of all articles collected for the 
discourse analysis of this news event, please refer to appendix 3 and 4. 
 
5.1    Quantitative Analysis: Publications General Profile Analysis 
 
Categories 
UK Press Arab Press 
DTC TTC TGC TIC TOTAL GNC GTC KTC ANC TOTAL TOTAL 
News 34 65 117 40 256 72 185 16 79 352 608 
Hard 27 54 101 32 214 67 183 16 74 340 554 
Soft 7 11 16 8 42 5 2 0 5 12 54 
Opinion 12 26 68 25 131 13 6 13 42 74 205 
Column 8 9 54 17 88 11 2 13 39 65 153 
Editorial 2 4 6 8 20 2 4 0 3 9 29 
blog 2 13 8 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 23 
Total 46 91 185 65 387 85 191 29 121 426 813 
Table 5.1   Event B: Genre analysis 
As with the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ analysis, articles including the query terms were 
found to be slightly higher in number in the Arab corpus (N=426) in comparison to the UK 
corpus of articles (N=387). Also, similarly both contexts featured a much higher number of 
news articles, which made up 66.41% (N=256) of the UK corpus and an even higher 82.62% 
(N=352) of the total number of articles in the Arab press. This meant, once again, that 
opinionated discourse was more prominent in the UK press (33.85%, N=131) than it was in 
the Arab press (17.37%, N=74). Indeed, this was quite apparent in the CDA analysis of the 
articles, where arguments and argumentation schemes were much less evident in the Arab 
based articles.  
 
 
  
 
The analysis continued by examining the bylined sources in both 
illustrated in fig 4.9 and fig 5.1
 
 Fig 4.9 Event B: UK press byline 
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5.2   Qualitative Analysis: Topic Analysis 
The following sections will present the CDA analysis of articles related to the ‘2006 Danish 
cartoon controversy’ news event. All articles examined in this section are provided in 
appendix 3 and 4. 
The qualitative analysis began by examining the primary topics of the articles selected from 
the UK and Arab English language newspapers. Fig 5.2 illustrates some of the main primary 
discourse topics found to dominate the articles examined. 
 
Topics UK press Arab English Language press 
Frequency % Frequency % 
 
Muslim protest against 
cartoons 
 
18 
 
48.6 
 
13 
 
48.1 
 
Reactions to the cartoons 
 
 
           5 
 
13.5 
 
3 
 
11.1 
 
Muslim boycott of Danish 
products 
 
1 
 
2.7 
 
2 
 
7.4 
 
Freedom of speech vs. 
Responsibility 
 
6 
 
16.2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Freedom of Speech vs. Respect 
of religion 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
11.1 
 
Other 
 
 
7 
 
18.9 
 
6 
 
        22.2 
Table 5.2 Event B: Primary topic analysis 
What became quite clear from the off set of analysing the primary topics covered in both 
the UK and Arab English language newspaper articles was the prominence of ‘Muslim 
protests against the cartoons’ as a primary topic. In the UK corpus, it was the primary topic 
in approximately half (48.6%, N=18) of the articles analysed. Similarly, it was found to 
dominate 48.1% of the Arab based articles (N=13). As a result, a large part of the analysis on 
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the ‘2009 Danish cartoon controversy’ news event will be dedicated to articles covering this 
primary topic (section 5.3). 
It was also clear, as one may expect, that the ‘Danish cartoon controversy’ story mainly 
attracted topics arguing for freedom of speech, and thus, the publication of the cartoons or 
for censorship and against the publication of the prophet cartoons. Moreover, despite some 
similarities in topics, as shown above, the majority of topics and variety of arguments were 
quite different in each context. The following sections will highlight some of the primary 
topics dominating articles in the each context, and the diverging representations and 
arguments on Muslims and Islam. 
• Topics: The UK Press 
One of the key topics found to apply arguments for and against the publishing of cartoons in 
the UK press was the topic, ‘Freedom of speech vs. Responsibility’ (16.2%). Reflecting the 
fact that no UK newspaper actually published the cartoons in question, the majority of 
articles under this topic represented arguments for freedom of speech, while emphasising 
its application with responsibility, i.e. selective censorship. The argument for this 
responsible application of freedom was argued necessary should news content be 
considered to possibly: (1) cause serious offence to readers, (2) result in negative financial, 
commercial and profit related implications, and/or (3) endanger the safety and security of 
the general public. Some of the headlines included: ‘When Freedom gives in to fear’ 
(TGC49), ‘No news is good news’ (TIC21), ‘Publishing controversial cartoons and being 
damned’ (TTC6), ‘Conscience or Commerce: that is the question’ (DTC16). Having said that, it 
was these articles, arguing against the cartoon publications that included negative 
representations of Islam and Muslims, drawing quite extensively on the topos of ‘threat’. 
These arguments were highlighted across all the newspapers analysed.  
‘Reactions to cartoons’, the primary topic of 5 UK based articles (13.5%), also included 
arguments for and against the publication of the cartoons. These articles mainly involved 
views and opinions towards the controversy, as well as, reactions by various sources around 
the world. Headlines included, ‘Why the Mohammad Cartoons fail’ (TTC10) and ‘The double 
standards over free speech’ (TIC22). Some of these articles were sympathetic towards 
Muslims by drawing on the topos of ‘victimisation’, where the publications were argued to 
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result in Islam and Muslims becoming victims of racial abuse, hate and discrimination. The 
topos of ‘religious obligation’ also highlighted a sympathetic tone towards the Muslim 
position. Drawing on this topos, the argument against the publications and sympathy 
towards the negative reaction by Muslims are justified by Muslim religious beliefs and 
obligations.  
Most other primary topics spread across the newspaper articles with no significant high 
frequencies, most being the primary topics of individual articles. These articles presented 
standpoints that generally leaned towards arguing for freedom of speech and against 
censorship. Examples of such articles include, ‘Stop cringing and stand up for your own 
values’ (TIC18), with the primary topic ‘Islam and Europe’, and ‘A worm’s eye view: logic and 
principle can’t resolve the row over the Danish cartoons’ (TGC44), focusing on ‘Freedom of 
speech in Europe’ as a primary topic. Again, the topos of ‘threat’ was frequently drawn upon 
in some of these arguments, whereby Islam and Muslims (out-group) are represented as 
posing a threat to freedom of speech and the democracy that is argued to characterise the 
in-group society, i.e. Europe and the ‘West’. 
Finally, one interesting topos found to be drawn upon in the UK press, criticising the Muslim 
reaction and arguing for the freedom to publish the cartoon, was the topos of 
‘contradiction’. Here, the criticism of the reactions displayed by some Muslims and the 
argument for the publication of the cartoons are based on the representation of Muslim 
double standards, whereby, Muslims are represented as demanding selective censorship, 
yet described as not practicing this censorship in their own media, i.e. when offending other 
religions. 
In addition to argumentation schemes, all the above mentioned topoi were also highlighted 
on the micro level, through the use of referential and predicational strategies and the social 
actions allocated to Muslims.  
• Topics: The Arab Press 
The genre of newspaper reporting seemed to have a determining effect on the primary 
topics and amount of argumentation utilised in the Arab English Language articles related to 
the ‘Danish cartoon controversy’ news event. The articles analysed qualitatively, reflecting 
204 
 
the general reporting of the full corpus of articles, were predominantly made up of news 
reports (N=23, 85%). In fact, the rest of the articles made up of four opinion pieces, were all 
published in one newspaper, the Saudi based Arab News.  
The predominance of news reports meant that the majority of articles in the Arab press 
reported on news updates, covering a wide range of topics with no significant frequency in 
coverage. Some of the topics covered include, ‘Muslim boycott of Danish products’, ‘GCC 
requests Danish apology’ and ‘Danish paper sends editor on vacation’. This focus on hard 
news coverage in most of the articles resulted in the reduced use of argumentation 
strategies in comparison to the UK press, as will be illustrated in the analysis. Nevertheless, 
most of the topics and more specifically, the headlines, highlighted the general negative 
attitude towards the publications: ‘JCCI not to invite Danes for forum’ (ANC28), ‘French see 
reprinting as ‘unnecessary provocation’ (GTC58), ‘Danish boycott ‘success’’ (KTC13). 
Having said that, some argumentation was still evident in the Arab based press and the 
primary topics clearly tended to attract arguments against the publication of the cartoons. 
‘Freedom of speech vs. Respect for Religion’ was one such primary topic covered in 3 
articles (11.1%). These articles were dominated by arguments against the cartoon 
publications on the premise that they lacked any respect for religion. In fact, they were 
represented as a direct attack on the Muslim religion in particular, drawing on the topos of 
‘discrimination’. Some of the headlines under this topic include: ‘Press freedom Vis-a-Vis 
respect for the sacred’ (ANC33) and ‘Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western 
nations?’ (ANC34). 
‘Reactions to the cartoons’ as a primary topic was another recurring topic presenting 
arguments in support of censorship and against the publication of the cartoons. These 
arguments mainly drew on the topoi of ‘victimisation’ and ‘discrimination’ in the 
representation of Islam and Muslims. This was highlighted mainly by the use of analogies as 
an argumentation scheme, stressing the out-group’s (i.e. Europe/ the ‘West’) discriminatory 
role towards Muslims in particular by their ‘selective censorship’ policies. This was also 
highlighted in their frequent allocation of passive roles to ‘Muslims’, on the receiving end of 
negative actions carried out by ‘Western/European’ actors. One example of an article with 
this topic as its primary focus is headlined, ‘Europe’s uncivilised act’ (ANC32). 
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5.3   Topic in Focus: ‘Muslim Protests against the Cartoons’ 
As discussed earlier in the literature review, ideological construction can be at its most 
influential on the macro level with the selection of ‘discourse topics’ to form the main focus 
of articles published about various social groups. A clear interest in ‘Muslim protests against 
cartoons’ as a dominating topic in the UK and Arab based newspaper articles may be 
revealing regarding the underlying ideological representation of Islam and Muslims. 
Therefore, the following section will focus on articles dominated by this particular topic, 
applying the same research and textual analysis questions presented in sections 3.2 and 
3.3.1. This will also assist in minimising the amount of data to be analysed using CDA, adding 
further focus to the analysis. 
This topic did get significant attention in both the Arab English language articles and the UK 
based texts as a main general direction for the articles. However, key differences were 
illustrated in relation to news values and what to cover regarding the Muslim protests. 
The UK press, as one may expect, gave significant attention to the local (UK based) Muslim 
protests, and more importantly, the negative reactions and criticisms that they provoked 
from government officials and the general public. Arguments centred around the need for 
legal action against the protestors, highlighting their active role in negative actions, drawing 
heavily on the topos of ‘threat’. This was also emphasised in the negative referential and 
predicational strategies used in describing the protestors and their actions, linking the 
demonstrations primarily to ‘extremist’ and ‘radical’ groups. Another repeated argument 
found in the UK based articles covering ‘international protests’ (e.g. protests in Lebanon and 
Syria) was the standpoint that protests were triggered by unrelated political interests and 
motivations; they were argued to be planned and executed by various external/political 
parties and governmental authorities. 
The English language Arab press mainly covered international protests, providing detailed 
descriptions of the actions taken by the protesters and the authorities in various contexts. 
The analysed articles were largely found to sympathise with the demonstrators, drawing on 
the topos of ‘victimisation’.  
 
206 
 
5.3.1   Headline Analysis 
A brief scan of the headlines and leads used in both contexts will reflect some of the key 
differences in reporting on the protests. 
UK Press English Language Arab Press 
The Guardian Gulf News 
Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew 
images: A world of protests (TGC40) 
Violence erupts at cartoon protests (GNC21) 
Downing street statement on weekend 
cartoon demonstrations (TGC41) 
Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes 
(GNC23) 
Threats that must be countered (TGC42) Gulf Times 
Arrest extremist marchers, police told 
(TGC43)  
Thousands march in Islamabad over 
cartoons (GTC62) 
Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over 
cartoons (TGC47) 
Philippine Muslim leader urge restraint  
(GTC64) 
Suicide bomber’ protestor apologises 
(TGC48)  
Bakhari call for campaign against Denmark 
over offending cartoons (GTC65) 
Danish embassy in Tehran attacked (TGC51) Kenyan riot police clash with cartoon 
protesters (GTC66) 
Rioting with well planned spontaneity 
(TGC52) 
Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies 
erupt (GTC67) 
The Independent 41 Pakistani workers detained in 
Afghanistan (GTC68) 
Authorities backed Damascus riots, says 
protestors (TIC16) 
Arab News 
 
Ministers appeal calm (TIC17) Six die in global protest (GTC29) 
Police must bear down on extremist 
protestors (TIC19) 
Kuwait Times 
Robert Fisk: The Fury (TIC20) Cartoon protests turn deadly (KT12) 
The Times 
‘Let the hands that drew be severed!’ 
(TTC14) 
Daily Telegraph 
I am sorry, says ‘suicide bomber’ (DTC17)  
‘Suicide bomber’ is freed drug dealer (DTC18) 
Extremists in demonstration face inquiry by 
police squad (DTC19) 
Protests cast cloud over IOC (DTC20) 
This soft approach to militant Muslims is a 
gift to the far right (DTC21) 
                                                                                                                             
Table 5.3 Protest reporting headlines 
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As illustrated in table 5.3, the lexical choices in the UK headlines highlight a theme of 
violence in relation to the protests: ‘violence, fatwa and anti-Jew images’, ‘The fury’, 
‘threat’. Moreover, in using referential and predicational strategies, such as, ‘extremists in 
demonstrations’, ‘extremist protestors’, ‘militant Muslims’ and ‘’suicide bomber’ protestor’, 
an explicit association is made between the protests/protesters and ‘extremism’, feeding 
into the key topos of ‘threat’ found in the representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK 
articles. The headline, ‘Let the hands that drew be severed’ (TTC14), which quotes one of the 
placards held in the protests, highlights this sense of threat and fear further. Finally, with 
the use of the modals, ‘must’ and declarative ‘arrest’ in the headlines which involve the 
police, ‘Police must bear down on extremist protestors’ (TIC19), and  ‘Arrest extremist 
marchers, police told’ (TGC43), a sense of threat and urgency in the demand for police 
action is emphasised. A more explicit example using the modal ‘must’ was also found in the 
Guardian headline, ‘Threats that must be countered’ (TGC42). 
In the Arab articles, some of the headlines also highlight violence in relation to the nature of 
the protests taking place, for instance, predicational strategies attribute the protests with 
terms, such as, ‘violent’. However, there is no link made between the protest/protesters and 
‘extremism’, in fact, the only time demonstrators are explicitly referred to (GTC66), they are 
referred to simply as ‘cartoon protestors’. The headlines in the Arab corpus also paid 
particular attention to ‘death’: ‘Two shot dead in violent cartoon Clashes’ (GNC23), ‘Cartoon 
protests turn deadly’ (KTC12) and ‘Six die in global protest’ (ANC29). This fittingly 
corresponds with the topos of ‘victimisation’ in the representation of Muslims emphasised 
further within the articles. The topos of ‘victimisation’ is also emphasised in the syntactic 
construction of active processes involving the ‘police’, e.g. ‘Kenyan riot police clash with 
cartoon protesters’ (GTC66). As was detected regularly in the majority of articles, frontal 
positioning is used, placing the ‘police’ as active agents of actions against the protesters. 
Finally, in tune with the ideological square, Muslim actors (‘Us/in-group’ in these newspaper 
contexts) are highlighted as active agents of positive actions, for instance, ‘Philippine Muslim 
leaders urge restraint’ (GTC64); Muslims are highlighted as advocating peace. This is another 
quality repeatedly attributed to ‘protests’ in the texts analysed, challenging the 
representation of the protests as mainly violent. 
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5.3.2   Social Actors: Protesters/Demonstrators 
As with the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ analysis, protesters in both the UK and Arab press 
were predominantly referred to collectively using assimilation strategies. They were mainly 
referred to as a collective group, e.g. anti-cartoon protesters. Collectivisation was also 
indicated by the use of nouns denoting groups, with terms such as, crowds and mob. 
However, there were distinct patterns in both the naming strategies and attributes given to 
protesters in both contexts, as table 5.4 illustrates: 
UK Press Arab Press 
1. 
 
Aggregation 
• Large number of protesters 
(mainly Guardian) 
1. Aggregation 
• Large number of protesters 
• Protesters high death toll (topos 
of  ‘victimisation’) 2. Negativisation 
• Topos of ‘Threat’ 
Table 5.4 Referential/predicational analysis: Protesters/demonstrators 
The following sections will further discuss the referential and predicational patterns found in 
the UK and Arab based articles. 
 
5.3.2.1    UK Press 
Aggregation patterns were found to be used, highlighting the large numbers of protesters 
involved in the protests, this was particularly evident in Guardian:  
(1) Hundreds of angry protesters threw stones and fire bombs (TGC51) 
(2) Thousands protested (TGC40) 
In terms of referential strategies, individuals taking part in the protests were generally 
referred to as protesters or demonstrators, without specifying their religious affiliation. 
However, one key trend found in all the newspapers analysed was the use of negative 
referential and predicational strategies in regard to the protesters, highlighting the topos of 
‘threat’. Protesters were linked to ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’, and at times, this was done 
with direct reference to ‘Islam’. Some examples include: 
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A day after Islamic extremists set fire to building housing the Danish embassy...  
(TGC47) 
In the long run too, the Islamist fanatics may have done themselves damage by 
revealing so much about themselves in public...  (TGC42) 
A special police squad has been set up to investigate Islamic extremists involved in 
the protests...  (DTC19) 
 
Elsewhere, as extremists continue to burn flags and embassies, and demand 
executions, exterminations and beheadings because of the mocking of their religion... 
(DTC21)  
 
‘Suicide bomber’ protester apologises (TGC48) 
 
The move comes after growing protests over the failure to arrest the militant 
demonstrators... (DTC19) 
 
5.3.2.2   Arab Press 
Aggregation patterns were also found to be used in reference to protesters in the Arab 
based articles. These patterns highlighted: (1) the large number of protesters taking part in 
the demonstrations, and (2) protesters’ death toll. 
In contrast to the UK based press, estimates regarding the number of protesters taking part 
in the protests were much higher. Numbers were mainly in the thousands and this was 
highlighted across the newspaper articles analysed: 
Thousands of Muslims protested in Malaysia yesterday over controversial 
cartoons...(GTC61) 
Thousands of protesters had gathered on the mall road... (GNC21) 
Tens of thousands of Muslims demonstrated in the Middle East, Asia and Africa over 
the drawings... (KTC12) 
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Moreover, as shown above, the protesters, unlike their depiction in the UK press, were 
referred to explicitly as ‘Muslims’ in many instances. 
Aggregation also drew on the topos of ‘victimisation’ in the representation of Muslim 
protesters by highlighting the number of deaths and injured in the protests. Again, this 
pattern was highlighted across the Arab based newspapers analysed. 
Global protests over cartoons of the prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) 
escalated yesterday, with six demonstrators killed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and 
Somalia... (ANC29) 
 
At least two people were killed and dozens injured in Lahore...according to Lahore 
police, those who were killed were shot by security guards of the Union bank as the 
miscreants tried to set the LDA plaza building on fire... (GNC21) 
 
Afghan police shot dead four people protesting yesterday against cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammed (PBUH)... (KTC12) 
 
 
5.3.3 Social Actions: Protesters/Demonstrators 
 
In both the UK and Arab based articles, protesters/demonstrators were mainly allocated 
active roles. This may somewhat be expected, since the articles are covering the protests 
and the protesters would be expected to be actively taking part. Accordingly, this 
demands their frequent role as agents in various actions during the protests. Having said 
that, there were distinct patterns in each context (Arab/UK) specific to not just the 
active roles, but the passive roles they were given, drawing on various topoi. Table 5.5 
illustrates some of the key patterns. 
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Protesters/Demonstrators 
UK Press Arab Press 
 
Mainly in active roles: 
• Agents of direct and indirect negative 
actions (Topos of ‘threat’) 
• Frontal positioning of protesters in 
negative actions towards police. 
 
Mainly in active roles: 
• Agents of direct negative actions 
• Agents of positive actions, i.e. 
peaceful protests, by various 
members of society. 
 
Passive roles: 
• Patients under control of 
organised/political parties (topos of 
‘political motivation’) 
•  Patients of criticism by ‘in-group’ 
members and the request for their 
arrest (topos of ‘threat’) 
 
Passive roles: 
• Patients of negative actions by police 
and ‘out-group’ members, topos of 
‘victimisation’. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Social action analysis: Protesters/demonstrators 
 
5.3.3.1   UK Press 
In the UK press, protesters were mainly allocated active roles as agents of negative material 
processes. These involved direct violent behaviour during protests and towards the police 
and indirect negative actions through proposed threats. When protesters were allocated 
passive roles, they were mainly depicted as under the influence of political/organised 
groups or being criticised for their negative behaviour by ‘in-group’ members, e.g. UK 
government officials.  
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• Active Roles 
In the UK press, Muslim protesters were mainly allocated active roles in negative actions. 
However, these negative actions displayed two distinct patterns related specifically to the 
context of the article, in relation to which particular protests were being reported on. 
In international news reports on Muslim protests against the cartoons, Muslim protesters 
were mainly allocated active roles in direct negative material processes during the protests, 
highlighting their role in causing physical damage. Some examples include: 
 The mob grew fiercer, and finally the police withdrew. As they moved back, the 
crowd smashed their way into the building housing the Danish embassy and set it 
ablaze. (TGC52) 
...as the Danish consulate was set on fire and a large church was attacked by a mob. 
(TIC20) 
The first protests took place in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, 
when around 150 members of the Islamic Defenders front tried to storm the Danish 
embassy in Jakarta after pelting the building with eggs. (TTC14) 
In most cases where protesters were agents of negative violent behaviour, the police were 
given passive roles and came in second position. The police were also found to be placed in 
active and first position, if the actions were not directly negative towards the protesters.  
In the articles reporting on international protests, this worked to portray the police as not 
being able to control the protests and violence caused by the protesters: 
throwing the metal barriers and barbed wire aside they chased the police up into the 
narrow alleys of Achrafieh...  (TGC52) 
..security forces armed with tear gas and rubber bullets were taken by surprise. 
(TIC16) 
 In the Northern city of Fayzabad police fired into the air to disperse a group of rowdy 
protesters. (TGC40) 
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The Lebanese, far from firing bullets into the surging crowds, pushed them back 
with water cannons. (TIC20) 
Police fired warning shots to stop protesters from ripping a plaque from the wall of 
the US consulate in Surabaya. (TGC51) 
In articles covering the local London protests, police were similarly portrayed as taking a soft 
approach towards the protesters by not taking any legal action. This also involved 
positioning the police in passive roles on the receiving end of requests by officials to take 
more action, at times, emphasised further using the modal verb ‘must’. 
Scotland yard said police received more than 100 complaints about the protest, but 
no arrests were made. (TIC17) 
 ...Criticised police for failing to arrest radical demonstrators... (TIC17) 
Police must bear down on extremist protestors (TIC19) 
 ...urged the police to make arrests (TGC43) 
Based on the examples found in the reporting on local UK and international protests, the 
police force can be argued to have been portrayed as being less forceful, and indeed, not in 
control of the protesters who are explicitly allocated negative actions. This highlights the 
topos of ‘threat’ in the representation of Muslim protesters, which was one of the key topoi 
drawn upon in the main arguments found in the UK based corpus of articles. 
Negative processes allocated to Muslims also took the form of ‘descriptive’ indirect negative 
actions, which were mainly detected in articles reporting on the local London protests. In 
addition to highlighting protesters as agents of negative material processes actively 
occurring during the protests, emphasis was placed on allocating to protesters negative 
actions they are described to be the agents of in the interpretative analysis of their actions 
during the protests. These descriptions are mainly provided by various ‘in-group’ actors 
arguing for legal action against the protesters. Once again, the topos of ‘threat’ can be seen 
to be drawn upon, portraying an imminent internal threat posed by the protests and 
protesters towards British society: 
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David Winnick, a labour member of the commons Home Affairs Committee, called for 
people carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism to be 
prosecuted or deported. (TIC17) 
David Cameron, the Conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take 
‘appropriate action’ against people who ‘break the law by inciting hatred or inciting 
people to violence or murder’. He added: ‘many of those people carrying the 
placards were clearly inciting violence or inciting hatred’. (DTC19) 
Ashok Kumar, the Labour MP for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, 
condemned the demonstrations. ‘Muslim extremists are poisoning the atmosphere 
in this country in what was, what has been, a great multicultural society,’ he said. 
(DTC19) 
The ‘threat’ towards the ‘in-group’ was also highlighted by the frequent emphasis of the 
protesters as active agents ‘carrying placards’ with various negative statements displaying a 
‘threat’:   
Others showed demonstrators wielding placards threatening a repeat of the 
September 11 and July 7 attacks and calling for the beheading of those responsible 
for the cartoons.  (DTC19) 
 
• Passive Roles 
To a much lesser degree, protesters were allocated passive roles. Passive roles were found 
to highlight: 
(1) The protesters as being under the control and influence of organised parties, 
drawing on the topos of ‘political motivation’. 
(2) The argument for the arrest of some of the protesters, drawing on the topos of 
‘threat’. 
The first case was mainly highlighted in the Independent and the Guardian in the reporting 
of international protests. The topos of ‘political motivation’ was highlighted by portraying 
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the protests and protesters as part of well organised and externally motivated 
political/organised parties and movements. This is as opposed to the protests resulting from 
individual or general feelings of condemnation Muslims may have felt towards the cartoons.  
Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in 
Damascus at the weekend were encouraged to organise by the Syrian authorities, 
and received text messages from Islamic study centres urging them to gather... 
(TIC16) 
‘The sheikhs told us to send five text messages to every true Muslim we knew 
urging them to participate’...  (TIC16) 
And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. The 
leaders of the mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it 
was time to leave. (TGC52) 
As illustrated, in addition to highlighting the protesters as following orders and requests by 
various parties, the ‘out-group’, represented by: ‘Syrian authorities’, ‘Islamic study centres’ 
and ‘Sheikhs’, are highlighted as active agents of negative actions encouraging or allowing 
the violence that took place. 
Also, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, protesters were allocated passive roles, highlighting 
the need for legal action to be taken against them. This was translated in the text through 
allocating ‘in-group’ members with the active role of demanding legal action against the 
protesters, with the aim of protecting the British society from any threat. In some instances, 
this was emphasised further with the use of the modal verbs ‘should’ and ‘must’.  
David Winnick, a labour member of the Commons House Affairs Committee, called 
for people carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism to be 
prosecuted or deported. (TIC17) 
So far the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the fanatics 
because of the fear, which may have been well-judged, that it would make an 
already ugly situation even worse. But no society can allow the threats that were 
made on Friday’s march to pass without further action. Those who threatened to kill 
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should answer for their threats. They should be arrested, cautioned and placed under 
surveillance. If appropriate, the authorities must not be afraid of bringing charges. 
Those who are eligible for deportation should be deported. (TGC42) 
 
5.3.3.2    Arab Press 
In the English language Arab newspapers, protesters were also mainly positioned as agents 
of actions. However, these involved both negative and more positive processes. Protesters 
were also found to be frequently given passive roles, positioned on the receiving end of 
negative actions by the police or special forces, highlighting the topos of ‘victimisation’. 
• Active role 
When protesters were given an active role in the Arab articles, as in the UK press, they were 
also found to be placed as agents of negative material processes during the actual protests. 
Some of these processes include: 
The protesters spat on giant Danish flags... (GTC65) 
A 300-strong crowd - mainly student members of the Basij militia - torched the 
facade of a building housing the Austrian embassy in Tehran and pelted the mission 
with stones, firecrackers and eggs, smashing all its windows. (ANC29) 
 ...a crowd pelted the Danish embassy with petrol bombs and stones for a second 
day. (KT12) 
However, in contrast to the findings in the UK corpus, protests also included protesters 
taking part in more peaceful or non-violent protests. An example where this was shown was 
in a Gulf News article (GN21): 
Pakistani parliament members staged a march here on Tuesday to protest [sic] 
publication of blasphemous cartoons in European newspapers while police cracked 
down on a separate student rally after it turned violent at the capital’s diplomatic 
enclave.  
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Some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both 
the opposition and government marched from the parliament to diplomatic quarters 
near the foreign ministry.  
Here, the article introduces the active involvement of another segment of society in the 
protests against the cartoons, referred to collectively as ‘Pakistani parliament members’ and 
‘some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both the 
opposition and government’. This stands in contrast to the more recurring ‘young’, ‘male’ 
‘bearded’, and ‘student’ protesters referred to in most of the articles, in both the UK and 
other Arab based newspaper texts. 
The active role of various segments of the Muslim community in the cartoon controversy 
debate was also highlighted in the Gulf Times news report titled, ‘Warning on ‘chasm’ 
between West and Islam’ (GTC61): 
A total of 60 religious leaders, government officials, academics and scholars have 
gathered in the capital to ponder the challenges facing the Muslim world. 
In this example, a different and a more positive representation of the Muslim communities’ 
reaction to the cartoons is shown. Various segments of the Muslim community are given an 
active role in taking part in a two day international conference held in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, discussing the cartoon controversy along with other relevant issues. 
Female protesters were also given an active role in the protests. Again, this was highlighted 
in the description of a non-violent protest taking place in France: 
Some 300 girls formed a human chain near a French cultural centre to protest the 
cartoons in France as well as a headscarf ban in French schools. (GTC67) 
The portrayal of peaceful protests can be described to take a more explicit turn, where in 
the majority of articles (particularly in the Gulf Times), protesters are allocated the positive 
agency of taking part in peaceful protests or ending the rallies and demonstrations 
peacefully. The protests themselves are also predicated with the positive quality of being 
‘peaceful’ or ending ‘peacefully’: 
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...protesters remained peaceful (GTC62) 
The group later broke up peacefully. (GTC64) 
a larger demonstration and march through Nairobi that had been largely peaceful, 
although US and Danish flags were set afire.  (GTC66) 
In the central city of Bhopal, thousands of men crammed the narrow streets around 
the old quarter’s mosques in silent protest, blocking roads for several hours. (GTC65) 
 
• Passive Roles 
In terms of passive roles, one key contrasting pattern found in the Arab based articles in the 
representation of Muslim protesters was the positioning of the protesters in the passive role 
of negative actions, causing death and/or injury. In a few examples, the agents of these 
actions were not explicitly stated, however, in the majority of instances, agency was 
allocated to the police or security forces.  
 ...with six demonstrators killed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia...  (ANC29) 
At least 13 people have been killed in demonstrations against the cartoons in mainly 
Islamic countries... (GTC61) 
According to Lahore police, those who were killed, were shot dead by security 
guards of the union bank...  (GNC21) 
...with police firing on some 2,000 protesters as they tried to break into the heavily 
guarded facility. Two of the demonstrators were killed and five wounded. (ANC29) 
Topicalization of the police was also noticed in the reporting of clashes between security 
forces and the protesters. That is, in actions including the police and demonstrators, police 
and their negative actions towards the protesters were often positioned first in the action 
(frontal position). Meanwhile, if any negative actions were allocated to the protesters in the 
same instance, the protesters and their actions came in second position. 
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 A few examples include: 
 Police fired on the demonstrators after a man shot at them and others threw stones 
and knives...Two protesters were killed, and three other people were wounded. 
(ANC29) 
Afgan police shot dead four people protesting yesterday...  (KT12) 
Local Police fired tear gas and resorted to baton charge to disperse the mob.... 
(GNC21) 
In the Arab press, the topos of ‘victimisation’ was also drawn upon by the allocation of 
Muslim scholars and governmental officials as the agents of vocal processes, highlighting 
‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ as being under attack and as victims of negative actions. At times, 
these negative actions are highlighted to be inflicted by members or sources related to the 
‘out-group’ or the ‘West’. This is done by placing ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’, the ‘in-group’, as the 
passive receivers of these negative actions. This pattern was mainly detected in the Qatari 
Gulf Times: 
‘They think Osama Bin Laden speaks for the religion and its followers. Islam and 
Muslims are linked to all that is negative and backward,’ said Abdullah, whose 
country heads the 57-member Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). ‘The 
demonisation of Islam and the vilification of Muslims, there is no denying, is 
widespread within mainstream Western society," he said.  (GTC61) 
 
The city’s top Islamic leader, Qazi Abdul Lateef, said that the turnout showed that 
‘attempts by anti-Islam forces to defame Muslims...would not be tolerated’. (GT65) 
The protesters branded the publication of the cartoons ‘an act of terrorism’ and said 
they were part of a plot by European countries to defame Islam. (GT65) 
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5.3.4   Argumentation Strategies: UK Press 
As mentioned in the topic analysis, the amount of opinion pieces found to be included in the 
Arab corpus of articles related to the cartoon controversy was quite minimal. This was even 
more the case in articles focusing on ‘Muslim protests against the cartoons’ as their main 
topic. In fact, all the articles dominated by this topic in the Arab corpus were news reports 
on the protests. Accordingly, this meant that argumentative discourse was much less 
prominent. Therefore, argumentation analysis on articles related specifically to the protests 
was only applied to the UK press. 
Two key arguments were detected in the UK based corpus of articles covering the protests. 
The first one to be discussed was found in articles focusing on local protests that took place 
in London, and that have developed much criticism and condemnation as a result of the 
negative actions played out by some of the protesters taking part. This argument was 
regarding the need for the UK government and police to take legal action against these 
protesters on the premise that they pose a threat to the general well being of the British 
public. Building on the negative referential and predicational strategies discussed earlier, 
the argument drew heavily on the topos of ‘threat’ in the representation of Muslim 
protesters. 
The second main argument found was utilised specifically in reports and opinion pieces 
covering international protests, in this case, protests that took place in Beirut and 
Damascus. The argument revolved around the idea that the cartoon protests were the 
result of well organised external networks with ulterior motivations and objectives not 
directly related to the cartoons. Here, the topos of ‘political motivation’ was drawn upon in 
the representation of some of the protesters, as well as, the protest organisers. 
 
5.3.4.1   Topos of ‘Threat’ 
Arguments drawing on the topos of ‘threat’ were found across the UK newspapers analysed 
in this study. One example of such arguments was emphasised in the op-ed, ‘This soft 
approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far Right’ (DTC21): 
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Also, the Government needs to be aware that the impression it gives of influencing 
the police to shy away from confronting this evil is providing a recruiting sergeant for 
the BNP. That party has just had its best week ever, not simply because of Nick 
Griffin’s acquittal for speaking his unpleasant mind about Islam and black people, but 
because of the encouragement given to racial hatred by the combined efforts of 
militant Islam and an ineffectual political response to it. Unless we are happy for the 
extreme Right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow this appeasing and 
unjust approach to continue.  
In this example, the writer is critical of what he describes as the government’s soft approach 
towards some of the protesters and their negative actions. Drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, 
the soft approach towards the protesters who are referred to negatively as ‘evil’ is 
portrayed as possibly leading to negative effects on the British society, through the rise of 
the popularity of the BNP, a political party known for its negative attitude towards ‘Islam 
and black people’. Using causal argumentation, highlighted by the phrase, ‘unless we are 
happy for the extreme right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow this appeasing 
and unjust approach to continue’, it is argued that the BNP will ‘win credibility’, not just as a 
result of the lack of political and police action towards the protesters, but by the negative 
actions carried out by ‘militant Islam’, encouraging racial hatred. 
In terms of the reasonableness of the argument, it can be regarded as fallacious. It commits 
a ‘slippery slope’ fallacy, where it argues that by taking a soft approach in dealing with the 
event, the already existing situation which is portrayed as negative will get worse, ultimately 
leading to a rise of BNP’s popularity. This makes the assumption that the actions taken by 
the protesters and the government’s reaction to them will undoubtedly lead the British 
public into turning to or favouring the BNP party as their political representation. This 
argument is clearly unjustified, as it does not only negatively generalise the British public as 
reactionary in turning in favour of the BNP as a result of certain events, but it also assumes 
that this consequence is inevitable.  
The topos of ‘Threat’ is drawn upon again towards the bottom of the same article: 
Second, it must take note of the internationally co-ordinated and highly 
opportunistic nature of the protests, which clearly took some months to arrange – 
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the cartoons were first published last September – and draw conclusions from them 
about the network of well-organised extremists that threatens all Western society. 
In this argument, the writer emphasises the importance of the British government taking 
notice of the danger posed by the protests through the use of symptomatic argumentation. 
The symptomatic relation triggered by the phrase, ‘draw conclusions’, is based on the 
assumption that the protests which are described as ‘internationally co-ordinated’ and 
‘highly opportunistic’ are a necessary characteristic of ‘a network of well organised 
extremists’, posing a threat to ‘all Western society’. 
However, the argument can be considered fallacious, since not all well planned, 
‘coordinated’ and ‘opportunistic’ protests can be seen as the result or a characteristic of a 
well organised network, let alone one co-ordinated by ‘extremists’. Furthermore, the 
argument also makes the presupposition that the protests were in fact organised by 
extremists and not by various independent Muslim groups/individuals, without any 
sufficient support. 
The topos of ‘threat’ was also highlighted in the opinion piece fittingly titled, ‘Threats that 
must be countered’ (TGC42): 
Serious things happened in our midst on Friday – and even more serious things are 
happening to Danes around the world. Ministers do nobody any favours by 
appearing to imply that the best thing is just to muddle through. These threats are 
real, present and serious, and if ministers put their heads in the sand they will lose 
the argument.  
As with the previous examples, the writer is critical of the government’s stance and reaction 
towards some of the Muslim protesters and their negative actions during the London based 
anti-cartoon protests. In line with the main argument for some legal action to be taken 
against the protesters, causal argumentation is utilized to highlight an imminent threat. That 
is, it is argued that if the government ‘ministers’ ignore the ‘threats’ posed by the 
protesters, which are attributed with the qualities of being ‘real, present and serious’, there 
will be negative consequences, highlighted by the use of the metaphor ‘they will lose the 
argument’. Using this metaphor in combination with the modal verb ‘will’ removes any form 
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of hedging, emphasising that the lack of action by the UK government would ultimately lead 
to or allow the threat to win or prosper.  
 
5.3.4.2   Topos of ‘Political Motivation’ 
The second main argument drew on the topos of ‘political motivation’, where it was argued 
that the protests were not just the result of public condemnation of the cartoon 
publications, but at times, the outcome of well organised external networks with ulterior 
motivations and objectives. This argument was based on the premise that the protests were 
either, (1) supported by governmental authorities, or (2) motivated by and resulting from 
external political parties with various objectives, not directly related to the publication of 
the cartoons. Drawing on this topos, Muslims are represented as manipulative, echoing the 
closed views of Islam introduced by the Runnymede Trust (1997) (see section 2.1.3). 
One instance where this topos was found to be drawn upon was in an opinion piece 
published by the Independent titled, ‘Robert Fisk: The Fury’ (TIC20): 
Yesterday’s violence may have been inspired by the previous day’s assaults on the 
Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus – or were perhaps encouraged by the 
same Baath party which must have originally permitted the Syrian demonstrations 
to take place. 
More likely, the crowds in both cities were allowed by the authorities to stage 
protests, but the demonstrators quickly became overwhelmed as Sunni extremists – 
in Lebanon, perhaps from the Salafist Hizb al-Tahrir party in Tripoli, and equally 
Wahhabi-minded Palestinians from Ein el-Helweh refugee camp – arrived with 
sticks and stones to assault the Danish property and then attack the St Maroun 
church and march on the Lebanese foreign ministry.  
The main focus of the above excerpt is the protest that took place in Beirut which resulted 
in some violence. The topos of ‘political motivation’ is highlighted by the use of the modal 
verb ‘may’ and the adverb ‘perhaps’. By using the modal verb ‘may’, the writer enhances 
the probability that the Beirut protests were in fact influenced by external forces, in this 
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case, the events that took place a day earlier in neighbouring Damascus. Moreover, by the 
use of the adverb ‘perhaps’, the external influence towards a violent protest is specified and 
enhanced further as being instigated by the ‘Baath party’, the Syrian ruling political party. 
The involvement of this political party in the Syrian protests is emphasised further by the 
use of the modal verb ‘must’, describing not only their categorical involvement in the 
protests by allowing them to take place, but the presumption that they were in fact aware 
that the protests were going to take place. 
In addition to the ‘Syrian’ external governmental influence on the Lebanese events, other 
political influences are highlighted as possibly playing a part, by the use of the adverb 
‘likely’, which is intensified further by the addition of the modifier ‘more’. These include, a 
Salafist group ‘Hezb al-Tahrir’ and ‘Wahhabi minded Palestinians’, both of which are 
considered conservative and religious Muslim political parties, based outside the Lebanese 
capital Beirut. 
The topos of external ‘political motivation’ is also supported by the use of assimilation 
methods, using quantification to highlight the number of foreign protesters involved in the 
protests that took place in Beirut. Examples of this pattern were found in both, the 
Guardian and Independent: 
The authorities said that of 200 people arrested after the riot, 76 were Syrian and 
35 were Palestinian. Many took this as further evidence of Syrian involvement. 
(TGC47) 
At least 30 people were arrested and the Lebanese authorities later announced – 
predictably – that most were “foreigners”. (TIC20) 
Another argumentation technique which drew on the topos of ‘political motivation’ was 
rhetorical ethos or what may be considered as, a fallacy of Argumentum ad Verecundiam. 
That is, a standpoint was presented as true based on the fact that an authority declares it be 
so: 
Asad Harmoush, a leader of Jamia Islamiya, the conservative Sunni Muslim group 
that had helped organise the protest...’We can’t control tens of thousands of 
people...There has to be an investigation. Obviously there were infiltrators. (TGC52) 
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Lebanon’s interior minister, Hassan Sabei, resigned late on Sunday after criticism of 
the failure of the security forces to curb the violence. He said that the protest got out 
of control because of a hardcore [sic] of ‘infiltrators’ (TGC47) 
This form of argumentation also took the shape of a populistic fallacy, another variant of 
Argumentum ad Populum: 
Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in 
Damascus at the weekend were encouraged to organise by the Syrian authorities, 
and received text messages from Islamic study centres urging them to gather, 
according to participants in the riot’. (TIC16)  
Many people in Lebanon have accused Syria of instigating the violence, and said it 
was part of a broader campaign by Damascus to sow instability and sectarian 
division in Lebanon (TGC47). 
In  the above examples, the standpoint arguing for governmental involvement in the Syrian 
protests and Syrian external political involvement in the protests that took place in Lebanon 
are both built on the premise that a certain number of individuals, ‘many people’ and 
‘according to participants in the riot’, declare this to be the case. 
This topos also takes a narrative form in the Guardian op-ed piece, ‘Rioting with well- 
planned spontaneity’ (TGC52). Here, the argument does not only highlight ‘political 
motivation’, but that the protests were pre-planned and organised. This is done by using a 
narrative form, where the article begins by describing a typical morning in Lebanon’s capital, 
Beirut, listing some of the peaceful daily chores and activities typically witnessed: 
It was one those unpredictable Lebanese Sunday mornings. The ski slopes in the 
mountains overlooking Beirut would have been crowded with skiers enjoying the 
brilliant winter sunshine. Walkers were out along the corniche...the chic restaurants 
were preparing for lunch time...And there were a few men on scooters riding around 
town broadcasting an imminent protest. 
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This is followed by a long detailed description of the arrival of the protesters ‘young, often 
bearded men who wore headbands and carried identical flags with calligraphic inscriptions 
in Arabic’. A list of their actions (mainly negative) and the police reaction to them followed: 
On the street the riot began to take a more sectarian turn. Throwing the metal 
barriers and barbed wire aside they chased the police up into the narrow alleys of 
Achrefieh, well beyond the embassy and deep into the Christian quarter. 
A deductive argument is presented here, arguing that the protest took a ‘sectarian turn’, 
based on the premise that the protesters chased the police ‘well beyond the embassy and 
deep into the Christian quarter’. However, a hasty generalisation is committed, since it is 
unreasonable to assume that the protest took a sectarian direction based solely on the 
observation that some protesters ended up in some of the Christian areas of Beirut.  
Ending in the narrative form it began with, the article concludes with the following:  
And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. The leaders 
of the mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it was time to 
leave. Obediently, the crowd thinned out and began walking to their buses...The 
police returned in force...Fireman hosed down the blaze. Crowds of Filipino maids 
returned from their day off back to their jobs in the homes of the wealthy...Dozens of 
street sweepers hosed down the roads and collected debris of the day. 
The use of the narrative form, in combination with the actions allocated to the actors 
involved, highlights the protest as a pre-planned and carefully organised event by particular 
interested parties. This portrays the protesters as controlled into taking certain actions, 
rather than choosing to protest freely based on their individual feelings.  
 
5.4     General Analysis: 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy 
The following section will discuss the key arguments and argumentation schemes utilised in 
the rest of the articles collected for qualitative data. As mentioned earlier in the topic 
analysis (Section 5.2), these articles mainly revolved around arguments for and against the 
publication of the cartoons. Moreover, although both contexts predominantly leaned 
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towards arguments for selective censorship, the premises and topoi on which these 
arguments were built and drawn upon were drastically different, highlighting the ‘out-
group’ in each context in a negative light. 
The discussion will begin with the analysis of key arguments and topoi found in the UK 
press, followed by analytical findings on argumentation in the Arab English language 
newspapers. 
 
5.4.1    UK Press: Argumentation  
As none of the UK based quality newspapers examined in this study actually published the 
cartoons in question, unsurprisingly, one of the main recurring arguments found was for 
freedom of speech, while defending selective censorship in avoidance of negative political, 
social, economical and security related implications. These implications, at times, albeit to 
lesser degree, highlighted the negative consequences these publications may have on local 
Muslim communities. 
Arguments against any form of censorship were also illustrated in the articles, in keeping 
with the principals and values of democratic societies. In such arguments, the protection of 
these values was the main supporting premise for the publication of the cartoons.  The 
Muslim ‘double standard’ was another claimed premise on which arguments for freedom of 
speech were built. These were particularly critical of the negative Muslim reaction, arguing 
that Muslim media has been found to practice selective censorship themselves, publishing 
offensive material in reference to other religions.  
Arguments presented by Muslim actors justifying Muslims’ negative reactions were also 
highlighted in the UK Press. In these examples, the argument against the publication of the 
cartoons and the justification of Muslim reactions is based on the religious obligations and 
commitments Muslims are described to have towards their prophet.  
To summarise, Islam and Muslims were represented drawing on the following topoi: 
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(1) Threat: Muslims pose a threat by demands for censorship or/and by their negative 
reactions should the cartoons be published in the UK press. These include, 
economical, social and security related threats. 
(2) Religious Obligation: Muslims are represented as religiously obliged and committed 
to demand censorship. 
(3) Victimisation: Muslims are represented as victimised by various possible negative 
implications should the cartoons be published. 
(4) Contradiction: Muslims are represented as practicing a double standard in their 
demand for media censorship. 
 
5.4.1.1 Topos of ‘Threat’  
One argument that was detected repeatedly in the UK based corpus was the argument for 
the responsible use of freedom of speech. Drawing on the topos of ‘threat’, an argument for 
selective censorship is introduced based on the premise that it would be the responsible 
step to take by the media, as the publications may lead to negative social and economical 
consequences. 
In a Daily Telegraph op-ed, ‘Conscience or Commerce: That is the question’ (DTC16), the 
argument for responsible application of freedom of speech is based on a description of the 
British multicultural society as one that ‘is more fragile than we imagined’. The fragility is 
employed as the basis of why the cartoons have not been republished in the UK press, and 
part of what forms this fragility is the social reality of Muslims living in Britain and how they 
feel, which is described as the following: 
Some complain of internal prejudice and some are upset at external oppression. 
Many therefore identify more with Muslims in Palestine and Iraq than they do with 
their fellow British citizens.  
Instead of becoming assimilated, and perhaps being drawn towards secularism, some 
of them – and, arguably, it is a minority of the minority – have deepened their 
Muslim faith. This has resulted in them becoming unduly hostile to the British state 
and even the non-Muslim British population.   
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The excerpt begins by representing the British Muslim community as distant from the 
general British public, drawing on the topos of ‘separation’ by the use of causation. That is,   
as a result of negative feelings, Muslims are placed in the active role of identifying with 
foreign Muslims, rather than their ‘fellow British citizens’. This is followed by another 
causation argument, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’ in the representation of ‘Islam’ as a 
religion. This fallacious cause and effect argument is indicated by the phrase ‘this had 
resulted in’, signalling the action of Muslims who ‘deepened their faith‘, as sparking their 
resentment and feeling ‘unduly hostile to the British state and even the non-Muslim British 
population’.  The post hoc ergo propter fallacy committed here is based on an unjustified 
argument that the deepening of Muslim faith by some Muslims in the UK triggers their 
hostility to the UK and its citizens of other religions. 
Similarly, the topos of ‘threat’ was drawn upon in the Independent op-ed headlined, 
‘Stephen Glover on the press: No News is Good News’ (TIC21). In analysing the reasons 
behind British newspapers’ decision not to publish the cartoons, fears of negative 
commercial implications are highlighted as a possible factor leading to this censorship 
decision. In this case, commercial implications that may develop as a consequence of 
negative reactions from Muslim readers and clients: 
So what explains their reticence this time? One possibility is that our papers are more 
commercially minded than many on the continent. Some of them have a fairly high 
proportion of Muslim readers, of whom even the most moderate might be appalled 
by these cartoons. In what is probably the world’s most competitive market, no 
newspaper wants to face a boycott. There is also the risk that some of the many 
paper shops owned and run by Muslims might somehow discriminate against - or be 
urged to do so by more extreme Muslims – a newspaper which published the 
cartoons.  
The causation argument is built on the premise comprised of two parts. The publication of 
the cartoons is argued to lead to: 
(1) The large number of Muslim readers that ‘might’ be appalled by a republication, 
and thus, ‘boycott’ the papers. 
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(2) ‘Some of the many’ Muslim owned and managed shops selling newspapers 
‘might somehow discriminate’ against the newspapers publishing the cartoons. 
In both cases, there are profit loss concerns, and in both events, the commercial threats are 
posed by ‘Muslims’. The probability of a threat is intensified by the double use of the modal 
verb ‘might’, describing the negative actions or effects that could take place resulting from 
the reprinting of the cartoons. Interestingly, Muslim newspaper agents who may react 
towards the publications are described with the negative agency of ‘discriminating’ against 
the papers publishing the cartoons. 
The same article also ends with an ‘apparent empathy’ disclaimer, highlighting a sense of 
threat more directly: 
Had it been my decision, I suppose I would not have published the pictures out of 
respect for Muslims, but I would not have been entirely proud of myself. There is a 
gigantic culture clash here. Free speech is under threat. And there are millions of 
Muslims who believe that Western governments can and should tell newspapers 
what they can, and cannot, publish.  
Forming a positive self-representation, the author begins by empathetically identifying with 
the feelings of Muslims on the issue, by having the view of not publishing the cartoons ‘out 
of respect for Muslims’. However, this is followed by the author’s criticism of his own stance.  
More importantly, this apparent empathy is followed by a negative description of ‘Muslims’ 
or the ‘out-group’, as posing a ‘threat’ to freedom of speech. This existing threat is indicated 
by the direct proposition, ‘Freedom of speech is under threat’, which is further supported by 
allocating to Muslims the mental action of ‘believing’ that ‘Western governments’ should 
control freedom of speech in the press. The ‘threat’ of this belief is intensified further with 
the use of quantification as an assimilation strategy, referring to the Muslims as ‘Millions of 
Muslims’ involved in this mental action or ‘belief’, committing a populistic fallacy. 
Another example of a disclaimer highlighting a ‘threat’ was found in the Times news report, 
‘World press opinion of cartoon row’ (TTC9), reporting on world press opinion regarding the 
cartoon controversy. This particular opinion was quoted from the Daily Telegraph:  
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‘Our restraint is in keeping with British values of tolerance and respect for the 
feelings of others. However, we are equally in no doubt that a small minority of 
Muslims would be offended by such a publication to an extent where they would 
threaten, and perhaps even use, violence. This is a problem that the whole of the 
Western world needs to confront frankly, and not sidestep’. 
The use of an apparent empathy is indicated by the positive self presentation of the Daily 
Telegraph newspaper as having the positive qualities associated with ‘British values’, such 
as, ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ for others, highlighting feeling of sympathy towards Muslims or 
the ‘out-group’. However, this is immediately followed by a negative portrayal of the ‘out-
group’, or what are referred to as a ‘small minority of Muslims’. This negative portrayal 
takes shape by allocating to the out-group  the agency of negative actions, ‘would threaten, 
and perhaps even use, violence’, thus, presenting them as posing a real danger. 
In the op-ed, ‘When freedom gives in to fear’ (TGC49), the writer explains the newspaper’s 
position in not reprinting the cartoons. One of the key reasons behind this position, which 
the writer qualifies as ‘a less attractive explanation’ are the negative commercial and social 
implications that may result as a consequence of republishing. Drawing on the topos of 
‘threat’, these consequences are portrayed as mainly developing from Muslim reactions to a 
possible republication. Through a set of questions, these reactions are argued to affect 
newspaper production, risk jobs, as well as other negative social implications: 
The less attractive explanation is pure pragmatism. Do you want a protest greeting 
you next morning? Is it worth having production disrupted for the next few months? 
How will Muslim newsagents react to what you print? Freedom of the press is all 
very well, but newspapers are commercial operations.  
Not only that, but they should feel some responsibility for their actions. We might ask 
Danish workers whose jobs are threatened by Middle Eastern boycotts if they are 
happy to pay the price for press freedom. Is the principle behind publication of 
offensive cartoons important enough to have the foreign office spend the next few 
months  clearing the mess? 
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The topos of ‘threat’ takes a more direct approach in the representation of Islam and 
Muslims in the next section of the article. Although the writer acknowledges the importance 
of pragmatic judgements in not republishing the cartoons, she is critical of it. She argues 
that the decision not to publish by the press indicates a growing threat towards the concept 
of freedom of speech in the UK. This is highlighted by the negative active role allocated to 
Muslims: 
Unfortunately, there is a strand of Muslim opinion that questions not only our right 
to be offensive but also our right to explore and debate these issues. 
A growing threat is also highlighted by the use of the modal verb ‘should’ prior to the action 
‘worry’, allocated to the in-group ‘we’: 
That was another pragmatic decision, but we should worry that it had to be taken. 
Finally, the topos of ‘threat’ is highlighted yet again towards the end of the article: 
I suspect the truth is that many British journalists feel uncomfortable with the 
accommodations we are already making, not because they think it is the role of free 
press to cause gratuitous offence, but because we have accepted that a large group 
is to be treated with greater circumspection for fear of what it will do if we don’t. 
British journalists are argued to be ‘uncomfortable’ with not republishing the cartoons in 
fear of the possible reactionary actions by Muslims. The use of the modal verb ‘will’ in 
describing the actions of Muslims who are referred to as ‘a large group’, removes any form 
of hedging and portrays their reactionary action as absolutely categorical should the 
cartoons be republished. 
The topos of ‘threat’ was also highlighted in the Guardian op-ed headlined, ‘A Worm’s Eye 
View: Logic and principle can’t resolve the row over the Danish cartoons’ (TGC44). Here, the 
topos of ‘threat’ is drawn upon in an argument of a looming danger on two levels. The first 
level argues that the cartoon conflict can have detrimental effects on the global relations 
front. However, echoing other articles analysed in the UK based corpus, it also presents the 
cartoon conflict as posing a threat to the freedom of speech associated with liberalism and 
the West. In regard to the first level drawing on this topos, the writer uses an analogy as an 
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argumentation scheme, where he narrates a historical event involving a famous English 
major, and compares this narrated incident to the cartoon conflict. 
The narrative begins by describing ‘Major Charles Napier’ with the positive qualities of a war 
hero, who faced challenges and prevailed, continuing his military career. He is described as 
a ‘remarkable soldier who conquered Sind, now a part of Pakistan’, ‘fought the Turks in 
Greece’ and to have become ‘the first British governor of Cephalonia’, all after overcoming 
injuries, such as, ‘his leg was broken by a musket shot...and his ribs were broken by a 
gunshot’. Following this positive description, the narrative continues by retelling the 
following story involving the major, which took place during one of his conquests: 
When a group of Brahmins petitioned him for permission to burn a widow alive after 
her husband’s death, explaining that it was the custom of their country, he replied 
that it was the custom of his country to hang those who did so, and if they followed 
their custom, his soldiers would build a gallows beside the funeral pyre and follow his 
custom as soon as they had followed theirs.  
The writer makes an analogy between this historical case and the cartoon conflict, by 
referring to both cases as examples of ‘conversations of Multiculturalism’. He states the 
following: 
All conversations about multiculturalism come back to this point sooner or later. In 
the end it is force, or the threat of it, which decides whose customs are followed and 
whose taboos are honoured...But any attempt to impose one set of customs on the 
whole world is now going to require more force than the globe can safely contain. 
Through the use if this false analogy, it is argued that ‘force’ or ‘the threat of it’ is what 
determines which social group ultimately gets its way. However, drawing on the topos of 
‘threat’, this form of dialogue ‘now’ or today, where social groups try to impose their owns 
cultural norms and customs, is argued to possibly pose threats on global peace and security. 
As seen in the above example, no particular social group (‘West’ or ‘Muslims’) are given the 
agency of this conflict and thus, both can be represented to take blame in bringing along 
this threat.   
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5.4.1.2    Topos of ‘Religious Obligation’ 
Another topos drawn upon in the representation of Muslims was the topos of ‘religious 
obligation’, which was more sympathetic towards the Muslim position. One article this 
topos was highlighted in was a Times news report headlined, ‘British Imam warns against 
overreaction’ (TTC15), which mainly focuses on the Muslim religious reaction to the cartoon 
row. The article depends heavily on the views of a ‘leading British Imam’ in explaining the 
Muslim negative reactions towards the published cartoons. In his description, he argues that 
Muslims have been ‘hurt’ by the cartoons. Drawing on the topos of ‘religious obligation’, 
this ‘hurt’ is argued to be primarily based on Muslims’ highly valued religious connection 
with the prophet as dictated by the Quran (the Muslim holy book) and the sayings by 
Prophet Mohammed. 
Imam Mogra, a theologian and expert in Islamic law or Sharia, explained why 
Muslims had been so hurt by the caricatures. He said that Muslims started from the 
position of loving God, which meant total obedience to his messenger, Mohammed. 
Even moderate Muslims took seriously the Koranic injunctions to listen to the 
Prophet, and not to be forward in the presence of God or his messenger.  
They also believe, from chapter 21, verse 107, that God sent Mohammed as his 
messenger as an act of ‘mercy’ to the whole world. In addition, Mohammed is 
reported in the Hadith to have told his followers: ‘None of you is a true believer until I 
become more beloved to him than his child, his father and the whole of mankind’. 
Utilising the argument of authority, the imam justifies the Muslim reaction by explaining 
that Muslims’ close connection with religious scripture and their obligation towards the 
Islamic religion and the Muslim prophet is the prime motivating drive behind such a 
defensive reaction. He further explains, ‘because of these teachings it is very easy for 
Muslims to feel hurt and pain when such an important person is vilified in this manner’’. 
Verses from the Quran, ‘chapter 21/verse 107’ and a ‘Hadith’ (sayings by the prophet) are 
used as the supporting authoritative premise. 
The topos of ‘religious obligation’ was also utilized by the imam in an argument against 
violent behaviour and Muslim overreaction.  
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‘The Messenger said we must love our neighbour, we must do unto others what we 
want done unto ourselves, we must care for the poor and needy, we must stand up 
for justice, we must stand against oppression, we must be honest in our dealings, we 
must not cheat, lie or swear.’  
‘The Messenger taught that no matter what the wrong or injustice done to us, we do 
not lower ourselves to that level where we carry revenge. To carry out a terrorist 
attack because of this incident would not be justified.’  
The argument of authority is used once again in the argument against violent reactions 
towards the cartoons. This is done by the use of the prophet’s sayings, which highlight the 
prophet and Islam as peace promoting. The prophet is given active roles in positive actions 
advocating, ‘love’, ‘honesty’, ‘care for the poor’ and ‘justice’. These positive actions are 
further emphasised as a religious obligation upon Muslims, who are referred to repeatedly 
using the pronoun ‘we’, and positioned in passive roles prior to the repeated use of the 
modal verb ‘must’.  
The topos of ‘threat’ and ‘religious obligation’ were also drawn upon in an article focusing 
on the Islamic jurisdiction regarding depictions of the Muslim prophet. The title of the 
article leads one of these topoi with a somewhat unrelated headline, ‘West tries to calm 
tensions as militants threaten kidnaps’ (TTC8). In accordance with the ideological square, 
the ‘in-group’, referred  to as the ‘West’, are attributed with the positive actions of trying to 
‘calm’ tensions, while the ‘out-group’, who are referred to as ‘militants’, are attributed with 
the negative action of ‘threatening’ kidnaps. 
The topos of ‘threat’ is enhanced further in a standpoint presented at the beginning of the 
article, arguing that the republication of the prophet cartoons would ‘inevitably lead to 
more terrorist attacks on the West’. This argument is introduced by a ‘leading Muslim 
scholar’, Mufti Abdul Barkatulla, a senior Imam at North Finchley mosque. He bases the 
argument on the premise that verses of the Quran ‘rail against slander and mockery of Islam 
and prayer’, citing the following: 
Chapter 9 verse 12 urges all Muslims to ‘fight’ any who ‘revile’ Islam. Chapter 104 
warns these who slander and defame that they will be hurled into ‘crushing disaster’. 
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The Muslim scholar uses rhetorical ‘ethos’ or an argument of authority, citing verses of the 
Quran to support his claim. In this particular instance, the Quran is attributed with ‘violent’ 
themes, urging Muslims to ‘fight’ and ‘warning’ others who cause ‘slander’ and ‘defame’, of 
ending up ‘hurled into crushing disaster’. 
However, the fallacy of unclearness is committed, resulting from, (1) referential 
indefiniteness, and (2) vagueness. Regarding referential indefiniteness, it is not clear who 
specifically is/are being referred to in the statements: ‘who revile Islam’ and ‘they will be 
hurled into crushing disaster’. That is, to acquire a full and comprehensive interpretation of 
these Quranic verses, essential contextual information is required, this would include, the 
local micro discursive context surrounding these verses and the macro situational context 
they are referring to.  
Moreover, the fallacy of unclearness can also be said to result from the vagueness regarding 
the verses shared. As mentioned earlier, meanings of Quranic verses are open to several 
interpretations from various expert Islamic scholars and schools, therefore, the criteria by 
which these religious obligations/laws should be applied or adapted remain open to 
extensive debate.  
 
5.4.1.3   Topos of ‘victimisation’  
The topos of ‘victimisation’ was also drawn upon in the representation of Islam and 
Muslims. This topos was mainly indicated in arguments against the republication of the 
cartoons, since their publication can cause deep offence and social related implications 
towards various Muslim communities. 
It is important to note that many of these arguments were mainly found in an article 
highlighting other newspaper views on the cartoon controversy, the article which was 
published in the Times was headlined, ‘World press opinion of cartoon row’ (TTC9). 
Therefore, it mainly reflected the views of other newspaper establishments, in the case of 
this argument, namely, the Guardian and the Daily mail. 
Starting with the Guardian, the following view was selected to be reprinted in the Times: 
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‘It is one thing to assert the right to publish an image of the prophet. As long as that 
is not illegal – and not even the government’s amended religious hatred bill makes it 
so – then that right undoubtedly exists. But it is another thing to put that right to the 
test, especially when to do so inevitably causes offence to many Muslims and, even 
more so, when there is currently such powerful need to craft a more inclusive public 
culture which can embrace them and their faith.’ 
In this excerpt, the topos of ‘victimisation’ is drawn upon by allocating Muslims with a 
passive role, where they are portrayed as the object of ‘offence’. However, the agents of 
this action are suppressed. The example continues where a presupposition is made that 
‘Muslims’ and their faith are currently not socially ‘embraced’. The nominal presupposition 
is signalled by the use of an adjective ‘more’ to modify the noun phrase, ‘inclusive public 
culture’, implying that the current system is not as successful in doing so.  
Similarly, the Daily mail was quoted as stating the following: 
‘While the Mail would fight to the death to defend those papers that printed the 
offending cartoons, it disagrees with the fact that they have done so. Rights are one 
thing. Responsibilities are another. And newspapers that so piously proclaimed their 
right to freedom of speech were being – to put it mildly – deeply discourteous to the 
Islamic view.’ 
In this example, again, the argument against the republication of the cartoons is based on 
the premise that it leads to deep offence to Muslims. The newspapers which published the 
cartoons are attributed with the negative process of being ‘deeply discourteous to the 
Islamic view’. 
The topos of ‘victimisation’ was also found in a quote by the G100 (Coalition of World 
Economic Forum) in a Times article headlined ‘Muslim Cartoon’ (TTC7): 
We are saddened and appalled by the cartoons, and the irresponsible action of the 
papers in Denmark and France in allowing the cartoons to be published. We 
recognize the importance of free speech and we agree that religions should not 
expect any favours or privileges against other groups in society. However to publish 
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such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world as an attack on a 
world faith and only deepens the suspicion between the West and Muslim world. 
As seen in the above example, those publishing the cartoons are represented negatively as 
agents of an ‘irresponsible act’, albeit with the use of a metonym, whereby the writers of 
the newspapers are replaced by the papers themselves ‘the papers in Denmark and France’. 
On the other hand, Islam referred to as a ‘world faith’ is represented as victimised through 
the use of an argumentation of authority. It is argued that publishing these ‘offensive’ 
cartoons would result in ‘many around the world’ to see it ‘as an attack on a world faith’. 
This is presupposed to result in further damage to the already severed relations between 
the ‘West’ and the ‘Muslim world’, by the use of the change of state verb ‘deepens’. 
Nevertheless, this argument can be seen as an example of a populistic fallacy (argumentum 
ad populum), since the standpoint is argued to be acceptable because ‘many’ individuals 
would share the same view, which does not necessarily guarantee that this is in fact the 
case. 
 
5.4.1.4    Topos of ‘Contradiction’ 
Another line of argument found repeatedly in the UK discourse on the cartoon controversy 
directly rejected Muslim negative reactions towards the cartoons by drawing on the topos 
of ‘contradiction’. The arguments rejected Muslim requests for censorship based on respect 
of religion, since the request itself is viewed as a contradictory act by Muslims. Such 
arguments were based on the premise that although Muslims severely condemn the 
cartoons’ offensive nature, they have been found to reproduce their own offensive 
publications, related to other religions.  
An example of this argument was found towards the end of the op-ed, ‘Drawing the Line: 
Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned’ (TTC6): 
Consistency would also be a virtue. The anger directed at these cartoons by certain 
Muslims would carry more weight if pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians 
were not found regularly in the Middle East. To contend that faiths of many forms 
239 
 
merit a degree of deference, but not absolute protection, is one notion. To insist that 
this principle be applied selectively is another, quite indefensible, assertion. 
In this example, Muslims are argued as ‘contradictory’ by insisting that censorship be 
applied selectively, this claim is based on the premise that ‘pictures that crudely insult Jews 
and Christians’ are published regularly by various Middle Eastern media outlets. By building 
the argument on this premise, however, a false analogy is committed based on the fallacy of 
ambiguity. The article generally refers to ‘pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians’, 
not clearly illustrating what these ‘pictures’ actually entail, i.e. do they mock Christians and 
Jews in general or do they depict any of the prophets in an offensive manner? 
To explain further, Muslim objection towards the Danish cartoons was mainly directed at 
the act of depicting the Muslim prophet, a sacred figure, whose depiction is forbidden in the 
Islamic religion. This is in addition to the negative portrayal of the prophet as a bomb 
shaped turban wearing terrorist, reflecting Islam as a violent religion. This is as opposed to 
negative cartoons or depictions of individual Muslims, which are occasionally published in 
the media, and do not raise such condemnation. 
 This line of argument takes a more detailed approach in the article headlined, ‘Muslim 
Cartoon’ (TTC7). Following the initial section of the article, where the writer highlights the 
condemnation of the prophet cartoons by a quote made by Muslim and Christian leaders of 
the C-100 (Coalition of the World Economic Forum), readers are asked to examine an online 
article taken from Tom Gross’s Mideast Media Analysis site. The writer describes what the 
article is comprised of, which is a review of a selection of ‘anti-Semitic’ cartoons published 
by 7 Arab nations (all predominantly Muslim), some of which are described as ‘moderate or 
allied to the West’. Following these examples, the writer asks:  
Where is the condemnation from and of those in the Arab world responsible for these 
atrocious anti-Semitic images?  
In addition to the negative predicational strategies attributed to members of the ‘Arab 
world’, described as ‘responsible for these atrocious anti-Semitic images’, a presupposition is 
made that these ‘anti-Semitic’ cartoons are similar to the prophet cartoons, thus, justifying a 
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condemnation as well. Moreover, the question presented also triggers a general assumption 
that nobody in the Arab world in fact condemns or has condemned these cartoons.  
In support of his argument the writer provides a detailed description of one particular ‘anti-
Semitic’ cartoon published in a Jordanian paper, and a presumption is made that such a 
cartoon should call for similar condemnation, but nevertheless was published by the Arab 
based paper: 
One cartoon depicts the railroad to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau – but with 
Israeli flags replacing the Nazi ones. It is taken from the Jordanian newspaper Ad-
Dustur. The sign in Arabic reads: ‘Gaza Strip or Israeli Annihilation camp.’ Gross 
writes: ‘This accentuates the widespread libel that Israel’s policies towards the 
Palestinians have been comparable to Nazi actions towards Jews.’ 
Although, unlike the earlier example, the writer is less ambiguous regarding what the 
cartoon is actually comprised of, a false analogy may still be argued to be committed. As 
mentioned earlier, the condemnation towards the prophet cartoons mainly arose out of 
what was viewed as the mocking of a religious sacred figure, the Muslim prophet. This 
stands in contrast to the cartoons published in the Jordanian paper whose main target is the 
‘state of Israel’ and not the ‘Jewish religion’ or any sacred figures per se, as the description 
of the cartoon above illustrates. 
 
5.4.2    Argumentation: Arab Press  
Argumentation schemes are predominantly found in opinion pieces. Therefore, it was no 
surprise that most of the argumentation analysed were found in the Arab News articles, as it 
was the only Arab English language newspaper that included opinion pieces in the corpus of 
Arab based articles selected to be analysed using CDA. This also limited the amount of 
argumentative discourse available for analysis. 
The Danish cartoon controversy discourse in general did reproduce some dominant 
meanings highlighted in the UK based newspapers. However, arguments exclusively argued 
against the publication and thus for selective censorship, and the topoi and premises drawn 
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and built upon in these arguments clearly differed from those in the UK Press. Arguments 
against the publication of the cartoons emphasised: (1) the importance of respect towards 
religion, and (2) the negative implications the cartoons may have on Islam and Muslims, 
drawing on the topos of ‘victimisation’. More importantly, as with the ‘2009 French face veil 
ban’ analysis, Islam and Muslims were depicted as victims of targeted discrimination; 
Muslims as a social group were argued and represented as being specifically discriminated 
against by Western media. 
Therefore, in the Arab English language articles examined, representation of Islam and 
Muslims was mainly sympathetic to the Muslim position, drawing on the topos of: 
(1) Victimisation: Muslims are represented as victims of ill treatment by the 
publication of these cartoons and the ‘West’ in general. 
(2) Discrimination: Muslims are reported as directly targeted and discriminated 
against by the publication of cartoons.  
 
5.4.2.1   Topos of ‘Victimisation’  
The topos of ‘victimisation’ was drawn upon in an article headlined, ‘Europe’s uncivilised 
act’ (ANC32), which directly criticises the ‘West’ and the publication of the cartoons: 
Policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West have opted to conduct 
the discourse on terrorism using a terminology that has unwittingly but dangerously 
indicted the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. Terms like Muslim terrorists, Islamic 
terrorists and Islamic terrorism have led to the demonization of the Muslims and 
Islam. Whatever the European paper may claim they are upholding by ridiculing the 
holy Prophet, they would not have contemplated doing so in a pre-9/11 environment. 
As illustrated, Muslims are represented as victims of ‘demonization’ by the ‘out-group’, in 
this case the ‘policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West’ and the ‘European 
papers’. A causal argumentation is constructed, indicated by the phrase ‘led to’, where the 
‘demonization of Muslims and Islam’ is argued to be the result of discourse chosen and 
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utilized by ‘Them’ or the ‘Western’ sources. ‘They’ are allocated with the negative act of 
choosing discourse that has ultimately had negative effects on ‘Us’ or ‘Muslims and Islam’. 
In terms of the reasonability of the argument, it can be considered as an example of 
unreasonable use of a causal argumentation scheme, since it commits a post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy. The demonization of ‘Muslims and Islam’ rests only on the actions 
(discourse choices) taken by the ‘out-group’ and not as a consequence of any other factor. 
Admittedly, discourse on terrorism may result in the negative portrayal of Islam and 
Muslims, but many other factors unrelated to actions taken by the ‘out-group’ may also 
certainly contribute to this presupposed ‘demonization’ Muslims and Islam are exposed to.  
The topos of ‘victimisation’ continued further down in the same article: 
This is a season of acute polarization. For example if the online responses of the 
public are any guide, this act of insulting the Prophet has unfortunately received 
widespread public support in many European countries. 
In this example, the representation of Islam as being the victim of negative actions by the 
‘out-group’ or what were referred to as, ‘many European countries’, continues with the 
utilization of a par pro toto synecdote. That is, characteristics of a part are incorrectly 
transferred to a whole. Based on a single observation ‘online responses’, the writer makes a 
general assumption that the negative act of ‘insulting the prophet’ has in fact received 
‘widespread public support in many European countries’. However, by making a general 
conclusion about the stance of ‘many European countries’, be it positive or negative, based 
on the unrepresentative and insufficient supporting premise of ‘online responses’, the 
argument produces a serious presumption and can be considered fallacious.  
Moreover, in the argument against the publication of the cartoons, the actions of Muslims, 
some of which are negative, are justified as being in response to negative actions taken by 
the ‘out-group’ or ‘western’ sources towards Muslims. The topos of ‘victimisation’ is drawn 
upon once again, where Muslims are portrayed as victims of mistreatment, which is the 
main justification behind any negative action they may take part in. 
Deliberately defiling the Prophet is a highly irresponsible act. It is bound to have 
negative social and political fall-out. It exacerbates the existing social tensions 
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among the locals and the Muslim population. Within the Muslims it is bound to 
create more alienation and resentment toward Westerners who, have chosen to be 
completely indifferent toward the faith and feelings of the Muslims across the world. 
It is the arrogance of these Westerners they will resent. Like millions of Westerners 
who have opted to not view terrorists as a fringe phenomenon within the Muslims 
and instead referred to terrorism as Islamic terrorism, many Muslims too will 
wrongly implicate the Westerners across the board for this blasphemous act against 
the Prophet. (ANC32) 
In the above excerpt, both the topos of ‘threat’ and ‘victimisation’ are utilised in the 
argument against the publication of the prophet cartoons. The argument begins with the 
topos of ‘threat’. Unlike the UK articles, where the topos of ‘threat’ is drawn upon in the 
argument that the publishing of the cartoons would lead to threats being posed on the 
European and British communities by Muslim actions, the argument here highlights the 
publications of the cartoons as placing Muslim social realities at stake. They are also argued 
as jeopardising Muslims’ general feelings and perceptions towards Western communities 
and indeed, the relations between ‘locals’ and the ‘Muslim population’ in general. Western 
sources or the ‘out-group’ are represented as actively being responsible for instigating this 
political and social unrest by ‘deliberately defiling the Prophet’, which is described as an 
‘irresponsible act’. 
Having said that, this line of reasoning may be argued to exemplify a slippery slope fallacy, 
since the act of depicting negative images does not always guarantee intensified tensions 
and more importantly, further ‘alienation and resentment towards Westerners’. Although 
this may undeniably occur, it may also result in more positive and productive social debates 
between ‘Muslim’ and ‘Western’ communities. 
The topos of ‘threat’ is highlighted further in addition to the topos of ‘victimisation’ by the 
use of causal argumentation and passive/active role allocation. Muslims are first placed in 
the passive role of negative actions by ‘Westerners’, who are attributed with the negative 
quality of ‘arrogance’ and ‘who have chosen to be completely indifferent towards the faith 
and feelings of Muslims around the world’. This is intensified by the assumption or sweeping 
generalisation that ‘millions of Westerners’ view terrorism as characteristic of Islam and 
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Muslims. These negative actions are argued to result in the justified activation of Muslims as 
agents of the negative action of wrongfully implicating all Westerners for the publication of 
the cartoons, ‘many Muslims too will wrongly implicate the Westerners across the board for 
this blasphemous act against the Prophet’, thus, jeopardising and threatening international 
relations.  
 
5.4.2.2     Topos of ‘Discrimination’ 
Comparative argumentation or analogies as argumentation schemes were found to be used 
time and time again in the Arab News opinion pieces in the argument against the 
publication of the cartoons and for censorship. These arguments mainly drew on the topos 
of ‘discrimination’ in the representation of Islam and Muslims. The argument against the 
publications and for censorship was based on the premise that allowing the publications to 
continue is a discriminatory act by the ‘out-group’ or the ‘West’ against ‘Muslims and Islam’ 
in particular. This is supported by descriptions of ‘out-group’ media or ‘European’ media as 
previously practicing selective application of freedom of speech, depending on the event 
and issues being reported on. 
The use of such analogies was found to be repeatedly used in the op-ed headlined, ‘Is free 
speech truly alive and well in the Western nations?’ (ANC34). The concept of non-
discriminatory application of freedom of speech in Western nations is questioned in the title 
itself.   
The argument initiates with the following: 
The questions people are asking now are these: Where does free speech end and 
incitement begin? When it comes to humiliation and insult, have Muslims become 
fair game since 9/11 and is the West guilty of double standards purporting to hold 
free speech as an inviolable principle when in reality its media harbors its own red 
lines. 
Through the use of a series of questions and change of state verbs, several presupposed 
meanings are made in the text. The first presupposition is made with a ‘wh-question’, 
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beginning with ‘where’ and including two change of state verbs, ‘end’ and ‘begin’. The 
question presupposes, not only that there is a point that the concept of freedom of speech 
stops, but that at times it can develop or ‘begin’ to transform into something more negative, 
‘incitement’. This is followed by placing Muslims in a passive role, as victims of ‘humiliation’ 
and ‘insult’, without directly indicating the actors responsible for these negative acts. 
However, agency may be linked to the ‘West’ in the next part of the text, where a 
presupposition is made that ‘the West’ might in fact be guilty of ‘double standards’ in their 
application of freedom of speech.  
 
The argument is made more explicit in the following excerpt: 
 
The fact is Western networks and papers are influenced by government as well [sic] 
audience/reader sensitivities whether they like it or not. So, to my mind, their recent 
cause célèbre touting their freedom to publish over the deep hurt caused to Muslim 
communities is a red herring when the underlying issue is nothing more than a cover 
for old-fashioned bigotry and incitement. 
 
Here, both the topoi of ‘discrimination’ and ‘victimisation’ are explicitly drawn upon. The 
argument begins by placing ‘Western networks and papers’ in a passive role of being under 
the control of governments and their audience, in regard to their application of freedom of 
speech. Based on this premise and their negative active role in selecting to publish the 
cartoons over the deep hurt experienced by ‘Muslim communities’, they are argued to be 
‘covering’ for their negative qualities of ‘bigotry’ and ‘incitement’ towards Muslims in 
particular. 
 
The article supports this standpoint by highlighting how the ‘West’ has displayed double 
standards or selectivity in practicing or advocating freedom of speech. This is illustrated 
through the presentation of a series of comparable examples and events, where ‘Western’ 
sources did/do apply censorship laws, actively limiting the degree of freedom of speech that 
is actually practiced. Some of the examples listed include: 
(1) Limitations in the discussion of the Holocaust in Europe. 
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As many of my media colleagues have already pointed out, the greatest taboo in 
Europe is discussion of the Holocaust.  
 
(2) The prohibition of selling of Hitler’s Memoir ‘Mein Kampf’ in Holland... 
 
In Holland, it’s a punishable offense to sell Hitler’s memoir ‘Mein Kampf’  
 
(3) The Removal of a U.S. peace campaigner during a presidential speech for an 
expressive item of clothing. 
More recently, the US peace campaigner Cindy Sheehan was rudely marched  
away from the presence of George W. Bush as he was giving his State of the  
Union address and arrested simply for wearing a T-shirt showing the number of  
US troops killed to date in Iraq. 
 
(4) Press served with gag order 
 
And if there is any veracity to a recent memo leaked by the British press, George Bush 
actually contemplated the bombing of that network’s (‘Al-Jazeera’ added) head 
office. In that case, the press was slapped with a gag order. 
 
All examples presented were taken from the ‘Western’ context, in which one way or 
another, freedom of speech was regulated or controlled.  
 
In the Arab news article headlined, ‘Europe’s uncivilised act’ (ANC32), the argument against 
the publication of the cartoons focused on highlighting Muslims as being discriminated 
against by ‘Europe’, ‘Europeans’ and the ‘European papers’ who are attributed with the 
quality of applying the principles of freedom of speech selectively, depending on the event 
and parties involved. The argument is constructed through the use of an analogy as an 
argumentation scheme, in addition to presuppositions put forward though the use of ‘wh-
questions’. 
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The argument begins by representing ‘Europeans’ as actively practicing selective freedom of 
speech: 
But also the way many Europeans have selectively applied the principle of freedom of 
expression is intriguing. 
This standpoint is supported by the following analogy: 
When the ancient Buddhas in Afghanistan were criminally destroyed by the Taleban, 
the Europeans screamed murder the loudest. We all did too in the Muslim world. 
What was the protest for? So destruction of history is blasphemous but the 
attempted destruction of a people’s faith and deeply treasured symbols is not? 
The writer supports his standpoint regarding the selective practice of freedom of expression 
by comparing two controversial events considered as forms of freedom of expression, and 
the European reaction to each, these are: (1) the Taleban’s destruction of ancient Buddhas’ 
history, and (2) the destruction of Islam as a ‘faith’ and its ‘deeply treasured’ symbol (the 
Muslim prophet) by the publication of the cartoons. Through the use of a series of ‘wh-
questions’, a presupposition is made that Europeans considered the former a blasphemous 
act, and thus an unacceptable form of expression, while the latter was viewed as an 
acceptable form of expression.  
In terms of the acceptability of the analogy in question, this example is quite complex. The 
reasonableness of the analogy as an argument rests on what is meant by ‘freedom of 
expression’ and if it differs from ‘freedom of speech’, and more importantly, what acts fall 
under each of these concepts. If freedom of expression is viewed as comprising any act, 
physical or conceptual, tangible or not, than this may be considered reasonable. However, if 
freedom of expression is understood as the expression of views in the various forms of 
speech, writing, illustrations and art, the argument would be an example of a false analogy. 
That is, in this case, the categories, the destruction of ancient Buddha history and the 
publication of the cartoons, are not really the same and cannot be fairly compared. 
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This line of argument continues with another analogy further on in the same article: 
Also if the freedom of expression is so sacred, how many European papers have 
dared to support what the Iranian president said about questioning the reality of the 
Holocaust? 
Once again, Europeans or ‘European papers’ are represented as discriminatory in taking part 
in the selective application of freedom of speech. In this example, the questioning of the 
holocaust is compared to the publication of the cartoons. Using a question, a presupposition 
is made that unlike the case with the publication of the prophet cartoons, European papers 
did not dare question the Holocaust in support of the Iranian president’s comment on the 
topic. Therefore, they are portrayed as selecting to forgo their freedom of speech in some 
cases and not others. 
 
5.5 Quantitative Analysis  
 
The following section presents the quantitative analysis exploring the larger corpora of 
articles covering the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’. The findings are presented mainly 
in the form of charts and diagrams, further details on the data are provided in appendix 15. 
The quantitative analysis examining a much larger corpus of articles began by developing 
key word frequency lists. Muslim protests against the cartoons formed a main focal point of 
the qualitative CDA analysis in the current research. The frequency list of the key lemmas in 
the total corpus of articles in the February 2006 period in the UK and Arab newspapers also 
highlighted the prominence of the ‘protests’ in the texts.  
Table 5.6 lists the top 10 lemmas in the UK and Arab English Language newspaper corpora 
(UK: 208,136 Arab: 150,804). 
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UK Press Arab Press 
Lemma Frequency Overall 
Proportion    
% 
Lemma Frequency Overall 
proportion
% 
Islam 2228 1.07 Islam 2030 1.34 
Cartoon 1588 0.76 Denmark 1318 0.87 
Denmark 1368 0.65 Cartoon 1277 0.84 
Protest 811 0.38 Protest 757 0.50 
Publish 705 0.33 Publish 605 0.40 
Newspaper 618 0.30 Prophet 576 0.38 
Mohammed 607 0.29 World 565 0.37 
Prophet 553 0.27 People 510 0.33 
Britain 540 0.26 Newspaper 494 0.32 
People 539 0.25 Religion 426 0.28 
       Table 5.6 Event B: Keyword frequency analysis 
 
As illustrated, the lemma ‘protest’ formed one of the top lemmas in both the UK and Arab 
texts, although varying in proportion to each individual corpus examined (UK: 0.38%, Arab: 
0.50%). Therefore, similar to the qualitative study, the quantitative analysis will also initiate 
by examining discourse related to the protests. In this case, the focus will be on the 
representation of individuals taking part in these protests and their semantic roles.  
Following the qualitative analysis, it was found that those taking part in the protests, were 
generally referred to as protester/s or demonstrator/s. In the UK February articles, these 
actors were referred to 389 times (0.18%), while in the Arab based articles, they appeared in 
the texts on 301 instances (0.19%). Examining the concordance patterns related to these  
items, in terms of negative and positive attributions was the first level of analysis, as shown 
in figure 5.2. 
250 
 
 
                 Fig. 5.2 Protesters/demonstrators attribution frequency analysis 
 
Protesters/demonstrators were mainly attributed with negative predicational strategies and 
actions. This was found in both contexts, although to a lesser degree in the Arab corpus of 
articles (UK: 61.69%, Arab: 45.84%). Negative attributions included predominantly negative 
actions highlighting the protesters/demonstrators as violent, for instance, ‘protesters 
ransacked Western businesses’, ‘protesters pelted police and US led coalition forces’ and 
‘demonstrators burned a Danish flag’. Less frequently, negative attributions took the form 
of adjectives, such as, ‘militant Muslim protester’. In the very few instances protesters were 
attributed with positive qualities, mainly found in the Arab based articles (1.99%), these 
qualities described them as active in ‘peaceful’ actions, such as, ‘protesters peacefully 
dispersed’ and ‘protesters remained peaceful’. 
Patterns in the semantic roles given to protesters/demonstrators were examined next. This 
began by analysing the frequency of active and passive roles allocated to these actors (fig 
5.3). 
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                     Fig. 5.3 Protesters/demonstrators: Semantic position frequency analysis  
 
Protesters/demonstrators were mainly positioned in active roles as agents of actions, in 
both the UK and Arab articles examined. In the UK based articles, they were positioned as 
agents of actions in 241 instances (61.95%), and as patients in 98 instances (25.19%), ᵪ² (1, 
N=389) = 58.98, P≤0.1. Protesters/demonstrators positioned as agents of actions was even 
more frequent in the Arab based articles (70.43%, N=212), while also similarly taking passive 
roles much less frequently (24.58%, N=74), ᵪ ²(1, N=301) = 63.93, P≤0.1. These findings can 
be argued as somewhat unsurprising, as the articles examined covered the Muslim protests 
against the cartoons, which expectedly involve describing the activities taking place and the 
actions of the protesters/demonstrators, who are the active agents behind the protests.  
 
However, based on the qualitative data, what may be more revealing is examining the type 
of actions attributed to these actors (Positive/Negative), in relation to their positions as 
passive patients or active agents. As discussed earlier in the qualitative analysis, one key 
difference in the representation of protesters in the Arab press was in their positioning as 
patients of actions. This mainly highlighted them as passive recipients of negative actions by 
the police or special forces, causing their injury or death, drawing on the topos of 
‘victimisation’. Therefore, the quantitative analysis examined the semantic roles of 
protesters/demonstrators in relation to negative actions and the findings are displayed in fig 
5.4. 
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          Figure 5.4 Protesters/demonstrators: Semantic position attribute frequency analysis  
 
When protesters/demonstrators were given agency of actions, these actions were more 
frequently negative in the UK Press (75%, N=181) than the Arab press, where they were 
responsible for negative actions 56% (N=119) of the total number of instances they were 
given agency, ᵪ ² (1, N=453) = 18.13, P≤0.1. However, the frequency of 
protesters/demonstrators as passive recipients of negative actions in both contexts was 
more revealing, supporting the qualitative analysis. When protesters/demonstrators were 
positioned as patients of actions in the UK press, the actions were negative 41.83% (N=41) 
of the total number of instances examined. However, protesters/demonstrators were 
highlighted as patients of negative actions much more frequently in the Arab texts (71.62%, 
N=53), ᵪ² (1, N=172) = 15.08, P≤0.1. Moreover, when they were recipients of negative 
actions, the agent of these negative actions were slightly more likely to be suppressed 
through agent deletion in the UK press (46.34%, n=19), than in the Arab based articles 
(30.18%, n=16). However, in terms of agent deletion, this contrast in frequency was not 
found to be statistically significant, ᵪ² (1, N=94) = 2.56, P≥0.5. 
The final part of the quantitative analysis on the articles covering the ‘2006 Danish cartoon 
controversy’ focused on the concordance patterns of the terms, Muslim/Muslims, 
examining any reoccurring thematic collocations. Muslim/Muslims were referred to 1,455 
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times (0.69%) in the UK articles and 1,317 times (0.87%) in the Arab based articles analysed. 
Figure 5.5 highlights the top collocation themes in both the UK and Arab press. Only the 
themes that conjured 50 collocations and above are included, other themes drew very low 
numbers that may not be as significant. 
 
  Figure 5.5 Muslim/s: Attribution frequency analysis 
The UK and Arab texts revealed similar concordance patterns suggesting:  
(1) Quantification of Muslims  (UK: 18.76%, N=273 / Arab: 17.61%, N=232) 
(2) Emphasis of Muslim feelings of Anger (UK: 9.62%, N=140 / Arab: 11.31%, N=149) 
(3) Muslim association with violence (UK: 7.14%, N=104 / Arab 5.92%, N=78) 
‘Quantification’ was indicated using numbers, e.g. ‘170,000 Muslims’ and phrases that 
suggest quantity, ‘many Muslims across the world’, generally describing population numbers 
and the quantity of Muslims taking part in a particular action or feeling a certain emotion, 
e.g. anger. This brings us to another frequent concordance pattern, associating Muslims 
with feelings of ‘anger’. This was indicated by phrases that directly indicate anger, such as, 
‘cartoons have angered Muslims’, or by describing Muslims as ‘outraged’. However, to a 
greater extent, Muslim/s were frequently collocated with phrases such, ‘sparks’, ‘uproar’ , 
‘fanned flames’, ‘welling up’,  ‘inflamed’, ‘aflame’, ‘boiling over’, all of which indicate a great  
extent of ‘heated’ emotions or anger which the cartoons have caused Muslims to feel. 
Finally, in both contexts, Muslims were linked to acts of ‘violence’. This was done, by the 
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frequent agency of Muslims in various violent actions, e.g. ‘went on a rampage’, ‘looted and 
burned’. Such examples were mainly used in describing the Muslim protests against the ban. 
Violence was also highlighted by attributing Muslims with certain qualities, e.g. they are 
‘more prone to violence’.  
In addition to ‘violence’, the UK texts also indicated higher frequencies of other negative, 
and at times, related concordance patterns, such as, ‘extremism’ (6.66%, N=97), ‘threat’ 
(7.56%, N=110) and ‘difference/separation’ (3.43%, N=50). All of which, if included at all, 
were not significantly frequent patterns in the Arab corpus. In fact, comparing the total 
number of negative attributions included in the top thematic concordance patterns in the 
UK and Arab corpus (presented in figure 5.7), the difference becomes clearer. In the UK 
corpus, there were 361 instances of negativisation, while the Arab texts only developed 78 
concordance lines illustrating negative attributions. This is statistically significant at ᵪ² (1, 
N=2772) = 185.02, P≤0.1. 
Another interesting pattern found to be more frequent in the UK based texts, was the 
pattern of ‘type’, where Muslims were attributed with adjectives that divide them to various 
types of Muslims. These attributions were mainly involved describing Muslims as, 
‘moderate’, ‘sane and moderate’, ‘mainstream Western’, ‘conservative’ and ‘traditional’. 
This pattern echoes earlier discussion regarding the representation of Muslims in the ‘2009 
face veil ban’ UK based discourse, where the conservative/moderate dichotomy was found 
to be used in support of arguments for a ban (sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5.1). 
One clear difference between the UK and Arab press was in the pattern of ‘victimisation’, 
which was highlighted in the Arab texts much more frequently (24.98%, N=329) than the UK 
based articles (5.97%, N=87), ᵪ² (1, N=2772) = 180.05, P≤0.1. This echoes the topos of 
‘victimisation’, one of the key topoi argued to be predominantly drawn upon in the 
representation of Muslims in the qualitative analysis examining the Arab press. 
Quantitatively, this was mainly indicated by collocations that emphasised the negative 
effect the cartoon has/had on Muslim feelings.  Muslims are emphasised as being victimised 
by the frequent use of verbs, such as, ‘hurt’, and verbs causing them ‘pain’ and ‘injury’. The 
frequent use of propositional phrases, such as, ‘against’, which highlighted Muslims as 
victims of negative and discriminatory treatment was also repeatedly detected in the Arab 
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press, e.g. ‘gratuitous bias against Muslims’ and ‘deep prejudice against Islam and 
Muslims’. Other attributes highlight Muslims as victims of ‘vilification’, ‘distress’, 
‘marginalisation’, ‘humiliation’, ‘alienation’, ‘insult’ and ‘demonization’.  
 
 
Another frequent concordance pattern found in the Arab press that is closely related to the 
‘victimisation’, in terms of the ‘hurt’ the cartoons have caused, are attributions highlighting 
Muslims’ religious ‘position’ in Islam in relation to their negative feelings over the publishing 
of the cartoons (Arab: 7.59%, n=100). Verbs such, such as,  ‘consider’ ‘regard’, ‘find’, ‘feel’ 
and ‘believe’ proceeding description of Muslim beliefs and views towards the depiction of 
the Prophet Mohammed develops a discourse explaining their position on the issue. Some 
examples of this pattern include: ‘consider cartoons as blasphemous’, ‘that’s how Muslims 
feel towards their prophet’, ‘Muslims regard the cartoons as offensive, as Islamic tradition 
prohibits any images of the prophet’ and ‘Muslims cannot digest Denmark’s and other 
European countries position...’. 
In the Arab based corpus of articles, the theme of victimisation was also related to 
collocations highlighting discourse on Muslims as a minority social group or/and as 
‘immigrants’ in Europe (4.17%, n=55). Muslim/s were frequently collocated with phrases, 
such as, ‘minority in Denmark’, ‘are citizens who pay taxes’, ‘block Muslim residents from 
Denmark’ and ‘recent migrants and are perceived as double threat’. This may relate to 
arguments against the cartoons drawing on the topoi of ‘discrimination’ and ‘victimisation’ 
of Muslims, which were highlighted in the qualitative argumentation analysis of the Arab 
English language newspaper texts.  
One final collocation pattern distinguishing the Arab discourse from the UK based discourse 
was regarding the ‘relationship’ or relation between ‘Muslims’ and others social groups, 
mainly referred to as the ‘West’ and ‘non-Muslims’ (4.55%, n=60). Discourse on this 
relationship was signalled by the frequent collocation of Muslim/s with the preposition 
‘between’. Examples of this collocation include, ‘Unbridgeable Gulf between Muslims and 
the West’, ‘Inflame relations between Muslims and the west’, ‘Hostility between Western 
Christians and migrant Muslims’ and ‘Drive a wedge between Muslims living in Europe and 
the non-Muslim population’. As illustrated in these examples, the use of ‘between’ highlights 
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a relation between Muslims and the other parties and in most cases the negative effects the 
cartoons can and have had on this relationship. Again, this pattern supports an argument 
found in the Arab articles against the publication of cartoons based on the premise that it 
poses a threat on Muslim-Western relations (section 5.4.2.1). 
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Chapter 6 
Reader Interpretation Analysis 
 
The following sections will highlight the key findings of the reader interpretation study, 
based on the analysis of Muslim and non-Muslim focus group interpretive discussions of 
selected articles (A-D) in Kuwait and the UK (refer to appendix 9 for full articles). Analysis of 
the discussions adopts Hall’s (1980) encoding/decoding audience reception model (see 
section 3.5.2). The discussion will begin by focusing on the Muslim focus group discussions 
in Kuwait, followed by presenting key findings of non-Muslim and Muslim focus group 
discussions in the UK context.  
6.1    Kuwait: Muslim Groups 
Female and male focus group sessions conducted in Kuwait generally revealed similar 
readings of the articles, characterised mainly by negotiated or oppositional positions 
towards the text. However, female participants were less critical than their male 
counterparts, with a tendency to accept dominant or preferred readings at face value in 
more instances of the texts examined. Male participants tended to read articles as 
ideologically driven, pointing out both explicit and implicit ideological constructions in more 
instances than the female participants. Clear oppositional positions were mainly expressed 
towards articles A and B, while negotiated and some dominant positions were reflected 
towards article C and D.  In reference to the representation of Muslims, face veiling women 
and the face veil, discussions highlighted: 
 (1) Oppositional positions towards themes of discrimination against Muslims in 
particular and the representation of face veil wearers as different.  
(2) Oppositional positions towards referential and predicational strategies used in 
reference to the face veil in the majority of articles, apart from article D. 
(3) Scepticism towards the reasons for the ban as indicated in the texts, i.e. women’s 
oppression), and instead negotiated or sympathetic positions towards a ban out of 
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security concerns, which many participants believed to be the main motivation 
behind the ban.  
(4) Oppositional positions toward themes of female oppression and extremism 
associated with the representation of face veiling women and the practice itself, 
instead arguing for women’s freedom of choice in choosing to face veil. 
 
6.1.1    Arguments of Discrimination 
Oppositional positions stemmed mainly from arguments of discrimination or what was 
perceived as themes of discrimination in the text towards Muslims as a social group in 
particular. This was highlighted towards articles A and B. Views shared in the pre-session 
questionnaires may further support these findings.  Representations of face veiling women 
in both these articles were largely interpreted as negative by the participants in this 
category (Article A: 70% Article B: 41%). One example where this was highlighted was during 
the initial stages of the focus group sessions when discussing article A, a news report on the 
French parliament’s interest in a law banning the face veil. The interpretation of the views 
of the French parliament members against the face veil was viewed as an action against 
religious choices instead of the face veil as a garment, displaying the participants’ 
interpretation of the face veil, as a clothing garment with religious associations. 
Moderator: So, what was the article generally about? 
Abdullah: I think it was about how the French government believes that the religious 
choices of some people is affecting their individual freedoms 
In explaining where they believe the article was published and the reasons behind their 
views, other participants explained:  
Ahmed: if it was in an Arab country they can post this as..like..they want to show 
France is a country where they are opposing our views as a Muslim religion or it can 
be in France as they can consider a ban just to show the French nationals and to talk 
about Muslims as a bad religion or .. 
Waleed: Exactly, it can go both ways. If they put it in the Arabic like in the Arabs...it 
will probably cause problem.. because it’s very negative on how they speak about the 
burqas so I don’t think they really want to cause problems, cause they actually talk 
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about the parliament and the president and the..so they would be like the 
government of France..they are against the religion of the Arabs.. so that’s why I 
think they published it in Europe.  
Article A was predominantly viewed as ideologically biased and in favour of a ban by both 
female and male participants. The link between the participants oppositional position 
towards the article’s dominant reading and the theme of discrimination is directly expressed 
by the interpretation of how the ‘West’ views the ‘Muslim minority’ in the text: 
Yousif: When it says that the parliament legislators they said it’s [reads] ‘a breach of 
individual freedoms on our national territory’.. number one I see the first thing is the 
Muslim minority they see them as completely just foreigners although it says I 
think..I am not sure if it was this article that most Muslims in France are attached to 
France but they see them... as it’s a breach on OUR national territory, it’s OUR land 
..OUR this..they don’t include them as part of it. 
Ahmed: but they don’t express the West.. 
Yousif: but the thing is the French Muslims work in the government sector..there are 
some that contribute to the country..some of them are French citizens they wear the 
veil..so for you to say ‘individuals on our national territory’..it’s like you’re not 
including them. 
 
Similar statements were made by the female participants: 
Manal: What was really interesting about this article is that he tries to show ..he said 
that France ‘home to largest Muslim minority’ when he referred to ‘minority’ he 
wants to show ok they are minority so why do they ask for something..because they 
are ‘minority’ they don’t have to ask for something that is against the law. Although 
they are large but he used ‘minority’, because we know that people are more focused 
on  the word ‘minority’ ...so that’s why I think he’s with the ban..yeah 
The imbalance of voices for and against the ban in article A was another reason it was 
viewed as ideologically biased and for the ban. Participants pointed out the absence of any 
quotes representing views arguing against a ban. 
Hala: another thing is that he just shows the readers the reasons for which they 
must introduce this law, he never talks about why they should not introduce the law 
The use of particular lexical items, were also seen as ideological, e.g. ‘fundamentalist’, 
‘minority’, among others. They were interpreted to assist in a negative representation of 
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Muslims and face veiling women. There were also participants who opposed the article’s 
preferred meaning and described it as having negative undertones, however, they explained 
that it was a general feeling they felt, not being able to point to any linguistic evidence.  
The theme of discrimination was also highlighted in the interpretation of article D. Most of 
the men taking part in the Kuwait sample leaned towards dominant or negotiated positions, 
accepting and negotiating some of the preferred reading. In fact, according to the 
questionnaire, the majority of female and male participants (78%) agreed to be persuaded 
by article D, which they viewed to be anti-face veil ban and to represent face veiling women 
positively or ‘accurately’, according to some. Although many of the participants agreed with 
article’s arguments emphasising the discrimination towards Muslims, the majority also 
agreed that the article was ideologically biased, going so far as to describing it as ‘angry’ and 
‘aggressive’. One argument generally agreed upon was an argument drawing on the topos 
of ‘discrimination’, through a rhetorical question presented by the writer, comparing 
Christian nuns and face veiling women and questioning why one is objected to and not the 
other. 
 
Yousif: He feels that the president in the article.. the president and the parliament 
maybe attacking the burqa because he even states in the first paragraph ‘would he 
call the dress worn by nuns a sign of subservience and debasement’..because it’s true 
nuns are forced to wear the black and white and the veil, not covering their face 
but their hair and that..but no one has ever talked about it, it’s their decision..they 
believe it’s part of their church and they wear that.. Muslims also have a right to 
wear what she believes is part of her religion 
Bader: It’s like they are saying... it’s contradicting their national moto. 
Ahmed: He’s trying to show that the west are being judged in a different way than 
Muslims..so they are better judged than Muslims, Muslims are always negative.. 
Muslims are always put in bad habits 
Bader: It shows they have double standards. 
 
Female participants were also found to agree with this comparative argument. However, 
they emphasised another part in article D, which they agreed with and which once again 
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highlights the French authorities as discriminatory. In reference to another rhetorical 
question posed by the writer, ‘so how can a country which prides itself on protecting liberty 
and equality discuss in its parliament an issue which is an infringement on one’s freedom?’, 
the following was pointed out by the participants: 
Sara: You talk about liberty equality 
Mariam: Yeah France..exactly 
Sara: And you don’t allow women to wear whatever they want to be free in whatever 
they want to choose to wear etc.. So he was like you shouldn’t if you have these 
concepts in your country you shouldn’t ban something like.. 
Mariam: It’s contradiction, they say something.. 
Sara: Being hypocrites 
Mariam: Yeah..they’re hypocrites they say freedom and they do the total opposite 
Sara: They are oppressing them in what they have to wear and how to... how they 
present themselves basically 
Although the women discussing the articles did agree with some of the preferred meaning 
in article D, such as, the description of what the veil stands for and themes of discrimination 
against face veiling women, they opposed the representation of Western women as morally 
deficient. 
Sara: He’s being extreme..this is not the case with all of the women in the west they 
don’t walk around with bikinis all the time 
Lama: Yeah..he also said that they’re brought up to think they are [reads] ‘not mere 
objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display’.. they‘re not all 
like that 
Mariam: yeah they don’t usually care about, ok they care about..it’s not like they 
walk around looking like models and they care what they look like physically, they 
usually don’t actually..so 
Sara: They’re doing their daily activities.. they’re going on with their daily activities.. 
Mariam: if anything I think actually Arab women care about their looks more than 
Western women actually 
Lama: and he’s also saying in a way you’re supposed to respect how you are brought 
up but he’s not respecting how they are brought up, because they are brought up.. 
it’s fine to do that..you know 
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Mariam: Yeah 
Lama: So he’s asking for respect but he’s not giving them respect so..yeah 
 
6.1.2    Theme of ‘Difference’ 
The theme of discrimination also leads to the theme of ‘difference’. The participants 
detected and rejected the representation of face veiling women as different and separate 
from main stream French society. This was indicated in the discussions of article A, yet the 
participants could not point out the particular linguistic structures that they felt highlighted 
this representation. In discussing article A, the following was highlighted: 
Jassim: Maybe they made it feel like the veiled women are out of this place. It’s 
negative cause you make them sound like they are a different kind of human 
being..where everyone else is just normal.. unveiled people would be normal women 
but veiled women would be different 
Moderator: Where in the text do you feel this? 
Jassim: it’s mostly a general feeling I am getting 
One of the female participants highlighted a particular phrase that she felt assists this 
interpretation: 
Yasmin: When she said [reads] ‘covered from head to toe’, it shows like..it’s a black 
something..black moving...you can see nothing no expression no..I think it was a very 
negative statement.  
The theme of ‘difference’ in representation of face veiling women was also highlighted by 
participants discussing article B. One of the readers, highlighted a more implicit example 
representing face veiling women as different from the rest of society by describing them as 
‘leaves’ that would have to be ‘singled out..for different treatment’ in France, which is 
viewed as a harmonious ‘herbal infusion’. This representation was interpreted as negative: 
Khalid: it was kind of negative when they mentioned the herbs. 
Moderator: the herbs? 
 
 
263 
 
Ali: Yeah  
Khalid: They want to take the leaves, leave some leaves and take the rest. 
Moderator: why do you think it’s negative? 
Khalid: because they just separated them from society.. they said the herbs are just a 
mixture but you should just sometimes take several herbs or specific herbs and just 
put them away 
 
6.1.3     The ‘Burqa’: Reference and Description 
Oppositional positions were also clearly taken towards the understanding of the ‘burqa’ in 
all articles, excluding article D, which was viewed as providing an accurate description of the 
‘burqa’. This may reflect participants’ heightened awareness of the multiple forms of the 
veil and the various possible motivations behind wearing it, which may be due to their 
contextual and religious identification (Arab/Kuwaiti and Muslim). Participants either 
thought an accurate description of the motivations behind the face veil were not provided 
or the ‘burqa’ was described using inaccurate referential and predicational strategies. Either 
way, these views led to their opposition of some of the dominant meanings, arguing that 
the newspaper writers do not seem aware of what the ‘burqa’ stands for or is about. This 
paved the way for some of the participants to give their own interpretations of the face veil, 
describing it as mainly practiced as a result of religious convictions. Once again, this was 
detected early on in one of the sessions examining article A: 
Khalid: I think there is a quote even that they misunderstood what the burqa is 
Ali: hmm..the whole thing 
Khalid:  Burqa is a whole thing that covers [reading text] ‘from head to toe’...the 
burqa is just a part on the face, they didn’t even have a clear idea about what it is  
Ali: yeah 
Fahad: because they don’t understand what it is, the Arabs know what it is, the 
Arabs know what the burqa is, the abaya is. There it’s one. The burqa, the abaya, it’s 
clothing that covers the whole body...This is Western thinking..They don’t have the 
right idea. 
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The same views were shared by some of the female participants: 
 
Lama: They did not seem to know what the veil or the veiling concept is all about, it’s 
just an appearance and something they would act towards basically 
Sara: Misinterpreted. Like they said it covers the wearer from head to toe, but it does 
not. There are some other articles that describe exactly what it is but like for this one 
[article A] I don’t think they’re sure what it is..they just think it’s something that 
covers the whole body 
Mariam: Yeah 
 
The participants’ understanding of what the burqa is, as a clothing garment and its function, 
seems to stand in opposition with how it is described in the text. This reflects earlier findings 
in the CDA analysis of the Arab English language newspapers, where some writers signalled 
their objection of the descriptions of the ‘burqa’, dominating the French face veil ban 
discourse. 
However, participants’ oppositional stance was not limited to referential ambiguities. More 
importantly, they felt that face veiling and what it means for its wearers was inaccurately 
portrayed, disassociating it from religion, which they believe is the primary reason it is 
practiced. This was evident when discussing article C, readers mainly leaned towards a 
negotiated position. They understood the preferred meaning of the article which argues 
against the ban and they agreed with it. Nevertheless, the readers rejected the writer’s 
comparison of the face veil to a mascot costume, his understanding of the motivations 
behind face veiling, and how he presented his argument against a face veil ban in general. 
Hamad: but the arguments are so weak...um I mean yeah now I sympathise with 
them after having this mask on ..whatever..now I don’t have to show excitement or 
smile..hiding ..is that really a good enough reason?  
Khalid: No it’s not a good enough reason..I don’t think it’s good enough and women 
wearing the burqa they wear it for religious reasons..you wore just a mascot for a 
match ...it’s not the same..and I mean though he’s in favour of the burqa..the 
arguments weren’t that strong...more sympathetic 
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Majid: I think he gave a negative image at the beginning ‘hot’ how he was feeling 
behind the mascot..he didn’t feel good.. ’frustrating’... I don’t know where it said that 
exactly but that’s what it said..so he kind of gave support for the members..yeah it’s 
not good for women 
Kareem: yeah he’s comparing a mascot costume..that’s not even a comparison 
Khalid:  Yeah I think what he said ‘we cannot accept women prisoners behind a 
screen’ [referring to Sarkozy’s speech quoted in article B] kind of goes with what he 
said about the mascot...but giving women freedom is about giving them the choice 
whether to wear it or not 
Kareem: No we disagree with it because he was comparing two different things   
 
6.1.4      Arguments against ‘Oppression’ 
Oppositional positions were also taken by the male participants towards the main meanings 
presented in article B regarding the arguments of why a ban should take place. Discussions 
developed a form of suspicion towards ‘women’s oppression’ as the main motivation behind 
the movements for a ban.  They opposed these views emphasising that women practice 
veiling out of free choice, adding that ‘oppression’ can never be proved. The participants 
argued that the real reasons behind the ban are in fact not mentioned in the articles. The 
real motivations for the face veiling ban, as explained by the participants, stem from 
security concerns. A ban over possible security concerns was sympathised with, developing 
negotiated positions, although only by a few of the readers. 
Khalid: they are saying it’s about freedom when they are not mentioning the real 
reason they want to do this...they cannot say in front of your face..we want to ban 
this because we are afraid of terrorists..they make up a reason that they are not free 
and are not the same level as the women in the country..this is a kind of a cover 
page to not say what’s actually inside 
Majid: I think there is a part about a school..what if women went inside a school 
wearing a burqa..wants to take a kid what makes them sure who it is? 
Moderator: There is a part in the article that says that? 
Majid: kind of says that..not exactly..but women can take off the burqa in front of 
women it’s not a big matter...they made it look like a security matter ...only bigger 
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Hamad: Some women in some places they would take it off so other people would 
identify them but in other cases some women refuse to take it off and like maybe in 
check points or like wherever...In a kindergarten when women go to pick up their 
kids..right they might allow other women to have a look at their faces..in some cases 
they wouldn’t and that’s the problem. 
Khalid: In check points and stuff..I don’t know in France they have police 
women..even in Saudi Arabia when they go to the borders there is a special room 
where they can take off the burqa and just check on the women, it’s just simple..they 
can bring anyone  
Hamad: yeah but especially for them...bring women...say there is a check point on 
the borders between one place and another and this women is travelling with her 
burqa and there is only one man on the check point and she refuses.. 
Khalid: I don’t know..they didn’t mention that this happened but if it did..yeah that’s 
a big problem..just take it off at this point..she needs to take it off 
Kareem: but if you see them at the airport..some of them take it off so their family 
could see them when they get with their family..they put it on again..it’s not..I have 
seen that happen so it’s not much of an issue 
Ali:  I think it depends on the country because if we are talking about Saudi Arabia 
this is a well known thing...but when you go to France I mean like they cannot be 
safe by having someone covered from top to bottom without knowing who’s that 
person...when it comes to political and safety regards..they had a lot of bombers 
and a lot of problems that makes them really hold on to this kind of thing and make 
it forcible to happen because you don’t feel safe.. they just want to be safe in their 
country that’s what it is..but as I said before the problem is they are not saying this 
clearly they are just bringing up excuses 
Preferred representations of face veiled women as oppressed or associated with extremism 
were indicated in article B and were opposed to, pointing to more explicit examples of 
negative meanings in the text where these particular representations were interpreted.  It 
was argued that many of these women actually choose to practice face veiling and should 
be given the freedom of choice, despite the participants’ personal stance on the issue.  
Yousif: There is a story about an Algerian Chef..she..her sister was murdered by 
extremists...She the chef says that she would never serve a face covered women 
cause they represent the people that killed her sister..she basically...every face 
covered women is represented as extremist as.. 
Bader: Yeah exactly...that’s stereotyping that’s wrong 
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Yousif: I am not persuaded at all because it talks about the burqa like it’s 
something that undermines women, something that’s very negative for the 
country, it’s against equality of human rights.. It’s like they are asking for specific 
rights and stuff like that...She’s not basically asking for specific rights..she’s doing 
what she believes is right.   
 
During this session, one participant then indicated that face veiling women were 
represented positively taking only the first part of this statement from article B, ‘women 
who wear the voile integral do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn’t an exotic symbol, but 
a political one’. This is viewed as a positive representation and in line with the argument 
repeated by the majority of participants, arguing for freedom of choice. 
Kareem: Some point here it shows it in a positive way because it says they are not 
forced to wear the burqa 
Khalid: I think that’s the answer for why are they saying it’s a freedom matter, we 
should give them their freedom ..they are not forced to wear it so you can’t talk 
about freedom in that case.. 
Moderator: And you consider that positive  
Kareem: yeah 
Hamad: They are not forced by society? or by their.. 
Others: By their husbands  
 Khalid: their families 
Hamad: how would you know that? 
Kareem: Some of them it’s ok with them 
The argument for freedom of choice was also seen as a preferred meaning in article C. 
Again, many of the participants agreed with this argument, for instance: 
Khalid: The only part I agree with the article is where he says that women should 
be free by being given the choice whether to wear the burqa or not, not putting a 
law that they can’t wear the burqa...it’s their choice..so I think that’s the best thing 
about this article 
The positive representation of face veiling women, which was viewed as dominating article 
D, was in line with most of the participants own personal views as well. This triggered a 
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discussion over the choice of clothing and its link to ‘respect towards women’, with varying 
and at times, quite conflicting views. 
 
6.2     UK: Non-Muslim Groups 
As a group, the British non-Muslim candidates’ interpretations and discussions of the 
articles revealed some interesting differences in comparison to the Muslim group 
discussions analysed in Kuwait and the UK. Generally, the participants adopted dominant or 
negotiated positions towards the texts, accepting the preferred meaning and highlighting 
some points of conflict. There were slight variations within the groups themselves, with 
some participants displaying more critical readings than others. Articles A, B and C generally 
attracted dominant positions with many of the non-Muslim participants accepting the 
majority of preferred meanings. Article D conjured more oppositional views, where the 
participants were particularly vocal about their rejection of the preferred meanings.  
Discussions highlighted the following: 
(1) General dominant positions accepting preferred meanings in article A, B and C. 
(2) Dominant positions towards preferred meanings in representing face-veiling women 
as different, separate and oppressed. At times, these themes were reproduced by 
the readers themselves. 
(3) Religious identification is drawn upon in the interpretation of negative 
representations of face-veiling women, where the interpretation is frequently found 
to be framed in relation to ‘other’ readers, rather than the participants themselves. 
(4) Oppositional positions were not limited to the contents of the articles, but also 
stemmed from journalistic tone and style of writing. 
(5) Heightened vocal opposition towards articles mainly resulted from interpretations of 
preferred negative representations of ‘in-group’ or ‘Western’ actors, e.g. Western 
women in article D.  
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6.2.1    Increased Dominant Positions 
Article A developed the least amount of conflict in the discussions, most of the participants 
accepted the preferred meanings and viewed the article as not leaning towards either side 
of the arguments for or against the ban. No particular representation of face veiling women 
was viewed to be depicted in the article. The questionnaire responses echoed this stance, 
unlike Muslim readers in Kuwait and the UK, the non-Muslim British readers predominantly 
(77%) viewed article A as not leaning towards a particular view, i.e. not arguing for or 
against a ban. More importantly, although 54% of readers agreed that the representation of 
face veiling women in article A was predominantly negative, nearly an equal number of 
readers 46% disagreed. The article was generally described with phrases, such as, ‘fair’, ‘well 
balanced’, ‘matter of fact article’, containing ‘no emotive language’ and seeming ‘to look at 
both sides’. Readers generally picked up on its structure as a news piece, rather than an 
editorial. They described the article as ‘not really opinion based’, ‘just talking about facts’, 
‘just reporting’, and to contain ‘more information than opinion’. Therefore, the article was 
generally viewed as simply presenting unbiased facts. 
In the few instances the article was viewed as possibly leaning towards a negative view of 
face veiling, participants hedged this view by emphasising the article’s fair and balanced 
approach. 
Emma: I think it leaned more towards a negative view point..I thought it was very 
fair.. but it only talked about how it’s a breach of individual freedom and didn’t put 
anything else about possible other viewpoints..it was just..only showed why it would 
be banned.. I thought 
Lisa: where he says about how it hides their face and it’s an [reads] ‘infringement of 
women’s rights’ being [reads] ‘imposed by fundamentalists’ and like I think like those 
choice of words kind of can portray a negative view on it just cause they’re quite 
heavy, but then you have a possibility of law [reads] ‘why not’ that’s quite a kind 
of..he doesn’t seem like they are really into it..not really kind of into actually 
posing a ban, it’s just like why not have a law...why not? So I think it has balance 
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In emphasising the article’s unbiased characteristics, participants also described the writer’s 
careful choice of words: 
Mark: I thought the writer of article was being quite umm..self conscious about what 
he was writing about..because even in the headlines it says [reads] ‘France is 
considering ban on burqas spokesman says’..so he’s being cautious in the wording he 
uses 
Moderator: Yeah..any other examples in the actual article or is it just that example 
that supports that view..do you thinks he’s being careful somewhere else.. 
Monica: He says ‘many see the burka’  
Mark: mmm 
Reader interpretations of article B was the most revealing under this category of focus 
group participants. Their reaction to this article stood in clear contrast with the other groups 
examined. They mainly adopted dominant and negotiated positions towards the preferred 
readings. Very few instances of oppositional positions were found to be taken towards any 
dominant meanings represented by the article. The article was mainly viewed as 
representing both sides of the arguments for and against the ban, rather than leaning to a 
particular view, either way. Participants also pointed out some positive representations. In 
fact, some of the readers felt the article was written by a Muslim who is sharing his own 
experiences in the article. Nevertheless, some readers did signal some of the explicit 
negative representations of face veiling women. 
One interesting aspect highlighted in the non-Muslim groups in particular, was the clear role 
of religious identification when interpreting negative Muslim representations in the texts: 
Melanie: I sort of got the impression that she’s sort of saying that people who wear 
the burqa are sort of asking for specific rights they don’t want to be equal to others 
they want more rights they want to be above the law..which is sort of going against 
her saying I have no definite opinions cause that’s quite a definite opinion to have.. I 
think a lot of people would be quite offended by that... 
Anna: Yes it also is saying that it would put someone above the law which I think is 
quite negative 
Charles: Saying that religious law shouldn’t be above state law which obviously for a 
religious person that’s quite a strong comment to hear because if..if you have faith in 
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a god then you believe that gods law is a above the law of your country so that’s why 
these debates can rage 
As seen in the above examples, readers highlighted negative connotations in relation to 
‘other’ people or people who identify themselves with religion or being ‘religious’, instead 
of these representations being negative in general. 
Positive representations were seen as mainly reflected by what was viewed as the 
representation of veiled women as practicing face veiling by choice. This positive 
representation, for instance, was signalled as being portrayed in the following statement 
from article B: ‘In France, women who wear the voile integral do it by choice, not by 
obligation. This isn’t an exotic symbol, but a political one’. As with earlier Muslim 
participants in Kuwait, the positive interpretation could be argued as readers’ general lack 
of political awareness, or the result of the dominant meaning not being interpreted as 
negative.  
Positive interpretations regarding the representation of Muslims in general were also made 
by assumptions made regarding article B by one of the readers: 
James: The Muslim community at large comes across umm I thinks she’s trying to be 
positive about it all, the author trying to be positive about them in the first paragraph 
saying that the..um..the burqa supporters are being sort of diffident and not chanting 
in the streets and shouting being more open to debate...although again in a slightly 
backhanded comment with [reads] ‘uncharacteristic reserve’ [laughs] 
Although the article does not specifically state the actions taken by the burqa supporters, 
but instead describes conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them as ‘protesting 
against the enquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve’, the reader interprets the dominant 
meaning as positive in reference to Muslims in general. He bases this interpretation on the 
premise that the protesters were are not described as ‘chanting in the streets and shouting’. 
This interpretation may reflect the participant’s schema on what Muslim reactions are 
typically comprised of and expected to be or/and it may align with the dominant media 
representation of Muslim reactions. Accordingly, anything opposing these reactions would 
automatically be viewed as positive. 
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The interpretation sessions also revealed dominant positions towards preferred meanings 
analysed and argued in the main CDA study as ideologically biased, representing face veiling 
women as different, separate and oppressed. In fact, some of the readers explicitly 
expressed their agreement with these meanings, at times, describing the arguments as 
persuasive and actively reproducing these representations. 
6.2.1.1     Face veiling women as ‘different’ and ‘separate’ 
In article B, where face veiling was represented as a practice that may lead to the 
separatism of French society, participants dominant position agreeing with these meanings 
were highlighted in the following discussion:  
Charles: The fact that it does..it does lead to separatism because um obviously if 
some women are covering their faces and it’s very difficult in a society where you’ve 
got...that’s not the norm and you have to adapt around that and I can understand 
why people are sometimes a little bit fearful of it cause it’s... 
Marcus: he’s used the nice sort of the tea simile in paragraph...represent 
the..umm..choosing to sort of single out some of these leaves is something I don’t 
really agree with..umm  
Moderator: what do you think is the problem with this sort of example? 
Marcus:  well he’s claimed well we never tried it but why not why shouldn’t we but I 
think..but I think it’s good that you know using the tea metaphor tea uhh simile again 
that we should all blend together uhh but of course that’s never truly gonna happen 
and that’s sad to see that and it does make you think 
In one of the group discussions, the topos of ‘difference’ is taken one step further by one of 
the participants who agreed with the article’s argument of the face veil as foreign or 
different, portraying those in support of face veiling as separate or not part of the 
community. The reader rationalises the ban, explaining that women who wish to practice 
face veiling are responsible for their wishes, and thus, should relocate to a context where 
they would be able to practice veiling freely. 
Louise: I found it interesting umm when the writer says something like they can..they 
can go to somewhere where it’s allowed like Britain, because that’s true.. it’s like if I 
lived in a country and then they were like ‘oh we’re putting this ban..everyone has to 
wear a burqa’ I will be like oh well I am leaving whereas I wouldn’t fight for it I 
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suppo.. I suppose if you want that freedom then you could just go somewhere where 
you can live how you want  
Kate: It’s not always as simple as that though is it? Like once you’ve kind of got 
yourself comfortable somewhere I think I would probably fight for the right for what I 
wanted where I was living or I would feel like I should be a valued member of that 
community in the same way.. 
Louise: No I know but if I suppose if you didn’t win if you fought for it and the ban 
happened anyway they’re not really..it’s not really impinging on their rights because 
they’re free to go somewhere else.. 
Kate: That’s true..yeah 
Louise: So if they did happen to lose they could go somewhere else but yeah  
Paula: I would agree with that  
The citizenship status of face veiled women is not taken into consideration and the 
responsibility of the consequences they may be faced with, as a result of a legal ban, is 
completely shifted onto face veiling women for wanting to practice wearing the veil. This 
shift of responsibility is also reflected by one reader, in the same group, explaining a ban 
should have been expected by face veil wearers, justifying her arguments by describing 
France’s ‘notoriously  secular’ nature. 
Donna: I think because France is such a notoriously secular country and like they ban 
the cross, which is like a size of 5p umm from being worn..I think that I mean like that 
they should have expected to have a burqa ban..I don’t know..because like that’s 
massive and then compared to like a 5p cross..I don’t know I think it was kind of a bit 
like ‘they will never notice if we like wear these all the time’ but I think it’s kind of like 
an inevitable thing that was going to happen because France..like because it’s not 
like they are necessarily against religion I don’t know..but I think they are trying to 
keep everybody on a level playing field and that’s kind of what their aim is in that and 
so because of that I think it was kind of expected..like it should have been expected 
that it was gonna happen.  
Unlike the Arab based texts analysed for this study and some of the views vocalised in the 
focus group sessions in Kuwait, where arguments of religious discrimination were frequently 
vocalised,  some of the readers in non-Muslim groups reflected quite opposite views. The 
ban is justified by France’s secular nature and they are represented as wanting to keep 
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‘everybody on a level playing field’, once again, shifting the responsibility to face veiling 
women for failing to expect the proposal of such a ban. 
 
6.2.1.2     Face veiling women as ‘oppressed’ 
Readers also accepted some of the preferred meaning portraying face veiling women as 
oppressed. In fact, one such argument for a ban on the face veil based on its oppressive 
nature was found particularly persuasive by one reader (referring to article B): 
Paula: I think yeah some of the points are very convincing like the discrimination one 
I think was very convincing. 
Moderator: What discrimination which one? 
Paula: The one about umm..can by [reads] ‘some sort of magic trick a women 
maintained that she was consenting her own  discrimination’...what happened if she 
changed her mind later? I think that’s quite an interesting point of like they could be 
fighting for the burqa but then actually not want it later in life umm.. 
Earlier Paula also added the following regarding the same example: 
Paula: I think the writer was saying how like even these women can be quite naive 
because ahh the point about umm what if somebody like..like agrees to their own 
discrimination is that..is that still ok um and I don’t... that’s quite an interesting 
question is someone allowed to agree to their own discrimination and how the 
German judge who found in favour of violent husband because the wife knew he was 
going to be violent and then I don’t know where does that sit?  I think he’s kind of 
saying that even although obviously a lot of it is out of choice.., a lot of it is like yah 
but you know I choose to be discriminated against...like I don’t know where’s the 
line..like where do you step in when that happens.. 
 
6.2.3    Negotiated and Oppositional positions 
Article C gathered some mixed reactions. Readers generally acknowledged the preferred 
meaning of the article as arguing against a face veil ban. The article was described as ‘funny’, 
‘humorous’, ‘really interesting’ and as ‘very light hearted’. Most participants also enjoyed its 
‘conversational’ style. It was also viewed by some as giving the reader a glimpse into the 
experience of wearing the face veil and giving a voice to face veiling women, through the 
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comparison of wearing a mascot costume to the wearing of the face veil. However, similar 
to most of the Muslim participants, some participants also viewed this comparison as ‘weak’ 
and ‘ignorant’, arguing that the main motivations behind women adopting the face veiling 
practice were not highlighted.  
Charles:  It’s not really about..talking about why women..these women wear the 
burqa it’s saying oh yeah they might enjoy it.. they might enjoy the freedom of it but 
it’s not going into the reasons why..with the humour and the mascot example..it’s 
not really saying obviously they‘re not doing it as a costume it’s not just some kind of 
uniform it’s about the principal of niqab and disguising..you know..so there is no lust 
there.. 
 Donna: I think he tried kind of to offer a voice for the argument of women who say 
that they like wearing the burqa but I don’t think he represented them enough as 
much as he wanted to..maybe  
Louise: I don’t think umm..if like the women that actually wear the burqa..I don’t 
think they would be impressed because the writer was saying something like ‘oh yeah 
like it’s nice just to be like you don’t have..don’t have to do any facial expressions and 
it just makes life easier and umm that’s not why they wear it.. they wear it to be like 
modest like I don’t think they would appreciate this article but I can kind of see how it 
does  try to make it relate to like people who aren’t religious but.. 
 
One interesting aspect regarding readers’ interpretation of the texts was highlighted by 
some oppositional positions taken. At times, oppositional positions were not exclusively 
based on the contents of the text, but the style in which it was presented. This was 
highlighted by one reader’s justification for his oppositional position towards article C, 
which stemmed from the article’s ‘conversational’ style, which he viewed as unsuitable 
given the ‘controversial’ nature of the topic.  
Marcus: It drew comparisons to being inside it made it seem almost like a costume to 
put on when really it’s..there is a degree of modesty..I mean he mentions that fact 
that you inhabit this secret world umm and he thinks that’s ok..but when talking 
about African culture uhh he believes there are things which are objectively wrong so 
he doesn’t appear to be totally appreciative of other people’s cultures umm almost 
seems to be a constant contradiction.. whilst he sees strength in Sarkozy’s attack on 
the garment umm I don’t know I think I felt it was too conversational the article 
itself.. 
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Charles:  yeah I think that’s the point of it seems to be more of a column piece than 
a news report it’s got lots of humour..making cracks about European politicians like 
[reads] ‘Mr. Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife’ and it makes a 
comment about Berlusconi and stockings and suspenders at the end.. it’s very light 
hearted it’s not making a serious argument. But he’s..I think what he’s trying to do, 
obviously it’s an intense debate and he’s trying to bring it back down to ‘c’mon we’re 
all...there might be reasons why people enjoy doing it but we shouldn’t be really 
worried about it’.. 
Marcus: I mean I don’t think humour would have been uhh..humour would have 
been good in perhaps a different article but to include it in something which you 
know is such a controversial topic and something so sensitive to many people I don’t 
think..it would’ve been perhaps dampened down or diluted..perhaps..I don’t know.. 
 
As seen in the above discussion between the two readers, reader’s preferences and 
expectations of the appropriate style of journalistic writing and presentation are quite 
different, with the topic in this case being crucial in determining the suitability of the tone 
and style of newspaper articles. This oppositional position towards the text based on a lack 
of ‘cultural sensitivity’ was highlighted by one reader, Marcus, coincidentally, a non-Muslim 
British reader of mixed ethnic background. Arguably, ethnic identification may have played a 
role influencing his interpretation and reaction to article C.  
Reader criticism towards the comparison of a mascot costume and the face veil was not 
limited solely to the above mentioned reasons. Participants in the non-Muslim group, unlike 
the other groups, also highlighted the difference between the effects of both garments on 
their contextual surroundings, which were highlighted as quite different. Therefore, the 
garments themselves are seen to have little in common. Here, the participants draw on their 
own schemas, portraying the face veil as foreign to society with negative connotations at 
times.  
Paula: I think as well because people like everyone loves the mascot like on the 
football field and so it’s like everyone’s like ‘oh mascot yeah love it’ and then but then 
if you walked through a town that was..that I reckon that had never really seen a 
burqa before and just walked through in a full length burqa you would get stared at 
and like not judged...maybe judged by some people but like people would be very like 
confused as to why it was..I don’t know..I think it is very very different umm and 
obviously there is their freedom of behind their mask not being judged and stuff but 
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then like I don’t know to put like a full length black thing on is kind of like I don’t 
know I don’t know [laughs] it’s kind of maybe encouraging that...I don’t.. 
As seen above, as in earlier examples, the reader shifts the responsibility of negative 
reactions towards face veiling women to the women themselves, who are described as 
‘encouraging’ such reactions. Moreover, discussions highlighted some of the reader’s 
perceptions of how the face veiling woman may behave on a day to day basis, where the 
face veil is portrayed as limiting her from particular activities. 
Donna: He was like loving it because you know he was taking pictures with children 
and stuff but I don’t think women in a burqa would be taking pictures with loads of 
children  
Others: yeah [laughing] 
Donna: so I think it’s a very different experience wearing it every single day 
 
Oppositional positions appeared more prominent in the discussion of article C, and to a 
greater extent in the views vocalised against the preferred meanings presented in article D. 
Oppositional positions were mainly taken towards the negative representation of ‘Western’ 
men and women in both articles. Readers also opposed the arguments of religious 
discrimination against Muslims in particular, as well as, arguments linking people’s choice of 
dress with the concept of morality, two prominent meanings in Article D.  
 
6.3    UK:  Muslim Groups 
Although only two focus groups were conducted involving British Muslims, there were some 
significant differences in their reading of the newspaper articles. The men in this category, 
similar to the Muslim sample in Kuwait, were far more critical than their female 
counterparts. In fact, they were the most critical of the texts amongst all other focus group 
participants in this study. Articles were described as ideologically constructed more often by 
pointing out particular wordings in the text or what they viewed as assumptions made by 
the articles. The men and women in this category also emphasised that dominant ideologies 
were not reflected exclusively by what was included in the texts, but more importantly, by 
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what they believed was kept out of the articles, which they argue to be more telling. The 
men displayed higher political awareness, associating their interpretation with their general 
understanding of French politics. They were also more media literate, repeatedly reading 
texts as ideologically driven, discussing the possible ideological backgrounds of the 
newspapers producing the texts, as well as, the possible particular audience they may be 
catering to. Oppositional positions were mainly taken towards the dominant meanings in 
article A and B, while article C and D attracted negotiated and dominant positions. 
Discussions highlighted the following: 
(1) Oppositional positions towards the discrimination targeting Muslims, which are 
argued to exist in the texts, emphasising the actual existence of such discrimination 
during the focus group discussions.  
(2) Increased awareness and opposition of dominant negative ideological meanings 
regarding Muslims and face veiling women, i.e. oppression of women, pointing out 
many ‘assumptions’ in the text. 
(3) Participant identification of the existence of moderate vs. conservative Muslim 
dichotomy discourse in the representation of Muslims. 
(4) Increased dominant positions towards the main meanings framing articles C and D, 
while taking negotiated positions to what were viewed as some assumptions in the 
text.  
(5) Frequent emphasis on the lack of Muslim and face veiling voices in all the articles 
examined. 
 
6.3.1   Themes of Discrimination  
As in the Arab context, the theme of discrimination towards Muslims was highlighted 
throughout the discussion. Article A triggered this discussion, both the male and female 
British Muslim participants took oppositional positions towards the article, declaring it as 
containing ‘reporter bias’, as described by one participant, towards arguments for a ban. It 
was argued as not representing both sides of the conflict. This was echoed in their individual 
views in the questionnaires, where 75% of the participants believed the article was for a 
ban. More importantly 87.5% of the participants believed it represented face veiling women 
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negatively. The degree of bias in the article’s content was argued as possibly having effects 
on readers with less knowledge regarding the face veil. The women had more difficulty in 
expressing how they interpreted ideologically biased and negative meanings in relation to 
the face veil/face veiling women in article A: 
Hanan: If it wasn’t in favour of the ban it wouldn’t just be using quite negative words 
towards the burqa..like..not even negative words I can’t really explain it like  
Amina: One sided opinions 
Hanan: yeah exactly 
Amina: or one sided quotes yeah 
Hanan: it’s quite biased I think even in its informing 
Lama: Certainly I think it’s not like a huge thing if someone reads this article.. 
Amina: He would be swayed quite subconsciously  
Lama: He would read like brush over to be informed of what’s happening in politics 
that time.. but you wouldn’t..can’t really explain it like 
Amina: You only have the part that wants to ban...and people that don’t know much 
about it.. they will like easily be swayed by it 
Lama: It’s not neutral enough.. I don’t think for people that are non-Muslims to 
understand 
This form of difficulty in expressing their interpretations of negative representation was 
repeated on a few instances in the discussion. One re-occurring and clearly expressed 
reason that the article was seen as ideologically driven was the absence of arguments 
against the ban and more importantly, the absence of Muslim voices. Whether face veiling 
or Muslims who form part of the ‘French system’, as one participant referred to them, their 
absence in the article is argued to add to the article’s biasness. This led the way to an 
argument of Muslims being portrayed as separate from French mainstream society, thus, 
highlighting their discrimination. 
Lama: all it mentions is France is home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority but then 
talks about France as if it’s like being representative of everyone because it says 
[reads] ‘France is strongly attached to its secular values and to gender equality’ but it 
doesn’t include the Muslim minority as being part of 
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Hanan: Yeah, when I saw, when I hear secular...I was like..if it’s so secular then why 
do they have such a thing against the burqa?  
Amina: It’s quite subjective in what it’s says..I think 
Hanan: You would think they would be quite accepting of it but.. 
On the other hand, male participants seemed more confident in their oppositional views, 
stating that the article presented one side of the argument and failed to acknowledge any 
arguments against the ban. More importantly, unlike any of the other groups, a direct 
negative representation of face veiling women as victims of oppression was argued to be 
constructed in the text. 
Abdul: Those who wear the veil optionally or forcefully they are seen as they are 
oppressed and the French legislators are almost seen as the liberators and those 
individuals who are bringing freedom in a sort of the right to wear what they want in 
a manner they choose or deem to be correct 
This view paves the way to a brief discussion of French politics, where the participants show 
their opposition to the French legislators’ stance and their understanding of the concept of 
liberty, which is described as ‘one of the main parts of their constitution’. They oppose the 
concept of liberty as it is defined by the French legislators, which is viewed as the prime 
motivator behind the ban. Its application is argued as unjust, discriminating towards 
minorities in particular, in this case, the Muslim community. 
Abdul: To hold the word liberty, are we holding it to neo-translation or are we 
holding liberty to the translation that was used at the time when the constitution was 
used...So it’s a misinterpretation of the umm constitution if you ask me and it’s a 
breach of liberty whether an individual chooses to dress fully from head to toe or an 
individual chooses to dress almost close to nothing, you know that seen as individual 
expression and liberty... to what extent is France actually you know are we giving the 
freedom of choice? to what extent is liberty..is liberty extended to? is it to the whole 
of society? Is it to the majority or can liberty not be deemed as liberty to a minority 
because they are different to whatever they are 
Hakeem:  you cannot give justice to the woman whose been forced to wear the veil 
or the burqa by removing justice from the woman who wants to wear the veil or 
burqa.. So they are looking or this argument is on a pretext of protecting women who  
have been forced to wear the burqa.. A. There is no way of ever knowing who is being 
forced to wear the burqa or not and if there was a way, it’s certainly not being 
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implemented and B..you cannot protect a woman who is being forced to wear a 
burqa by removing the rights of those who want to wear the burqa 
The theme of discrimination was also particularly emphasised in discussing article D, where 
British Muslim participants predominantly adopted dominant positions towards the 
preferred reading, agreeing with many of the ideas and arguments presented in the article. 
The portrayal of the ban as a discriminatory act against Muslims in particular was one key 
argument presented in article D. The readers identified with this argument and reproduced 
similar views in their discussions: 
Lama: I think if it was a French citizen or British citizen in a Western country..was 
reading this and how she [referring to the writer] does relate it and compare to nuns 
and such..she does give what Islam tells us on the concept of hijab..she does do it. 
certainly, I think it would get people to think a lot..I don’t think people would ever 
compare Muslims to uhhh nuns.. 
Amina: She just highlights the double standards in this article in societies especially 
the West, where one kind of religious persons are not attacked but... 
Lama: another is 
Amina: Another is for almost the same thing 
6.3.2    Identifying and Rejecting Assumptions 
As with article A, male participants were quite critical towards article B, pointing out several 
dominant meanings perceived to depict Muslims and face veiling women in a negative light. 
Although the female participants were also critical, they mainly highlighted their opposition 
to more explicit dominant negative meanings towards face veiling women.  Their male 
counterparts emphasised many of the more implicit meanings, which they themselves 
described as ‘assumptions’ in the text, presuppositions they rejected. An example of such 
assumptions was highlighted regarding the views of Muslims in France: 
Hakeem: This article is making a lot of assumptions just as the brother was saying, 
this article is trying.. a lot of its views is kind of trying to speak for the Algerian and 
Iranian people..I mean it’s making the assumption that these immigrants from 
Algeria and Iran because they fled from political prosecution they will automatically 
have a view on the burka 
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Another participant highlighted an assumption, he believes, was made by the article 
regarding what Muslim girls would experience if the veil was allowed in schools: 
Zaher:  Yeah..it’s just giving assumptions on what would happen if it was allowed in 
schools..some young Muslims would be forced..who did you ask? Is it a fact? 
The article was described as ideologically written in trying to sway readers’ opinions to 
reject the face veil. This was supported by what was viewed as irrelevant information in the 
article, placed to highlight negative aspects: 
Hakeem: It’s also full of emotions (pointing to comments on Yusuf Al Qaradawi) for 
example he has a go at Yusuf al Qaradawi at the end..it’s got some needless 
references..they just have to point it out yeah [reads] ‘the man with reference to 
homosexuality, openly wonders whether it is best first to kill the ‘active’ or the 
‘passive’ one’..its giving this sheikh’s views on homosexuality when it’s not 
necessary.. you’re debating the veil.. but then you wanna kinda of point out that this 
guys views on homosexuality..to kind of win the reader 
Zaher: totally agree 
 
6.3.3     Moderate vs. Conservative Muslim Dichotomy 
Interestingly, the British Muslims were the only group that characterised article B to be 
catering for or representing a particular type of Muslim, the ‘liberal’ Muslim. In their 
discussion of the article, it seemed clear that they were aware of the liberal/conservative 
Muslim representation sometimes found in the media, they indicated this form of discourse 
in article B. The female participants who were not as critical towards the article, highlighted 
this divide when describing the article as being pro-Muslim, yet emphasising not Muslims in 
general, but a more ‘liberal’ and ‘westernised’ Muslim, who they believe may be more 
inclined in agreeing with the French government’s views supporting a ban.  
Amina: I think it’s a bit pro veil  
Moderator: pro veil 
Amina: not really pro veil more like pro Muslim but not necessarily veil 
Moderator: Ok 
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Amina: If that makes sense 
Moderator: yeah 
Lama: I feel like it’s trying to depict a certain type of Muslim though its.. not Muslims 
in general  
Amina: yeah, Muslim democrats or conservative Muslims type thing but not 
necessarily  
Lama: so it’s still Muslim but I don’t know if its  
Amina: more like a westernised Muslim maybe or a more liberal Muslim that is quite 
open to the idea of women being forced..not being allowed to wear the burqa 
Lama: and agreeing with the French government.. 
The male participants highlighted this divide when discussing the possible contexts this 
article may have been published in. One of the participants argued that it would only be 
published in a Muslim country with predominant secular values or in a newspaper based in 
a Muslim country, but characterised with secular values.  
Hakeem: This could either have been published in more of a right wing leaning British 
umm newspaper or if foreign newspaper..this could possibly be an article in a Muslim 
country umm from a newspaper which has secular support..so for example in Egypt 
umm there are secular newspapers..in Saudi Arabia well I am sure there is and in Iraq 
secular..so it could by all means..this could be in a Muslim country..that wouldn’t 
surprise me at all but it would be from a secular umm leaning newspaper 
Moderator: And you say that because..is there something in the text.. 
Hakeem: Because it has secular values 
Abdul: Umm I agree with where the brother is coming from but I completely disagree 
I don’t think they could umm any newspaper could just out rightly just almost go on a 
slaughter of how extremist you know these individuals are who wear the niqab can 
get away with it in a Muslim country regardless of how liberal or secular this Muslim 
quote un quote country can be.. even in Egypt or even Algeria or even in anywhere 
else..I think..again I think it’s Western newspaper..  
Hakeem: The reason umm the reason I disagree is because I know that in certain 
Muslim countries..Muslims have less rights than Muslims in this country and an 
example I quote is I think Tajikistan..where um children under the age of 16 cannot 
go to a mosque..so that’s why I am saying that um there is a chance that it could be 
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from a Muslim country though I think I would agree that more likely it’s from a umm 
a Western newspaper 
 
6.3.4   Dominant/Negotiated Positions  
Articles C and D attracted mixed reactions from the British Muslim sample of participants. In 
both articles, the preferred dominant meanings were generally accepted and even 
described as reinforcing their own views. Supporting these findings, 87.5% of the UK Muslim 
participants declared they persuaded by the contents of article C in their responses to the 
questionnaire. This was expressed to an even greater degree regarding the contents of 
article D, where all the UK Muslim participants (100%) felt generally persuaded by its ideas. 
One participant, for instance, in describing how persuaded she was by the ideas presented 
in article D, stated: 
 Amina: I would say it reinforces my own personal views 
Dominant positions mainly reflected the participants’ acceptance of the macro arguments 
dominating both articles, arguing for freedom of choice for women who wish to practice 
face veiling. In addition, they accepted some of the dominant meanings representing the 
benefits of veiling, in particular regard to the modesty it offers, which happens to fall in line 
with their individual views.  An example of such agreement with the article was displayed 
when discussing article C. Participants agreed with the writer’s description of the ‘Western 
cult of physical attractiveness’ and how problems arising from it could potentially be solved 
by the face veil. They acknowledged this representation of Western society as being rather 
negative, yet deeming it as accurate. 
Abdul: It gives the perfect translation of how we look at people..we don’t look at 
their intellect but their physical appearance..by the attractiveness..it gives the correct 
opinion of how the West deems or holds women..but not always admitted..it’s really 
funny and true at the same time that she feels no longer desirable..no longer 
receiving approval cause she is older..is she not getting approval cause she’s older or 
cause she’s not wise or because she’s not polite or of good character or good morals 
or a firm believer or is it just beauty...her beauty has faded away so does the interest 
of people 
Moderator: Do you think that’s a negative representation? 
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Abdul: I think that’s a correct representation of Western society 
Hakeem: I do in terms of social groups I think there is a negative but correct 
representation of Western men..which I might say I am included in that 
population..British men gawp at women..I think that’s a negative but a correct view.. 
I can’t be biased ‘cause I am a man and I am British [laughs] 
Article C also generally attracted dominant positions from the British Muslim female 
participants with no reservations regarding any aspect of the article. Their accommodating 
interpretation of the article is triggered by a positive description of who they believe wrote 
it and the general positive aspects of the article. Their description of the author seemed to 
imply their surprise and perhaps appreciation of what they believe was a positive take on 
the face veil by a ‘non-Muslim’ author, described as ‘a very open minded westernised man’. 
Lama: I like the quote saying that [reads] ‘to remove a women’s choice is using 
oppression to combat oppression’ 
Amina: Yeah that’s what I really..I highlighted that bit too..I thought it was quite 
umm it’s good wording..I think it summarises what he thinks 
Hanan: He chooses a different way of writing this article by putting himself in the 
shoes of women who covered up and he’s sensitive to the choice that women should 
be allowed to dress the way that they want 
Amina: He also actually does say that the burqa is actually quite a solution towards a 
incident he mentioned about women or a friend here..and so does show that even 
though he might not practice Islam or whatever such.. or you know he’s not a 
Muslim woman himself or wearing a burqa..but he does see the benefits of it 
Lama: I think this does actually genuinely cover the debate quite well, just in a sense I 
don’t think it’s a Muslim writing it 
Amina: Yeah definitely 
Lama: And for like a non-Muslim to have such a strong view on like the rights of 
Muslim people who want to wear the burqa 
Hanan: It would be quite persuasive I think 
Lama: It is..it’s an argument that definitely would persuade.. if I wasn’t a Muslim 
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Interestingly, the alignment of the readers’ views with the article’s general argument against 
a ban highlighted in the initial stages of discussing article C, seems to steer the readers’ 
interpretation of every aspect of the article as accommodating to that view. That is, even 
arguments emphasising positive aspects of President Sarkozy’s objection towards the face 
veil in France are inaccurately interpreted by the female British Muslim participants as a 
criticism of Sarkozy’s stance. An example of this is highlighted towards the end of the article, 
where the author emphasises his ‘respect’ towards President Sarkozy’s ‘courage to speak 
out on the sensitive issue of cultural difference’. One participant interpreted this statement 
as a criticism of Sarkozy, stating: 
Hanan: I think to me what his point was..cause he says [reads] ‘a group of us’..this is 
when he went to Africa..[reads] ’mainly white middle class liberals sat in a village in 
blah blah blah and spoke to the village elders’..I think what he’s trying to say with 
that point is the fact that..he went out and spoken to people of different cultures 
even though he might not agree with it..he’s gone out and went out of his way and 
he is doing the same now..whereas what he’s trying to highlight in my point of view 
is that Sarkozy hasn’t done that..he’s just..sort of voicing his opinion’. 
As illustrated, the participant seems to appreciate the writer’s attempt to try to understand 
other cultures and practices, i.e. his visit to Africa and the writing of this article on veiling. 
The understanding of the article’s macro structure as being against the ban and critical of 
Sarkozy seems to affect the participant’s interpretation of all meanings (opposing or not), as 
in line with this argument. This interpretation may be further affected by the participant’s 
dominant and favourable position towards the macro meanings characterising the article. 
As mentioned earlier, although articles C and D did receive dominant positions towards the 
macro dominant meanings, they did also attract oppositional views negotiating and resisting 
some of the preferred meaning interpreted. Similar to the Arab context and some of the 
British non-Muslim participants, the mascot/face veil comparison was generally rejected. 
Moreover, the author’s description of the motivations behind face veiling were rejected and 
viewed as negative towards face veiling women. The Muslim British men in particular 
emphasised their opposition: 
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Abdul: Actually I found it a little insultive to women in burqas..in a niqab or burqa or 
any sort of veiling they wear..just on the specific fact that first of all..he’s using his 
experience of what he did on a football ground to entertain people and almost 
became a clown of the people and his experience where he did not have to be happy 
and did not have to express his expression of his face and people wouldn’t know.. and 
he sort of compared that to umm women in niqab or women in burqa 
Hakeem: He’s making some assumptions as well, have to be fair on this article as 
well, he’s kind of suggests maybe some like to wear the burqa ‘cause they can’t be 
bothered to smile 
 
Similarly, although the main argument in article D highlighting the face veil ban as a 
discriminatory act towards Muslims was overtly accepted, endorsed and reproduced by 
many of the readers, oppositional views were also voiced against what were viewed as 
assumptions and generalisations made by the text.  These mainly revolved around rejecting 
what was viewed as a negative representation of women in the West.  Two participants 
highlighted this dilemma clearly by describing how far they were persuaded by the contents 
of the article: 
Hakeem: I am not a 100% I am 50/50.. Like again even if it speaks positively of the 
burqa..again it doesn’t speak well of the Western world.. it gives a negative image of 
the Western world especially portrays women in the Western world as dressing in 
bikinis..you know and umm..I don’t think that that’s true..some people might be 
wearing it.. umm but it’s not the case for everybody..so that is why I am in-between 
for this one 
Abdul: I agree with Hakeem in that he believes generalisations have been made of 
British women and I agree with him and I am against these generalisations but when 
I say I have been persuaded by the argument..I say that in that these generalisations 
did not have to be made.. the article could have reiterated that you know not every 
British women wears a bikini..But I am persuaded in a sense that if the bikini could be 
accepted why can’t a burqa be accepted.. I am persuaded by the argument that if a 
woman has the legal right to wear a bikini and offend.. a woman should have the 
right to wear a burqa regardless if it is offensive or not..that is the argument I agree 
with 
As seen in the above excerpts, the participants seem to agree/disagree with the arguments 
as far as they correspond with their own personal views and beliefs. Unlike the non-Muslim 
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British sample, who rejected the overall argument linking morality with choice and form of 
dress, the opposition here is of the generalisation that all Western women practice wearing 
the bikini. The argument associating the choice of dress with degrees of morality was not 
rejected. 
British Muslims were also the only group to highlight their rejection of the assumption by 
article D claiming that in all cases women wear the face veil by choice. They indicated this as 
ideologically biased and explained that there are in fact cases where face veiling women are 
indeed forced into wearing the face veil. In discussing article D, the women point to this 
indirectly, while the men highlight specific phrases in the text, criticising them as 
assumptions.  
Hanan: I think like the purpose of the ban was to combat oppression and that people 
are forced to be wearing it and she’s saying here that people do it for choice but I 
don’t think she has combated the fact that a lot of people are probably forced into 
doing it but you can’t like take away force with force. ..I don’t know how to say it 
Hakeem: I think again it’s a massive assumption to say that the answer in [reads] 
‘all cases will be the latter’ because as a Muslim I’d well say fine there are probably  
a few individuals who have been forced to wear it.. you know.. they’re probably is a 
few individuals..but the point I am going to emphasise is a few.. because not all 
Muslims can be good people 
As with the Arab Muslim focus group sessions, the association of the face veil directly with 
Islam as a religion was also highlighted by some of the British Muslim participants. This was 
emphasised during discussions of article D. One participant interpreted the author as 
disconnecting the face veil from Islam as a religion in the statement, ‘Sarkozy was right 
when he said the burqa –the particular type of dress – was not a religious issue. Islam asks 
its followers – men and women to dress modestly, and so do all religions’. In response, the 
reader took an extreme oppositional position to the article, rejecting this meaning. 
Abdul: Actually, this is an incorrect statement, it’s absolutely incorrect, to be honest 
with you if anything..you know..like it is an issue of religious debate..Most of the 
Middle East hold it to be compulsory, whether we choose as individuals to believe in 
that or to follow that..it is up to us and you know we are responsible for what we 
decide but actually it is a religious debate. a lot of the contemporary and of the 
past scholars hold it to be 
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In this example, religious identification and knowledge seems to trigger and allow the 
participant to take an oppositional position towards the meaning he interpreted in the text. 
6.3.5    Muslims/Face Veiling Women: Voiceless 
Throughout the focus group discussions with British Muslims, one common aspect 
highlighted in regard to all the articles was the lack of Muslim voices, particularly voices of 
those who would be most affected by a ban, the face veil wearers. One participant, for 
instance, explains: (further examples in appendix 18) 
Zaher: I agree with him that he says that..people are speaking on behalf of people 
and making assumptions..because you know there has not been any..there are no 
quotes from any Muslim women who wear the burqa there’s no opinion polls from 
Muslim women who wear the burqa,..there is..there’s not much reference to them in 
that sense.. 
As highlighted earlier, participants believed the articles exposed more dominant meanings 
by what was not included in the text than by what was. The suppression of Muslim voices 
formed one of these dominant meanings, according to the British Muslim participants. 
 
6.4   Discussion 
The analysis of the focus group discussions suggests an alignment between the researcher’s 
analysis of the dominant discursive representations of Islam, Muslims and face veiling 
women and instances of reader interpretations reflecting themes of these dominant 
representations. This is mainly supported by readers highlighting themes of difference, 
oppression, separateness, threat and discrimination in the representation of Muslims and 
face veiling women in some of the articles examined. More importantly, the findings also 
indicate the naturalisation of some of these representations, primarily reflected by some of 
the dominant positional readings expressed by the non-Muslim British focus group 
participants. This is affirmed further by the reassertion and reproduction of these dominant 
negative representations by some of the group members when encountering them in the 
text, discussing them as commonsensical justifications for a potential face veil ban. As van 
Dijk (1998b) explains, ideological influence is most efficient if the ideologies presented in 
the discourse are parallel to the recipients’ personal experience (models). This ideological 
influence can also be viewed as successful if discourse recipients “have no better 
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alternatives than the proposed ideologically based models for their opinions and actions” 
(van Dijk, 1998b: 318).  The difference in how these dominant negative ideological 
representations were framed by British non-Muslim and Muslim groups in Kuwait and the 
UK were particularly revealing. Muslim readers rejected most of these dominant 
representations framing them as negative, while non-Muslims generally accepted such 
dominant meanings without any negative or positive framing.  
Having said that, these findings by no means suggest that the social groups, distinguished by 
their religious and contextual backgrounds, responded to the text homogenously as unified 
social blocks.  Instead, readings displayed active readers with variations in interpretations, 
shaped by several of their individual, external and internal interpretive frameworks. 
Individuals interpret the text depending on their social context and by drawing on their own 
“existing ideologies, attitudes, knowledge, models of experience” (van Dijk, 1998b: 318). 
Therefore, the decoding of meaning relies heavily on the multilayered facets of the ‘identity’ 
each recipient inherently brings along when engaging with any given form of discourse. In 
many instances in this study, as van Dijk (1998b: 85) also emphasises to be typically the 
case, participants were witnessed to rely on or prefer one or a few of their many social 
‘identities’ to dominate their interpretation. 
As this study divided readers into social groups based on their religious and contextual 
background, it naturally hypothesised a difference in interpretation based on these 
variables. Indeed, religious identification played a pivotal role in the decoding of meanings 
and reading positions adopted by the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. This was apparent in 
the key findings mentioned above, where negative representations of face veiling women 
and Muslims were mainly opposed to by Muslim readers, who identify with their social 
group as being under criticism. This was frequently highlighted, for instance, by Muslim 
readers’ use of the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘we’ when discussing how Muslims are represented in 
the text. Religious identification and the knowledge of the different facets of their religion 
also gave Muslim participants the confidence and ability to reject what they viewed as some 
of the dominant negative meanings associated with the face veil and women who wear it. 
The frequent emphasis on the association of the face veil with religion by Muslim readers in 
the UK and Kuwait as a premise upon which these representations were rejected was one 
prime example of this essential knowledge. Meanwhile, this understanding of the face veil 
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seemed absent in the non-Muslim British group discussions. Instead, in their description of 
what the face veil is and the principals behind adopting face veiling, the face veil was merely 
associated with ‘modesty’ in general, not based on religious convictions or a ‘religious 
obligation’ as such. These finding corresponds with the main analysis of discourse on the 
face veil ban presented in this research, where UK based newspapers were found to 
frequently utilize the disassociation of the face veil from religion as one premise on which 
arguments for a ban were built. This discourse was rejected in the Arab English language 
press, often associating the face veil with religious obligation in the anti-ban argument. 
Having the knowledge to reject dominant meanings was not limited to being erudite on the 
possible motivations behind face veiling, but in fact being familiar with the various forms of 
the face veil and other veiling items worn by Muslim women around the world and the 
multiple referential strategies they can attain.  
Religious identification was also drawn upon by non-Muslims in how they anchor their views 
towards some of the negative representations of Muslims and face veiling women that they 
acknowledged to exist in the text. Negative representations were indicated, but with 
emphasis on them possibly being viewed as negative by ‘others’ or by those who identify 
themselves as ‘religious’. Framed in this manner, the non-Muslim participants distance the 
negative interpretation from themselves as readers, instead associating it exclusively with 
‘others’, who depending on their social identity may view them as negative. 
The contextual positioning of the participants, i.e. Kuwait and the UK, illustrated particular 
effects on reader interpretations as well. Oppositional positions taken by some of the Arab 
Muslims did not simply rest on rejection of meanings in the text, but resonated suspicion 
towards its content and what in fact they viewed as the article’s pre-attempt to ‘cover’ the 
real motivations behind the ban. These motivations are believed to be purely driven by 
‘Western’ security concerns, concerns some of the participants were coincidentally  
sympathetic towards. These suspicions seem to lead to their general dismissal of some of 
the articles. This reaction to the text may be argued to reflect the ‘conspiracism’ that tends 
to form a glaring component of the ‘Arab street’, found to manifest itself in the general 
political culture as well as daily discourse reproduced by the mainstream audience (Pipes, 
1996; Zonis & Joseph, 1994). 
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The amplified critical and negative interpretations vocalised by British Muslims and male 
participants in particular, corresponds with earlier findings from similar studies (Poole, 
2002). This response may be argued as a “consequence of exclusion and reality of their 
position in Britain in their encounters with discrimination” (Poole, 2002: 242). According to 
Poole, the immediate dismissal of articles and the lack of attention to the textual details 
displayed by British Muslim readers, particularly the male readers in her study, supports this 
argument. Although there were instances of such reactions in this study, with some of the 
male readers steering discussions from the contents of the article to general politics in 
Europe and the discriminatory treatment of Muslims, in contrast to Poole’s findings, the 
British Muslim male participants were the most attentive to the textual features, constantly 
highlighting various sections of the text to support their interpretations. They were 
extremely sensitive to the implicit negative meanings towards Muslims included in the text, 
pointing out many of the presuppositions, which they described as ‘assumptions’ made by 
the text. At times, these presuppositions included negative meanings towards ‘Western’ 
actors in articles arguing against a ban, i.e. ‘Western’ women. Moreover, the British Muslim 
participants (male and female) were the only group that frequently emphasised the absence 
of the voices and perspectives of Muslims and face veiling women in the articles examined. 
They also repeatedly insisted that the articles revealed more by what was not included, 
instead of what actually was. Having said that, these differences in points of emphasis and 
the heightened critical stance these readers adopted towards the textual features may also 
be argued to be the result of their reality or position as Muslims in the UK, and the 
relevancy of the issue to them as Muslim citizens in a European nation.  
As with previous studies (Poole, 2002), ethnic identification in the non-Muslim British 
sample of participants appeared in participants of other ethnic groups. From the 
participants of other ethnic groups in this sample, one participant rejected the contents of 
one of the articles (article C) based on its lack of ‘cultural sensitivity’, suggesting a more 
sympathetic outlook to the Muslim perspective.  This was in addition to his clear resentment 
and rejection of the article’s ‘conversational’ style, emphasising its incompatibility with a 
topic of such ‘controversial’ nature. This oppositional stance generated a discussion of 
conflicting views towards journalistic styles of presentation, reflecting varying reader 
preferences. Another participant, for instance, found the ‘conversational’ style acceptable 
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and even expected from opinion based journalism. Similar critical reactions were also 
witnessed towards article D, many participants (Muslim and non-Muslim), despite their 
reading positions (dominant, negotiated or oppositional), did not appreciate the style in 
which it was written, describing it as too ‘opinionated’ and ‘judgy’.  
This conflict in reader oppositional positions towards texts based on the texts’ 
presentational style as opposed to their content, drew attention to limitations posed by 
Hall’s (1980) encoding/decoding model applied to the data collected in this study. The 
oppositional/dominant/negotiated reading positions offered by the model exclusively target 
preferred meanings included in the text and not the structure or form of presentation. 
Indeed, this limitation in the framework was pointed out by David Morely’s famous ‘The 
Nationwide Audience’ study (1980), not long after the framework was developed. In 
Morely’s study, similarly in some instances, the audience were found to oppose an article 
based on its ‘presentational style’ instead of content (Taylor & Willis, 1999: 147). Moreover, 
the fact that the oppositional position was taken by a British non-Muslim reader of an ethnic 
minority origin, while other readers predominantly vocalised their agreement with the 
presentational style, one could argue that cultural differences may account for the varying 
reader preferences in the current study. However, again, as Shaun Moores (1993: 21) has 
argued, “this type of difference between cultural ideas about taste could not have been 
accounted for within the confines of Hall’s model”.  
The genre of journalistic reporting, i.e. opinion vs. news report, was also found to influence 
how readers responded to the article and its contents, e.g. article A. This was particularly 
apparent in the British non-Muslim sample of readers who held dominant positions towards 
article A, accepting its contents and describing it as unbiased on the premise that it was a 
factual news article and not an opinion piece, separating the author’s views from the ‘facts’  
being reported. This stood in contrast with Muslim readers in both contexts who 
predominantly viewed the article as containing opinions leaning towards arguments for the 
ban; in fact, British Muslim readers described the article as containing ‘reporter bias’. 
Findings were also found to reassert audience theory that upholds the discriminatory and 
selective nature of audience interpretative processes (Poole & Richardson, 2006). As Pintak 
(2006) explains, audience approach texts through their own ‘world view’, thus, interpreting 
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the texts to fit this view, even if it means reading into the text or adapting the text to 
correspond with their own personal stance. This selective process was illustrated by a key 
difference in how meanings in the same text (article D) were rejected, but on two very 
different levels by Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Whilst non-Muslim readers rejected the 
negative representation of Western women and the predominant argument linking choice 
of clothing with morality, Muslims group members rejected the same negative 
representation, but on a different level. Their opposition to the meanings was based on the 
author’s generalisation of all ‘Western’ women as ‘scantily’ clothed or as women who wear 
‘bikinis’. Thus, oppositional positions were adopted so far as they do not conflict with the 
reader’s individual held values and beliefs. It may also be argued that dominant meanings 
linking morality to body coverage may be naturalised common sense for some of these 
Muslim readers.  
Readers were also found to read into the text or misinterpret meanings, so that it falls in 
line with their stance. The macro structure of article C was predominantly viewed as anti-
ban and this was detected by most participants from the initial parts of the article, i.e. 
headline and lead. British female Muslim participants’ quick acknowledgment and 
agreement with the article’s stance and their appreciation of the author’s ‘open minded’ 
and ‘favourable’ views towards the face veil seemed to lead them to interpret all meanings, 
including those that contradict the macrostructure, to be in line with their own position. 
This also supports arguments relating the effects of the structure of newspaper articles on 
the audience’s cognitive understanding and construction of meaning. As van Dijk explains, 
the initial parts of news articles, e.g. headlines and leads, are the most influential on reader 
interpretations, since this ‘top level‘ information of a news article usually functions as the 
top level of the mental model readers build upon in reference to the issue being reported 
on (1991: 51). Any alternative meanings/interpretations further on in the article are argued 
to require extra effort by newspaper readers, who often skim through the information in 
newspapers.  
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In analysing newspaper discourse on Muslim related news stories in the British quality press 
and the less explored Arab English language quality newspapers, the research sought to 
investigate the existence of any dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims 
as social actors. It was also interested in exploring whether the dominant ideological 
discursive representations of Islam and Muslims detected in the UK press were reproduced, 
resisted or rejected in the Arab English language newspaper texts.  
Through a specifically tailored qualitative/quantitative methodological approach, the 
research endeavoured to describe how these dominant representations are translated in 
the text by highlighting the various linguistic constructions and strategies adopted and 
utilised. The mixed methods research allowed for the examination of media texts from 
multiple perspectives with the aim of developing a more comprehensive understanding of 
the production and interpretation of dominant social meanings. Detailed critical discourse 
analysis highlighted and uncovered both manifest and covert underlying meanings in the 
texts. Meanwhile, the quantitative methods of content analysis and corpus linguistics 
provided further verification of the existence of these meanings on larger corpora of 
newspaper texts. Moreover, as social meanings are not solely existent in the text, but rather 
the product of the interaction between text and the recipients of the text, the research 
explored reader interpretation processes of some of the articles analysed. In investigating 
these processes, a much less examined area in relation CDA studies, the research was able 
to shed some light on the significance of the dominant ideological textual meanings argued 
to exist in social meaning making. 
Chapters four and five, each targeting the analysis of articles on a particular Muslim related 
news event featured the qualitative and quantitative analytical findings, highlighting in 
detail, a series of linguistic constructs and strategies used in developing a dominant 
representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK and the Arab based quality newspaper texts. 
Chapter six featured the analytical findings of reader interpretation processes which were 
gathered through several reader focus groups conducted in the UK and a predominantly 
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Muslim Arab context (Kuwait). Chapter six also included a discussion of the possible 
interpretations of these findings in relation to the research questions set forward in chapter 
three. 
This chapter mainly addresses the findings of the qualitative and quantitative discourse 
analytical findings on both Muslim related news events in relation to the research questions 
presented in chapter three. The discussion also relates the linguistic findings to the various 
relevant socio-political, contextual, institutional and journalistic processes discussed in 
chapter two.   
7.1   UK and Arab English Language Quality Press: Diverging Dominant Meanings 
The texts analysed in the UK and Arab English Language quality newspapers both revealed 
dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims with diverging and at times 
directly antagonistic meanings. These dominant representations, mainly taking shape in the 
form of implicit assumptions, were arguably increasingly illuminated by the comparative 
perspective provided by this research. Indeed, despite the extensive reliance of the Arab 
English language newspapers on foreign primarily ‘Euro-centred’ news feeds, through 
various linguistic constructs and strategies, found mainly in internally bylined opinion 
pieces, the Arab based texts were found to produce their own dominant representation of 
Islam and Muslims. At times, these representations were found to resist and explicitly reject 
the Muslim representations and meanings found to be dominating the UK based articles. In 
correlation with the ‘polarization schema’ (van Dijk, 1998b), dominant meanings in each 
context were constructed in a positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ social representation. 
Moreover, although essentially heterogeneous in their representations of Islam and 
Muslims, the newspaper texts in both contexts were frequently found to utilise 
corresponding linguistic constructs and strategies in conveying these dominant ideological 
meanings. Some of these linguistic strategies include, predicational strategies, e.g. 
aggregation strategies (quantification), active roles in vocal processes (quotation patterns) 
and active vs. passive semantic constructions.   Interestingly, similarities were also detected 
in the topoi drawn upon in the main arguments steering the discussions. However, these 
carried opposing (e.g. topos of difference), and at times, more specific and centralised (e.g. 
topos of victimisation vs. topos of discrimination) meanings, depending on each context. 
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Some reproduction of dominant meanings found in the UK based articles, nevertheless, 
were detected in the Arab English language newspaper texts. These, however, were mainly 
found in news articles and limited to predicational strategies attributing social actors 
(Muslims, protesters, Face veiling women) with specific qualities and attributes.  
The following sections will delve into these findings further, discussing some of the key 
patterns found in relation to past research and literature discussed in chapter two, keeping 
within the scope of the research aims and objectives.  
7.1.1   The UK Press: Re-contextualising Dominant Representations  
As illustrated in the analysis of UK based articles covering both news events, representation 
of Islam and Muslims revolved around some key negative meanings or topoi. These included 
highlighting Islam, Muslims and practices associated with them as different, threatening, 
separate and oppressive. More importantly, some of these representations may be argued 
as naturalised based on the Muslim/non-Muslim reader interpretation focus group 
analytical findings, discussed in section 6.4. 
These themes in representation echo much research arguing the continued existence and 
reproduction of some ‘Orientalist’ depictions of Islam and Muslims, although as argued by 
Said (1997), adapting themselves to the specific political and social contexts in question. 
Dominant negative discourses varied in focus depending on the news event examined. In 
reporting on the ‘2009 French face veil ban’, for instance, dominant representation of Islam 
and Muslims emphasised their social difference to ‘Us’ and our values and norms, their 
repression of women, and ‘Them’ as a social threat. In the reporting on the ‘2006 Danish 
cartoon controversy’, however, social representation predominantly centred on the idea of 
a Muslim threat targeting the ‘in-group’, be it socially to ‘Our’ freedom of speech and 
democracy or physically to ‘Our’ security. Falling in line with the ‘closed’ views of Islam, 
introduced by the Runnymede Trust report (1997), dominant meanings leaned towards 
what the report described as ‘Islamophobic’; Islam and Muslims were represented as, (1) 
separate , and (2) an enemy to be feared. In this research, such representations were 
detected in the texts through argumentation schemes maintaining the act of face veiling as 
being the result of Muslim veiled women’s desire to remain separate from mainstream 
society; if not resulting from such desire, the act of face veiling itself results in this 
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separation. The topos of ‘threat’ or the representation of Muslims as an entity to be feared, 
was even more frequently drawn upon, highlighted in both news events analysed through: 
(1) predicational strategies, (2) active allocation of Muslims as agents of direct and indirect 
violent/threatening actions, (3) disclaimers, and (4) fallacious causation arguments, 
highlighting an imminent threat (social, financial or security related). Also in line with the 
‘closed’ views of Islam and Muslims, as indicated by the Runnymede Trust report, there 
were instances in which British newspaper discourse highlighted Muslims as ‘manipulative’, 
i.e. Muslim protests against the cartoons not resulting from individual Muslim disapproval of 
the cartoons’ contents, but rather, the result of well planned ulterior motives, set forward 
by various Muslim governments and/or political groups.  
Having said that, the UK based articles analysed in this research did illustrate variations in 
the construction of some these more negative or ‘closed’ views of Islam and Muslims. 
Representation of Islam and Muslims as one homogenous, monolithic entity or group with 
no diverse social, political and religious internal differences and layers has repeatedly been 
argued as dominating ‘Western’ media (Richardson, 2004; Said, 1997; Runnymede Trust, 
1997). One study specifically argued that no distinction is made between what is referred to 
as ‘Islamists’ and ‘Muslims’ in the media (Karim, 2007). Examples of such representations 
were detected in the analysis of the UK articles in this study as well. The frequent one fits all 
reference to the multiple and quite different forms of the face veil as ‘burqa/burka/burkha’ 
in the UK press, might arguably be one such example, reflecting a homogenous discursive 
representation (see sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3). However, the UK articles analysed revealed 
discourse contending this dominant homogenous representation, particularly in reference 
to ‘Muslims’ as social actors. Indeed, through the use of predicational strategies, the UK 
press revealed discourse dichotomising Muslims into two groups or types, moderate and 
conservative. This was highlighted in the qualitative analysis of articles related to the ‘2009 
French face veil ban’ event, and the quantitative concordance analysis of qualities attributed 
to ‘Muslim/s’ in articles related to the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’. As argued in 
previous research (Mamdani, 2004; Riley, 2009; Jiwani & Dakroury, 2009), attributing 
Muslims with such labels allows for the construction of ‘Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim’ 
dichotomy discourse. Good Muslims are those described as ‘moderate, regular, modern, 
mainstream’ and tend to share the values of the ‘in-group’. Meanwhile, polarised from 
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‘good Muslims’, ‘bad Muslims’ described as ‘Islamist, conservative, traditional’ (as they were 
referred to in this study), are depicted as displaying ‘different’ values and beliefs, some of 
which are considered ‘extremist’. Utilizing this dichotomy through the use of: (1) 
predicational strategies, (2) allocation of specific roles/actions to each of these polarised 
groups, and (3) the use of argumentation schemes, e.g. causation, the discourse was able to 
highlight the face veil and those who practice it as posing a social ‘threat’; hence, providing 
a justification for a pro face veil ban argument.  
 
Nevertheless, although the UK based texts did reveal discourse polarising Muslims into such 
groups (moderate vs. conservative), and although these labels are arguably ambiguous, as 
individual groups, they remain portrayed as monolithic and static with no internal 
variations. This suggests every Muslim as having to be either, moderate or conservative, and 
in effect, each type of Muslim is assumed to ultimately share his/her members’ uniform 
views to various social and religious aspects, i.e. the practice of face veiling. This dichotomy 
can also be viewed as having the socio-political function of signalling ‘group membership’ on 
a macro level. That is, it allows for the proliferation of discourse dividing Muslims into 
groups that are either in line or allegiance with ‘Us’ as the in-group,  or belonging to ‘Them’, 
the ‘Other’ Muslims, in this case, the negatively depicted ‘conservative Muslims’.  
 
Moreover, van Dijk (1992) emphasises the importance of racism denial strategies in 
dominant ideological or racist discourse which have been particularly featured in white 
dominant group discussions on ethnic relations and minority groups, e.g. disclaimers (see 
2.4.4.2). They are applied on a semantic level as ‘face keeping’ strategies when the ‘in-
group’ negatively describes the ‘Other’. Therefore, they function as mitigation strategies in 
avoidance of the possibility of the ‘in-group’ being interpreted as discriminatory or 
‘politically incorrect’. The division of Muslims into two groups, Bad vs. Good, can also be 
argued to form what can be referred to as a ‘macro discursive denial of racism’, allowing the 
in-group to represent ‘itself’ positively as tolerant. That is, it insinuates that the negative 
descriptions shared do not apply to Muslims in general, but rather to a particular group of 
Muslims, ‘conservatives’. Adopting such a strategy allows for the avoidance of any conflict 
with the general norms and laws constraining various forms of religious/ethnic prejudice 
and discrimination, while legitimating such discriminatory ideologies. This is especially when 
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these views form part of public discourse produced by newspapers considered to be 
controlled by the dominant elite, mainly white members of society, writing for the middle 
and upper social classes (see section 2.3.1.1). Indeed, as van Dijk (1992: 89) explains, denials 
of racism are not exclusively limited to the individual level, ‘but become more influential 
when they adopt a ‘social dimension’ (van Dijk 1992: 89), such as the discourse of 
dichotomy exhibited by some of the British newspapers examined.  The social discursive 
form of denial can function to defend the in-group as whole, and as van Dijk argues, can 
have the most detrimental social effects, since it ‘persuasively helps construct the dominant 
white consensus’ (ibid). 
 
7.1.2   The Arab Press: Muslims in the face of Discrimination 
  
As revealed in the analytical findings of the Arab English language articles related to both 
news events examined, Arab based texts produced their own dominant representations of 
Islam and Muslims. Representations, at times, directly opposing or rejecting some of the 
dominant meanings and representations found in the UK based articles.  
 
In the Arab based texts, the shaping of dominant ideological discursive representations was 
at its most influential in the primary topics chosen to dominate the articles examined on 
both news events. The core of conflict represented by both, the French face veil ban 
proposal and the Danish cartoon controversy, bring the chief principals and beliefs of Islam, 
some of which are considered to form part of Muslims’ religious obligations, into the 
forefront of fierce social and political debate. With that being said, opinions regarding both 
news events, i.e. the legislation of a ban and the publication of the cartoons, are bound to 
conjure arguments for or against a particular action. In the Arab based texts, the almost 
complete absence of primary topics critical or/and arguing against standpoints considered 
to be rooted in Muslim religious convictions and beliefs was arguably a crucial determining 
factor in the dominant ideological discursive representations of Islam and Muslims available 
in the texts. This can be explained as a direct consequence of the censorship policies 
generally characterising the Arab media, which as discussed in section 2.3.2.2, strictly forbid 
any form of criticism towards the Muslim religion or the publishing of views and arguments 
viewed to be contradictory to its teachings. The widespread condemnation and intense 
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negative reaction from Muslims across the world towards the cartoon publications, 
stemming from the blasphemous nature of the cartoons (as viewed by most Muslims), 
clearly ascertains the expected censorship of arguments for the publication of the cartoons. 
Similarly, applying censorship to explicit arguments against face veiling could be argued as 
resulting from its religious significance to some Muslims in the region. A significance which 
was emphasised in the Arab based texts analysed by the frequent association of the face veil 
with religion through: (1) predicational strategies attributing the face veil with 
religion/religious obligation, (2) allocation to Muslim scholars the agency of vocal processes 
emphasising this religious association, and (3) allocation to face veiling women passive roles 
of being obliged to wear the face veil, using obligation modality. Indeed, this religious 
association was also emphasised by the Muslim focus group participants in the UK and the 
Kuwaiti context in particular. 
 
As a result, many of the arguments found in the UK press, for instance, arguments critical of 
face veiling, drawing on various negative topoi, e.g. topoi of  oppression  and threat, were 
not reproduced in the Arab based articles examined. Moreover, although arguments against 
the publication of the cartoons were frequently found in the UK based texts, the topoi on 
which these arguments drew were not shared by the Arab press. That is, the UK press 
primarily involved arguments against the publishing of the cartoons, based on the possible 
consequential social and economic threats towards the UK in general, argued to result from 
Muslims’ negative reactions.  
 
In contrast, in the newspaper coverage of both events examined, the Arab based texts were 
dominated by discourse emphasising Islam and Muslims as victims. In line with van Dijk’s 
ideological square, the linguistic construction of this representation clearly displayed and 
emphasised positive self and negative other presentation. Muslims are argued and 
represented as victims of ill treatment by various sources representing the out-group or the 
‘West’. How this victimisation was framed, however, was particularly interesting, forming 
another key difference in the dominant representation of Islam and Muslims in the Arab and 
UK press. Although the UK press drew on the topos of ‘victimisation’ in some of arguments 
used, the topos was mainly highlighted by the description of Muslims as passive recipients 
of negative actions, as opposed to the frequent use of argumentation schemes. In the Arab 
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based articles, the topos of ‘victimisation’ was centralised further, drawing on the topos of 
‘discrimination’. In addition to arguing against the face veil ban and the cartoon publications 
by representing Muslims simply as victims of these actions, Muslims are depicted as victims 
of targeted discrimination by the ‘West’, emphasising the out-group’s negative role even 
further. Therefore, the arguments against the ban/publications were based on the premise 
that they were acts designed to discriminate against individual Muslims because they are 
Muslims. In addition to allocating to Muslims the role of passive recipients of negative 
actions directly targeted at them by various out-group sources, the frequent use of 
analogies (fallacious at times) as an argumentation scheme worked to emphasise this 
discrimination further. This, for instance, was found in the Arab based reporting of the 
cartoon controversy, where incidents/materials considered to be as controversial as the 
prophet cartoons were listed and argued to have been censored in the ‘Western context’, 
emphasising the out-group’s selective/discriminatory censorship policies. Such 
representation, is consistent with much of the continuous angst and apprehension voiced 
regarding the depiction of Islam Muslims, which as mentioned in the introduction, escalated 
further in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, it also correlated with the dominant 
and oppositional positions taken by the Muslim participants in the focus group discussions, 
accepting standpoints arguing of the discrimination against Muslims, while reproducing 
similar arguments in rejection of some of the negative textual meanings on face veiling 
women and Muslims. It also corresponds with much research (see 2.1.3) maintaining Islam 
and Muslims as being subjected to racial/religious discrimination and prejudice (Poole, 
2002; Richardson, 2004; Karim, 2003; Richardson, 2009; Morey & Yaqin, 2011), among 
others.  
 
Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative analytical findings illustrated a prominence of 
referential and predicational strategies that highlight discourses on immigration. References 
and attributions, such as ‘French’, ‘citizens of France’, ‘French converts’, and ‘immigrants’ in 
reference to Muslims, further emphasised the discrimination arguments being presented in 
the text. This again, echoes various scholarly arguments of the existing and growing 
discourse in Europe asserting the view of Muslims as an internal enemy. Muslims are argued 
to stir up particular anxiety in Europe in relation to immigration and multiculturalism 
(Madood, 2003), and this is explained as evident across the social and political spectrum in 
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various European nations. This coincides with the continuing presence and development of 
a contemporary form of racism, xeno-racism (Fekete, 2004) or new racism, which according 
to Madood (1997), are based on cultural agents rather than any biological factors. Focusing 
on the British context, he exemplifies such racism as when “cultural differences from an 
alleged British or ‘civilised’ norm [is used] to vilify, marginalise or demand cultural 
assimilation from groups who also suffer biological racism” (cited in Morey & Yaqin, 2011: 
41). Indeed, such themes regarding the lack of assimilation and difference were exemplified 
frequently in the representation of Muslims in the UK articles examined in the study. In the 
French face veil ban story, for instance, the topos of difference was extensively drawn upon 
in arguments for a face veil ban, where the women who wear it and the practice itself are 
depicted as contradictory to the values and norms of Western or British societies.  
 
Finally, in discussing the prominence of the representation of Islam and Muslims as victims 
of discrimination in the Arab press, in addition to the possible effects of censorship policies, 
one must take into account the  lack of arguments that were actually available in the corpus 
of articles covering both events. As illustrated in the genre and argumentation analysis of 
the articles, news reports as opposed to op-ed pieces were far more frequent in the Arab 
press, limiting the amount of argumentation to be analysed. The Arab English language 
newspapers as a genre and its target readership characterised mainly by foreign residents 
(Rugh, 2004) primarily interested in international news, can be argued to have limited the 
amount/variety of local opinion provided in the newspaper texts, and thus, the various 
other possible dominant discourses on the topics analysed.  
 
7.2 Ideology of ‘Difference’  
 
Although the UK and Arab based texts displayed diverging dominant discourses in relation 
to Islam and Muslims, as mentioned earlier, the construction of these opposing discourses 
frequently depended on the reproduction of similar linguistic structures and strategies. 
Echoing past research findings (Poole, 2002; Karim, 2003) characterising Western media 
discourse as propagating a series of binary oppositions, positioning the ‘West’ (in-group) in a 
direct polarised and superior position to Islam and Muslims on various levels, the UK 
newspapers analysed in this study revealed discourse reproducing similar dominant 
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meanings. More importantly, in some instances, the Arab based newspapers were found to 
produce ideological discursive representations advocating such binary oppositions further, 
adapting similar polarised frameworks, serving their interest (the in-group) in the Arab 
predominantly Muslim contexts. One such instance where this was expressed in discourse 
produced in both contexts was in drawing on the topos of ‘difference’ in the representation 
of in and out groups in reporting on the face veil ban story (section 4.2.6.3). The topos of 
‘difference’ was drawn upon emphasising positive self and negative other through the use 
of argumentation schemes, and the attribution of positive/negative qualities to in-
group/out-group social actors through predicational strategies, differentiating them socially 
and culturally.  
 
In line with van Dijk’s description of how ideologies function (1998a) (see section 2.2.2), the 
reproduction of such binary oppositions in the Arab press may be argued as exemplifying 
the production of dominant ideologies resisting or rejecting ‘Western’ based discourse, in 
this particular case, discourse directly produced by then French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Alarmingly though, such discourse also exhibited its own stereotypical and indeed racist 
images of Western society, a society depicted to be in direct polarised and inferior position 
to Islam and its principals. Such discursive strategies as described by Barker (1981) and 
Davidio and Gaertner (1986) are often argued to be legitimate cultural self defence, but in 
fact form part of racist discourse or “more ‘modern’ subtle and indirect ‘ethnicism’ based on 
constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility” (cited in van Dijk 1992: 93).  
 
These representations, although prompting oppositional positions by some of the Muslim 
focus group participants, describing them as negative assumptions, they were seemingly 
naturalised meanings for others from the same category of readers (see section 6.3.4). The 
possible detrimental effects of such dominant interpretations to negative, and at times, 
prejudice representations of a different ‘Other’ by groups of varying social, cultural and 
religious backgrounds are obvious. Such discourses not only polarise social groups further, 
but reaffirm the claimed dismal fate of multiculturalism, fuelling the fierce anti-
multiculturalism arguments and movements argued to saturate social and political debates 
since 9/11 (Morey & Yaqin, 2011) 
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7.3 Voiceless Representation 
 
Finally, discussion of the key findings in this research cannot end without highlighting the 
startling absence of the ‘Muslim’ voice in articles covering events primarily related to 
Muslims, and more importantly discussing laws and actions that may have serious and very 
real effects on the everyday lives of Muslims living in Europe and beyond. Both the UK and 
Arab based articles limited their direct and indirect quotes to Muslim elites/scholars, 
frequently allocating them active vocal roles supporting key arguments presented in the 
text. The suppression of Muslim voices in comparison to other quotes by actors not 
described as Muslim or representing a Muslim party/association was further emphasised by 
the quantitative analytical findings examining the availability of Muslim opinion in 
newspaper articles (see section 4.3). This absence in voice was also repeatedly emphasised 
and criticised by some of the Muslim focus group participants, mainly in the UK context.  
 
The lack of Muslim opinion in the UK quality press might stem from the demographic profile 
of the target readership of these papers (described in 2.3.1.1). Muslims do not make up a 
large part of elite and middle class members of British society, who are considered to the 
prime readers of quality newspapers, therefore, as Richardson (2004) explains, these papers 
tend to write about Muslims and not for them. The lack of Muslim quotes in the Arab based 
press may also be explained by the target readership (mainly foreign expatriates) and the 
over dependency of this genre of newspapers on foreign news agencies. As the newspaper 
readers are not local nationals, local Muslim opinion on the events may not form great 
importance in terms of news values.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there were instances, albeit a few, where the UK press 
illustrated some interest in exploring Muslim opinion by publishing opinion pieces written 
by Muslims, e.g. face veiling women, discussing their own opinions about the news 
event/conflict. However, even in such cases, instances of a homogenous view towards 
Muslims and Muslim practices were arguably indicated. In reporting on the face veil ban, for 
instance, many of the women who were asked to contribute to special news features and 
opinion pieces were in fact women who practice wearing the hijab (head cover) and not the 
face veil, two practices that can have quite different meanings to the women who practice 
them.  
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7.4   Limitations and Shortcomings 
Although the current research thoroughly prepared for and aimed towards a comprehensive 
analysis of the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the press, it is 
aware of the following limitations and shortcomings: 
• As mentioned in section 2.4.4.1, analysing newspaper texts on a discursive level 
involving the various processes of media production and consumption has been argued 
to have received minimal research attention (Cotter, 2001; Richardson, 2007). Although 
this research shed some light on reader interpretation processes, due to time and space 
constraints, it did not actively analyse the various relevant journalistic practices (e.g. 
editorial procedures and journalistic norms and routines) that may impact news 
production. Exploring these areas could further illuminate the important factors 
preconditioning news output, thus further informing the analysis of linguistic choices in 
the text. 
• In analysing the concordance of key terms, e.g. Muslim/s, it was noted that in many 
instances the particular subjects being examined may be referred to using determiners 
and pronouns, e.g. they, them, it, these. As Baker (2006: 90) explains, examining these 
references “may yield further evidence of patterns or even completely different 
discourses”. Having said that, concordance analysis of determiners and pronouns tends 
to develop very large amount of concordance lines, which in many instances are 
‘irrelevant’ (ibid.). In addition, as concordance analysis, unlike many other methods of 
corpus linguistics, demands increased qualitative attention, this direction of analysis can 
be extremely time-consuming and thus the current study could not afford to explore it 
in addition to the various areas examined. 
• In exploring reader interpretation processes through focus group discussions, the study 
aimed to shed some light on the complex processes of meaning making, while testing 
readers awareness and interpretation of the ‘naturalised dominant ideologies’ argued to 
be interpreted in the texts. However, reader sample sizes forming each focus group 
based on religion and context variables were limited and not equally distributed, i.e. UK 
Muslim participants formed a smaller sample of readers compared to other groups 
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examined.  Larger samples are required for increased validity and reliability in the 
interpretation of findings. Furthermore, the samples which were divided according to 
context/religion variables cannot be viewed as sufficiently heterogeneous. The research 
did endeavour to maximise the internal heterogeneity of sample groups by setting 
particular specifications to be met by participating respondents, e.g. age, university 
students, nationality, however, the heterogeneity in respondents’ other important 
demographic characteristics were limited. These include race and ethnicity, 
religious/political affiliations and economic status, all of which can influence the 
interpretations of newspaper texts. Nevertheless, the religious and contextual variables 
characterising the sample groups did reveal some insight into meaning making in 
relation to the discursive ideological representations of Islam and Muslims argued by the 
researcher as dominating the newspaper texts. 
• As the genre of English language Arab newspapers examined in this research primarily 
caters to foreign nationals living in the region in which they are published, as explained 
earlier, a large bulk of their content depends extensively on international news through 
external news wires. This ensues less coverage of local views on the topics examined and 
the dominant ideologies these may reveal. Although examining this genre of newspapers 
is important, exploring Arabic language newspapers catering for Arab nationals could 
develop further more extensive insight into the prevalent discourses on Muslim and 
Islam in the Arab Muslim context. 
7.5   Avenues for Future Research 
Throughout the development of the current research and the synthesis of analytical findings 
along with the limitations encountered, a series of important and possibly fruitful areas for 
further research were inspired. This final section of the thesis lists and describes some of the 
perhaps most interesting areas to explore further from a much larger collection of queries 
and paths that are yet to be addressed and scrutinised.  
• First and foremost, extending this research further by replicating the analytical study on 
Arabic quality newspapers published in the same region, catering for the local Arab 
readership can add further insight on the discursive meanings shared by predominantly 
Muslims Arabs for Muslims Arabs. Dominated by local politics and views on national and 
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international news events, analysis of these newspapers can directly probe into further 
discursive ideological representations that as mentioned in discussing the limitations, 
may not be as prominent in the Arab English language press. 
 
• Exploring journalistic production processes preconditioning newspaper output is 
another area that can lend further insight. Examining intertextuality, for instance, or 
‘how texts draw, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 17) is of particular relevance in news reporting. It can be quite 
significant in analysing the genre of newspapers examined in this study, which depend 
highly on incorporating texts from foreign primarily ‘Euro-centred’ news feeds in the 
articles they publish. How reported speech is framed and contextualized, for example, 
can “frame readers understandings of reported events and, in some cases, this may be 
ideological’ (Richardson, 2007: 103).  This process among other procedures and norms 
practiced by the journalistic community can efficiently be examined taking an 
ethnographic approach. As Cotter (2010: 19) explains, investigating firsthand, the 
community producing the discourse can “reveal a better sense of what their message, 
behaviors, and actions mean”. As challenging as it may be obtaining an insider 
perspective, this path in analysis would ultimately add to an area that has been argued 
to attract particularly limited research attention.  
 
• As highlighted in the introduction and section 2.3.3, new media (i.e. internet, Facebook, 
Twitter, online newspapers) and transnational news media outlets have dramatically 
and arguably transformed the media and communications landscape indefinitely. Not 
only do they currently attract a vast number of users, highlighting their relevance in 
meaning making today, transnational Arab media targeting large sectors of the Arab 
Muslim population can bypass the sometimes rigid censorship policies applied on local 
national Arab media. This again allows for further insight into ideological meanings that 
may be unique to the Arab context, especially considering the new media’s powerful 
role in generating the now infamous events leading to the media coined ‘Arab Spring’. 
Moreover, the structure of the internet, frequently described as a ‘democratic 
cyberspace’ (Riley et al,. 1998), along with other new media allow for immediate 
audience response towards meanings they produce, thus revealing their interpretations 
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of these meanings. Reader message boards, for instance, which are provided at the end 
of news articles in newspaper websites can attract an abundance of reader 
interpretation activity, providing researchers rich amounts of raw data previously not as 
readily attainable. 
 
• Finally, inspired by the findings of this research, investigating ‘out-group’ representation 
in media discourse produced in Arab Muslim contexts may be of particular interest. Arab 
based texts, at times, revealed quite negative, even racist social representations of the 
‘Other’, i.e. West, Western society and its members. Such representations not only 
polarise social groups further, but can actively proliferate and assist in the reproduction 
of detrimental social misconceptions and stereotypes. As was the case in this study, 
exploring such meanings and how they take shape discursively, can function towards 
raising further social awareness. 
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Appendix 1 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Articles – UK Press 
 
Article Date The Times  
TT1 21/6/09 France considers ban on full Muslim veil 
TT2 23/6/09 Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy 
TT3 24/6/09 Britain could never debate the burka like France 
TT4 26/6/09 Women, West Brom, the burka and me 
TT5 26/6/09 Veiled threat: The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a 
free society 
TT6 26/6/09 Niqabi, interrupted 
TT7 5/7/09 France and the burka 
TT8 12/8/09 The burkini makes a splash in France 
TT9 13/8/09 French Muslim woman wearing ‘burkini’ banned from Paris 
swimming pool 
TT10 3/11/09 Mother of six Houria Chentouf hid terror manual in burka 
TT11 7/11/09 As a Muslim women, I think the veil is a mistake 
TT12 10/12/09 France and the Burka bride 
TT13 13/12/09 France readies law against full Muslim veil 
TT14 14/12/09 French politician calls for burka ban under equality and public 
safety rules 
TT15 10/1/10 Banning the burqa unveils some nasty traits in us 
TT16 11/1/10 Are you for or against a ban on the burqa? 
TT17 15/1/10 Sarkozy aims to outlaw niqab on public transport but outright ban 
is ‘unworkable’ 
TT18 15/1/10 France backs away from burqa law 
TT19 16/1/10 Veil of Ignorance 
TT20 16/1/10 UKIP woos white working class with call for total ban on burkas 
TT21 18/1/10 Banning of burkas is oppressive, says the respect leader Salma 
Yaqoob 
TT22 19/1/10 Better to draw a veil over this draft idea, Nigel Farage 
TT23 24/1/10 Ban on Burqas receives strong public support in France 
TT24 26/1/10 Nicolas Sarkozy backs a ban on full Muslim veil 
TT25 27/1/10 In a burka, you’re cutting me off as well you 
TT26 27/1/10 French set to ban niqab on public transport 
TT27 22/3/10 A ban on headscarves just leaves women out in the cold 
TT28 25/3/10 President Sarkozy promises to ban veil in France 
TT29 31/3/10 Belgium  moves to ban the burqa 
TT30 1/4/10 Belgium poised to be first in EU to ban burqa 
TT31 22/4/10 Saudi Arabia’s got talent 
TT32 26/4/10 Sarkozy seeks capital in Muslim Veil 
TT33 30/4/10 Muslim butcher’s many wives ‘no worse than French mistresses’ 
TT34 30/4/10 Burqa ban is a revival of an older European battle against religion 
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TT35 1/5/10 Belgium poised to ban full-face Muslim veils in public spaces 
TT36 4/5/10 French lawmakers focus on husbands of Muslim women who wear 
the veil 
TT37 9/5/10 Woman in Italy receives first European fine for wearing burqa in 
public 
TT38 19/5/10 Burqa ban may strip designer stores of sales 
TT39 19/5/10 First case of French ‘burka rage’ as shopping dispute turns violent 
TT40 30/5/10 Europe vs the burka 
TT41 30/6/10 The niqab: fact vs fiction 
TT42 19/6/10 Attitude harden in liberal Barcelona towards wearing Islamic dress 
TT43 28/7/10 Is it British to ban the face veil? 
TT44 14/7/10 A niqab is a symbol of misogyny. It shouldn’t be banned 
TT45 15/7/10 The burka ban falls in line with France’s philosophy of equality 
TT46 18/7/10 Understanding the French burqa ban 
TT47 18/7/10 Burka won’t be banned in Britain 
TT48 18/7/10 Government rules out British burqa ban 
TT49 19/7/10 Before we ban burkas, ask if we pass the Pankhurst test 
TT50 20/7/10 ‘They wouldn’t try to ban the miniskirt, would they?’ 
TT51 20/7/10 Student veil ban as regime keeps watch for signs of extremism 
TT52 20/7/10 Want status? Try being super-religious 
TT53 21/7/10 Do us a favour. Let us wear what we like 
TT54 21/7/10 Spain rejects burka ban 
TT55 24/7/10 Arranged marriage? I learnt about it from Beatrix Potter, says 
Sayeeda Warsi 
TT56 25/7/10 MP faces legal threat for shunning veiled Muslims 
TT57 26/7/10 Yes to the Hijab, no to the burka  
TT58 26/7/10 Should the burka be banned? 
TT59 19/8/10 Judge orders Muslim witness to remove burqa 
TT60 1/9/10 Acting tough won’t win Sarkozy the trust of the French 
TT61 14/9/10 When you can cover your face under the new ‘burqa law’ 
TT62 16/9/10 Religious beliefs and the UK courts 
TT63 1/10/10 Burkas to be banned in Dutch deal to reward Wilders for support 
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Article Date The Daily Telegraph 
DT1 22/6/09 Nicolas Sarkozy says the burqa is ‘not welcome’ in France 
DT2 24/6/09 Why the burka is part of Britain 
DT3 24/6/09 Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban 
DT4 30/6/09 Muslims pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils 
DT5 17/7/09 Micheal Nazir-Ali: Burkas should not be worn where it compromises 
safety 
DT6 4/8/09 Police dress up in burkhas ‘to improve community relations’ 
DT7 15/8/09 Swimmers are told to wear burkinis 
DT8 15/8/09 Burkinis give me a sinking feeling 
DT9 16/8/09 How the West was lost: the burqini 
DT10 22/8/09 The Italians have banned the ridiculous burkini from public pools. 
Good for them. 
DT11 26/8/09 Robber in Burkha fled jewellers with £279,000 haul 
DT12 27/8/09 Burka robbers hunted by police 
DT13 15/9/09 France’s immigration minister is wrong to want to ban the burka 
and niqab 
DT14 26/10/09 French school children encouraged to sing national anthem 
DT15 30/10/09 Cambridge university to allow burkhas at graduation 
DT16 2/11/09 Mother ‘had enough terror documents to fill Marks and Spencer’ 
DT17 7/1/10 Women who wear burkas in France face £700 fine 
DT18 16/1/10 UKIP to call for ban on wearing burka 
DT19 18/1/10 Don’t ban the burka. Ban liberals instead 
DT20 18/1/10 France must ban Muslim veil, says Sarkozy party chief 
DT21 22/1/10 Tearing veils off women will help no one 
DT22 22/1/10 Paris Imam backs France’s burqa ban 
DT23 1/2/10 Nicolas Sarkozy rival calls on David Cameron to ‘join France ‘ in 
Europe 
DT24 24/3/10 Mp investigated by police after criticising Muslim veils in parliment 
DT25 26/3/10 Man dressed as Muslim woman robs bank 
DT26 29/3/10 British artist’s contribution to French debate on the veil 
DT27 30/3/10 Burkha wearing housewife poised to win Middle East ‘Pop Idol’ 
DT28 31/3/10 Belgium could be first country to ban the burka 
DT29 9/4/10 Burka bullying banned by Bangladesh court 
DT30 29/4/10 Belgian MPs vote to ban burka 
DT31 3/5/10 Husbands targeted by France’s anti-burkha law 
DT32 6/5/10 Woman in burka sparks flight emergency 
DT33 6/5/10 Robber wore burka to carry out jewellery raid 
DT34 26/5/10 Spanish town to vote on burqa ban 
DT35 19/6/10 It’s not in our interest to ban the burka 
DT36 21/6/10 Exhibition visitors to pose in Burkas 
DT37 1/7/10 A burqa ban would be un-British 
DT38 1/7/10 Ban the burka, says Tory MP Philip Hollobone 
DT39 9/7/10 Europeans back burka ban, Americans oppose outlawing Muslim 
veil 
DT40 17/7/10 Burka ban ruled out by immigration minister 
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DT41 17/7/10 Burka ban: Why must I cast off the veil? 
DT42 18/7/10 By refusing to ban the burka, Damien Green is supporting the 
humiliation of millions of British women 
DT43 18/7/10 Caroline Spelman: Wearing burka can be ‘empowering’ 
DT44 19/7/10 Burkas are not empowering 
DT45 20/7/10 Syria bans full face veils at universities 
DT46 22/7/10 Two Muslim women thrown out of pool for wearing ‘burkinis’ 
DT47 28/7/10 Jeremy Clarkson joins burka debate 
DT48 29/7/10 Indian lecturer barred from teaching by students for refusing burka 
DT49 30/7/10 Isreali rabbis clamp down on burka  
DT50 3/8/10 Baroness Warsi: ‘Burka wearing women can engage in everyday life’ 
DT51 5/8/10 Muslim woman sparks burka debate in Australian court case 
DT52 6/8/10 Man at centre of burka controversy ‘stabbed’ 
DT53 10/8/10 Richard Dawkins causes outcry after likening the burka to bin liner 
DT54 11/8/10 Soft-line Richard Dawkins permits the burqa-he’ll be letting the 
pope off with community service next 
DT55 19/8/10 Australian court orders Muslim witness to testify without burka 
DT56 1/10/10 Dutch politicians revolt over burka plans 
DT57 2/10/10 British schools where girls must wear the Islamic veil 
DT58 7/10/10 Italy move to ban burka 
DT59 8/10/10 Magistrates order pregnant Muslim to remove veil 
DT60 11/10/10 Al-Qaeda demand end of French burka ban in return for hostages 
DT61 13/10/10 Emirati politician backs France over Burqa ban 
DT62 14/10/10 Retired French school teacher in ‘niqab rage’ case 
DT63 15/10/10 French MP says UK is ‘losing fight against Islamic extremists’ 
DT64 16/10/10 Islamic face-veil part of ‘British way of life’ 
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Article Date The Guardian 
TG1 19/6/09 Why not ban the full veil, says French government spokesman 
TG2 22/6/09 Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France 
TG3 23/6/09 Brush up your Hegel, Sarko 
TG4 23/6/09 Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban 
TG5 24/6/09 France searches its soul over the veil 
TG6 25/6/09 France’s burka barrier 
TG7 26/6/09 Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter divisions in 
France 
TG8 8/7/09 Response: We don’t need Hegel. The burka is a cloth soaked in 
blood 
TG9 20/7/09 Western hostility to Islam is stoked by double standards and 
distortion 
TG10 2/8/09 Islam and dress 
TG11 5/8/09 Policing under the veil in Yorkshire 
TG12 26/8/09 Don’t be outraged for Muslim women  
TG13 2/11/09 Women who dropped memory stick at airport admits terror charges 
TG14 6/11/09 Withdrawal: Word gets louder with every death in Afghanistan 
TG15 13/12/09 The world through lens: Saudi daytime TV show. 
TG16 22/12/09 France may ban women from wearing burka in public 
TG17 9/1/10 What women wear 
TG18 14/1/10 Full veil not welcome in France, says Sarkozy 
TG19 16/1/10 Sarkozy’s veil climb down 
TG20 25/1/10 French cross-party committee to recommend partial ban on full veil 
TG21 25/1/10 The power behind the veil 
TG22 26/1/10 France’s attack on the veil is a huge blunder 
TG23 26/1/10 ‘veil committee’: no outright ban 
TG24 28/1/10 In search of Frenchness 
TG25 31/1/10 The young French women fighting to defend the full-face veil 
TG26 1/2/10 ,France don’t ban the burka 
TG27 2/2/10 France denies citizenship to Moroccan man who forces wife to wear 
full veil 
TG28 3/2/10 ‘I refuse to wear the niqab to teach’ 
TG29 8/3/10 Europe must not ban the burka 
TG30 10/3/10 Egypt’s chilling conservatism  
TG31 10/3/10 Who really wears a burka? 
TG32 12/3/10 Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, 1928-2010 
TG33 21/3/10 Is France right to ban wearing the burka in public? 
TG34 23/3/10 Conservative MP unrepentant for the burka slur after watchdog 
complaint fails  
TG35 23/3/10 MP Philip Hollobone was referred to police over ‘paper bag’ burka 
comments 
TG36 31/3/10 Belgium moves towards public ban on burka and niqab 
TG37 12/4/10 The Saudi housewife who spoke out 
TG38 21/4/10 French government prepared total ban on full Islamic veil 
TG39 22/4/10 Islamic veils face ban in Belgium 
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TG40 22/4/10 Belgian government collapses after party quits coalition 
TG41 22/4/10 A Belgian face-veil would be senseless 
TG42 23/4/10 Muslim driver fined for wearing veil 
TG43 23/4/10 A ban to celebrate 
TG44 26/4/10 French Muslim in polygamy row hits out at threat to revoke 
citizenship 
TG45 28/4/10 Sarkozy’s niqab ban: a legal nightmare 
TG46 30/4/10 Afghan feminists fighting from under the burqa 
TG47 4/5/10 All parties must stand up to Islamophobia 
TG48 4/5/10 Italian police fine Muslim woman for wearing veil 
TG49 5/5/10 Muslim woman fined for wearing burqa in northern Italy 
TG50 9/5/10 Imam tells Italy that wearing of veil is in tradition with Madonna 
TG51 13/5/10 Let them wear burqas 
TG52 19/5/10 Nicolas Sarkozy’s cabinet approves bill to ban full Islamic veil 
TG53 23/5/10 Laicite and the French veil debate 
TG54 28/5/10 Juliette Binoche: the Queen of Cannes 
TG55 12/6/10 City of Veils by Zoe Ferraris 
TG56 1/7/10 UK attempt to ban the burqa would be disproportionate and 
intolerant 
TG57 2/7/10 Burqa bans spread across Catalonia 
TG58 7/7/10 Noises off: How burqavaganza pitted theatre against conservative 
Pakistan 
TG59 8/7/10 French burqa debate in a smokescreen 
TG60 13/7/10 France votes on the burqa 
TG61 14/7/10 Tycoon plans 1M fund to fight French niqab ban 
TG61 14/7/10 Racism veiled as liberation 
TG63 15/7/10 French niqab ban: beneath the veil 
TG64 18/7/10 Copying French ban on burqa would be un-British, says minister 
TG65 19/7/10 Syria’s niqab ban is part of a clash within Islam itself 
TG66 20/7/10 Four councils line up for David Cameron’s big society pilot scheme 
TG67 20/7/10 Syria bans niqab from universities 
TG68 21/7/10 Muslim schoolgirls show faith and fashion are not incompatible 
TG69 22/7/10 Manningham-Buller was right about the Iraq war 
TG70 25/7/10 If Britain decides to ban the burqa I might just start wearing one 
TG71 25/7/10 Niqab ban Tory MP told he is breaking the law 
TG72 26/7/10 An MP’s posturing talk of a burqa ban 
TG73 3/8/10 Burqas and bikinis 
TG74 3/8/10 Hideously diverse Britain: What to do when an MP goes bad? 
TG75 12/8/10 French woman threatens legal action over ‘burkini’ ban 
TG76 19/8/10 Australian judge orders witness to remove niqab 
TG77 23/8/10 Europe’s union riven by government attacks on minorities 
TG78 26/8/10 France’s ban on the Islamic veil has little to do with female 
emancipation  
TG79 14/9/10 France: Senate votes for Muslim face veil ban 
TG80 18/9/10 A secularist manifesto 
TG81 1/10/10 Dutch far-right party wins pledge on burqa ban 
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TG82 3/10/10 I migrated to Europe with hope. Now I feel nothing but dread 
TG83 7/10/10 ‘Niqabitch’ unveil themselves in Paris 
TG84 11/10/10 Geert Wilders and co need Austrian treatment 
TG85 14/10/10 French woman faces fine for tearing niqab from tourist’s face 
TG86 18/10/10 MIA: what was she doing in that niqab? 
TG87 21/10/10 When you watch the BNP on TV, just remember: Jack Straw started 
all this 
TG88 24/10/10 My Journey to the heart of Isla,  
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Article Date The Independent 
TI1 20/6/09 France split over plan to outlaw burqa 
TI2 23/6/09 Sarkozy’s Louis XIV moment 
TI3 24/6/09 Sophie Morris: Sarkozy’s  right: the burqa is a tool of repression 
TI4 9/7/09 Brandon Robshaw: The burqa should not be worn in class 
TI5 13/7/09 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: Wearing the burqa is neither Islamic nor 
socially accaptable 
TI6 22/7/09 The burqa-clad bombers who terrorise Afghanistan 
TI7 16/8/09 Editor at large: Twitter ye not, for not will not change the world 
TI8 1/11/09 Our man in Cairo rashly enters Egypt’s veil debate 
TI9 15/12/09 Burka Barbie, a doll for the modern age 
TI10 8/1/10 France moves to outlaw the burka and niqab citing egalite 
TI11 8/1/10 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: They are right to ban the burka, even if it 
is for the wrong reasons 
TI12 13/1/10 The many faces behind the veil 
TI13 18/1/10 Ukip calls for ban on burkas 
TI14 19/1/10 Joan Smith: Nothing liberal about defending burkas 
TI15 25/1/10 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: The cloak of darkness is no exercise of 
civil liberties 
TI16 27/1/10 Inquiry condemns burka as ‘un-french’ 
TI17 10/3/10 Paris designers react to burka ban 
TI18 18/3/10 Rosie Waterhouse: Universities must take action on Muslim 
extremism 
TI19 22/3/10 Sisters. Crucible studio theatre, Sheffield 
TI20 22/4/10 Sarkozy launches new law to the burka 
TI21 24/4/10 Woman charged in France for driving in full burka 
TI22 26/4/10 Polygamy and fraud claims fan burqa row 
TI23 1/5/10 Belgium passes Europe’s first ban on wearing burka in public 
TI24 12/5/10 Burka-clad knifeman robs third travel agent 
TI25 17/5/10 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: Stand up against the burka 
TI26 20/5/10 French cabinet unites to pass burka bill that has split country 
TI27 20/5/10 ‘No one should be told what to wear’ says artist 
TI28 15/6/10 Barcelona is first Spanish city to ban burka 
TI29 1/7/10 Rosie Waterhouse: Will the voice of moderate Muslims be heard 
in city? 
TI30 1/7/10 Tory MP proposes law to ban wearing burkas 
TI31 7/7/10 Banning the burqa compromises the very principles that we 
value 
TI32 13/7/10 French parliament set to approve veil ban 
TI33 14/7/10 Constitutional confrontation looms after vote to ban burka 
TI34 15/7/10 Adrian Hamilton: Banning the burka is a lot of hot air 
TI35 17/7/10 Champion of UK burka declares war on veil-wearing constituents 
TI36 17/7/10 Even in France, a full-scale burka ban remains unlikely 
TI37 17/4/10 Leading article: This burka ban does not translate 
TI38 17/7/10 Tehmina Kazi: Inconsistency in enforcing laws just breeds 
resentment 
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TI39 17/7/10 Rajnaara Akthar: Comments like these fan flames of intolerance 
TI40 18/7/10 Joan Smith: Heels show the humanity burkas lack 
TI41 18/7/10 Minister says burka ban would be ‘un-British’ 
TI42 19/7/10 Burka ban would be ‘un-british’ 
TI43 25/7/10 Burka ban Tory MP could face legal action 
TI44 28/7/10 Christina Patterson: The limits of multi culturalism 
TI45 10/8/10 The strange case of a man called Lies 
TI46 15/8/10 DJ Taylor: Burning the candle at both ends suits Kiera, but it’s not 
for dave 
TI47 7/9/10 Taboo-breaking Syrian soap causes Ramadan stir 
 
TI48 4/10/10 Papal Plots, burqa bans: what does it mean to be secular today? 
TI49 6/10/10 Julie Burchill: An up-itself language that deserves to be thrown in 
the dustbin of  
History 
TI50 8/10/10 France’s highest legal authority removes last obstacle to ban on 
burka 
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Appendix 2 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Articles – Arab Press 
 
Article Date Gulf News 
GN1 20/6/09 France considering ban on burka, spokesman says 
GN2 22/6/09 Sarkozy says burqas are ‘not welcome’ in France 
GN3 22/6/09 Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task 
GN4 23/6/09 Egyptian Scholar slams French president for anti-veil remarks 
GN5 23/6/09 Sarkozy should be open-minded 
GN6 23/6/09 Sarkozy’s burqa stance under fire 
GN7 23/6/09 French president’s burqa views leave readers fuming 
GN8 25/6/09 West must respect the Muslim veil 
GN9 27/6/09 No burqas please, we’re French 
GN10 29/6/09 Liberte includes freedom of dress 
GN11 1/7/09 Strength through tolerance 
GN12 2/7/09 Finding freedom in Dubai 
GN13 8/7/09 France begins hearing on banning the burqa 
GN14 9/7/09 Muslim’s woman’s murder a sign of Islamophobia 
GN15 11/7/09 To enforce or ban attire is wrong 
GN16 21/7/09 Militants attack Afghan city, 2 burqa bombers killed 
GN17 29/7/09 Use of burqa in France is ‘marginal’ 
GN18 30/7/09 France shouldn’t focus on the burqa 
GN19 13/08/09 Suit bought in Dubai: Burqini row in Paris 
GN20 7/10/09 Egypt’s to cleric plans face veil ban in schools 
GN21 10/10/09 Aim to spread trust, Egypt cleric said 
GN22 10/10/09 Egyptian authorities try to reason with those opposed to niqab 
ban at varsities 
GN23 25/10/09 College bans Muslim student over veil row 
GN24 30/10/09 Cairo worried over growing extremism 
GN25 1/11/09 Cambridge students can wear ‘burqas’ at graduation ceremony 
GN26 14/11/09 France will not ban full face veils: Official 
GN27 1/1/10 University ban has helped us: niqab trader 
GN28 3/1/10 Cairo court upholds niqab ban 
GN29 12/1/10 Egyptian university bans replacing niqab with surgical masks 
GN30 13/1/10 Egypt varsity bans surgical masks in place of full veil 
GN31 16/1/10 Draft law filed in France to ban face-covering veils 
GN32 20/1/10 Egypt court revokes ban on niqab at exam halls 
GN33 24/1/10 Ayesha unveiled 
GN34 3/2/10 France denies citizenship to man who forced wife to wear Islamic 
veil 
GN35 6/2/10 Niqab confusion reigns in France 
GN36 11/3/10 Egypt’s top cleric actively courted controversy with his liberal 
views 
GN37 23/3/10 Saudi woman blasts clerics in TV contest poem 
GN38 30/3/10 French state council advises against total ban on burqa 
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GN39 31/3/10 Belgian lawmakers vote to ban Islamic burqa in public 
GN40 1/4/10 Belgium votes to ban niqab, burqa in public 
GN41 3/4/10 Banning the veil would be indefensible  
GN42 14/4/10 Veil pose no threat to European Identity 
GN43 17/4/10 Belgium could be first in Europe to ban burqa 
GN44 18/4/10 Clothing styles cannot be regulated 
GN45 21/4/10 France to ban full Islamic veil from public places 
GN46 24/4/10 Woman driver wearing veil fined in France 
GN47 25/4/10 French people want law limiting the use of burqa 
GN48 27/4/10 ‘Keeping mistresses is French way of life’ 
GN49 27/4/10 Niqab is not the issue 
GN50 30/4/10 Belgium ban burqa-type dress in public 
GN51 1/5/10 Ban burqas across Europe : German EU law maker 
GN52 1/5/10 Belgium Burqa ban under fire 
GN53 4/5/10 Bigotry drives Belgium’s burqa ban 
GN54 4/5/10 Italian city fines woman for wearing burqa 
GN55 7/5/10 Video threat of attack over veil ban under investigation in 
Belgium 
GN56 19/5/10 Women protest as French cabinet gets veil ban bill 
GN57 20/5/10 Women protest as French Veil cabinet approves veil ban 
GN58 21/5/10 Weekend review: Veiled affront 
GN59 22/5/10 Intolerance on display in France 
GN60 31/5/10 Outrage over burqa ban at college exam 
GN61 5/6/10 France should not ban the veil 
GN62 14/6/10 Barcelona to ban burqa in municipal buildings 
GN63 22/6/10 Burqa-clad German man detained close to border with 
Afghanistan 
GN64 23/6/10 Students to bring niqab ban before UN 
GN65 2/7/10 Attempt to regulate face coverings 
GN66 7/7/10 French parliament debates ban on burqa style veils 
GN67 8/7/10 French parliament debates ban on burqa 
GN68 11/7/10 French lead West European calls for ban on veils in public 
GN69 12/7/10 French veil ban set to pass parliament 
GN70 13/7/10 French parliament approves ban on veils 
GN71 13/7/10 Veil ban debate continues in France 
GN72 15/7/10 Banning clothing is not liberating 
GN73 15/7/10 An absolute ban on niqab makes no sense 
GN74 18/7/10 A clear case of hypocrisy 
GN75 18/7/10 Minister rules out veil ban in Britain 
GN76 19/7/10 Opposition party wants debate on buqa ban 
GN77 19/7/10 Britain rules out burqa ban law 
GN78 21/7/10 Syria bans full Islamic face veils in universities 
GN79 21/7/10 Niqab ban report sparks debate in Syria 
GN80 23/7/10 Dressed up to show change in attitude 
GN81 24/7/10 Muslim woman refused bus ride over veil 
GN82 24/7/10 Saudi cleric: Women can forgo veil in anti-niqab countries 
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GN83 26/7/10 Rights groups warn Tory MP  over veil issue 
GN84 19/8/10 Australian judge orders Muslim witness to remove burqa 
GN85 24/8/10 Bangladesh authorities asked to ensure veil is not forced 
GN86 14/9/10 French parliament adopts ban on full-face veil 
GN87 16/9/10 Ban on veil undermines European Values 
GN88 18/9/10 Islamophobia fuels the fires of hatred 
GN89 19/9/10 Woman shuns the burqa despite death threats 
GN90 19/9/10 Europe’s Islam dilemma 
GN91 25/9/10 Renegade France defies Europe 
GN92 1/10/10 Netherlands to ban the burqa, says anti-Islam MP’s 
GN93 4/10/10 Netherlands flirts with extremism 
GN94 12/10/10 Doha debates reject ban on wearing of face veils 
GN95 16/10/10 French woman on trial for burqa assault on Emirati 
GN96 21/10/10 Shiv Sena wants ban on burqa for security reasons 
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Article Date Gulf Times 
GT1 19/6/09 France divided over burqa ban plan 
GT2 23/6/09 Burqa not welcome in France 
GT3 23/6/09 French parliament sets up inquiry into burqa 
GT4 28/6/09 Dressing Down 
GT5 30/6/09 Dress row opens bitter divisions 
GT6 30/6/09 Al Qaeda warns France over burqa Stance 
GT7 8/7/09 Paris MP’s Discuss banning the burqa 
GT8 10/7/09 Is Europe really Islamophobic? 
GT9 14/7/09 France row over burqa unveils contradictions 
GT10 21/7/09 Burqa-clad Taliban launch daring attacks 
GT11     24/7/09 Veiled woman ‘barred’ from bus in Sydney 
GT12 26/7/09 Celebrities and activists get a dressing down 
GT13 12/8/09 Pool bans Muslim woman in a ‘burqini’ swimsuit 
GT14 15/8/09 French Minister for ban on Islamic veil 
GT15 20/8/09 Women vote for change 
GT16 23/9/09 Muslim woman rebuked on burka by judge in Spain 
GT17 5/10/09 Top imam orders student to remove face veil: daily 
GT18 6/10/09 ‘Call to ban’ niqab stirs controversy 
GT19 7/10/09 Cleric told to quit over face veil remark 
GT20 7/10/09 Italy far-right party demands burka ban 
GT21 8/10/09 Al-Azhar varsity to ban the niqab in women’s classes 
GT22 2/11/09 Women jailed over terror files 
GT23 13/11/09 France will oppose, but not ban, the burqa 
GT24 14/12/09 Niqab protest 
GT25 22/12/09 University to appeal veil ruling 
GT26 6/1/10 Socialists to oppose bill on burqa ban 
GT27 13/1/10 France stays divided over compromise on burqa ban 
GT28 21/1/10 Court lifts niqab ban 
GT29 24/1/10 France moves on burqa ban  
GT30 26/1/10 French parliament panel moots ban on the burqa 
GT31 27/1/10 Uncertainties over law on Islamic face veils remain 
GT32 29/1/10 Islamic school niqab ban is overturned by Egyptian court 
GT33 30/1/10 Italy moves towards emulating France on burqa ban 
GT34 6/1/10 Students defy Egypt efforts to ban niqab 
GT35 2/2/10 No citizenship for men who force their wives to wear burqa  
GT36 3/2/10 France to reject men who impose ‘burqa’ 
GT37 10/2/10 Wife-to-be is bearded, cross-eyed behind veil 
GT38 17/2/10 Egypt PM says niqab negates a women’s personality 
GT39 8/3/10 India confounds those who write it off 
GT40 17/3/10 Cops kill suicide bombers in burqa 
GT41 30/3/10 French govt told to limit burqa ban 
GT42 31/3/10 Belgian lawmakers vote to ban Islamic burqa in public  
GT43 13/4/10 The poetess who spoke out 
GT44 16/4/10 European push to ban burqas appalls women 
GT45 18/4/10 Burqa bombers kill 41 at camp for displaced 
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GT46 18/4/10 Burqa bombers target camp for displaced 
GT47 21/4/10 France moves towards banning veils in public 
GT48 23/4/10 France wants to apply burqa ban to tourists 
GT49 24/4/10 Most French want burqa law but not total ban 
GT50 24/4/10 French driver fined for wearing niqab 
GT51 24/4/10 Veiled woman driver fined 
GT52 26/4/10 French Muslim man hits back at polygamy row 
GT53 26/4/10 A Belgian face-veil ban would be senseless 
GT54 30/4/10 Belgium’s MP’s vote to ban the burqa in public 
GT55 30/4/10 Belgian vote on veils may echo in Europe 
GT56 30/4/10 France law calls for imprisonment, fines for offenders. 
GT57 1/5/10 Belgium’s Muslims lash out at looming burqa ban 
GT58 2/5/10 France expects criticism over burqa ban minister  
GT59 4/5/10 Italian city fines women in burqa 500 Euros 
GT60 4/5/10 German minister rejects talk of ban 
GT61 7/5/10 Covered bandits case sparks talk of burqa ban 
GT62 8/5/10 Qaradawi warns of backlash against Europe’s niqab ban moves  
GT63 8/5/10 Another sign of anti-Muslim Xenobia  
GT64 8/5/10 Belgium analyses video threat 
GT65 17/5/10 Australian state to vote over burqa ban 
GT66 19/5/10 France unveils bill to ban veil 
GT67 21/5/10 Pro-burqa protestors plan rallies 
GT68 28/5/10 Spanish council bans Muslim veil in public 
GT69 28/5/10 57% Swiss favour burqa ban:poll 
GT70 2/6/10 Spain towns mull banning complete Islamic veils: reports 
GT71 6/6/10 Government warned on burqa ban 
GT72 14/6/10 Barcelona to be first major city to ban the burqa 
GT73 15/6/10 Anti-burqa ban will  not stand: advisory body 
GT74 16/6/10 Spain planning burqa ban says minister 
GT75 23/6/10 Law makers debate burqa ban July 6 
GT76 28/6/10 French PM urges Muslims to reject ’hijacked Islam’ 
GT77 1/7/10 Catalonia parliament rejects burqa ban 
GT78 4/7/10 French ‘burqa ban’ still goes before parliment 
GT79 6/7/10 ‘Burqa ban’ debate begins 
GT80 11/7/10 Crises ‘sparked’ more racism 
GT81 13/7/10 French lawmakers back ‘burqa ban’ legislation  
GT82 13/7/10 Amnesty slams French Move 
GT83 17/7/10 Saudi students defy Western preceptions 
GT84 18/7/10 UK must not seek veil ban: minister 
GT85 21/7/10 Niqab ban on Syrian campuses stirs debate 
GT86 22/7/10 Afghan women retreat behind veil in fear of Taliban 
GT87 23/7/10 Women banned from bus for wearing veil 
GT88 25/7/10 Women can obey ‘veil ban’ 
GT89 28/7/10 Zawahiri slams France’s veil ban 
GT90 3/8/10 Swedish minster moves to ban veil 
GT91 8/8/10 School sacks teacher for insisting wearing burqa 
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GT92 19/8/10 Court tells witness to remove her veil 
GT93 12/9/10 Final vote on French burqa ban tomorrow 
GT94 14/9/10 ‘Burqa ban’ law clears parliamentary hurdle 
GT95 1/10/10 Dutch govt expected with anti-Islam party support 
GT96 3/10/10 Wilders supports new anti-Islam party in Germany 
GT97 8/10/10 French court expels veiled woman 
GT98 8/10/10 Burqa-ban passes last legal hurdle in France 
GT99 12/10/10 About –face: French ban on veil wears thin 
GT100 15/10/10 Ex-teacher on trial for ‘burqa assualt’ 
GT101 15/10/10 Courts uphold’s a rape victim’s right to wear niqab 
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Article Date Saudi Gazette 
SG1 20/6/09 France open to banning Muslim veil: spokesman 
SG2 24/6/09 Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty 
SG3 25/6/09 Mufti Sarkozy’s ‘fatwa’ not amusing 
SG4 1/7/09 Burqa not tool for political maneuver 
SG5 9/7/09 France begins burqa ban hearings 
SG6 14/7/09 France burqa ban clashes with haute couture 
SG7 17/7/09 Demonizing Hijab-wearing Muslim women for politics 
SG8 25/7/09 Veiled women barred from bus in Australia 
SG9 16/8/09 French minister spits venom against burqa 
SG10 12/10/09 Pray for our sisters around the world 
SG11 12/10/09 Death-Knell for the face-veil?Not so 
SG12 12/10/09 Deconstructing the ‘niqab-is cultural’ myth 
SG13 26/10/09 Why fear? 
SG14 1/12/09 A little query 
SG15 16/1/10 France closer to banning Muslim veil 
SG16 26/1/10 French call to ban veil in public buildings 
SG17 27/1/10 French parliament panel calls for burqa ban 
SG18 29/1/10 Assuming niqab 
SG19 31/1/10 Egypt’s veil wearers see it as barrier to harassment  
SG20 8/2/10 ‘Newcomers to France should sign no burqa clause’ 
SG21 4/3/10 ‘No burqa no proble, B’desh court tells police’ 
SG22 1/4/10 Parliament panel in Belgium approves banning of burqa 
SG23 10/4/10 Don’t force women to cover up: B’desh court 
SG24 22/4/10 France set to unveil bill banning veil 
SG25 23/4/10 France’s new low 
SG26 23/4/10 France veil ban 
SG27 24/4/10 To wear the veil or not? Leave the choice to women 
SG28 24/4/10 Driver wearing Islamic veil fined in France 
SG29 1/5/10 French Muslims feel victimised by veil ban 
SG30 1/5/10 Amnesty slams burqa ban 
SG31 2/5/10 Belgium’s Muslims lash out at burqa ban 
SG32 5/5/10 Woman fined in Italy for burqa 
SG33 19/5/10 How western journalists reported the ban on the burqa 
SG34 20/5/10 French cabinet Ok’s burqa ban law 
SG35 7/6/10 Are you getting enough of vitamin D? 
SG36 17/6/10 Barcelona to ban veil in public buildings 
SG37 23/6/10 Oz woman asked to remove veil at interview 
SG38 2/7/10 UK MP moves bill to outlaw ‘burqa’ 
SG39 8/7/10 French disputes debate ban on burqa-style veils 
SG40 10/7/10 French denies citizenship to Muslim man 
SG41 14/7/10 French house approves face veil ban 
SG42 16/7/10 Veiled way to ban the niqab in France 
SG43 19/7/10 Niqab in focus again 
SG44 20/7/10 Syria bans face covering veils in universities 
SG45 24/7/10 Women ‘refused bus ride’ over veil 
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SG46 25/7/10 Muslim women can respect veil bans: cleric 
SG47 27/7/10 Man jailed for ripping niqab from Saudi student in Scotland 
SG48 30/7/10 Indian students demand teachers wear burqas 
SG49 20/8/10 Veil not allowed in court: Australian judge 
SG50 16/9/10 Leading Al-Azhar scholar applauds French veil ban 
SG51 17/9/10 Does the niqab have basis in Shariah? 
SG52 17/10/10 Doublespeak of rights in France 
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Article Date Kuwait Times 
KT1 20/6/09 France divided over calls to ban burka 
KT2 13/8/09 ‘Burqini’ - clad woman barred in Paris 
KT3 14/8/09 Tiny weenie yellow polka dot burqini 
KT4 6/10/09 Imam orders student to remove face veil 
KT5 7/10/09 Excuse me your Eminence! 
KT6 7/10/09 Increasing use of face veil worries Egypt government 
KT7 8/10/09 Hayef blasts Tantawi over niqab comments 
KT8 9/10/09 Fatwa stirs heated debate over face veiling in Kuwait 
KT9 27/10/09 Between hallucination and reality 
KT10 3/11/09 Battle over niqab brewing in Egypt 
KT11 4/11/09 Azhar in spotlight over ban on niqab 
KT12 23/12/09 Clerics back niqab curbs 
KT13 1/1/10 A Jewish voice against the ‘burqa ban’ 
KT14 16/1/10 France moves closer to banning the niqab 
KT15 29/1/10 To veil or not to veil? Kuwaiti women face off 
KT16 31/1/10 Egypt veil wearers see it as barrier to harassment 
KT17 14/2/10 More Saudi women than niqab 
KT18 17/4/10 Europe grapples with Muslim dress code 
KT19 18/4/10 Burqa bombers slay 31 
KT20 22/4/10 France to ban niqab from public spaces 
KT21 24/4/10 ‘Veiled driver’ fined 
KT22 29/4/10 Appeal to ban driving with niqab in kuwait 
KT23 1/5/10 Belgium’s Muslims lash out at looming burqa ban 
KT24 2/5/10 Belgian vote on veils could echo in Europe 
KT25 21/5/10 To niqab or not to niqab 
KT26 25/5/10 Who’s to blame 
KT27 13/7/10 French parliament set to vote on veil ban  
KT28 14/7/10 French law makers approve niqab ban 
KT29 20/7/10 Syria bans niqab on campus 
KT30 24/7/10 Women ‘refused bus ride’ over veil in UK 
KT31 25/7/10 Cleric says women can take off niqab 
KT32 5/9/10 French veil ban worries tourists 
KT33 20/9/10 ‘Forced veiling’ debate divides Bangladesh women 
KT34 21/9/10 Anti-Islam rant sees far-right fly high across Europe 
KT35 26/9/10 The psychology of the human mind 
KT36 4/10/10 Burqa bans: France, then Netherlands, who’s next? 
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Appendix 3 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ Articles – UK Press 
 
The Times 
Article Date Headline 
TTC1 1/2/06 Muslim cartoon protester urged murder, court told 
TTC2 1/2/06 Museum to house ‘historic’ Danish Mohammad cartoons 
TTC3 1/2/06 Religious hatred and Muhammad cartoon 
TTC4 1/2/06 A free society must respect all religions 
TTC5 2/2/06 The Danish cartoon furore 
TTC6 3/2/06 Drawing the line: Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned 
TTC7 3/2/06 Muslim cartoon 
TTC8 3/2/06 West tried to calm tensions as militants threaten kidnaps 
TTC9 3/2/06 World press opinion of cartoon row 
TTC10 3/2/06 Peter Brookes: Why the Muhammad cartoons fail 
TTC11 3/2/06 Muslim protests spreads to Danish butter 
TTC12 3/2/06 Incitement with little insight: 
TTC13 3/2/06 Foreigners flee as gunmen hunt ‘targets’ 
TTC14 3/2/06 ‘Let the hands that drew be severed!’ 
TTC15 3/2/06 British Imam warns against overreaction 
TTC16 4/2/06 Gathering storm as protests hit Britain 
TTC17 4/2/06 No Buts in Denmark 
TTC18 4/2/06 Portraying prophet from Persian art to South Park 
TTC19 4/2/06 What price must be paid for free speech? 
TTC20 4/2/06 In God’s name 
TTC21 4/2/06 Editorials 
TTC22 4/2/06 Muslim ire increases, but ‘day of anger’ has few takers 
TTC23 4/2/06 Call for holy war at London demo 
TTC24 5/2/06 Muslims tell Yard to charge protestors 
TTC25 5/2/06 These cartoons don’t defend free speech, they threaten it 
TTC26 5/2/06 Focus: Freedom v faith: the firestorm 
TTC27 6/2/06 The cartoons and the offence 
TTC28 6/2/06 The challenges of intolerance in a generally tolerant society 
TTC29 6/2/06 Timeline: The Muhammad cartoons 
TTC30 6/2/06 Suicide bom ‘protester’ apologises to 7/7 bereaved 
TTC31 6/2/06 Danes in despair as protesters set fire to consulate in Beirut 
TTC32 6/2/06 First deaths in Muhammed cartoon protests 
TTC33 7/2/06 World leaders rally round as crises deepens 
TTC34 7/3/06 Restraint, please – except for taking retaliatory action on Mr Bongo-
brains 
TTC35 7/2/06 Fake suicide bomber sent back to prison 
TTC36 7/2/06 ‘Fake bomber’ served jail sentence for drugs 
TTC37 7/3/06 UK peacekeepers flown in to calm Afghan protests 
TTC38 7/2/06 Call to arrest British radicals as six die in protests abroad 
TTC39 8/2/06 Rice accuses Iran and Syria of incitement over cartoons 
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TTC40 8/3/06 Seriously, I need to know more about this funny cartoon of the 
Prophet... 
TTC41 8/2/06 Analysis: What next in the cartoon wars? 
TTC42 8/2/06 Drug dealing ‘suicide bomber’ is jailed again for breach of parole  
TTC43 8/2/06 Children’s book that started it all is flying off the shelves 
TTC44 9/2/06 Danes accuse the imams of ‘speaking with two tongues’ 
TTC45 9/2/06 All right, I insulted Americans – but they are not planning to behead 
me 
TTC46 9/2/06 Denmark dragged into fresh controversy over IOC decision  
TTC47 9/2/06 Sarkozy on free speech 
TTC48 10/2/06 New rally warned against placards of hate 
TTC49 10/2/06 ‘God save us from the voices of reason’ 
TTC50 10/2/06 Unlucky Omar 
TTC51 12/2/06 Public anger at Muslim protesters 
TTC52 12/2/06 Muslims are trading respect for fear 
TTC53 14/2/06 Rioters storm embassies and Western restaurants  
TTC54 16/2/06 Divestment: Chief Rabbi on enemies and friends 
TTC55 17/2/06 “A true conservative speaks” 
TTC56 18/2/06 Police fear right-wing hijack of rally 
TTC57 18/2/06 Against religious censorship 
TTC58 19/2/06 Minister offers £6m to behead cartoonist 
TTC59 20/2/06 Rallies against the Muhammed cartoons descend into sectarian fury 
and rioting 
TTC60 21/2/06 Don’t panic. It’ll get worse 
TTC61 22/2/06 Stand by Denmark 
TTC62 23/2/06 BNP publishes Danish cartoon 
TTC63 26/2/06 My generation of spoilt brats is being challenged  
TTC64 26/2/06 We should fear Holland’s silence 
TTC65 2/3/06 Support of free speech 
TTC66 6/3/06 Mask of the blasphemer 
TTC67 8/3/06 Muslim incited terror murder 
TTC68 8/3/06 Cartoon protest Muslim is guilty of soliciting murder 
TTC69 14/3/06 No stranger tp controversy, Dershowitz remains unapologetic  
TTC70 15/3/06 Danish paper faces charges over Muhammad cartoons 
TTC71 15/3/06 Five arrested over London cartoons protest 
TTC72 16/3/06 Three charged over cartoon protests at Danish embassy 
TTC73 17/3/06 Danish Muslims sue over Muhammad cartoons 
TTC74 21/3/06 Charles criticises cartoons on Middle East tour with Camilla 
TTC75 21/3/06 Welsh Church recalls magazine over Muhammad cartoon 
TTC76 21/3/06 Prince Charles – Defender of faith? 
TTC77 22/3/06 Editor of church magazine quits over cartoon 
TTC78 3/4/06 Why must the media attack our soldiers’ mission? 
TTC79 10/4/06 Praise God or pass the ammunition? 
TTC80 21/5/06 Cartoonist draws a line under contest to picture Prophet 
TTC81 11/6/06 Ain’t no mountain high enough for her 
TTC82 11/6/06 It’s no joke, this taking of offence 
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TTC83 23/7/06 Putting the fun in fundamentalism 
TTC84 17/9/06 McAleese charm offensive gives trade a boost 
TTC85 17/9/06 Leading article: Let the Pope preach 
TTC86 25/9/06 Stuff 
TTC87 26/10/06 Danish court throws out Muslim cartoons lawsuit 
TTC88 28/10/06 ‘Mickey Mouse Project’ plotted to kill Muhammad cartoonist 
TTC89 30/10/06 Police call for ban on flag burning 
TTC90 9/11/06 Cartoon protester guilty of race hate 
TTC91 10/11/06 Cartoon protester stirred race hate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
343 
 
Daily Telegraph 
Article Date Headline 
DTC1 1/2/06 Danish Humour may be no laughing matter, it must be defended 
DTC2 3/2/06 Commentary from Capital spreads 
DTC3 3/2/06 Why we will defend the eright to offend 
DTC4 4/2/06 If you get rid of he Danes, you’ll have to keep paying the Danegeld 
DTC5 4/2/06 Demonstrators burn flags on the streets of London 
DTC6 5/2/06 I wonder if the Danes will ever be the same 
DTC7 5/2/06 Muslims protests are incitement to murder, say Tories 
DTC8 5/2/06 Islamic group behind protests ‘peddles race and religious hatred’ 
DTC9 5/2/06 Unchallenged, a man poses as a suicide bomber. Police stop press 
taking pictures 
DTC10 5/2/06 The Tinker-box 
DTC11 6/2/06 One law for the bloodthirsty, another for the tolerant 
DTC12 6/2/06 Flame of Islamic fury spreads to Beirut 
DTC13 6/2/06 Why extremists treat us with contempt 
DTC14 6/2/06 Arrest pedlars of hate, Police urged 
DTC15 6/2/06 Newspapers reflect nervousness 
DTC16 7/2/06 Conscience or commerce: that is the question 
DTC17 7/2/06 I’m sorry, says ‘suicide bomber’ 
DTC18 7/2/06 ‘Suicide bomber’ is freed drug dealer 
DTC19 7/2/06 Extremists in demonstration face inquiry by police squad 
DTC20 7/2/06 Protests cast cloud over IOC 
DTC21 7/2/06 This soft approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far right 
DTC22 8/2/06 Muslim protestors face arrest 
DTC23 8/2/06 University drops editor over cartoon 
DTC24 8/2/06 Redifining the boundaries of free speech 
DTC25 8/2/06 Muslim cleric jailed for inciting murder 
DTC26 8/2/06 Protestor who dressed as bomber is sent back to jail 
DTC27 8/2/06 Free speech? Labour cares more about Muslim vote 
DTC28 10/2/06 Have you heard? Retecool.com 
DTC29 11/2/06 Thousands protest against prophet cartoons 
DTC30 12/2/06 We were brought up to hate-and we do 
DTC31 12/2/06 Meanwhile..have you seen what’s been happening in Bush’s backyard? 
DTC32 18/2/06 Ministers forced out as cartoon row escalates 
DTC33 26/2/06 Did the Greeks tell the first Jokes? 
DTC34 5/3/06 Marginalia: Free speech 
DTC35 16/3/06 Arrests over cartoon protests 
DTC36 22/3/06 Church cartoon editor quits 
DTC37 22/3/06 Charles mends fences over Islam cartoon 
DTC38 25/3/06 Jack is a man of straw when Muslims talk of killing converts 
DTC39 7/4/06 Arla back on the shelves in the Middle East 
DTC40 8/4/06 Danish dairy firm’s products go back on sale in Middle East 
DTC41 30/5/06 This post has been censored 
DTC42 2/6/06 How has this cartoon crises come about 
DTC43 16/9/06 The Pope’s message of greater dialogue achieves the opposite 
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DTC44 29/10/06 Police want water cannons to douse religious riot threat 
DTC45 2/11/06 Muslims arrested in Old Bailey demo 
DTC46 10/11/06 Cartoon protestor guilty of race hate 
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The Guardian 
Article Date Headline 
TGC1 13/10/05 Paper threatened over drawings of Muhammad 
TGC2 30/1/06 Danish paper sparks angry protests 
TGC3 31/1/06 Danish paper sorry for Muhammad cartoons 
TGC4 1/2/06 Cartoon row spreads across Europe 
TGC5 1/2/06 Bomb threat to repentant Danish Paper 
TGC6 2/2/06 Palestinian gunmen in Cartoons protest 
TGC7 2/2/06 Prophetic fallacy 
TGC8 2/2/06 Anger as papers reprint cartoons of Mohammed 
TGC9 2/2/06 More European papers defy Muslim protests 
TGC10 2/2/06 Cartoon Controversy: to publish or not 
TGC11 2/2/06 Spectator makes cartoon u-turn 
TGC12 2/2/06 BBC joins cartoon controversy 
TGC13 2/2/06 Cartoons published in Jordan 
TGC14 3/2/06 Jordanian editor sacked over cartoons 
TGC15 3/2/06 British Muslims protest over cartoons 
TGC16 3/2/06 Published and damned 
TGC17 3/2/06 Sense and sensibilities 
TGC18 3/2/06 UK press hold back in cartoon row 
TGC19 3/2/06 It’s about discretion and good taste 
TGC20 3/2/06 Jack Straw praises UK media’s ‘sensitivity’ over cartoons 
TGC21 3/2/06 Norwegian editor apologises 
TGC22 3/2/06 Cartoons and their context 
TGC23 3/2/06 ‘I was convinced we had found a solution to living together – not now’ 
TGC24 3/2/06 The freedom that hurts us 
TGC25 3/2/06 European elite scrambles to defuse furore over caricatures of 
Muhammed  
TGC26 4/2/06 Cartoon row escalates and telegram service ends 
TGC27 4/2/06 Child’s tale led to clash of cultures 
TGC28 4/2/06 Should the cartoons have been published? 
TGC29 4/2/06 Cartoon controversy spreads tthoughout Muslim world 
TGC30 4/2/06 Syrian protestors set fire to embasssies 
TGC31 4/2/06 Protests and calls for vengeance spread across globe 
TGC32 4/2/06 Does the right of freedom of speech justify printing the Danish 
Cartoons? 
TGC33 4/2/06 Editor’s week: Readers echoed internal debate on the Danish 
Cartoons 
TGC34 4/2/06 Insults and injuries 
TGC35 5/2/06 How cartoons fanned flames of Muslim rage? 
TGC36 5/2/06 Embassies ablaze as Muslim anger spreads 
TGC37 5/2/06 Cartoons and freedom: Why we’ve got to draw a line somewhere 
TGC38 5/2/06 We must put a stop to this savage bitterness 
TGC39 6/2/06 BBC defends cartoon coverage 
TGC40 6/2/06 Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew images: a world of protests 
TGC41 6/2/06 Downing street statement on the weekend’s cartoon demonstrations 
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TGC42 6/2/06 Threats that must be countered 
TGC43 6/2/06 Arrest extremist marchers, police told 
TGC44 6/2/06 A worm’s eye view: logic and principle can’t resolve the row over the 
Danish cartoons 
TGC45 6/2/06 Jerusalem post publishes Muhammad cartoons 
TGC46 6/2/06 Danish paper rejects Jesus cartoons 
TGC47 6/2/06 Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over cartoons 
TGC48 6/2/06 ‘Suicide bomber’ protester apologises 
TGC49 6/2/06 When Freedom gives in to fear 
TGC50 6/2/06 Cartoon conflicts 
TGC51 6/2/06 Danish embassy in Tehran attacked 
TGC52 6/2/06 Rioting with well-planned spontaneity 
TGC53 7/2/06 Media points finger at Syria for violent rallies as Lebanon fears for its 
fragile sectarian peace 
TGC54 7/2/06 Scotland Yard sets up squad to track protestors 
TGC55 7/2/06 Danish friendly threatened by cartoon backlash 
TGC56 7/2/06 ‘suicide bomber’ cartoon protestor arrested 
TGC57 7/2/06 Major US paper runs cartoon 
TGC58 7/2/06 Something rotten? 
TGC59 7/2/06 Dave’s reform promises go way beyond our ken 
TGC60 7/2/06 We have lost our voice 
TGC61 7/2/06 Iranian paper to run Holocaust cartoons 
TGC62 7/2/06 Student editor suspended after printing cartoon 
TGC63 7/2/06 Q&A: The cartoons row 
TGC64 7/2/06 Drawn conclusions 
TGC65 7/2/06 Cartoons ‘part of Zionist plot’ 
TGC66 8/2/06 Mock suicide bomber back in jail for breaching parole 
TGC67 8/2/06 Muslims demand better legal protection 
TGC68 8/2/06 Punishment, not martyrdom 
TGC69 8/2/06 Blair appeals for Tory support on terror bill 
TGC70 8/2/06 Danish Paper Pursues Holocaust cartoons 
TGC71 8/2/06 Four die on attack on Nato base 
TGC72 8/2/06 Four killed in Afghanistan cartoons protest 
TGC73 8/2/06 French weekly prints more cartoons 
TGC74 9/2/06 US says Iran and Syria stoking cartoon protests 
TGC75 9/2/06 Imams plan ‘civil’ march to show distress at cartoons 
TGC76 9/2/06 Bad news for Danish goods 
TGC77 9/2/06 Our Media must give Muslims a chance to debate with each other 
TGC78 9/2/06 Danish paper in U-turn on Holocaust cartoons 
TGC79 10/2/06 Cartoon editor sent on leave 
TGC80 10/2/06 This is not a cartoon war 
TGC81 10/2/06 Malaysia bans Muhammed cartoons 
TGC82 10/2/06 Unfair and unbalanced 
TGC83 11/2/06 Europe’s cartoon battle are drawn in shades of grey, not black and 
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white 
TGC84 11/2/06 Call to reinstate papers closed in cartoon row  
TGC85 11/2/06 Snow go in the Hashemite kingdom 
TGC86 11/2/06 Thousands join cartoon rally in London 
TGC87 11/2/06 Face to faith 
TGC88 11/2/06 Reborn extremist sect had key role in London protest 
TGC89 11/2/06 Risky Business 
TGC90 12/2/06 Why I reject the anarchists who claim to speak for Islam 
TGC91 12/2/06 The end of freedom? 
TGC92 12/2/06 Muslims fly flag for peaceful protest against cartoons 
TGC93 12/2/06 I’m proud of my son – whatever’s said about him 
TGC94 12/2/06 Print or net, that is the question 
TGC95 12/2/06 The end of freedom? 
TGC96 12/2/06 My week: Deborah Turness 
TGC97 13/2/06 A right to offend? 
TGC98 13/2/06 Danes told to leave Indonesia after terrorist threat reported 
TGC99 13/2/06 French Muslims to sue press over cartoons 
TGC100 13/2/06 This is the real outrage 
TGC101 14/2/06 Two killed in Pakistan cartoon protests 
TGC102 14/2/06 Even bigots and Holocaust deniers must have their say 
TGC103 15/2/06 No offence 
TGC104 15/2/06 Russia clamps down on religious insults 
TGC105 15/2/06 Three killed in Pakistani cartoon protests 
TGC106 15/2/06 ‘Christian voice is outside, praying for our souls...’ 
TGC107 15/2/06 Iran demands apology over German cartoon 
TGC108 15/2/06 Denmark’s new values 
TGC109 16/2/06 Western businesses burn in Pakistan riots 
TGC110 17/2/06 Cartoons, adolatry and victimhood 
TGC111 17/2/06 Europe’s contempt for other cultures can’t be sustained 
TGC112 17/2/06 Cleric offer reward for killing of cartoonist 
TGC113 18/2/06 Craving for calm 
TGC114 18/2/06 At least 9 killed in Libya as cartoon protests escalate 
TGC115 18/2/06 Libya suspends interior minister after cartoon riots 
TGC116 18/2/06 Enlightened values 
TGC117 18/2/06 15,000 protest in London against cartoons 
TGC118 19/2/06 Nigeria cartoon riots kill 16 
TGC119 19/2/06 It’s so cowardly to attack the church when we won’t offend Islam 
TGC120 20/2/06 Iranian minister calls for end to cartoon violence 
TGC121 20/2/06 Church ablaze as cartoon protests continue across globe 
TGC122 21/2/06 Cartoon protest draws from well of discontent 
TGC123 21/2/06 Freedom on trial  
TGC124 21/2/06 Russian paper closes after publishing cartoons 
TGC125 22/2/06 Drawing the line 
TGC126 27/2/06 It takes more than tea and biscuits to overcome indifference and fear 
TGC127 27/2/06 Muslims who want sharia law ‘should leave 
TGC128 28/2/06 We need the Lords to hold firm on terrorism bill 
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TGC129 2/3/06 We must stand up to the creeping tyranny of group veto 
TGC130 3/3/06 Anti-semitism, the Jewish way 
TGC131 8/3/06 Clarke criticises Danish ‘mistake’ over cartoons 
TGC132 10/3/06 Extreme designs 
TGC133 11/3/06 We can defuse this tension between competing conceptions of the 
sacred 
TGC134 15/3/06 Grey area 
TGC135 15/3/06 Five arrested over cartoon protests 
TGC136 16/3/06 Expelled cleric’s aide among five held in cartoon protest inquiry 
TGC137 16/3/06 Darfur: the awful silence 
TGC138 17/3/06 Student editor sacked over prophet cartoons 
TGC139 17/3/06 Danish threatened with legal action 
TGC140 21/3/06 Europeans should beware of fishing for US failure in Iraq 
TGC141 22/3/06 Editor of Welsh church magazine quits over cartoon of Muhammad 
TGC142 22/3/06 Cartoon row claims Swedish minister’s job 
TGC143 23/3/06 Mother out to seize stronghold of ‘unforgivable’ BNP 
TGC144 23/3/06 A misguided march 
TGC145 24/3/06 Free expression and the Yeats principle 
TGC146 24/3/06 Freedom of expression for all 
TGC147 24/3/06 Sense and sensibilities: Freedom of speech should not be abused 
TGC148 17/4/06 Opus Dei paper prints prophet in hell cartoon 
TGC149 20/4/06 Us and them 
TGC150 25/4/06 Police launch appeal over cartoon protest 
TGC151 26/4/06 Police hunt three over cartoon protest 
TGC152 5/5/06 Former Islamist leader held over cartoon protest 
TGC153 12/5/06 Imam who led cartoon protests to leave country 
TGC154 21/5/06 Fresh row over Danish cartoons 
TGC155 28/5/06 Yet again we cave into religious bigots. And this time they’re Hindus 
TGC156 3/6/06 Muslim cartoons were an ‘act of inclusion’ 
TGC157 5/6/06 Hooray for Harper’s 
TGC158 6/6/06 Security concern at cartoons debate in Moscow 
TGC159 6/6/06 Cartoon editor attacks misreporting 
TGC160 7/6/06 Iranian journalist attacks Muhammad cartoons 
TGC161 28/6/06 We need uncensored voices 
TGC162 21/7/06 Indonesian editor charged with offending Islam 
TGC163 28/7/06 It’s officially great to be a Dane 
TGC164 20/8/06 Iran cartoon show mocks Holocaust  
TGC165 21/8/06 We don’t all back Ahmadinejad 
TGC166 22/8/06 Battle lines 
TGC167 23/8/06 Why worry about terrorist attacks? You are much more likely to die 
from smoking or be killed in a car crash 
TGC168 10/9/06 Islam? That’s a nightclub, right? 
TGC169 11/9/06 How to avoid another cartoon crises 
TGC170 18/9/06 Faith in each other 
TGC171 30/9/06 Common sense and sensibilities 
TGC172 30/9/06 How one of the biggest rows of modern times helped Danish exports 
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prosper 
TGC173 5/10/06 BNP accused of exploiting cartoons row with Muslim leaflet 
TGC174 10/10/06 Muslims angry at new Danish cartoons scandal 
TGC175 18/10/06 Freedom and falsehoods 
TGC176 24/10/06 Rules of engagement 
TGC177 26/10/06 Controversy unveiled 
TGC178 27/10/06 Danish court dismisses Muhammad cartoons case 
TGC179 29/10/06 Get tough on extremist demos, urges Muslim police chief 
TGC180 1/11/06 Think before you speak 
TGC181 2/11/06 Danish ‘cartoons editor’ lives in fear after threats 
TGC182 4/11/06 Cartoon protester ‘called for beheading’ 
TGC183 10/11/06 Man guilty of inciting race hate at protest 
TGC184 29/11/06 Pope praises priest slain in cartoon furore 
TGC185 7/12/06 Times and Independent take cartoon awards 
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The Independent 
Article Date Headline 
TIC1 1/2/06 Mohamed cartoons provoke bomb threats against Danish newspaper 
TIC2 2/2/06 French editor fired over Prophet cartoon 
TIC3 2/2/06 Anger as Paris newspaper prints cartoon of prophet 
TIC4 3/2/06 Leading article: this is not just a simple issue of freedoms 
TIC5 3/2/06 Mohamed: the messenger of Allah 
TIC6 3/2/06 Protestors storm Danish embassy over cartoons 
TIC7 3/2/06 Threat to Europeans over ‘hostile’ Mohamed cartoons 
TIC8 3/2/06 Joan Bakewell: There aren’t many jokes in the bible 
TIC9 4/2/06 Robert Fisk: Don’t be fooled this isn’t an issue of Islam versus 
secularism 
TIC10 4/2/06 Mohamed: Flesh and Blood 
TIC11 4/2/06 Mary Dejevsky: Can a secular society accommodate Islam? 
TIC12 4/2/06 Leading article: A more responsible approach to the debate on 
freedom of speech 
TIC13 5/2/06 Hamish McRea: western companies must keep the faith in the Middle 
East, whatever the tensions 
TIC14 5/2/06 Germaine Greer: We’ve fallen for the street theatre of outrage 
TIC15 5/2/06 Leading article: ‘Can’t take a joke’ is the age old taunt of the bully 
TIC16 6/2/06 Authorities backed Damascus riots, say protestors 
TIC17 6/2/06 Ministers appeal calm 
TIC18 6/2/06 Bruce Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for our own values 
TIC19 6/2/06 Police must bear down on extremist protestors 
TIC20 6/2/06 Robert Fisk: The Fury 
TIC21 6/2/06 Stephen Glover on the Press: No good news is good news 
TIC22 6/2/06 Yasmin Alibhai- Brown: The double standards over free speech 
TIC23 7/2/06 Dour die in Afghanistan as anti-Danish protests rage 
TIC24 7/2/06 ‘Suicide bomb’ protestor arrested 
TIC25 8/2/06 Leading article: We should recognize our friends 
TIC26 8/2/06 Muslim rally to condemn cartoons and extremists 
TIC27 8/2/06 Doborah Orr: We despise this book-handed mullah but his propaganda 
feeds on our failures 
TIC28 8/2/06 Student paper that dared to publish is pulped 
TIC29 8/2/06 French weekly reprints cartoons 
TIC30 8/2/06 Violent protests are a ‘growing global crises’ 
TIC31 9/2/06 Adrian Hamilton: It’s not about free expression, it’s about politics 
TIC32 9/3/06 Chirac condemns ‘overtly provocative’ cartoons 
TIC33 9/2/06 Leading article: A right that comes with a moral responsibility 
TIC34 9/2/06 Johann Hari: Free speech for all, Abu Hamza included 
TIC35 10/3/06 Windows smashed at Wiltshire mosque 
TIC36 10/2/06 Militant Muslim protestors face arrest 
TIC37 10/2/06 How a meeting of leaders in Mecca set off the cartoon wars around the 
world 
TIC38 11/3/06 Muslim rally organisers tell extremists to stay away 
TIC39 11/2/06 Richard Ingrams’ week: Shackles that bind our free press 
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TIC40 11/2/06 Howard Jackobson: As Graham Greene once put it, kindness and lies 
are worth a thousand truths 
TIC41 12/2/06 Trail of terror that led to the radical embassy protests 
TIC42 12/2/06 Flag traders see profits hotting up 
TIC43 12/2/06 The two faces of Islam UK 
TIC44 12/2/06 Humera Khan: The bad news: British Muslims have been let down, and 
extremism is the result 
TIC45 13/2/06 Danes are urged to leave Indonesia as protests grow 
TIC46 13/2/06 Yasmin Alibhai- Brown: We have an army of barbaric brutes 
TIC47 13/2/06 Greg Dyke on broadcasting 
TIC48 15/2/06 Two die in cartoons protest as Pakistani violence worsens 
TIC49 16/2/06 Johann Hari: Moderate Muslims: the fightback begins 
TIC50 16/2/06 Miles Kington: Why I fell about laughing at a cartoon without even 
seeing it. 
TIC51 19/2/06 Danish cartoonist: ‘No regrets’ 
TIC52 20/2/06 Toppling Musharraf: Heat rises on Pakistan leader 
TIC53 24/2/06 Five days of violence by Nigerian Christians and Muslims kill 150 
TIC54 15/3/06 Five held over cartoon protest 
TIC55 21/3/06 Church apologises for cartoon publication 
TIC56 26/3/06 Imran Khan: Islam and the West, Jemma and me 
TIC57 7/4/06 Morgan’s ‘Big Mo’ cartoon: now for the backlash 
TIC58 17/9/06 Leading article: The Pope and the Prophet 
TIC59 18/9/06 Pope’s apology fails to placate Muslims as violence goes on 
TIC60 18/9/06 Leading article: Religion and respect in the global village 
TIC61 4/10/06 Has the West been silenced by Islam? 
TIC62 4/10/06 Leading article: Beware loose talk about clash of civilisations 
TIC63 10/10/06 Anti-Muslim video sparks new outrage against Denmark 
TIC64 7/11/06 Comic strip portrays Sarkozy as a power-crazed Napoleon figure 
TIC65 10/11/06 Anti-cartoon protester convicted of inciting racial hatred 
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Appendix 4 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ Articles – Arab Press 
 
Gulf  News 
Article Date Headline 
GNC1 29/1/06 UAE flays Danish cartoons 
GNC2 30/1/06 Danish daily apologises to Saudis 
GNC3 30/1/06 Libya to close embassy in Denmark 
GNC4 30/1/06 Gaza gunmen warn Danes 
GNC5 30/1/06 Danish daily apologises to Saudis 
GNC6 1/2/06 No official call for boycott 
GNC7 3/2/06 Shock and surprise 
GNC8 5/2/06 A matter of dignity for all Muslims 
GNC9 5/2/06 Muslims ‘should stand United’ 
GNC10 7/2/06 Mohammed tells nations to hold civilised dialogue 
GNC11 7/2/06 Freedom of speech or blasphemous insult? 
GNC12 10/2/06 Gulf News poll scrapped after online manipulation 
GNC13 12/2/06 Danish ambassadors leave Iran and Indonesia  
GNC14 13/2/06 Danish embassy staff pullout hasty 
GNC15 13/2/06 East and West must ‘work to end row 
GNC16 14/2/06 Islamic website team to fly to Denmark for talks 
GNC17 14/2/06 Solana seeks to calm Muslim anger 
GNC18 14/2/06 Iran launches cartoon contest 
GNC19 14/2/06 Media ‘can play key role in dialogue with West’ 
GNC20 15/2/06 Dismissed professor not reinstated official 
GNC21 15/2/06 Violence erupts at cartoon protests 
GNC22 15/2/06 I was maliciously set up-cartoonist 
GNC23 15/2/06 Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes 
GNC24 15/2/06 GCC calls for clear apology from Denmark 
GNC25 15/2/06 Iran protests Jesus and Mary cartoons 
GNC26 16/2/06 West should change its attitude 
GNC27 16/2/06 Yemini editor goes on trial for reprinting caricatures 
GNC28 17/2/06 Hundreds of cartoon protestors arrested 
GNC29 18/2/06 Ten die in Libya cartoon protest 
GNC30 19/2/06 Timeline: Deaths from cartoon violence 
GNC31 19/2/06 Use liquidity to cool tempers and create jobs 
GNC32 20/2/06 Group condemns publication of caricatures 
GNC33 21/2/06 Italy seeks to minimise fallout 
GNC34 21/2/06 It was an attempt to provoke 
GNC35 22/2/06 Editor defends paper’s action 
GNC36 22/2/06 Playing politics with religion  
GNC37 22/2/06 OIC asks EU to legislate to protect Islam 
GNC38 22/2/06 Academics: Freedom involves responsibility 
GNC39 23/2/06 Rice pledges to keep up pressure for Egypt reform 
GNC40 23/2/06 Sectarian riots in Nigeria leave 27 more dead 
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GNC41 24/2/06 Real dynamics of event 
GNC42 24/2/06 Free speech doesn’t mean spreading hatred is acceptable 
GNC43 24/2/06 Follow the noble teachings 
GNC44 27/2/06 Annan urges East and West to find common ground 
GNC45 27/2/06 Violence over images must end immediately  
GNC46 28/2/06 In the interest of world peace 
GNC47 1/3/06 Denmark moves to ease rising tension over caricatures 
GNC48 1/3/06 Satirical comic misunderstood claims supplier 
GNC49 5/3/06 Bush concerened about cartoons 
GNC50 6/3/06 Anti-cartoon rally condemns US policies 
GNC51 9/3/06 Drawing the line 
GNC52 10/3/06 Start a dialogue of cultures 
GNC53 11/3/06 Lawyers seek death penalty for Yemini editor 
GNC54 13/3/06 Hundreds enter holocaust cartoon contest 
GNC55 15/3/06 Emirates delays plan for flights to Copenhagen 
GNC56 17/3/06 Mandelson sees initial EU-Gulf free trade agreement in May 
GNC57 18/3/06 Radical group holds peaceful rally in Lahore 
GNC58 26/3/06 Free-speech activists backoff 
GNC59 27/3/06 Man to stand trial over cartoon protest 
GNC60 2/4/06 Newspaper cartoon angers Indonesian government 
GNC61 3/4/06 Danish products back on shelves 
GNC62 6/4/06 Supermarket lifts ban on Danish firm 
GNC63 8/4/06 Arla products return to Saudi stores 
GNC64 11/4/06 Cartoon protest ‘mirrored Muslims’ love for Prophet’ 
GNC65 11/4/06 Muslim fury hits Danish dairies 
GNC66 16/4/06 Cartoon controversy discussed 
GNC67 1/5/06 Store lifts ban on Danish dairy firm 
GNC68 6/5/06 Danish travel to Muslim countries falls 
GNC69 6/5/06 Student kills self in prison 
GNC70 7/5/06 Man held over cartoon protests 
GNC71 12/5/06 Denmark’s imam decides to leave country 
GNC72 15/5/06 Rafiq unlikely to be free despite bail 
GNC73 30/5/06 Malaysia’s role in US-Iran stand-off 
GNC74 7/6/06 Iranian dissident ‘duty bound to criticise regime 
GNC75 9/6/06 Debate reignites cartoon row 
GNC76 14/6/06 Danish prime minister blamed for cartoon uproar 
GNC77 21/6/06 Religious music gaining popularity in Egypt 
GNC78 21/7/06 Saudi tabloid survives closure and arrest 
GNC79 3/9/06 Holocaust cartoons’ issue raised 
GNC80 11/10/06 Danish firms fears another boycott 
GNC81 16/10/06 Dh10.5m drive to correct image of Islam in the West 
GNC82 27/10/06 Islamic group condemns Danish court decision 
GNC83 27/10/06 Danish court rejects suit against paper 
GNC84 2/11/06 Denmark one of Egypt’s worst enemies  
GNC85 14/11/06 Culture conflict can’t set us free 
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Gulf Times 
Article Date Headline 
GTC1 17/10/05 Youth held over link to death threats sent to cartoonists 
GTC2 3/12/05 Denmark warns threat over Prophet’s cartoons 
GTC3 21/12/05 Danish diplomats criticise PM over cartoon scandal 
GTC4 19/1/05 OIC slams paper over blasphemous cartoons 
GTC5 26/1/05 Saudi cleric seeks action over offensive cartoons 
GTC6 28/1/06 Top Saudi cleric warns Denmark 
GTC7 29/1/06 Leaflet calls for boycott of  products 
GTC8 29/1/06 Cartoons prompt Gulf boycott of Danish goods 
GTC9 30/1/06 Two Doha retailers boycott Danish goods over cartoons 
GTC10 30/1/06 Norway, Denmark sorry for offensive cartoons 
GTC11 30/1/06 OIC, league for UN action on blasphemy 
GTC12 31/1/06 A boycott should have an objective 
GTC13 31/1/06 More outlets withdraw Danish goods 
GTC14 31/1/06 Clinton slams prejudice 
GTC15 31/1/06 Call for boycott of Danish items 
GTC16 1/2/06 Danish PM expresses ‘alarm’as fury grows 
GTC17 1/2/06 Meeting on boycott of goods 
GTC18 2/2/06 Outrage as caricatures row widens 
GTC19 2/2/06 Call to continue boycott 
GTC20 4/2/06 Boycott of products ‘only logical response’ 
GTC21 4/2/06 Europeans leaders urge calm over cartoons 
GTC22 4/2/06 Western press split over controversial cartoons 
GTC23 4/2/06 Musharraf condemns offensive cartoons 
GTC24 5/2/06 Awareness campaign is a timely initiative  
GTC25 5/2/06 Indonesian, Malaysian leaders slam cartoons 
GTC26 5/2/06 Govt summons Europe envoys over cartoons 
GTC27 5/2/06 Heavily-guarded newspaper stands firm on free speech 
GTC28 5/2/06 Qardawi wants envoys recalled from Denmark 
GTC29 5/2/06 Danish march over cartoon 
GTC30 5/2/06 Turkey urges ‘legitimate  limits’ to reactions 
GTC31 5/2/06 Tempered reaction among American Muslims to cartoon row 
GTC32 6/2/06 Islam decries violent reaction 
GTC33 6/2/06 European leaders slam violence over cartoons 
GTC34 6/2/06 Protesters set fire to Danish consulate in Beirut 
GTC35 6/2/06 Traders torch flags over cartoons 
GTC36 6/2/06 Cleric urges Aussie media not to reprint caricatures 
GTC37 6/2/06 QCCI refuses to meet Danish delegation 
GTC38 6/2/06 Banning of Danish products boosts sale of other countries 
GTC39 7/2/06 Danes close embassy in Jakarta after protests 
GTC40 7/2/06 Hundreds rally for peace and dialogue 
GTC41 7/2/06 Three Afghans killed in riots over cartoons 
GTC42 7/2/06 Pakistani doctors to boycott European drugs 
GTC43 7/2/06 Global fury is no faults of our: Danish Imams 
GTC44 7/2/06 Protests erupt in many cities against offending cartoons 
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GTC45 7/2/06 Turkey says priest probably killed by a lone gunman 
GTC46 7/2/06 Protests stain Scandinavia’s Peace loving image 
GTC47 7/2/06 Dhaka to make formal protest over cartoons 
GTC48 8/2/06 US faces tough balancing act in cartoon row 
GTC49 8/2/06 Danes relieved at US, UK support 
GTC50 8/2/06 Outrage spreads in Pakistan 
GTC51 8/2/06 Dhaka asks Denmark to apologise over cartoons 
GTC52 8/2/06 Eminent scholars urge law preventing mockery of religious, social 
values 
GTC53 8/2/06 Four Afghans killed as cartoon protesters attack Norwegian troops 
GTC54 9/2/06 Thousands protest against cartoons in Bangladesh  
GTC55 9/2/06 Cabinet urges ‘mutual respect’ in imbroglio over Danish cartoons 
GTC56 9/2/06 Fury over cartoons eases in Indonesia 
GTC57 9/2/06 Kashmir group calls for boycott 
GTC58 11/2/06 French see reprinting as ‘unnecessary provocation’ 
GTC59 11/2/06 Dutch MP defends European press 
GTC60 11/2/06 Editor charged with blasphemy 
GTC61 11/2/06 Warning on ‘chasm’ between West, Islam 
GTC62 11/2/06 Thousands march in Islamabad over cartoons 
GTC63 11/2/06 Danish paper sends editor on vacation 
GTC64 11/2/06 Philippine Muslim leaders urge restraint 
GTC65 11/2/06 Bukhari calls for campaign against Denmark over offending cartoons 
GTC66 11/2/06 Kenyan riot cops clash with cartoon protestors 
GTC67 11/2/06 Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies erupt 
GTC68 11/2/06 41 Pakistani workers detained in Afghanistan 
GTC69 12/2/06 Most Danes lay blame for furore with imams: survey 
GTC70 12/2/06 Nationwide strike over cartoons on March 3 
GTC71 12/2/06 Thousands protest in London over cartoons 
GTC72 12/2/06 Islamic party urges punishment over offensive cartoons 
GTC73 12/2/06 Cartoons are part of ‘war against Islam’ 
GTC74 13/2/06 Tens of thousands in biggest cartoon row rally in Turkey 
GTC75 13/2/06 Cartoon row angers Iran 
GTC76 13/2/06 UN aid work to continue despite security concerns 
GTC77 13/2/06 Islam does not need arsonists to defend it 
GTC78 13/2/06 Kabul confirms abduction of two Nepalese citizens 
GTC79 13/2/06 T-shirts bearing offensive cartoons on sale in the US 
GTC80 13/2/06 UK sociologist explains Muslim reaction to cartoons 
GTC81 14/2/06 Bangladesh lawmakers condemn cartoons 
GTC82 14/2/06 Holocaust cartoon contest on 
GTC83 14/2/06 Danish PM stirs controversy with meeting on cartoon row 
GTC84 14/2/06 4,000 cartoon protestors tear-gassed 
GTC85 15/2/06 Cartoonist denies entering Iranian Holocaust contest 
GTC86 15/2/06 Norway religious delegation tenders apology for cartoons 
GTC87 15/2/06 British Muslims have been let down, and extremism is the result 
GTC88 15/2/06 Muslim nations seek UN ban 
GTC89 15/3/06 Two killed in Pakistan as cartoon riots turn violent 
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GTC90 16/2/06 Political far-right yet to cash in on row 
GTC91 16/2/06 EU rallies behind Denmark 
GTC92 16/3/06 Politics of hatred is still thriving in Italy 
GTC93 16/2/06 Security upped for players in Multan 
GTC94 16/2/06 Three more people dead as cartoon riots spiral 
GTC95 18/2/06 Meeting slams offensive publication 
GTC96 18/2/06 Qaradawi denies escalating tension 
GTC97 18/2/06 Muslim Danes see silver lining to cartoon crises 
GTC98 18/2/06 Printing of caricatures was a mistake: Clinton 
GTC99 18/2/06 Fresh cartoon riots erupt in Dhaka 
GTC100 18/2/06 Assembly condemns Prophet cartoons 
GTC101 18/2/06 Muslim-West ties ‘hit by cartoon row’ 
GTC102 18/2/06 Pakistan recalls its envoy over cartoon controversy 
GTC103 19/2/06 Activists bemoan closure of Russian paper over cartoons 
GTC104 19/2/06 Minister offers bounty for cartoonist’s head 
GTC105 19/2/06 Double history made by racers in 30 minutes 
GTC106 19/2/06 Thousands of Muslims rally over cartoons 
GTC107 19/2/06 Commonwealth chief calls for dialogue 
GTC108 19/2/06 Govt bans anti-cartoon protests in Islamabad 
GTC109 19/2/06 OIC head coming tomorrow to discuss common strategy  
GTC110 19/2/06 Nigerian protest turns violent, businesses hit 
GTC111 20/2/06 Nigeria govt sends in the army after cartoon riots 
GTC112 20/2/06 Danish ambassador returns home 
GTC113 20/2/06 Paper prints ‘apology’ 
GTC114 20/2/06 Thousands protest against cartoons  
GTC115 20/2/06 Police use tear gas to break up cartoon rally 
GTC116 21/2/06 Denmark, Norway condemn bounty on artists as ‘murder’ 
GTC117 21/2/06 Nigerian state bans planned demonstrations over cartoons 
GTC118 21/2/06 Hamas likely to ‘soften its line’ 
GTC119 21/2/06 Top MMA leader freed, vows to continue protests 
GTC120 21/2/06 Pharmacies lend support to Danish goods boycott 
GTC121 21/2/06 Anti- cartoon protestors threaten to join  Qaeda 
GTC122 22/2/06 Nigeria imposes curfew in restive north 
GTC123 22/2/06 ‘Fatwa’ on cartoonist wrong, says OIC chief 
GTC124 22/2/06 PM rejects enquiry into handling of Danish row 
GTC125 22/2/06 Rawalpindi traders close down shops 
GTC126 22/2/06 Opposition leaders face house arrest 
GTC127 22/2/06 Today’s fascists hate Muslims, not Jews 
GTC128 23/2/06 Boycott of Danish goods unnecessary: US envoy 
GTC129 23/2/06 Protest rallies continue to rage across Pakistan 
GTC130 23/2/06 Danish NGO leaving 
GTC131 23/2/06 Cartoon parody causes anger 
GTC132 25/2/06 Denmark makes overtures to Muslims in Cartoon row 
GTC133 25/2/06 Top leader of Islamic party detained 
GTC134 25/2/06 Danish goods withdrawal has little impact on stores and consumers 
GTC135 25/2/06 Hindu groups offer reward for killing M F Husain 
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GTC136 26/2/06 Sindh CM boycotts Western products 
GTC137 26/2/06 Islamabad ‘will take up’ cartoon issue at the UN 
GTC138 26/2/06 Vatican tells Muslims to turn tolerant cheek 
GTC139 26/2/06 2006 will open new chapter in West-Islamic world ties 
GTC140 27/2/06 Religious schism feared in multipolar world 
GTC141 27/2/06 Shun those not wanting religious co-existence: Rabbi 
GTC142 27/2/06 Cartoons boosted extremists: Khatami 
GTC143 27/2/06 Top Islamic party leader, Imran among several held 
GTC144 28/2/06 Jakarta says war on terror needs tolerance  
GTC145 28/2/06 Europe seeks end to ‘bitterness with Muslim world 
GTC146 28/2/06 Muslims urged to avoid violence while responding to cartoons 
GTC147 1/3/06 Children burn Danish PM’s effigy, coffins over cartoons 
GTC148 1/3/06 Elite panel urges end to violence and hatred 
GTC149 1/3/06 Afghans blame ‘infidels’ for Iraq attack, caricatures 
GTC150 1/3/06 Arab MP’s for a ban on religious offences 
GTC151 2/3/06 TV stations apologise over cartoons 
GTC152 4/3/06 Scholars blame clerics for sectarian violence in Iraq 
GTC153 4/3/06 Bush arrives in Pakistan amid protests and strike 
GTC154 6/3/06 Italian foreign minister said he never meant to offend 
GTC155 6/3/06 Blasphemy issue delays govt’s madrassa plan 
GTC156 6/3/06 Thousand rally against cartoons 
GTC157 8/3/06 Populist party tops Norway Survey after cartoon row 
GTC158 8/3/06 Spain, Pakistan agree to work for religious harmony 
GTC159 9/3/06 Court upholds MMA leader’s detention 
GTC160 12/3/06 Pakistan recalls envoy to Norway 
GTC161 13/3/06 2,000 protesters stage anti-cartoon rally in Multan 
GTC162 13/3/06 Danish rail operator briefly bans book ad 
GTC163 16/3/05 Cash and a car for the blood of Danish cartoonists 
GTC164 16/3/05 Five held for cartoons protests 
GTC165 22/3/05 Charles condemns cartoon violence 
GTC166 23/3/05 New groups signals formation of Muslim party 
GTC167 26/3/05 US accused of ‘creating bin Laden’ 
GTC168 1/4/05 Gang forces Paris cafe to censor cartoon exhibition 
GTC169 2/4/06 Firm sees customers lifting boycott 
GTC170 11/4/06 Muslim boycott over cartoons hit Danish dairy exports hard 
GTC171 21/4/06 Mission of Al Jazeera international in doubt 
GTC172 26/4/06 Danish products finding their way back to shelves 
GTC173 7/5/06 Protests erupt in Multan over German prison death 
GTC174 7/5/06 Pakistani student dies in German police custody 
GTC175 9/5/06 Protest over death of Pakistani in Berlin 
GTC176 10/5/06 Sleuths head for Berlin to probe death in custody 
GTC177 11/5/06 Room-mate casts doubts on student ‘suicide’ in Germany 
GTC178 14/5/06 Thousands attend Cheema’s funeral 
GTC179 23/5/06 Religious parties to oppose screening of Da Vinci Code 
GTC180 19/6/06 Key issues on OIC meeting’s agenda 
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GTC181 5/7/06 Denmark reopens embassy 
GTC182 3/9/06 Controversial cartoons sparked train bomb plot 
GTC183 7/9/06 Two Muslims jailed in Denmark raid 
GTC184 16/9/06 Violence over pope comments is feared 
GTC185 19/9/06 Fears feed clash of rival faiths 
GTC186 27/9/06 Court lifts ban on state newspaper 
GTC187 8/10/06 Muslims refuse to be provoked by TV cartoons 
GTC188 28/10/06 Danish verdict on cartoons slammed 
GTC189 9/11/06 Danish Muslims say arrest of seven suspects hurting integration 
hopes 
GTC190 21/11/06 Dutch play down risk of backlash over ban on veil 
GTC191 26/11/06 Yemen editor freed on bail 
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Arab News  
Article Date Headline 
ANC1 21/10/05 Muslim ambassadors to Denmark protest cartoons about Prophet 
ANC2 30/12/05 Arabs FMs slam Denmark over Prophet Muhammad Cartoon 
ANC3 20/1/06 Offensive cartoons draw people’s ire 
ANC4 22/1/06 Islam and the West: Who hates whom? 
ANC5 24/1/06 Kingdom blasts sacrilegious cartoons 
ANC6 27/1/06 Boycott Danish goods over Blasphemous cartoons 
ANC7 28/1/06 Imams back call for Danish boycott in cartoons row 
ANC8 29/1/06 We need more than a butter boycott 
ANC9 29/1/06 Effect of Danish boycott patchy 
ANC10 29/1/06 OIC demands unqualified Danish apology 
ANC11 29/1/06 Dodging boycott call, Norway voices Regret 
ANC12 29/1/06 Editorial: Irresponsible  
ANC13 30/1/06 OIC, Arab league seek UN resolution on cartoons 
ANC14 31/1/06 Naif urges Muslim stand on cartoons 
ANC15 1/2/06 Danish newspaper apologizes, receives Bomb threat 
ANC16 1/2/06 Muslims deserve the same respect as Christians and Jews 
ANC17 2/2/06 Danish Imam: Controversy opens important debate 
ANC18 2/2/06 Winner in Danish Boycott: Newspapers 
ANC19 3/2/06 The power of the Muslim and Arab worlds 
ANC20 3/2/06 Something out of Danish Character 
ANC21 4/2/06 It’s not  just about the Danes 
ANC22 4/2/06 ‘Cartoons infused Muslims with a spirit of defiance’ 
ANC23 5/2/06 Hate speech in the Guise of freedom of Expression 
ANC24 5/2/06 Republishing cartoons is stupid and offensive 
ANC25 6/2/06 A freedom Gone Too far 
ANC26 6/2/06 Musharraf reteriates Kashmir demilitarization 
ANC27 6/2/06 A ‘Freedom’ whose home is the jungle 
ANC28 7/2/06 JCCI not to invite Danes for forum 
ANC29 7/2/06 Six die in global protests 
ANC30 7/2/06 Defending ‘The life of Brian’ 
ANC31 7/2/06 Gulf Muslims step up Danish boycott over cartoons 
ANC32 7/2/06 Europe’s uncivilised act 
ANC33 7/2/06 Press freedom Vis-a-Vis respect for the sacred 
ANC34 7/2/06 Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations? 
ANC35 8/2/06 Protests Over cartoon spread in Pakistan 
ANC36 8/2/06 Bigotry as European Chic 
ANC37 8/2/06 Thousands take part in Dhaka anti-cartoon rally 
ANC38 8/2/06 US facing tough act in cartoon controversy 
ANC39 8/2/06 Norwegian troops attacked 
ANC40 9/2/06 Editorial: return to sanity 
ANC41 9/2/06 A call for respect, calm reflection 
ANC42 9/2/06 Danish paper rejected Jesus cartoons 
ANC43 9/2/06 Envoy’s advert fails to impress many 
ANC44 10/2/06 OIC calls for laws to protect sanctity of religions 
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ANC45 11/2/06 Huge ‘chasm’ with West: Badawi 
ANC46 12/2/06 ‘Stand firm to face challenges’ 
ANC47 12/2/06 Cartoon battle lines drawn in shades of gray 
ANC48 12/2/06 Denmark now a country of Torn emotions and doubt 
ANC49 12/2/06 A caricature of freedom  
ANC50 12/2/06 Confusing hate speech with freedom of expression, again! 
ANC51 13/2/06 Dialogue needed to end East-West divide: Gore 
ANC52 13/2/06 Al Gore calls for ‘century of renewal’ 
ANC53 13/2/06 It takes two to avoid a clash of civilisations 
ANC54 13/2/06 Understanding freedom 
ANC55 13/2/06 Countryside strike against cartoons soon 
ANC56 13/2/06 Anarchists shouldn’t be allowed to speak for Islam 
ANC57 14/2/06 Are we sleepwalking toward another conflict? 
ANC58 14/2/06 Courageous US woman builds bridges of understanding 
ANC59 14/2/06 Solana seeks to quell cartoon rage 
ANC60 14/2/06 Bangladesh House blasts cartoons 
ANC61 15/2/06 Toward a positive media strategy 
ANC62 15/2/06 Two dead, hundreds held in Pak cartoon rampage 
ANC63 15/2/06 Prevent repeat of cartoon scandal, Saud tells European countries 
ANC64 16/2/06 Locals express disgust at West’s ignorance of Islam 
ANC65 16/2/06 3 More die in Pak cartoon protests 
ANC66 16/2/06 Yemen charges journalist over cartoons 
ANC67 17/2/06 ‘Cut ties with cartoon-printing nations’ 
ANC68 17/2/06 Guilt of the callous few, pain of the decent many 
ANC69 18/2/06 OIC calls for emergency meeting on cartoon issue 
ANC70 18/2/06 Palestine’s democracy and Hamas: What now? 
ANC71 18/2/06 Cartoons: Europe needs to examine its own values 
ANC72 19/2/06 Indian minister offers bounty 
ANC73 19/2/06 Pak envoy, OIC chief to discuss caricatures 
ANC74 19/2/06 OIC chief, Aziz to discuss strategy over cartoons 
ANC75 20/2/06 Western democracy fails in too many ways 
ANC76 20/2/06 MBC team in Denmark to present correct image of the prophet 
ANC77 20/2/06 Our choice: Distrust and Hate, or social cohesion 
ANC78 21/2/06 Politics behind Pakistan’s cartoon chaos 
ANC79 22/2/06 ‘Inter-dependence key to Islamic nations’ growth’ 
ANC80 24/2/06 How free is free? 
ANC81 24/2/06 Exercising free speech or spreading hatred? 
ANC82 24/2/06 More protests on cartoons in Pakistan 
ANC83 26/2/06 Islamabad to raise cartoons issue at UN 
ANC84 26/2/06 Free speech or hate speech? 
ANC85 28/2/06 Anti-cartoon protests continue 
ANC86 28/2/06 UK Muslims: a community left to talk only to itself 
ANC87 2/3/06 MQM asks allies to take up cartoon issue at UN 
ANC88 3/3/06 Danish Cartoons: Who made the situation uncontrollable? 
ANC89 4/3/06 Top Pak court orders blocking of blasphemous websites 
ANC90 6/3/06 Rally in Karachi to protest blasphemous caricatures 
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ANC91 8/3/06 OIC, EU should take cartoons row to UN 
ANC92 8/3/06 Taking potshot at the powerless is not bravery 
ANC93 12/3/06 Islam, West: Let’s not allow extremists to set agenda 
ANC94 13/3/06 300 Islamic scholars to attend Manama meet on Prophet 
ANC95 13/3/06 Danish cartoons and Muslim reaction: Two wrongs and no right 
ANC96 15/3/06 Pak minister discusses cartoons with OIC, MWL 
ANC97 16/3/06 Freedom of speech: Whose freedom? What speech? 
ANC98 19/3/06 Pak envoy, OIC chief to discuss caricatures 
ANC99 19/3/06 Denmark PM’s Delhi visit put off over cartoon row 
ANC100 23/3/06 Hundreds protest against cartoons in Multan 
ANC101 23/3/06 Muslim groups call for ending boycott of Danish firm 
ANC102 4/4/06 Products of Danish dairy company return to supermarket shleves 
ANC103 8/4/06 Danish TV host’s head scarf sparks new row 
ANC104 17/4/06 Muslims protest cartoons published in  Italy 
ANC105 2/5/06 Islamophobia focus of OIC’s London conference 
ANC106 6/5/06 Germany asked to explain Pakistani’s death in custody 
ANC107 10/5/06 Kings Abdullah’s visit boosted morale of Indian Muslims: MP 
ANC108 21/6/06 Textbook with Prophet’s sketch withdrawn after protests 
ANC109 18/9/06 Both sides feel threats in Pope-Islam controversy 
ANC110 19/9/06 Muslims: Fearful fantasies in West’s own image 
ANC111 19/9/06 Editorial: Chasm of ignorance 
ANC112 6/10/06 When US sanctions abuse 
ANC113 8/10/06 Danish video sparks fresh outrage 
ANC114 10/10/06 OIC deplores Danish video of the prophet 
ANC115 12/10/06 ‘Islamofascists’ are roaming America’s cartoon world 
ANC116 14/10/06 Armenian genocide vote set to fan divisions 
ANC117 27/10/06 Danish court rejects lawsuit 
ANC118 28/10/06 Hilali message lost in translation 
ANC119 26/11/06 Yemen jails journalist over blasphemous cartoons 
ANC120 7/12/06 Yemen fines editor over prophet cartoons 
ANC121 14/10/06 Yemen bans two journalists over prophet cartoons 
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Kuwait Times 
Article Date Headline 
KTC1 21/1/06 Big shame on current world system 
KTC2 30/1/06 ‘Selective’ freedom of speech 
KTC3 30/1/06 Polemic against the Prophet through Kuwaiti eyes 
KTC4 31/1/06 Danish ambassador tries to solve cartoon controversy  
KTC5 31/1/06 Awaqaf lashes out on Danish press mockery 
KTC6 1/2/06 Kuwait may ban Danish medicine 
KTC7 4/2/06 Kuwait leads delegation to discuss cartoon crises 
KTC8 4/2/06 Kuwait voices protests against ‘hate cartoon’ 
KTC9 5/2/06 Scandinavian missions burn in Damascus  
KTC10 6/2/06 Anger makes people blind 
KTC11 6/2/06 Boycotts, protests continue around the world: No end in sight 
KTC12 8/2/06 Cartoon protests turn deadly 
KTC13 8/2/06 Danish boycott ‘success’ 
KTC14 8/2/06 Violence and democratically-elected govts 
KTC15 9/2/06 Kuwait urges calm in cartoon protests 
KTC16 11/2/06 Cartoon anger rages unabated 
KTC17 14/2/06 America’s double standards 
KTC18 15/2/06 Cartoon protests take a deadly turn in Pakistan 
KTC19 15/2/06 Ironic tips to new ministers 
KTC20 16/2/06 The Dwarfs take over 
KTC21 21/2/06 Peaceful co-existence of human beings 
KTC22 1/3/06 ‘Opportunities’ to rally more support 
KTC23 9/3/06 Security industry flourishing 
KTC24 11/3/06 We demand respect, says Kuwaiti scholar Muslims call for Danish 
cartoon apology 
KTC25 12/3/06 Egyptians vie for Islamists leadership 
KTC26 26/3/06 Egyptian child bearing machines 
KTC27 11/4/06 Co-ops mull lifting Danish ban 
KTC28 19/9/06 Respect of religion only way out 
KTC29 12/10/06 Danish mission in Iran firebombed MP demands ties with Denmark 
cut 
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The Times (TT1-TT6) 
TT1 
France considers ban on full Muslim veil 
France has set itself a troublesome real-life question that could have come from this week's 
baccalauréat philosophy test: should society dictate how people dress? 
The matter arises because parliamentarians are calling for measures to stop Muslim women 
wearing full veils in public. Niqabs and burqas -- the head-to-toe costumes that cover all or 
most of the face -- are said to be spreading as fundamentalist doctrines gain hold among a 
small minority of France's five million Muslims. President Sarkozy is going to address the 
issue in a speech on Monday and a string of public figures have come out largely in support 
of restrictions in order to protect women from oppression. Ministers in Sarkozy's 
government hold conflicting views on the question.   
This new debate over Muslim dress is reviving the passions that surrounded France's 2004 
law prohibiting religious head-cover and other symbols of faith in state schools. The 
justification was the enforcement of laicité, France's tradition that keeps religious 
expression away from institutions of the strictly secular republic.  The measure was mainly 
intended to ensure the equality of Muslim girls and it has worked smoothly.  
The subject goes to the heart of France's ideal of itself as a culturally integrated republic and 
it creates misunderstanding abroad, obviously in the Muslim world but also in the "Anglo-
Saxon" and north European countries which emphasise what they see as religious freedom. 
First-time French visitors to Britain are often shocked when they come across female police 
and immigration officers wearing Muslim head-gear, or male officers in Sikh turbans. The 
French are also taken aback by the constant references to God in the discourse of US 
politicians. In turn, British and Americans are often unable to understand the positive, 
egalitarian intentions of the French secular approach. Foreign correspondents here found 
their home media editing out the fact that the school veil ban was supported by Muslims. It 
didn't fit the Anglo-Saxon preconception that it was an undemocratic act of discrimination  
(The degree of support from Muslims was  open to dispute, with some polls showing about 
60 percent approval and others only a minority).   
Only two weeks ago Sarkozy and Barack Obama crossed swords over the existing headscarf 
ban after the US president took a swipe at it in his speech in Cairo. He said the United States 
prized freedom of religion and "we are not going to tell people what to wear."  To many 
French ears, that sounded naive.  In Normandy on June 6, Sarkozy told Obama that French 
principles of equality meant that people should not display religious affiliation in state 
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institutions.  "It is not a problem that young girls may choose to wear a veil or a headscarf as 
long as they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this being imposed upon them, be 
it by their families or by their environment."  
That is of course the crux of the problem. Who decides whether they have made a free 
choice?  Extending the ban from schools and some state agencies to an all-out prohibition 
on any face-covering raises big questions. Veiled women who have been questioned over 
the past few days by the media have generally said that the choice was their own.   
Critics, including some government ministers, say a ban on the burqa and niqab would be 
unworkable and would only force greater isolation on the victims, as the wearers are seen. 
Gilbert Collard, a celebrity lawyer, made the point today in France Soir newspaper:  
"These caged women show the power of the fundamentalists to indoctrinate. They 
testify also to an odious idea of woman as an object of submission to an all-powerful 
master who is the exclusive proprietor of her face. But... forbidding this provocation 
by shadows in the streets would only reinforce their provocation."  
The call for a parliamentary inquiry is led by André Gerin, a Communist MP and Mayor of a 
suburb of Lyons, who calls the burqa and the niqab "a moving prison for women." He has 
been supported by two young Muslim-born women ministers, Fadel Amara and Rama Yade.  
Amara, a rights campaigner who is Housing Minister, said she is alarmed by the number of 
women wearing veils. "We must do everything to stop burqas from spreading, in the name 
of democracy, of the republic, of respect for women."  Yade, Minister for Human Rights in 
the Foreign Ministry, said today that she supported a prohibition in the name of women's 
equality and human dignity. The wearing of veils "is a phenomenon which is visibly 
spreading," she said. 
Muslim leaders have mixed views. Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Paris Mosque, supported 
an inquiry, saying that face-covering for women was a fundamentalist practice that is not 
prescribed by Islam.  But the national Muslim Council, which is less tied to theestablish-
ment, accused lawmakers of wasting time on a fringe phenomenon. "To raise the subject 
like this...is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France," said Mohammed 
Moussaoui, head of the Council.  
  
I suspect that Sarkozy will not favour a new law. He was not enthusiastic about the school 
headscarf ban, which was introduced by his predecessor President Chirac. Sarkozy sees the 
clothing bans as a form of discrimination and he tries to promote policies that bring 
Muslims, many or most of whom were born in France, into the mainstream community. 
From that point of view, the President is on the same ground as the activists in the banlieue 
immigrant estates who see him as the devil. 
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I've made some sweeping statements and this is touchy territory. Feel free to fire away.   
And as a footnote, it's worth noting that the government yesterday published its decree 
banning facial cover during demonstrations. Anyone who wears a mask or other cover will 
face a 1,500 euro fine on the first offence and double on the second. Police unions are 
worried that they will be unable to enforce this law which is intended to make life harder for 
the casseurs, the violent extreme-left protesters who try to turn demonstrations into riots. 
  
TT2 
Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy   
President Sarkozy threw his weight yesterday behind attempts to bar French Muslim 
women from covering their faces in public, calling their full-body dress a “debasement of 
women”. 
Mr Sarkozy made his attack on a small but growing number of fundamentalist women in a 
“state of the nation” speech that was the first by a French President to both houses of 
parliament since 1873. 
Talking in the ornate chamber of the Château de Versailles Mr Sarkozy also rejected calls to 
raise taxes and promised to accelerate his project to remake France despite the deep 
recession. His strong words on the niqab and the burka were part of a confident personal 
performance review that was decried by the opposition as a selfaggrandising stunt. 
“In our country we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all 
social life, deprived of all identity,” Mr Sarkozy said to applause in the parliament’s 
ceremonial Versailles home. 
“The burka is not a religious sign. It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement,” he 
added. “It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic.” 
Mr Sarkozy was adding his voice to a strong consensus that has emerged this month against 
women in France’s five million-strong Muslim community who wear the full or nearly-full 
cover of their bodies and faces. The latest French controversy over Muslim dress, which 
follows the 2004 ban on head-cover in state schools, began this month when 60 MPs from 
both sides of the house demanded action against the burka and the niqab. 
“A debate has to take place and all views must be expressed,” said Mr Sarkozy. “What 
better place than parliament for this? I tell you we must not be ashamed of our values, we 
must not be afraid of defending them.” 
Many on the Left disapprove of what is seen as a small rise in women adopting 
fundamentalist dress — they are said to number several thousand. But they are unhappy 
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with what they see as Mr Sarkozy’s enthusiasm for action that would further stigmatise a 
big immigrant population that is excluded from much of mainstream life. 
Muslim leaders reacted cautiously to Mr Sarkozy’s words on the niqab and burka. Dalil 
Boubakeur, rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, called the President’s remarks “in keeping 
with the republican spirit of secularism”. Moderate Muslims also saw full face-covering as a 
symbol of submission, said Mr Boubakeur. 
Measures against face cover are supported by two of the three women Muslims in the 
Cabinet but other ministers are questioning the wisdom of legislation that could be 
impossible to enforce.  
It would also risk further criticism of France abroad. This month President Obama attacked 
the French headscarf rule in a speech in Cairo, saying that the United States did not believe 
that the Government should dictate people’s dress. 
Boosted by victory for his party in the European Parliament elections Mr Sarkozy devoted 
his speech to promising to continue the reforms that he began implementing after his 
election in May 2007. He is to stage his first medium-sized Cabinet reshuffle tomorrow to 
open a second phase of his five-year administration. Among those departing are Rachida 
Dati, the Justice Minister, and Michael Barnier, the Farm Minister. 
The joint parliamentary session at Versailles was attacked by all the opposition parties as an 
act of selfpromotion by a President with monarchical pretensions. The speech was made 
possible by a change in the constitution that Mr Sarkozy introduced last year. 
Since the late 19th century French presidents had been barred from appearing in parliament 
under rules intended to reinforce the separation of powers. The Socialist Party boycotted 
the debate after his speech and MPs from small Green and Communist parties boycotted a 
session that they depicted as an attempt by Mr Sarkozy to play Louix XIV, the Sun King, who 
based the Royal Court at Versailles. 
DRESS CODE 
— In France a law was passed in 2004 banning pupils from wearing “conspicuous” religious 
symbols at state schools, a move widely interpreted as aimed at the Muslim headscarf  
— In Turkey where 99 per cent of the population is Muslim, all forms of Muslim headscarf 
have been banned in universities for decades under the secular government. In June 2008 
the country’s Consitutional Court overruled government attempts to lift the ban, prompting 
protests  
— In Britain guidelines say that the full Islamic veil should not be worn in courts, but the 
final decision is up to judges. Schools may forge their own dress codes and in 2006, courts 
upheld the suspension of Aishah Azmi, a Muslim teaching assistant who refused to remove 
her veil in class  
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— German states have the option of choosing to ban teachers and other government 
employees from wearing Muslim headscarves; four have done so  
—The Italian parliament in July 2005 approved anti-terrorist laws that make hiding one’s 
features from the public — including through wearing the burla — an offence  
— Tunisia, a Muslim country, has banned Islamic headscarves in public places since 1981. In 
2006 authorities began a campaign against the headscarves and began strictly enforcing the 
ban  
— The Dutch Government said in 2007 that it was drawing up legislation to ban burkas, but 
it was defeated in elections in November and the new centrist coalition said it had no plans 
to implement a ban 
 
TT3 
Britain could never debate the burka like France 
President Sarkozy's proposed ban may be pure politicking, but it does expose a fundamental 
cross-Channel difference  
“The burka is not a religious problem, it’s a question of liberty and women’s dignity. It’s not 
a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement. I want to say solemnly, the 
burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can’t accept women prisoners behind a 
screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That is not our idea of freedom.” 
So spoke Nicolas Sarkozy in Versailles during his first state of the nation address to France’s 
two chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate. He won rapturous applause and 
there is little doubt that an overwhelming majority of the French agreed with his every 
word. I say an overwhelming majority because this issue crosses all party lines in France. 
Republican principles of equality and secularism are so deeply grounded in the French mind 
that they belong as much to the Left as to the Right.  
For someone like me, firmly on the Left, the defence of secularism is the only way to 
guarantee cultural diversity and national cohesion. One cannot go without the other. 
However, when I get on Eurostar to London, I feel totally alien. To my horror, my liberal-left 
British friends find such a position closer to that of the hard Right.  
So does Mr Sarkozy’s speech mean France is about to forbid its citizens to wear the burka on 
the streets? Unlikely. Mr Sarkozy’s speech should be seen as piece of politics; he wants to 
reassure his party of his allegiance to the ideals of the French Republic and to undermine 
even further the awkward position of the Left.  
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The resurgence of a public debate on religious symbols in France is not innocent on Mr 
Sarkozy’s part. It is another instance of his extraordinary ability to fill the public agenda with 
new debates and new ideas for yet more reforms to maintain a state of frenzied agitation, 
which leaves the French feeling both weary and wary. Despite good results at the European 
election, Mr Sarkozy and his Government are not popular.  
With gloomy economic forecasts and discontent in workplaces across France, Mr Sarkozy 
urgently needed to recapture the nation’s attention. But the burka and all ostentatious 
religious signs have already been banned in state-run schools since 2004. And in hospitals or 
municipal offices, anywhere where people interact as equal citizens, staff are not allowed to 
wear hijabs or burka, and patients or members will be told to unveil. The ban in schools was 
passed in 2004 as a reaction to the Socialist Government of Lionel Jospin, which was seen as 
violating the spirit of the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State. Its laissez-faire 
attitude allowed a handful of teenagers to start wearing the hijab in school, provoking 
national outrage and a debate that lasted until the 2004 law finally enforced the Republican 
principle.  
That such a debate is taking place again reveals the sturdy health of secularism in France, a 
tradition that doesn’t shy away from being confrontational even in a country with the 
largest Muslim and Jewish communities in Europe.  
Similar debates seem impossible in Britain. When Jack Straw dared to state the obvious in 
2006 by saying that the burka and the niqab were “visible statements of separation and of 
difference” before asking politely that women visiting his constituency surgery consider 
removing them, it provoked angry protests from Islamic associations and the British liberal- 
Left, always inclined, it seems, to defend the rights of liberty’s enemies.  
Seen from France, Britain’s tolerance of extremist views looks at best naive, at worse 
dangerous: a recipe for trouble, division and painful soul-searching. Britain’s recent 
questioning of Britishness and what is it to be British, could never happen in France where a 
sense of common identity has been steadily forged through two centuries during which the 
Revolution and the Republic have provided the cement of national unity.  
If Britain’s tolerance of political and religious extremism is often bewildering to the French, 
it also fascinates them. This tolerance does appeal to some French because of its sheer 
exoticism. French tourists visiting Britain for the first time, London in particular, are struck 
by what they perceive as a kaleidoscope of different ethnic minorities going about their day 
in their religious and cultural attire, cohabitating seemingly peacefully with punks and the 
half-naked: being free to differ.  
What those visitors may discover later is that the price of this peaceful cohabitation lies in a 
constant bargaining of specific rights for specific communities in the name of cultural 
difference - the opposite of equality as understood in France. In France, public swimming 
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pools would never allow women-only sessions to satisfy the demands of a minority. A public 
space is constructed for citizens to interact freely, and legislation written to remove the 
barriers of difference that separate them.  
Seen from Britain, French principles of equality and secularism are often misinterpreted, 
and dismissed as authoritarian or prejudiced. But critics of the French approach don’t seem 
to understand that secularism is neutral - the State doesn’t recognise any religion in 
particular but protects them all, guaranteeing cultural and religious diversity by ensuring 
that one faith does not get the upper hand.  
Can our two countries learn from each other? France could certainly try that very British 
tolerance and Britain could be more rigorous in arbitrating between the common good and 
the demands of communities. But our two systems are anchored in such different traditions 
and histories that we can only keep marvelling and staring in bewilderment at each other’s 
approaches to social harmony; both of which are struggling to keep pace with the growing 
confidence of minorities who, once ignored, are now at the centre stage.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
TT4 
Women, West Brom, the burka and me 
I think Sarkozy is wrong about the veil - and not just because I was a football mascot for 55 
minutes  
I was once asked if I'd like to be the mascot at a West Bromwich Albion football match. It 
involved me having to wear a large thrush costume. I mean, of course, the bird. It wasn't 
some tasteless promotional event where I was dressed as an irritating rash and then seized 
upon by a man dressed as a tube of Canesten.  
I agreed to be the thrush but only if no one knew that it was me inside. I'm world-famous in 
West Bromwich so I thought that it would be novel to stroll around in front of 20-odd 
thousand people and not be recognised.  
The outfit was quite heavy and hot, with just a small slit at eye level to stop me walking into 
things. Before the game, I wandered around, waving to the crowd and having my photo 
taken with small children. Such is the role of the mascot. 
For these photos, I adopted my regulation warm-hearted grin but after I'd posed for about 
20 such shots, it occurred to me that this was completely unnecessary because I couldn't be 
seen. I was getting a bit bored and hot by now and it was a real treat to not have to look 
happy and enthusiastic.  
Come photograph No50 I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was a truly 
liberating experience and it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women are 
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reluctant to give up the veil. It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the outside world 
with no obligation to smile or look interested - hidden in your own secret place.  
The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, took a much more negative view of the burka issue 
this week when he said: “We cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut 
off from all social life, deprived of all identity.” 
I assume that he wasn't a big fan of Blind Date. He seems to assume that Muslim women are 
always forced by others to wear the veil. I don't doubt that this is sometimes the case but it 
doesn't seem to be the whole story. One often hears Muslim women in interviews saying 
that they like wearing the burka, not just for religious but also practical reasons.  
These views tend to be disregarded and seen as the product of indoctrination. Such a 
dismissive response seems to make these women and their opinions every bit as invisible as 
the burka does.  
The much-demonised garb is seen as a symbol of oppression, but oppression comes in many 
forms. Lots of British women have said to me that they resent being gawped at just because 
they're wearing a miniskirt or a low-cut top. I always apologise and say that I didn't mean 
any harm.  
Alternatively, a friend said to me recently that she was saddened to notice that, as she grew 
older, men had stopped staring at her. She felt that she was no longer desirable, no longer 
receiving approval. These are two very different problems, both by-products of our Western 
cult of physical attractiveness and both solved by the burka. 
I don't believe that any man should force his wife to wear a burka but I'm not sure that Mr 
Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife, is the best man to speak on the 
matter. Add to this that he was once seen to be checking his text messages during a private 
audience with the Pope and one might also ask whether religious sensitivity is one of his 
strengths.  
Either way, his call to actually ban the burka on French streets cannot be the answer. 
In the late Nineties, I went to Africa with Comic Relief. A group of us, mainly white middle-
class liberals, sat in a village in Burkina Faso and spoke to the village elders. We asked about 
the distinctive scars that many of the men had on their faces and they turned out to be the 
result of some sort of initiation ceremony.  
Someone asked if we could see the ceremonial knife. I think that we were just trying to 
sound interested. Eventually a rather disappointing little penknife with a dirty wooden 
handle turned up, and we all passed it around as if it were a beautiful artefact.  
One of the women from the production team asked if it was used for any other purpose. 
“Female circumcision” was the reply. We all went silent and handed the knife back. None of 
us had the guts to register our disgust.  
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I sat in a disused army barracks afterwards imagining what I should have said. “I'm sorry. It's 
one thing having respect for other people's cultures but some things are just objectively 
wrong.” Only the mosquitoes heard my indignation. 
Consequently, I do respect Mr Sarkozy for having the courage to speak out on the sensitive 
issue of cultural difference, but on this occasion I think that he's being too simplistic. It's not 
as clear-cut as he suggests. I'm not sure that the burka is objectively wrong.  
Some Muslim women clearly feel oppressed by it, but then some clearly don't. To ban it is to 
remove women's choice, using oppression to combat oppression. 
Rigid rules that make no allowance for personal choice are more suited to the Taleban than 
to one of Europe's great democracies. So that's my take on the burka issue - all based on 55 
minutes in a thrush suit. Next week: Silvio Berlusconi on why stockings and suspenders 
should be compulsory. 
______________________________________________________ 
TT5 
Veiled Threat 
The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society  
In declaring that the burka, the all-eveloping garment that covers a woman from head to 
toe, was an unwelcome symbol of subservience, President Sarkozy has reignited the vexed 
issue of religion, culture and personal liberty with implications far beyond his own country. 
While many in France, home to more than five million Muslims, have applauded his stance, 
conservative Muslims in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his remarks. The burka, 
they insist, is a “symbol of freedom” and a Western state has no business dictating how 
Muslims should dress. But does it? 
The issue is as divisive as it is emotive. Libertarians and European liberals have generally 
argued that religion is a private matter and that its symbols, customs and observance should 
not be trammelled by law unless its practice is offensive, socially disruptive or contravenes 
other laws. They maintain that, unless coercion can be proved, a woman should be free to 
dress how she wishes. In Britain, such tolerance, based on the principles of J.S. Mill, has 
encouraged diversity in a policy of multiculturalism. Unlike France, where a laicism derived 
from the French Revolution has demanded the exclusion of religion from state institutions, 
Britain has not tried to ban the hijab, the Muslim headscarf, or other religious symbols from 
schools. 
The burka, however, is different. Not only does it divide European liberals; it also is 
controversial within Islam. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no Koranic 
foundation in the demand that a woman should hide her face. The Koran only enjoins 
modesty in appearance and clothing, and subsequent injunctions that a woman should 
cover her hair with a scarf or her face with a veil are derived solely from the Hadith, the 
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body of sayings attributed to the Prophet. The burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, 
and this cultural tradition has been given dubious religious sanction by conservative 
societies. 
Among European liberals the burka is seen as a symbol of female subservience. And the 
freedom to opt for such deplorable status runs counter to other liberties regarded as more 
important in the hierarchy of freedoms: openness, transparency, equality and opportunity. 
Within Western society, the covering of the face negates all such fundamental rights. The 
mistrust, alienation and brake on communication engendered by a face veil were the basis 
of Jack Straw's principled but contentious denunciation of the niqab. Such objections apply 
even more forcefully to the burka. 
There are also, in Western society, practical objections to any garment that hinders 
movement, impairs trust or conceals identity. A woman in a burka cannot properly drive a 
car, clear a security check, teach pupils, practice medicine, enter a jewellery shop or carry 
out a host of mundane activities. As Mr Sarkozy said, it is unacceptable for women to be 
“prisoners behind netting”.  
Tolerance of the practice is also a licence for intolerance. Too often extremists try to exploit 
this bogus symbol of Islamic piety to create Muslim ghettos where they assert their own 
personal power. Too often the issue is a deliberate provocation to challenge the values and 
mores of Western society. An absolute ban on the burka is unnecessary and unenforceable. 
But civic education and religious debate - here, in France and in the Muslim world - are the 
best way to consign to the dark ages this symbol of darkness. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 TT6 
Niqabi, interrupted 
Wearing my niqab is a choice freely made, for spiritual reasons  
I put on my niqab, my face veil, each day before I leave the house, without a second 
thought. I drape it over my face, tie the ribbons at the back and adjust the opening over my 
eyes to make sure my peripheral vision is not affected.  
Had I a full-length mirror next to the front door, I would be able to see what others see: a 
woman of average height and build, covered in several layers of fabric, a niqab, a jilbab, 
sometimes an abayah, sometimes all black, other times blue or brown. A Muslim woman in 
‘full veil’. A niqabi.  
But is that truly how people see me? When I walk through the park with my little ones in 
tow, when I reverse my car into a parking space, when I browse the shelves in the frozen 
section, when I ask how to best cook asparagus at a market stall, what do people see? An 
oppressed woman? A nameless, voiceless individual? A criminal?  
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Well, if Mr Sarkozy and others like him have their way, I suppose I will be a criminal, won’t I? 
Never mind that “it’s a free country”; never mind that I made this choice from my own free 
will, as did the vast majority of covered women of my generation; never mind that I am, in 
every other respect, an upstanding citizen who works hard as a mother, author and 
magazine publisher, spends responsibly, recycles and tries to eat seasonally and buy local 
produce!  
Yes, I cover my face, but I am still of this society. And, as crazy as it might sound, I am 
human, a human being with my own thoughts, feelings and opinions. I refuse to allow those 
who cannot know my reality to paint me as a cardboard cut-out, an oppressed, submissive, 
silenced relic of the Dark Ages. I am not a stereotype and, God willing, I never will be.  
But where are those who will listen? At the end of the day, Muslim women have been 
saying for years that the hijab et al are not oppressive, that we cover as an act of faith, that 
this is a bonafide spiritual lifestyle choice. But the debate rages on, ironically, largely to the 
exclusion of the women who actually do cover their faces.  
The focus on the niqab is, in my opinion, utterly misplaced. Don’t the French have anything 
better to do than tell Muslim women how to dress? Don’t our societies have bigger 
problems than a relative handful of women choosing to cover their faces out of religious 
conviction? The “burka issue” has become a red herring: there are issues that Muslim 
women face that are more pressing, more wide-reaching and, essentially, more relevant 
than whether or not they should be covering with a niqab, burqa or hijab.  
At the end of the day, all a ban will do is force Muslim women who choose to cover to 
retreat even further - it is not going to result in a mass “liberation” of Muslim women from 
the veil. All women, covered or not, deserve the opportunity to dress as they see fit, to be 
educated, to work where they deem appropriate and run their lives in accordance with their 
principles, as long as these choices do not impinge on others’ freedoms. And last time I 
looked, being able to see a woman’s hair, legs or face were not rights granted alongside 
“libert?, egalit? et fraternit?”.  
As a Muslim woman living in the UK, I am so grateful for the fact that my society does not 
force me to choose between being a practising Muslim and an active member of society. I 
have been able to study, to work, to establish a writing career and run a magazine business, 
all while wearing a niqaab. I think that that is a credit to British society, no matter what the 
anti-multiculturalists may say, and I think the French could learn some very valuable lessons 
from the British approach.  
So, three cheers for those women who make the choice to cover, in whatever way and still 
go out there every day. Go out to brave the scorn and ridicule of those who think they 
understand the burka better than those who actually wear it. Go out to face the humiliating 
headlines. Go out to face the taunts of schoolchildren. Go out to fight another day. Go out 
to do their bit for society and the common good. Because you never know, if Mr Sarkozy 
and his supporters have their way, there could come a day when these women think twice 
about going out there into a society that cannot bear the way they look. And, who knows, I 
could be one of them. And, while some would disagree, I think that would be a sad day.  
375 
 
The Daily Telegraph (DT1-DT4) 
DT1 
Nicolas Sarkozy says the burqa is 'not welcome' in France  
President Nicolas Sarkozy has used a major policy speech to declare the burqa was "not 
welcome" in France and should be banned.  
In comments which will reignite the debate about religious clothing in the country, he said 
the full-body garment was "not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience".  
Mr Sarkozy used the first presidential address to a joint session of France's two houses of 
parliament in 136 years to declare his support for a ban, even before hearing from a 
parliamentary commission set up to study the issue.  
"We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off 
from all social life, deprived of identity," Mr Sarkozy told the special session in Versailles.  
"That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's dignity.  
"The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the 
territory of the French republic," the French president said.  
A group of 58 MPs from the Left and Right has called on Parliament to take action against 
women adopting what they called oppressive head-to-toe Islamic dress that "breaches 
individual freedoms".  
André Gerin, a Communist MP, led the motion for the latest inquiry, calling the burqa and 
niqab "a moving prison" for women.  
Women's rights campaigners, including some Islamic groups, have backed the calls for 
measures to curb the small but growing trend of wearing burqas among France's five million 
Muslims.  
Fadela Amara, a rights campaigner of Algerian background, who is the Housing Minister, 
said that was alarmed by the number of women "who are being put in this kind of tomb".  
She added: "We must do everything to stop burqas from spreading."  
Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris Mosque, supported an inquiry, saying that face 
covering for women was a fundamentalist practice originating in Afghanistan that was not 
prescribed by Islam.  
But the national Muslim Council, which is less tied to the Establishment, accused politicians 
of wasting time on a fringe phenomenon.  
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"To raise the subject like this is a way of stigmatising Islam," said Mohammed Moussaoui, 
the head of the council.  
It is estimated that some 100,000 women, mainly born in France, have taken to full outfits 
with face covering. In 2004, France banned religious headcoverings in state schools.  
President Barack Obama attacked European laws on religious clothing in a speech in Cairo 
last week in which he said that the United States prized freedom of religion and would not 
"tell people what to wear".  
Mr Sarkozy responded by telling Mr Obama in Normandy earlier this month that French 
principles of equality meant that people should not display religious affiliation in state 
institutions.  
He added: "It is not a problem that young girls may choose to wear a veil or a headscarf as 
long as they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this being imposed upon them, be 
it by their families or by their environment."  
 
DT2 
Why the burka is part of Britain  
Modern moderate Muslims feel banning such religious clothing would prove counter-
productive.  
Imagine this scene at the next State Opening of Parliament. The Queen is standing in front 
of the assembled Lords and Commons, reading from the speech prepared for her by the 
Prime Minister. "My Government," she says in that familiar high-pitched but colourless 
voice, "will ban the burka. It is not welcome in Britain. In our country we cannot accept that 
women be prisoners behind a screen."  
The sound of jaws dropping would be audible at the Channel ports. And yet, only two hours' 
train journey away, it is possible for President Sarkozy to make such an announcement (for 
Britain, of course, read France). And these weren't off-the-cuff comments. He picked the 
first time both the National Assembly and Senate have met in one place for nearly 150 years 
– at the Palace of Versailles, no less – to launch his attack on this form of Muslim dress.  
If the Queen were to follow suit, it would arouse fury among many of those who feel they 
should be allowed to practise their religion in whatever way they choose. But it would also 
raise cheers, not least from some members of the Muslim community. "The French 
president should be applauded for initiating this debate," Dr. Taj Hargey of the Muslim 
Educational Centre of Oxford told me yesterday. Dr Hargey describes the growing belief that 
Muslim women should cover their head, face and hands as "doctrinaire brain-washing". Dr 
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Usama Hasan, a reformist London Imam, also has "some sympathy" with Sarkozy: he too 
does not think it is necessary for women to wear the burka.  
These sentiments will reassure those, including the Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, who feels 
uncomfortable in the presence of women dressed from top to toe in black, with only their 
eyes visible. Douglas Murray, director of the think tank The Centre for Social Cohesion, is 
one of them. "People shouldn't have the right to hide themselves away in society," he says. 
"Cutting yourself off from society is threatening when we have known terrorists to try to 
escape wearing a burka. Men who said they had to wear balaclavas would be very unlikely 
to be allowed into banks or to travel on most public transport. Ask yourself this: can you 
imagine asking the time or for directions from a woman in a burka?"  
To Murray, Sarkozy is showing "moral leadership", unlike the "spineless" British politicians 
who would never dare to reflect the majority view. To do so would risk accusations of 
committing an offence against religious belief. As he, as well as many Muslims, have pointed 
out, the Koran says nothing about how women should dress, apart from calling for modesty. 
The call to cover up comes from the hadith – interpretations of the Koran written many 
years after the death of the Prophet, and largely dictated by prevailing Middle Eastern 
custom.  
"The Koran," says Dr Hasan," says that Muslims should respect local customs." In Britain or 
France that doesn't have to mean wearing bikinis. A Muslim waitress was last week awarded 
£3,000 for being asked to wear a revealing dress. Those who do cover their faces should be 
subject to regulation. "A naturist is free to walk around naked at home, but not down 
Oxford Street," says Murray. "The same should go for the veil."  
Of course, an exception might be made for Saudi visitors shopping in Harrods, but not for 
people living and working in this country. But that is not the way the law has been moving 
over the past 20 years. Equality and human rights have been the buzzwords. School and 
police uniforms now feature matching headscarves (khimar) for those who wish to wear 
them. In a series of landmark judgments, the right of individuals to follow their own 
principles of modesty have been gradually established. In Shabina Begum, a 15-year-old 
schoolgirl won the right to wear the jilbab, (a long, loose-fitting garment) leaving only her 
hands and face exposed. The following year a judge pronounced that a lawyer could cover 
her face in court, so long as she was audible. In 2007, a teacher lost her appeal against 
dismissal for covering her face in the classroom; when interviewed for the job, she had not 
done so.  
Meanwhile, on the other side of La Manche, the law has been moving in a different 
direction. The French constitution is based on the separation of Church and State, allowing 
for the banning of the headscarf in schools and universities in 2004. Now President Sarkozy, 
under pressure from both the Left and the Right, wants to go further. "In France," says 
writer Bonnie Greer, a member of the Franco/British Council, "the revolutionary tradition is 
all about being a citizen. In Britain and America we believe in individual expression in a very 
profound way."  
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Individual expression ceases to have much meaning if women are being forced into wearing 
cover-up tents by male relatives or mullahs, but many Muslim women deny this is the case. 
"I wear the scarf and the abbaya (long coat)," says Rahana Ali, a 23-year-old LSE graduate. 
"In the last two or three years several graduate friends of mine have chosen to wear the full 
burka, even though their mothers don't. If they need an ID card for work they will be 
photographed, but they don't want to display themselves all the time."  
And if Douglas Murray were to ask one of them the time: "I can understand why some 
people find it off-putting, but if a man were to ask them for the time or directions in the 
street it would not be a problem. People should not judge by appearances."  
Other British Muslims are equally outraged by the idea of a government telling them what 
to do. "I thought it was only the Left who used to ban things," says a journalist, Urmee Khan. 
Many of them wonder whether Sarkozy has spoken to any of France's four million Muslims. 
Bonnie Greer doubts it: "Many of my friends who wear the veil are independent, even 
feminist."  
And they are mystified as to why Sarkozy is attacking the burka when it is worn by a tiny 
proportion of Muslim women – well under five per cent. "The only logical reason why he 
made those remarks is that he had just been to Afghanistan where women are oppressed," 
says Ahmed Versi, editor of the Muslim News, published in Britain. Others claim it is a tactic 
to secure the feminist vote in France.  
Versi fears any attempt to ban clothing will backfire. "Three years ago, when Jack Straw 
wrote about not feeling comfortable with someone whose face he couldn't see, many more 
women started doing so in defiance. At our next awards ceremony an artist came to collect 
an award. Normally she wears a scarf and abbaya but she came onto the stage wearing a 
nikkab – a veil over her face. 'Can you hear me?' she called out. 'It makes no difference to 
my art if I am covered.' "  
Versi believes the way forward is through tolerance and understanding, not legislation – and 
is glad he lives in Britain for that reason. "Britain is the best country in Europe for Muslims. 
We complain, but we are freer here, and we have more dialogue with government. In 
France, Muslim organisations are not representative; here they are independent. In France, 
Muslims live in ghettos and have double the unemployment rate of the rest of the 
population. Many French women come to university in the UK because they want to study 
and wear the headscarf which in France they cannot."  
Versi goes on to detail the remarkable level of integration he finds in this country, and the 
growing understanding among Muslims that they should not test people's patience by 
applying for jobs that they cannot do – a police chef required to cook bacon is going through 
the courts. "In fact," he concludes, "the UK is heaven compared to France."  
If it takes a foreign politician to prompt a Muslim to articulate that view, there is something 
to be said for an attack on the burka. At least it gets Muslims and non-Muslims talking, not 
just among themselves, but maybe even to one another.  
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DT3 
Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban  
Muslim leaders in Britain have warned that President Nicolas Sarkozy's calls for the burqa to 
be banned in France risk fuelling hostility towards Islam.  
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) said Mr Sarkozy's claim that the head-to-toe garments 
worn by Islamic women signify subservience were "patronising and offensive".  
Its criticism comes after Mr Sarkozy used a policy speech on Monday to declare the burqa 
was "not welcome" in France.  
In a move which threatens to reignite the debate over religious clothing in the country, Mr 
Sarkozy said: "The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience.  
"We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off 
from all social life, deprived of identity."  
The MCB reacted by calling on Mr Sarkozy to "desist from engaging in and promoting 
divisive politics" towards France's Muslim population.  
Dr Reefat Drabu, assistant secretary general of the MCB, said in a statement: "It is 
patronising and offensive to suggest that those Muslim women who wear the burqa do so 
because of pressure or oppression by their male partners or guardians."  
Speaking for the umbrella group of more than 500 Muslim organisations including mosques, 
charities and community groups, she added: "Such suggestions can legitimately be 
perceived as antagonistic towards Islam.  
"Instead of taking a lead in promoting harmony and social cohesion amongst its people, the 
French President appears to be initiating a policy which is set to create fear and 
misunderstanding and may lead to Islamophobic reaction not just in France but in the rest 
of Europe too."  
Mr Sarkozy's presidential address to a joint session of France's two houses of parliament 
stood in stark contrast to comments made by US President Barack Obama earlier this 
month.  
In a speech in Cairo, Mr Obama said it is "important for Western countries to avoid 
impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit, for instance, by dictating 
what clothes a Muslim woman should wear".  
The MCB said its attack on Mr Sarkozy echoed Mr Obama's plea.  
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There are no official figures, but around 100,000 women are thought to wear the burqa in 
France.  
France, home to an estimated five million Muslims, passed a law in 2004 banning 
headscarves or any other "conspicuous" religious symbol in state schools in a controversial 
bid to defend secularism.  
A group of 58 MPs from the Left and Right has called on Parliament to take action against 
women adopting what they called oppressive Islamic dress that "breaches individual 
freedoms".  
Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French citizenship after social services said she 
wore a burqa and was living in "submission" to her husband.  
In Britain, Jack Straw caused controversy in 2006 when he suggested that Muslim women 
should abandon wearing the burqa because it was a "visible statement of separation and 
difference".  
Mr Straw, then the Leader of the House of Commons, faced criticism from Muslim groups 
after disclosing that he asked women to remove their veils at meetings in his constituency 
office in Blackburn, Lancs.  
The MCB said its stance reflected its long established position that individuals must have the 
freedom to choose their attire on the basis of their religious beliefs.  
Shahid Malik, the Communities Minister, said on Tuesday: "It is not the job of government 
to dictate what people should or should not wear in our society – that is a matter of 
personal choice.  
"There are no laws stating what clothes or attire are acceptable and so whether one 
chooses to wear a veil or burqa, a miniskirt or goth outfit is entirely at the individual's 
discretion.  
"It is true that many Muslims feel the veil and its rationale are misunderstood and so 
sensible discussion provides an opportunity to create a better understanding and ultimately 
ensures we are more at ease with the diverse society within which we live."  
Muslim and non-Muslim groups in Britain have supported Mr Sarkozy’s claims and called for 
the burka to be banned here.  
Douglas Murray, director of the think-tank the Centre for Social Cohesion, said: “There is 
nothing in the Koran that justifies the covering of women in what amounts to a black sack.”  
Diana Nammi, of the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation in London, added: “I 
fully support President Sarkozy. The burka isolates women.”  
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DT4 
Muslim pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils  
Two pupils and their teacher were ordered to remove their face veils before they could 
make an official visit to a Roman Catholic school. The party were from an Islamic school in 
Great Harwood, Lancs and were visiting St Mary's College in nearby Blackburn, which was 
staging its annual open day.  
The two schoolgirls agreed to take off their niqab veils, which leave only slits for their eyes.  
However, their teacher refused and was taken into an office at the sixth form college and 
told she would not be allowed on the premises.  
St Mary's College yesterday defended the move, claiming that staff had requested that the 
trio remove the traditional Islamic veils because they are against the school's dress policy. 
Its principal Kevin McMahon said: "At the start of one of our 'taster days' for prospective 
students last week, some visitors did arrive wearing the veil.  
"When the policy was explained to them, all except one were willing to remove it. This lady 
– a member of staff at the school – refused, and opted to leave the premises."  
Muslim leaders condemned the college's reaction, saying it threatened to reignite the 
debate over religious clothing.  
Abdul Quereshi, chairman of the Lancashire Council of Mosques said: "I am very 
disappointed. "The information I have is that this was the action of one individual and now 
this will once again become a big issue."  
Blackburn is the constituency of Jack Straw, the Justice Secretary, who caused controversy 
in 2006 by describing veils as a "visible statement of separation and difference" and 
suggested women stop wearing them.  
Mr Straw, then the Leader of the House of Commons, faced criticism from Muslim groups 
after disclosing that he asked women to remove their veils at meetings in his constituency 
office.  
The incident at St Mary's also follows calls by President Nicolas Sarkozy last week for the 
burqa to be banned in France.  
The Muslim Council of Britain condemned the remarks, while Shahid Malik, the 
Communities Minister, said it was "not the job of government to dictate what people should 
or should not wear".  
St Mary's is a beacon status sixth form college for 1,450 pupils aged 16 to 18. 
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The Guardian (TG1-TG7) 
TG1 
Why not ban full veil, says French government spokesman 
•   Govenment spokesman wades in to divisive issue 
•  MPs argue women's rights are being compromised 
France's ability to reconcile secularism with religious diversity came under fresh scrutiny 
today after the government said it would not rule out banning Muslim women from wearing 
the full Islamic veil. 
Five years after a law was passed forbidding children from wearing the headscarf or any 
other "conspicuous" religious symbol in schools, the government indicated it was prepared 
to wade into another thorny row over the state's right to tell individuals what not to wear. 
Speaking after a group of MPs requested an inquiry into the "degrading" use of the burka 
and niqab, government spokesman Luc Chatel said it was important to establish to what 
extent women's rights were being compromised by the garments. 
"If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to 
republican principles, naturally parliament would have to drawn the necessary conclusions," 
he said. When asked whether that could mean bringing in legislation to ensure an outright 
ban, Chatel answered: "Why not?" 
Although there are no official figures, several thousand women are believed to wear the full 
veil in France, and their appearance has long caused consternation among the upholders of 
the country's staunchly secular values. Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French 
citizenship after social services found she wore a burka and was living "in total submission" 
to her husband. 
The Communist MP who led the call this week for an inquiry, André Gerin, denounced the 
garments as walking prisons. In his request, backed by 57 other MPs, mostly from Nicolas 
Sarkozy's centre-right UMP party, he said: "The sight of these imprisoned women is already 
intolerable to us when they come from Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia … It is totally 
unacceptable on French soil." 
For a ban to be implemented, an investigation would first have to be opened and its results 
studied for any sign of incompatibility between secular values and the use of the full veil. 
President Sarkozy, who recently defended France's division between the state and religion 
during a press conference with Barack Obama, is understood to be in favour of the issue 
being explored. 
Sarkozy's leftwing urban policies secretary, herself a Muslim and former president of a 
women's rights group, today gave her support to "a total ban" on the burka. "I am for the 
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banning of this coffin which kills basic freedoms," Fadela Amara told Le Parisien newspaper. 
"This debate has to clear the way to a law which protects women." 
This point of view, however, is not shared by everyone. Muslim leaders have urged 
politicians not to create more tension between communities. 
"To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatising Islam 
and the Muslims of France," said Mohammed Moussaouni, head of the French Council for 
the Muslim Faith. He said the full veil remained a marginal choice for most Muslim women, 
and such a provocative move threatened to alienate those more moderate in their 
practices. 
His plea for the motion to be left alone was echoed by the immigration minister, Eric 
Besson, who said that, since 2004, France had "managed to strike a balance, and it would be 
dangerous to call that into question". 
 
TG2 
Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France 
• State of nation talk breaks century of precedent 
• Cheers as president takes hard line on Muslim dress 
Nicolas Sarkozy arrives at the Versailles Palace in Paris. Photograph: Benoit Tessier/AP  
Nicolas Sarkozy today took a hard line in France's latest row over Islamic dress, saying full 
veils and face coverings were a sign of women's debasement and "not welcome" on French 
soil. 
More than 50 MPs, mostly from the president's centre-right UMP party, last week backed 
calls for a parliamentary inquiry to debate whether Muslim women who wear full-body 
religious veils with only their eyes visible posed a threat to the republic's secular values and 
gender equality. A government spokesman had suggested that a law could eventually be 
proposed to ban full coverings from being worn in public in France. 
Sarkozy today used his first state of the nation speech to defend the French republican 
principle of secularism and attack full Islamic veils. 
He said: "The problem of the burka is not a religious problem, it's a problem of liberty and 
women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement. I 
want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can't accept 
women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That's 
not our idea of freedom." 
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There was raucous applause from MPs and senators. Sarkozy backed the setting up of a 
parliamentary commission on the issue of full Islamic veils, calling for all arguments to be 
heard. "But I tell you, we must not be ashamed of our values. We must not be afraid of 
defending them," he said. 
Earlier in his speech, he warned against stigmatising religion in secular France. "We must 
not fight the wrong battle. In the republic, the Muslim religion must be respected as much 
as other religions." 
Muslim headscarves and all religious symbols were banned in schools in 2004, and the latest 
row over religious dress is likely to spark more soul-searching and controversy in France. 
There are no figures for the number of Muslim women who cover their face, but it is 
believed to be a very small minority. In France, the terms burka and niqab are often used 
interchangeably – the former refers to a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with 
a mesh screen over the eyes, while the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with a gap for 
the eyes. 
Critics have already warned that the government risks stigmatising Muslims over a minor 
and marginal issue. After Sarkozy's speech, the leftwing senator Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
said the subject was difficult because people were free to dress how they liked in public 
under French law, but full veils could contravene French ideas on gender equality. He 
cautioned against whipping up "pointless provocations". 
Sarkozy's views on Muslim women's dress came as he set out his social and economic 
reform themes for the second half of his five-year term. He made history as the first French 
leader in more than 100 years to address a special sitting of both houses of parliament in 
the sumptuous setting of the Chateau of Versailles. 
For more than a century the parliament has sought to preserve its independence by not 
allowing France's powerful leaders to address MPs and senators directly. The French 
constitution was changed last year to allow the president this new privilege, but critics on 
the left accused Sarkozy of weakening the role of prime minister and behaving like a power-
grabbing "hyper-president" or monarch. 
Sarkozy used the speech to stress that the financial crisis had brought the "French model" of 
strong public investment and generous social spending back into fashion across the world. 
He warned that the financial crisis was not over and France more than ever needed the 
public sector, economic and educational reforms he has styled himself as the only man 
brave enough to deliver. 
He ruled out tough austerity measures or raising taxes to deal with France's public debt. 
Instead, he pledged to raise a new public loan to help France out of the economic crisis, 
despite the country's ballooning budget deficit. 
Sarkozy's plans for the coming years included a review of the French retirement age of 60, 
tough new carbon tax measures, cuts to health spending and building new prisons. 
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Breaking with tradition 
Nicolas Sarkozy yesterday made history as the first president to address parliament in more 
than 100 years. Since 1875, France's leaders have been banned from appearing before 
lawmakers to safeguard parliamentary independence. But Sarkozy changed the constitution 
last year, allowing him to address parliament once a year. He delivered his US-style state of 
the union speech to a congress of both houses of parliament – MPs and senators – at the 
Chateau of Versailles. But critics on the left accused him of weakening the role of his prime 
minister. Media commentators called him the "Sun President", an allusion to the "Sun King", 
Louis XIV, who built Versailles. Greens and Communists boycotted the speech, while 
Socialists left immediately after in protest that the president was not obliged to debate his 
speech. Sarkozy said he was setting in motion a "profound change" to the French republic 
that showed the importance of the French parliament. 
 
TG3 
Brush up your Hegel, Sarko 
Monsieur Président's burka outburst suggests he can't tell his abstract and concrete 
freedoms apart 
Nicolas Sarkozy's problem is that he hasn't read enough Hegel. Let me rephrase that: one of 
his problems is that he hasn't read enough Hegel. When the French president told a special 
session of parliament in Versailles earlier this week, "We cannot accept to have in our 
country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of 
identity", he would have done better to hold his tongue, and instead reflect on that passage 
in the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel distinguishes between abstract and concrete 
freedom. 
The former means the freedom to do whatever you want, which, as you know, is the basis 
of western civilisation and why you can choose between 23 different kinds of coffee in your 
local cafe, or 32 different kinds of four-inch wedges the glossies tell you look sexy this 
summer but in none of which you can walk comfortably. Such is the freedom of late 
capitalism, which seems to systematically strive to deprive us of an identity that we might 
construct ourselves. 
For Hegel this isn't real freedom, because our wants and desires are determined by society. 
By those lights, a western fashion victim is as much a sartorial prisoner as a woman in a 
burka. 
Neither is really free. Those that must buy what someone else tells them are this season's 
must-haves are as much in mental chains as those who put on head-to-toe garment with 
netting for the eyes because of the strictures of the society to which they belong. 
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By real freedom, Hegel meant not doing whatever one wants but having the freedom from 
societal conditioning and the fatuous whirl of desires by using reason. If you come across 
someone who manages to be really free in this sense in either capitalistic or strict Islamic 
society then send me their names so we can celebrate their escape. 
None of us is really free in that sense. I used to think otherwise. I once wrote an article 
under the headline "If only we were more like the French: Call me a chippy atheist, but I'd 
rather see a headscarf ban than Muslim ghettoes." I thought forcibly liberating people from 
their mental and sartorial shackles would make us free. I was wrong. Now I believe the 
creation of Muslim ghettoes is made more likely by official displays of intolerance towards 
what some Muslim women wear, that the social integration France overtly seeks through its 
policy of laïcité, or secularism, is less likely. One of the reasons for this shift is because of 
thinking about what Hegel means about freedom in thesociety to which I belong. 
Yes, but, you might well want to say, surely women who wear burkas are more oppressed 
than those who treat the sartorial laws of Grazia as though they were truly the words of God 
(which, as you know, they are)? None of what I've said means that I feel anything but 
depressed when I see a woman in a burka, but that's my problem, something that I can't 
resolve in the way Sarkozy suggests. What's striking in Sarkozy's speech is that it is yet again 
a man who denounces women and presumes that they are cut off from social life. They may 
be cut off from Sarkozy's secular French society, and that may be difficult for allegedly 
tolerant western liberals, but they are not cut off from all society. In fact they're very much 
part of the society that many westerners despise as oppressing women. 
Sarkozy's remarks, though they're bound to upset some of France's five million Muslims, are 
consistent with French revolutionary culture and the tradition of laïcité that led, in 2004, to 
the banning of headscarfs in French schools. Doesn't he realise then that his speech 
exemplifies an abstract freedom of expression which, in Hegelian terms, proceeds from 
social conditioning, not reason? It seems unlikely. For French political culture, religion is 
tolerable only if it keeps itself to itself. As soon as a person of faith tries to present what 
religion means for them in public in France, they risk being accused of fundamentalism. 
Sarkozy now goes further, following revolutionary logic in not just chasing those who dress 
in ways he and French political culture finds intolerable out of public spaces, but pursuing 
those who dress in a way that is a rejection of western values even into their private worlds. 
He said: "The burka is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be 
welcome on the territory of the French republic." Even religious justification is bad enough, 
run the suppressed premises of this argument, but the absence of such despicable 
justifications is worse. 
The woman in a burka is revealed as subservient to patriarchal culture. She must be made 
free to choose to be more western. Sarkozy proposes, in giving his backing to the 
establishment ofa parliamentary commission to look at whether to ban the wearing of 
burkas in public, that such imposed freedom would improve her lot. 
French venerate such abstract freedoms. We needn't. They were, for Hegel, the basis of the 
revolution's collapse into the Terror in which, he argued, individuals were sacrificed to the 
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ill-conceived pursuit of abstract freedoms. Sarkozy is thus a modern-day Robespierre, 
proposing some women – whom he presumes to have been silenced by patriarchal society 
and whose voices he doesn't want to hear –be terrorised in the name of the kind abstract 
freedoms France has venerated for 210 years. Let's see if he succeeds. 
 
TG4 
Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban 
France has set up a commission to study the wearing of burkas and niqabs after President 
Nicolas Sarkozy said the Islamic veils turn women into prisoners. The 32-member 
commission will hold hearings that could lead to legislation banning burkas from being worn 
in public. France has western Europe's largest Muslim population, estimated at 5 million. A 
growing group of French women wear burkas and niqabs, which either cloak the entire body 
or cover everything but the eyes. On Monday Sarkozy told lawmakers he supported a ban 
on burkas, calling them "a sign of debasement" for women. 
 
TG5 
France searches its soul over the veil 
France's parliamentary inquiry into Muslim women's use of the veil looks set to provoke a 
vigorous national debate 
Even though I was active and outspoken during the 2004 debate on the ban on religious 
symbols in French schools, I have no definite opinions on the voile intégral — the burqa, 
sitar or khimar. But the French parliamentary inquiry has now been launched, and for the 
next six months, a debate will take place. The outcome is unknown. When the Stasi 
commission was set up, all the senior members (except for two) were opposed to legislating 
on religions symbols. During the hearings, young Muslims told them that if the veil was 
authorised in public schools, they would be forced to wear it. All the senior members, 
except one, subsequently asked for a law. But this debate is different: those in favour of the 
veil are not vocal in supporting the voile intégral. Dounia Bouzar, an anthropologist who is 
otherwise inclined to oppose any prohibition, refers to the "cultish practice" of burqa 
supporters. Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them are protesting against the 
inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. And the debate was initiated by a communist 
deputé, but supported by the rightwing majority in parliament. 
So will we need a broad and all-encompassing law on Islamic garments, or various decrees 
addressing one issue after another, as they arise? In France, women who wear the voile 
intégral do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one. 
We're used to showing our faces on a daily basis, as part of our identity: picking up a parcel 
at the post office, collecting children from Kindergarten. But what then, for women whose 
388 
 
face cannot be seen? In what case would a political position, even one stemming from 
religious conviction, put someone above the law? This isn't a question of religious freedom, 
but of equality before the law. In other words, women wearing the burqa aren't asserting 
their right not to be discriminated against – they're asking for specific rights. 
If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to look at 
changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a herbal infusion: the flavours 
of many different plants are present, but by blending together they create harmony of sorts. 
It's possible that we could choose to make our tea by singling out some of those leaves for 
different treatment – we've never tried it, but why not? It would, however, mean that we'd 
be moving from universality to separatism. 
Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of racial 
hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how to deal with 
a different type of situation. An Algerian chef whose sister died when extremists cut her 
throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman wearing a niqab, because she 
saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered her sibling. Today, her attitude could 
send her to court for racism and refusal to serve a client on discriminatory grounds. If the 
burqa was legitimised, there would be no reason to permit one political discourse and not 
two, something which would risk out social cohesion. 
Another point: how can we reconcile specific rights with universal ones? If by some sort of 
magic trick a woman maintained that she was consenting to her own discrimination, what 
would happen if she later changed her mind? 
A German judge recently ruled in favour of a violent man who beat his wife because, 
according to her, the woman knew what was in store for her since her husband had made 
his views clear on the question. 
Will we accept that some citizens are less equal than others? 
Finally, it would be wise to remember France and the UK are not one and the same – we 
really do not live in the same country. Some 79% of French Muslims are said to feel strongly 
attached to the French principle of secularism, also known as laïcité, whereas polls have 
suggested that 40% of British Muslims would prefer laws based on sharia. But Muslims who 
settled in the UK did it by choice, and often for economic reasons; they didn't flee anything. 
In France, Muslims are active at the grassroots level on the left. Many are political refugees 
who escaped from a form of politicised Islam. In the UK, Ken Livingstone could afford to 
welcome Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the man who, with reference to homosexuality, openly 
wonders whether it is best first to kill the "active" or the "passive" one. In France, this would 
be like spitting in the face of Algerian and Iranian political refugees. Given that women 
wearing the niqab do it by conviction, they can always do it in countries which tolerate such 
practices – such as Great Britain. But for many Algerian and Iranian women, France is their 
only refuge from political Islam. 
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I am still unsure if a law prohibiting the voile intégral is necessary, or even possible. I am 
waiting to hear the different points of view that will be aired during the investigation. But 
because I am of the left, I will say that I will mainly listen to Muslim democrats. 
 
TG6 
France's burka barrier 
The controversy over the full-face veil in France has excluded the people it most concerns – 
the women who wear it 
For a week now, the hundred or so French women who wear the sitar (a veil that covers the 
face, incorrectly referred to as the burka) or the niqab have been at the heart of the French 
political debate. Nicolas Sarkozy made a speech to parliament stating that the burka was not 
welcome in France as it was incompatible with women's rights and adding that France 
shouldn't be afraid to defend its values. A new commission has been set up to determine 
the best ways to combat the adoption of the full veil, and will eventually propose a law 
banning it from public spaces. 
The role of the state today is different to the one it had in 2004, when a law made it illegal 
to wear the hijab in schools. This isn't about the republic aiming to preserve the neutrality of 
its secular institutions by forbidding pupils to wear religious symbols. This time, it is about 
intervening directly in the private choice of women, because that choice would be 
incompatible with living in France. The different opinions generated by the debate reveal 
the difficulties faced by the French state over the past 50 years in determining how best to 
accommodate its 5 million Muslims. 
In France, the niqab is considered a threat to women's rights. This is the president's 
position. Even a woman who freely chooses to wear it doesn't have a place in France. She 
automatically becomes a consenting victim who is unworthy of any solidarity. A year ago, a 
Moroccan woman who wore the niqab was refused French nationality, a decision blamed on 
her "submission to her husband and her religious misogynist doctrine". But to punish 
women and not think about ways to fight their male oppressors makes little sense; it goes 
against the idea that French laws must be the same for everyone. 
For others, the niqab is a deviation from genuine French Islam, which is open and tolerant. 
For the majority of French Muslims, the culprit is salafism – a fundamentalist branch of 
Islam imported from Saudi Arabia that has about 5,000 followers in France. The Conseil 
Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship), the organisation 
responsible for Islam in France, explains that Islam doesn't prescribe the niqab and that 
wearing it is a cultural choice. However, the full veil's very existence challenges the official 
Islam adopted in France, and is one of the consequences of Muslim leaders' failure to 
ensure the integration of veiled young women after the 2004 law, and to protect the 
Muslim community from the many Islamophobic acts which followed. 
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Increasingly, veiled young women chose to look inwards, withdraw from society and benefit 
from the networks of solidarity offered by salafism, rather than fighting for their choice in 
the political sphere. The choice to wear the niqab is often linked to the breakdown of the 
French social model of integration, rather than religious radicalisation stemming from 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods under the control of extremist or terrorist movements – 
which is the alarmist argument of Ni Putes Ni Soumises, the group founded by Fadela 
Amara, who joined the government when Sarkozy created his cabinet and whose street 
credibility is greater among politicians than it is in the banlieues. 
The terms of the debate have changed since 2004. The feminist movements and the left, in 
particular, now say they reject the ghettoisation effect a ban on the burka would have on 
women wearing it. France's official position appears isolated when Denmark and Belgium 
are welcoming their first veiled elected politicians and Obama is reminding the world, in his 
Cairo speech, that western countries should not tell Muslim women what to wear. France's 
European neighbours debate the burka with more caution. In those countries, it is not the 
cultural or religious values of the burka that are being discussed, but legislation around 
security issues and identification. 
What the burka crisis underlines is that the debate on Muslim women's empowerment is 
crucial. But it has to be conducted with the participation of those who are primarily 
concerned and also be useful to citizens as a whole, rather than simply reinforcing the 
political class and its electoral objectives. 
 
 
TG7 
Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter divisions in France 
• Moves to ban Muslim face coverings gather force 
• Human rights groups warn of growing discrimination 
In the northern Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, with its busy market, fast-food joints and 
bargain clothes shops, Angelica Winterstein only goes out once a week – and only if she 
really has to. 
"I feel like I'm being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a smart area West 
of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: 'Why don't you go back to where you came 
from?' But I'm French, I couldn't be more French," said the 23-year-old, who was born and 
raised in bourgeois Versailles. 
Once a fervent Catholic, Winterstein converted to Islam at 18. Six months ago she began 
wearing a loose, floor-length black jilbab, showing only her expertly made-up face from 
eyebrows to chin. She now wants to add the final piece, and wear full niqab, covering her 
face and leaving just her eyes visible. 
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"But this week, after Sarkozy announced that full veils weren't welcome in France, things 
have got really difficult," she said. "As it is, people sometimes shout 'Ninja' at me. It's 
impossible to find a job – I'm a qualified childminder and get plenty of interviews because of 
my CV, but when people see me in person, they don't call back. It's difficult in this country, 
there's a certain mood in the air. I don't feel comfortable walking around." 
This week, France plunged into another bitterly divisive national debate on Muslim women's 
clothing, reopening questions on how the country with western Europe's biggest Muslim 
community integrates Islam into its secular republic. A parliamentary inquiry is to examine 
how many women in France wear full Islamic veils or niqab before a decision is made over 
possibly banning such garments in the street. More than 50 MPs from across the political 
spectrum have called for restrictions on full veils, called "degrading", "submissive" and 
"coffins" by politicians. Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so 
small that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate 
that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a 
Muslim population of over 5 million – often young French women, many of them converts. 
That such a marginal issue can suddenly take centre stage in a country otherwise struggling 
with major issues of mass unemployment and protest over public sector reform shows how 
powerful the symbol of the headscarf and veil remains in France. 
Human rights groups warned this week that the row over niqabs risks exacerbating the 
growing problem of discrimination against women wearing standard Muslim headscarves. 
Five years on from the heated national debate over France's 2004 law banning headscarves 
and all conspicuous religious symbols from state schools, there has been an increase in 
general discrimination against adult women who cover their heads. 
"Women in standard headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving 
lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from university 
classes and in one case, a woman in a bank was not allowed to withdraw cash from her own 
account at the counter. This is clear discrimination by people who wrongly use the school 
law to claim that France is a secular state that doesn't allow headscarves in public places. It's 
utterly illegal and the courts rule in our favour," said Renee Le Mignot, co-president of the 
Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples. "Our fear is that the current 
niqab debate is going to make this general discrimination worse." 
Samy Debah, a history teacher who heads France's Collective against Islamophobia, said 
80% of discrimination cases reported to his group involved women wearing standard 
headscarves. 
He had rarely seen any instances of women wearing niqabs, even in the ethnically mixed 
north Paris suburb where he lives. "From our figures, the biggest discriminator against 
Muslim women is the state and state officials," he said. "What people have to understand is 
that the concept of French secularism is not anti-religion per se, it is supposed to be about 
respecting all religions." 
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The current initiative against full Islamic veils began in Venissieux, a leftwing area on the 
industrial outskirts of Lyon. Its communist mayor, André Gerin, led proposals for a 
clampdown, saying he saw increasing numbers of full veils in his constituency. 
"I call them walking prisons, phantoms that go past us, it's that visual aspect that's an issue," 
Gerin said. "There's a malaise in the general population faced with the proliferation of these 
garments. I sense that on the part of Muslims, too." 
Gerin said women in niqab posed "concrete problems" in daily life. "We had an issue in a 
school where a headteacher at the end of the school day didn't want to hand back two 
children to a phantom," he said. Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a 
woman wearing niqab. Another woman wearing a full veil was refused social housing by a 
landlord in the area. The mayor said that when women haven't removed their face covering, 
it has resulted in conflict with public officials who often felt insulted or under attack. But he 
denied stigmatising the wider Muslim population. 
"The current situation [where women wear niqabs] is stigmatising Muslims," he said. His 
aim was to "establish a debate with the Muslim community, integrate Islam properly into 
French life" and expose fundamentalist practices. 
Two previous calls for a law restricting full veils have been left to gather dust. This time, the 
debate is gathering force. There are divisions in the government itself – the feminist Muslim 
junior minister, Fadela Amara, supports a niqab ban while the immigration minister, Eric 
Besson, warns it would create unnecessary tension. 
Horia Demiati, 30, a French financier who wears a standard headscarf with her business 
suits, said: "I really fear an increase in hatred." She recently won a discrimination case after 
she and her family, including a six-month baby, were refused access to a rural holiday 
apartment they had booked in the Vosges. The woman who refused them argued that she 
was a secular feminist and didn't want to see the headscarf, "an instrument of women's 
submission and oppression", in her establishment. 
Demiati said: "This niqab debate is such a marginal issue, yet it risks detracting from the real 
issues in France." 
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The Independent (TI1-TI3) 
TI1 
France split over plan to outlaw burqa 
Racial unrest feared over new law, which goes further than ban on headscarves 
A suggestion that the full-length veil, or burqa, might be outlawed in France split the French 
government down the middle yesterday.  
The government's official spokesman, Luc Chatel, said that legislation might be introduced 
to ban full-length veils if it was proved that they were being "imposed" on Muslim women 
against their will.  
However, the Immigration Minister, Eric Besson, said legal action would "create 
unnecessary and unwelcome tensions" and re-open the anguished dispute which 
surrounded the decision in 2004 to ban Islamic headscarves, and other religious symbols, 
from state schools in France.  
President Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking after the EU summit in Brussels, said he would address 
the subject in public on Monday but warned against surrendering to "emotional" 
arguments. 
Just like the headscarf debate, a dispute over the wearing of the full-length veil has 
scrambled the normal political boundaries between right and left and has divided France's 4 
to 5 million-strong Muslim community. The debate was re-opened by, of all people, 
President Barack Obama, who said in his speech in Cairo last week that Western nations 
should not impede the practice of Islam within their frontiers.  
This comment was endorsed by M. Sarkozy but criticised by some French politicians, of both 
right and left, as an attack on France's "headscarf law". André Gerin, a Communist MP who 
represents a poor, multiracial area in the suburbs of Lyons, tabled a motion this week calling 
for a commission of inquiry into what he said was an explosion in the number of women 
wearing full-length veils in France. He said that this was a "direct response" to President 
Obama's remarks.  
At first, M. Gerin's proposal seemed likely to go nowhere but his action was praised on 
Thursday by Fadela Amara, a left-wing crusader for Muslim women's rights who joined the 
centre-right French government in 2007. Ms Amara, Minister for Urban Renewal, said she 
was "in favour of the total prohibition in France of the burqa ... this coffin which kills the 
fundamental rights of women." 
She added: "You only have to go to certain markets, such as in the suburbs of Lyons, to see 
that there are more and more women wearing the burqa ... These are women who are the 
prey of oppression, from masculine domination to fundamentalistic Islamic indoctrination." 
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In a radio interview yesterday, M. Chatel said he supported the idea of an official inquiry. "If 
it emerged that the wearing of the burqa was imposed [on women], and therefore contrary 
to our Republican principles, parliament would naturally have to draw the appropriate 
conclusions." 
Asked if this might mean a law, he said: "Why not?" 
Such a law might be even more controversial than the head-scarf legislation of 2004. That 
law applied only to children and teachers in state schools and employees in public buildings. 
It banned not just head scarves but Catholic crucifixes and Jewish kippas. The suggested new 
law would ban the wearing of the full-length veil anywhere in public.  
M. Besson, another left-wing politician who was persuaded by President Sarkozy to join his 
government, said a legal ban would be "ineffective" and counter-productive, stirring up 
racial and religious tensions and reinforcing a sense of persecution among some Muslim 
communities.  
 
TI2 
Sarkozy's Louis XIV moment 
Parliament summoned to Versailles to hear President 
Nicholas Sarkozy yesterday trod where no French president for 161 years has dared, or 
chosen, to tread when he spoke to parliament. 
After a constitutional change, completed a few hours before, M. Sarkozy addressed both 
houses of parliament gathered in the Palace of Versailles to explain his vision of the future 
of France and of the world.  
Presidential Question Time it was not. The parliamentarians were forbidden to intervene 
while the President was speaking. They were forbidden to ask questions. The President's 50-
minute speech was followed by a debate but M. Sarkozy departed before it began. 
As a result, Green and Communist parliamentarians boycotted the speech. Socialists 
listened in silence but boycotted the debate. President Sarkozy's centre-right supporters 
gave him a rhythmic standing ovation.  
The whole event – transporting both houses of parliament, the government, the Republican 
Guard and Carla Bruni-Sarkozy to Versailles – cost the French taxpayer €400,000. One Green 
deputy suggested that it was "the most expensive press conference in history".  
In his speech, President Sarkozy attempted a brilliant balancing act. The man who had been 
elected two years ago to impose "rupture" on French politics said the global recession had 
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demonstrated that the "French model" was the best in the world. However, he said, this did 
not mean that "radical" reforms were no longer needed. 
Despite the explosion of the indebtedness of the French state, he said there would be no tax 
rises and no "policy of austerity". Instead there would be a new form of "state loan" – but 
only for productive investment. 
He took a few minutes aside from the macro-politics to address a burning headline issue of 
the day. The French government is split on whether or not there should be a ban on the 
burqa, or full-body Islamic veil. President Sarkozy said that the burqa was not a religious 
symbol but a "symbol of servitude". He supported proposals for a parliamentary inquiry, 
without saying specifically that he supported a legal ban. 
French presidents have been barred constitutionally from addressing parliament since 1875. 
None has done so since 1848. President Sarkozy pushed through a constitutional change last 
year, requiring the president to speak to both houses of parliament at least once a year, in 
the name of "transparency" and the "modernisation" of the French state.  
Despite the modesty and humility of these aims, the event rapidly became clothed in 
monarchical trappings. Satirists and opposition politicians had a field day. President Sarkozy 
was portrayed by French cartoonists yesterday in the long wig and robes of the absolutist 
Roi Soleil, King Louis XIV.  
President Sarkozy entered the chamber alone, the parliamentarians were forbidden to sit in 
their political groups. They were seated alphabetically. A debate followed but only after the 
President had departed. There was no official reply from the Prime Minister, François Fillon.  
Opposition politicians and commentators said the event marked the further humiliation of 
M. Fillon and the prime ministerial office, marginalised by M. Sarkozy's frenetic activity since 
he became President two years ago.  
A lightly reshuffled government – Fillon 2 – will be announced tomorrow. Rather than 
making wholesale changes, President Sarkozy has decided to do little more than replace two 
ministers – Rachida Dati (Justice) and Michel Barnier (Agriculture) – who are going to the 
European Parliament. One government deputy said: "Why bother to reshuffle the 
government when everyone knows that the real government is the Elysée Palace?" 
Burqas and budgets: What he said 
In his speech to both houses of the French parliament, President Sarkozy came close to 
anticipating the result of the planned parliamentary inquiry on the full-length Islamic veil. 
"The burqa is not welcome on the territory of the [French] Republic," he said.  
"The problem of the burqa is not a religious problem. It is a problem of women's liberty and 
dignity. It is not a religious symbol. It is a symbol of servitude and humiliation."  
Among other proposals in his speech, President Sarkozy said that any person made 
redundant in France should be given one year's salary and training. Despite record 
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borrowing of 7 per cent of GDP, M. Sarkozy said there would be no tax rises or steep 
spending cuts.  
 
TI3 
Sophie Morris: Sarkozy's right: the burqa is a tool of repression   
 
As I was pushing my way down a busy high street on Sunday afternoon, I got stuck in one of 
those awkward crowds at the corner of another large road. There's no real pedestrian right 
of way in these circumstances, so we all set to the mannered side-stepping and edging 
forwards required to get through the jam.  
I was stuck in the slow lane behind a pram when I noticed a woman coming in the opposite 
direction, who was getting absolutely nowhere, shoved to the back not just by the onwards 
traffic but by those coming from behind her and from all sides too. I remember her because 
she was wearing a burqa.  
She wasn't getting anywhere because, if anyone had noticed her, they weren't treating her 
as part of the scrum. Pushing your way through a crowd requires a degree of engagement 
with those you're pushing against – impossible if you cannot make eye contact. As her skirt 
was so long and roomy, who knew whether she had one foot in front of the other, a stance 
that signals you're about to start moving, or not? 
How rubbish it must be to be stuck inside such heavy black clothing on one of Britain's few 
sunny days, with the world swirling around you as if you were a lamppost, for that's about 
the level of interaction she could have with passers-by without engaging them in 
conversation.  
I also felt depressed – depressed that here was a woman entirely shrouding her identity in 
public. Depressed that she was denied even that most basic social interaction with strangers 
that comes with walking down a busy street. Most of all it depressed me off because it 
reminded me of what no one – Muslim, misguided liberal or anyone else – can dissuade me 
of, which is that the burqa is a tool of oppression. 
On Monday, President Sarkozy took issue with the proliferation of women wearing the 
burqa in France, weighing into the debate on whether, as a secular country, the French 
Republic might outlaw the veiling of one's body from head to toe in public. "The burqa is not 
a religious sign," he said. 
"It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement... in our country we cannot accept that 
women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity."  
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I couldn't have put it better myself. Still, I cannot make up my mind whether I hope Sarkozy 
gets his way or not. The official French value system is very different to the British one. As 
part of its struggle to promote equality, France tries to iron out difference, instead of 
promoting multiculturalism as we do here, and demands assimilation. This attempt to do 
away with an outward display of Muslim fundamentalism is just the latest evidence of how 
difficult the French state is finding it to absorb a group of immigrants who do not want to 
surrender themselves to its secularity. But banishing the burqa from public life will not have 
the knock-on effect of banishing everything Sarkozy does not like about it from the lives of 
women who wear it, or from France's problems with assimilating its Muslim community. 
More likely, some of these women will be kept from public life altogether. 
Who am I to judge what another woman can and cannot wear? The strongest pro-burqa 
argument I can find comes from Muslimah Media Watch in an angry response to an article 
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote in this newspaper last month. "It [Alibhai-Brown's dislike of the 
burqa] completely ignores one of the basic rights that feminists, whether in Britain or Saudi 
Arabia, have fought for, which is that women be able to dress as they please without being 
judged."  
I do not know how many women "choose" to wear burqas, but the idea they decide as one 
to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day rather stretches the 
possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have fought for. 
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The Gulf News (GN1-GN10) 
GN1 
France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says 
France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the 
growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a government 
spokesman said on Friday. 
 
France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the 
growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a government 
spokesman said on Friday.  
 
Nearly 60 legislators signed a proposal on Wednesday calling for a parliamentary 
commission to look into the spread of the burqa in France, a garment that they said 
amounted "to a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory".  
 
 France, home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, is strongly attached to its secular values 
and to gender equality, and many see the burqa, which covers the wearer from head to toe 
and hides her face, as an infringement of women's rights and is increasingly being imposed 
by fundamentalists. 
 
 The country has been divided by fierce debates about how to reconcile those principles 
with religious freedom."If it was proved after this inquiry that burqa-wearing was forced, in 
other words that it contradicted republican principles, then naturally parliament would take 
all the necessary decisions," Luc Chatel, who is the industry minister and government 
spokesman, said on France2television. Asked about the possibility of a law, he replied: "Why 
not?"  
 
President Nicolas Sarkozy has not yet spoken on the subject but promised to address the 
issue in a speech on Monday to members of parliament.  
More than 40 legislators from his ruling centre-right party signed the proposal. 
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GN2 
Sarkozy says burqas are 'not welcome' in France 
President Nicolas Sarkozy lashed out on Monday at the practice of wearing the Muslim 
burqa, insisting the full-body religious gown is a sign of the "debasement" of women and 
that it won't be welcome in  
President Nicolas Sarkozy lashed out on Monday at the practice of wearing the Muslim 
burqa, insisting the full-body religious gown is a sign of the "debasement" of women and 
that it won't be welcome in France. The French leader expressed support for a recent call by 
dozens of legislators to create a parliamentary commission to study a small but growing 
trend of wearing the full-body garment in France.In the first presidential address in 136 
years to a joint session of France's two houses of parliament, Sarkozy laid out his support for 
a ban even before the panel has been approved - braving critics who fear the issue is a 
marginal one and could stigmatize Muslims in France."In our country, we cannot accept that 
women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity," 
Sarkozy said to extended applause in a speech at the Chateau of Versailles southwest of 
Paris."The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement - I 
want to say it solemnly," he said. "It will not be welcome on the territory of the French 
Republic." 
In France, the terms "burqa" and "niqab" often are used interchangeably. The former refers 
to a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with only a mesh screen over the eyes, 
whereas the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with slits for the eyes. 
Later Monday, Sarkozy was expected to host a state dinner with Shaik Hamad Bin Jassem Al 
Thani of Qatar. Many women in the Gulf state wear Islamic head coverings in public - 
whether while shopping or driving cars.France enacted a law in 2004 banning the Islamic 
headscarf and other conspicuous religious symbols from public schools, sparking fierce 
debate at home and abroad. France has Western Europe's largest Muslim population, an 
estimated 5 million people. 
A government spokesman said Friday that it would seek to set up a parliamentary 
commission that could propose legislation aimed at barring Muslim women from 
wearingthe head-to-toe gowns outside the home.The issue is highly divisive even within the 
government. France's junior minister for human rights, Rama Yade, said she was open to a 
ban if it is aimed at protecting women forced to wear the burqa. But Immigration Minister 
Eric Besson said a ban would only "create tensions."A leading French Muslim group warned 
against studying the burqa. 
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GN3 
 
 
Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task 
 
President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Monday the French state would take out a national loan, 
from the markets or the public, to finance strategic investments in the wake of the 
economic crisis. 
 
 President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Monday the French state would take out a national loan, 
from the markets or the public, to finance strategic investments in the wake of the 
economic crisis. 
 
The French leader said the first task of Prime Minister Francois Fillon's government 
following a reshuffle on Wednesday would be to "set our national priorities and how to put 
in place a loan to finance them." In an address to both houses of parliament, Sarkozy said 
the government would launch a three-month consultation on July 1 with lawmakers, labour 
leaders and business and cultural leaders to agree on key areas for investment."Decisions 
will only be taken after that debate. 
 
Concerning the loan, its amount and modalities will be determined once we have set those 
priorities," he said, adding that the loan would be taken out "either from the French people 
or on the financial markets.""I will take the necessary steps to ensure that this loan is 
exclusively dedicated to strategic priorities for our future," Sarkozy added. 
 
In his speech, Sarkozy lashed out at the practice of wearing the burqa, insisting the full-body 
religious gown is a sign of the 'debasement' of women and that it won't be welcome in 
France.The French leader expressed support for a recent call by dozens of legislators to 
create a parliamentary commission to study a small but growing trend of wearing the full-
body garment in France."In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind 
a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity," Sarkozy said to extended 
applause in a speech at the Chateau of Versailles southwest of Paris."The burqa is not a 
religious sign, it's a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement - I want to say it solemnly," 
he said. "It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic." 
 
In France, the terms 'burqa' and 'niqab' often are used interchangeably. The former refers to 
a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with only a mesh screen over the eyes, 
whereas the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with slits for the eyes. 
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GN4 
 
Egyptian scholar slams French president for anti-veil remarks 
 
 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy is 'not qualified' to judge the Muslim women's dress code, 
said Muslim clerics in reaction to his branding of full-body veils as a sign of servitude.  
 
"This man is not qualified to tell Muslim women what they should or should not wear," said 
Moustafa Al Shaka'a, a member of the Islamic Research Centre, an influential arm of Al 
Azhar, the Sunni Muslim world's prestigious institution. "First, he (Sarkozy) does not believe 
in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds women in high regard. Another reason is 
that he belongs to a culture, which is unfair to women," Al Shaka'a told Gulf News.  
 
"One example, Islam gives women the right to keep her family's name after marriage, which 
is not the case in the West." Sarkozy said on Monday that the burqa is "not welcome" in his 
country. "The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of servitude,'' Sarkozy told both houses 
of parliament. He added that the burqa, largely donned in Afghanistan, is a violation of 
women's “dignity and freedom".  
 
A group of French lawmakers have called for a ban on the burqa and Sarkozy asked them to 
"open a debate" on the issue. More common in France is still the niqab, a full-face veil with 
slits for the eyes. "Neither the burqa or the niqab is ordered by Islam," said Al Shaka'a, who 
is also a noted Muslim scholar. "They are local costumes, but Muslim women should not be 
forced to remove them. It's a matter of personal freedom."  
 
There was no official comment from Al Azhar on Sarkozy's remarks. However, Egypt's 
Ministry of Waqfs (Religious Endowments) has recently started a campaign against wearing 
the niqab in this predominantly Muslim country. The campaign entails nationwide courses 
to discourage niqab-wearers.  
 
 
 
GN5 
Sarkozy should be open-minded 
The French president's attack on the burqa is likely to stigmatise Islam and Muslims. It is 
rather puzzling that French President Nicolas Sarkozy decided in his historic address to the 
French parliament, the first by a sitting president since the 19th century, to discuss his 
dislike for the burqa. Sarkozy said the burqa was "a sign of subjugation" and as such was 
"not welcome on French territory".  
Whether or not one agrees with wearing the burqa, isn't it a personal matter that should be 
left to individuals to decide upon? No government or leader should dictate to people what 
they should wear. Mohammad Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim 
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Religion, is right to say that this is one way to stigmatise Islam and the Muslims in France. At 
a time when European countries should be focusing on meaningful policies that bridge 
cultures, Sarkozy's comments stand out as intolerant and negative.  
 
It is hoped the Muslim community, a sizable minority in France, will not be looked upon in a 
negative light because of this. 
 
GN6 
 
Sarkozy's burqa stance under fire 
 
The president of France's parliament has announced the creation of a commission to study 
the wearing of Islamic face-covering, body-length burqas and niqabs in France. Leading 
scholars have reacted sharply to the controversial remarks made by the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy on the wearing of burqas by Muslim women.  
 
Leading scholars have reacted sharply to the controversial remarks made by the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy on the wearing of burqas by Muslim women. 
 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy is "not qualified" to judge Muslim women's dress code, 
said Muslim clerics in Cairo, reacting to his branding of full-body veils as a sign of servitude. 
"This man is not qualified to tell Muslim women what they should or should not wear," said 
Mustafa Al Shaka, a member of the Islamic Research Centre, an influential arm of Al Azhar - 
the Sunni world's prestigious institution. 
 
"First he [Sarkozy] does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds women 
in high regard. Another reason is that he belongs to a culture, which is unfair to women," Al 
Shaka told Gulf News. "One example, Islam gives women the right to keep her family's name 
after marriage, which is not the case in the West."Sarkozy said on Monday that the burqa, a 
full-body covering, was "not welcome" in his country."The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a 
sign of servitude," Sarkozy told both houses of parliament. He added the burqa, largely 
donned in Afghanistan, is a violation of women's "dignity and freedom". 
 
A group of French lawmakers have called for a ban on the burqa and Sarkozy asked them to 
"open a debate" on the issue. More common in France is the niqab, a full-face veil with slits 
for the eyes. "Neither the burqa or the niqab is ordered by Islam," said Al Shaka, who is also 
a noted Muslim scholar. "They are local costumes, but Muslim women should not be forced 
to remove them. It's a matter of personal freedom."There was no official comment from Al 
Azhar on Sarkozy's remarks. However, Egypt's Ministry of Waqfs (Religious Endowments) 
has recently started a campaign against wearing the niqab in this predominantly Muslim 
country. The campaign entails nationwide courses to discourage niqab-wearers.  
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In Saudi Arabia, a number of leading Saudi scholars reacted cautiously. Shaikh Fayez Al 
Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is permissible for a Muslim 
woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing the burqa, not to wear it. "It 
would suffice for her to wear the hijab (Islamic dress covering all parts of the body except 
face and two hands).He told Gulf News if a Muslim woman wants to travel to such a 
country, which imposes a ban on wearing the burqa, for educational or treatment purposes, 
then she should respect the regulations of the country by simply wearing the hijab.  
 
Dr Sulaiman Al Twaijri, member of the academic faculty at Makkah's Ummul Qura 
University, said that the Islamic dress (the hijab) has become a topic of controversy and 
debate among Islamic scholars not only in different countries but also among those in a 
single country."There are some scholars who rule that wearing Islamic dress covering face 
and hands is obligatory for women. On the other hand, there are others who say covering 
the whole body except the face and hands is permissible."There is a third group who are 
adamant women should cover all parts of her body except the eyes," he said while drawing 
attention to the ruling made by world-renowned Islamic scholar Shaikh Yousuf Al Qaderi 
that it is undesirable for Muslim women to wear the burqa in the modern age. 
 
Body to study burqa 
Meanwhile, France's parliament has announced the creation of a commission to study the 
wearing of Islamic face-covering, body-length burqas and niqabs in France.  
Bernard Accoyer said on Tuesday the commission would include members of all four major 
political parties in the National Assembly.  
 
 
 
 
 
GN7 
 
French president's burqa views leave readers fuming 
 
Many Gulf News readers were enraged after hearing a speech by French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy on Monday. In his speech, the French leader disapproved of the practice of women 
wearing a burqa.  
 
Many Gulf News readers were enraged after hearing a speech by French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy on Monday.In his speech, the French leader disapproved of the practice of women 
wearing a burqa. He was quoted as saying: "In our country, we cannot accept that women 
be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity." 
 
Jamie Watson, an American expatriate, was upset by the French president's comments. She 
said: "He obviously does not understand the concept of a burqa, since he is not a Muslim. It 
is not up to the people outside the religion to decide what is appropriate for us. And what 
does he mean by a 'religious sign'? A burqa, to me, is as relevant as a cross." After having 
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embraced Islam a few years ago, Jamie realised how "comfortable" she felt when covered 
from head to toe. 
 
Jonard Tabing, a Filipino expatriate, was infuriated by the "prejudiced comments". He said: 
"Most people are trying to bridge the gap amongst people of different cultures and 
religions. But, the French president seems to be countering all efforts! He is well aware that 
his comments will grab the world's attention and make matters worse." 
 
Yousufa Mohammad, an Indian expatriate, is convinced that most people are not aware of 
the purpose of the burqa. She said: "I agree it is not a religious sign, since several non-
Muslims in India also use it to cover themselves. I believe the main objective of a burqa is to 
avoid the exposure of body parts." 
 
There are some who are in agreement with Sarkozy's comments, however. L.T., a French 
expatriate, believes that people should respect the culture of the country they reside in. He 
said: "In France, displaying one's belief is not necessary.  
 
By wearing the burqa ... women are exhibiting their religion or culture. I personally think 
they are private details that should not be shared ... Everyone is allowed to have their own 
respective beliefs, but it is extremely important to fit in with the culture." 
 
 
 
 
GN8 
West must respect the Muslim veil 
Sarkozy should not seek to dictate to women who follow Islam about what they can and 
cannot wear. 
Speaking in Cairo, US President Barack Obama recently criticised a French law that prohibits 
Muslim girls and women from wearing body- and face-covering garments in public schools. 
"It is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising 
religion as they see fit, for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should 
wear," Obama said. 
However, this week French President Nicolas Sarkozy supported attempts to bar Muslim 
women from wearing body-cloaking robes such as the burqa. "The burqa is not a religious 
sign," Sarkozy said. "It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement. It will not be welcome 
on the territory of the French Republic." 
Sarkozy is not the first major political leader to speak out on matters of Muslim women's 
dress. In October 2006 Jack Straw, former home secretary, commented in on the wearing of 
the face veil (the niqab) by Muslim women. Writing in the Lancashire Telegraph on October 
5, 2006, Straw argued that it was a "visible statement of separation and of difference". His 
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comments created a national debate that at the time drew other notable political figures to 
make similar claims: prime minister Tony Blair, then chancellor Gordon Brown and the 
shadow leader of the opposition, David Cameron. 
The veil is often portrayed by its critics, whether in France or in Turkey, as a symbol of 
women's inferior status in Islam. Opponents link veiling with backwardness and oppression 
and Western dress with individuality and freedom. Critics of veiling, Muslim and non-
Muslim, stress the importance of self-expression, which they associate with the distinctive 
way in which a woman dresses and wears her hair. 
Supporters of veiling explain that they choose to wear the hijab because it provides freedom 
from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other women's looks as well as 
from being sex objects for males to reject or approve. It enables women to focus on their 
spiritual, intellectual and professional development. Some scholars have argued that in 
returning to Islamic dress, many Muslim women attempt to reconcile their Islamic tradition 
with a modern lifestyle. 
Many young Muslim women have adopted Islamic dress to symbolise a return to their 
cultural roots and the rejection of a Western tradition that in their view shows little respect 
for women. They think that Western fashions force women into uncomfortable and 
undignified outfits and, often in the name of liberation, actually turn them into sexual 
objects as reflected in modern media and movies. 
Western and Muslim critics of Islamic dress, on the other hand, question those who say it is 
their free choice to wear the veil. 
Women who wear the scarf point out that women of many other cultures and religions - 
Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women, and Catholic nuns - often 
wear head coverings. They ask why these women are not viewed as being oppressed. If 
opponents assume that women of other cultures who cover their heads are liberated, why 
can't they imagine freedom for Muslim women who wear a veil? Muslim women often talk 
about what the hijab symbolises: religious devotion, discipline, reflection, respect, freedom 
and modernity. But too often nobody asks them what the scarf means to them. 
Whether veiled or not, majorities of Muslim women - even in some of the most conservative 
Muslim societies - support equal rights. In sharp contrast to their popular image as silently 
submissive, socially conditioned women who readily accept second-class status, majorities 
of Muslim women in virtually every country surveyed say women should have the same 
legal rights as men. 
There are, of course, some important differences between a headscarf and a niqab. Masking 
the face can make it difficult to communicate directly with others, creating barriers and 
further isolating the very people that Muslim minorities need to better engage with. More 
importantly, the niqab can raise legitimate identity concerns, such as with driver's licences 
or security badges that require a photo. However, this is only a problem when a woman 
wearing a niqab refuses to accommodate these regulations. 
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The fear and loathing of any form of veiling sometimes expressed by those who object to 
what they see as a symbol of backwardness is not all that different from objections to the 
traditional religious garb and perceived lifestyle of Catholic nuns in the past (and, for some, 
still today). One could raise similar questions about the dress of Amish women and men, the 
practice and status of ultra-orthodox Jewish women, and others. Does the 'medieval' garb of 
the pope, patriarchs and other major religious leaders diminish their intellect or ability to 
negotiate life in the modern world? 
Modernity should not be defined solely from a Western, liberal, secular-centred point of 
view. Our world today is one of multiple modernities, in which societies are increasingly 
multicultural and religiously and non-religiously pluralistic. Western societies should respect 
the rights of Muslim women who choose to wear the veil. 
 
GN9 
No burqas please, we're French  
The commission appointed to study the issue must look at it in the context of personal 
choice and immigrant rights. 
The burqa is causing a turmoil in France, although only a few dozen Muslim women wear it. 
This is a new phenomenon not seen in France before, and it is still considered marginal, in 
terms of the number of people concerned. Most French citizens have only seen women 
wearing the burqa in newspaper pictures or on television, thanks to photographers who 
watched and waited until they could photograph one of them. However, even if this 
phenomenon was insignificant considering the number of people involved, it is not at all a 
marginal topic in French society.  
The magnitude of the controversy created by this issue made it appear like an earthquake 
that is shaking the identity and existence of French society.  
In an address to the joint session of France's two houses of parliament on June 22, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy declared his support for a ban on burqas.  
"In our country we cannot accept women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all 
social life, deprived of identity. That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's 
dignity," he said.  
"The burqa is not a sign of religion; it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome in the 
territory of the French republic," he added.  
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This announcement was the head of state's reaction to the lengthy parliamentary 
discussions on the issue. 
Sixty Parliament members of all parties submitted a memorandum requesting that a 
commission be formed to investigate the issue and take all measures against what they 
described as sectarian deviation.  
Subsequently, a 32-member commission was formed, and will submit its recommendations 
by the end of the year.  
Many voices called for an immediate ban of the burqa before this phenomenon spreads, 
and some even called for a special law in this regard, while others said that every human 
being is free to choose his or her attire, as long as he or she does not violate the law.  
Yet, the reality of the matter surpasses the burqa itself. This is seen clearly in the fear that 
swiped France in reaction to the burqa, which appears like a reproduction of the dress code 
imposed by the Taliban on women in Afghanistan. 
The historic implications of the burqa are those of radicalism and extremism, thus the stir is 
not an expression of racism against Muslims, as some claimed, but simply a fear of a drift 
towards sectarianism.  
There is no doubt that immigrants, in general, are subject to injustice and restrictions in 
France for many reasons not related to the burqa, but to the country's economic and social 
situations.  
Surely, there are some fanatics in France, but they remain a minority, just like in all other 
countries.  
The burqa situation, just like the ban of the hijab (headscarf) in French schools in 2004, 
brings up the issue of France's distinguished historical background. 
In Britain, for example, people face no problems concerning what they wear, even at 
government department. It is not odd to see British Muslim policewomen wearing 
headscarves, which is unimaginable in France, a secular country that embraced the 
separation of religion and state since 1905 and adopted the concept of citizenship, which 
considers all citizens equal, regardless of their religion.  
This is what Sarkozy referred to when said: "We must not fight the wrong battle. In the 
republic, the Muslim faith must be respected as much as other religions." 
The real issue is about personal freedom. If a woman decided to wear the burqa freely and 
consciously, then preventing her from wearing it would be a violation of her personal 
freedom, which is protected by the law.  
However, if the woman was forced to wear it, banning the burqa by law would be a must in 
the name of republican values.  
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In both cases, personal freedom is the keyword.  
Another controversial point here is about personal conduct and its relation to the laws and 
traditions of the country that an individual chooses to live in.  
Many people argue that Islamic countries impose heavy restrictions on dress code, thus it is 
not acceptable to deny other communities with different values this right.  
Also, many people are not aware that most French Muslims, or Muslim residents of France, 
including Dalil Abu Bakr, Dean of the Paris Grand Mosque, expressed their disapproval of 
the burqa, and some Muslim women's societies called for banning it on French soil.  
Thus, it is important for the commission set up by the French Parliament to study the issue 
carefully and investigate the roots of this phenomenon before making any decision. It is also 
vital to work silently, as the president of parliament said.  
Undoubtedly, the burqa issue and discussions in France were used by some politicians to 
divert attention from real problems, such as unemployment and buying power, the impact 
of which was felt heavily in France as a result of the global economic crisis. Also, some 
parties blew the issue out of proportion for political and electoral reasons. 
Although this problem made a lot of noise, it is not expected to linger, unlike the crisis of 
immigration and immigrants in France.  
 
GN10 
 
Liberte includes freedom of dress 
 
Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings on French citizens. 
The burqa worn by Muslim women is "a sign of subjugation" that is not "welcome" in his 
country, says French President Nicholas Sarkozy.  
 
Communist Party Member of Parliament Andre Gerin goes a step further. He likens it to a 
degrading "prison". But the movement to ban the burqa and the niqab is described by a 
spokesperson for the French Council for the Muslim Religion as a way of stigmatising Islam 
and the Muslims of France. 
 
France's parliament is currently split on the issue, with those against a proposed law that 
would make wearing the burqa illegal warning this could incite France's five million Muslims. 
Firstly, one might question the French president's motive for stirring up this potential 
hornet's nest. Is he genuinely concerned about the dignity of women or is this another 
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underhand attempt to erode the Muslim culture, as was the earlier banning of the hijab in 
public schools couched within a law outlawing religious symbols. 
There are a number of angles to this story - not least that many Westerners have a visceral 
dislike of traditional Muslim attire, reflected by a host of editorials in American and 
Canadian dailies in agreement with Sarkozy's arguments. For instance, a headline in the 
Calgary Herald reads "No sane, free person would choose to wear a burqa".  
The writer, Licia Corbella, recounts how she donned the garment for 10 minutes while giving 
a talk at her children's school and ended up "hyperventilating from the oppression of it". 
She later told the children that "I felt like I was buried". That's her experience and it is 
probably one I would share should I be persuaded to don a burqa. I must admit, I often 
wonder how those women who wear it day in and day out in warm climates don't pass out 
from the heat. But nobody is suggesting that France's First Lady Carla Bruni or Corbella 
should cover up. 
In a free country, it shouldn't be anybody's business what others choose to wear or not 
wear. Admittedly, if girls and women are being forced to conceal their faces, then 
something should be done about that.  
 
But I suspect that the vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to do so for 
religious or cultural reasons. Many say that wearing the burqa gives them a sense of 
freedom due to the sheer anonymity it provides. 
Other critics in France say the burqa is being used as a political symbol, but when one 
remembers that most French Muslims are of North African origin this is nonsense.  
 
I still remember my years spent in Algeria in the 1970s, when most Algerian women were 
veiled. If young French women of North African descent are choosing to be covered they are 
simply adhering to their roots.  
 
And why shouldn't they when for decades Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians have been 
treated as third-class citizens in France? 
Sarkozy might wish that France's North African population would assimilate into French 
society but they've never been given that chance. When it comes to accommodation and 
jobs they've been consistently discriminated against. 
It seems to me that Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings or his own 
interpretation of other people's culture on citizens within a democracy born on a platform 
of liberty, equality and fraternity. And if he is so worried about women's "subjugation" to 
male demands then why single out the burqa? There are many real symbols pertaining to 
women's loss of dignity that are deserving of his attention. He could begin with the pimps 
and their scantily clad prostitutes on display around the country, which offend 64 per cent 
of participants in a telephone survey who agreed that prostitution was "a degrading practice 
for the image and dignity of the women". He could crack down on the trafficking of women, 
outlaw breast augmentation which has no medical benefits, ban pornographic magazines 
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from newsstands, or even control magazines which idealise the female form and thus 
inspire anorexia and bulimia in young girls. On that principle he could even attack the bridal 
veil, the traditional nun's habit or the custom followed by Hassidic Jewish women who 
shave their heads upon marriage. But no, he prefers to focus his ire on a harmless piece of 
cloth. 
Of course, this isn't the first time that Western politicians have attempted to interfere in the 
way Muslim women choose to dress.  
 
Britain's Secretary Of State For Justice Jack Straw caused a storm in 2006 when he refused 
to talk to veiled women at constituency surgeries.  
 
And earlier, in 2001, Laura Bush and Cherie Blair led a brief assault on the burqa worn in 
Afghanistan, which is still being overwhelmingly worn out of choice today. 
As the debate continues to rage in France with calls to set up an investigatory committee, 
perhaps those who are affronted by Sarkozy's unsolicited judgments will make their own 
this summer. Geneva, London and Rome are great at this time of year. 
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The Gulf Times (GT1-GT6) 
GT1 
France divided over burqa ban plan  
The French government was split yesterday over whether a law should be enacted to  
restrict the wearing of the full Islamic veil by Muslim women in Europe’s most staunchly  
secular country.  
 
A group of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether women who wear the  
burqa or the niqab undermine French secularism and women’s rights. The government’s 
spokesman welcomed the proposal for a parliamentary commission that could lead to 
legislation, but Immigration Minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir tensions in France, 
home to some 5mn Muslims.  
 
Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would  
look at ways to restrict the burqa which he describes as a “prison” and “degrading” for  
women. The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north 
African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare 
occurrence. “If it were determined that wearing the burqa is a submissive act, and that it is 
contrary to republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to drawn the 
necessary conclusions,” said government spokesman Luc Chatel. Asked whether that would 
mean introducing legislation, he said: “Why not.” Home to Europe’s largest Muslim 
minority, France passed a law in 2004 banning girls from wearing veils in state schools as 
part of the government’s drive to defend secularism. Besson, a former Socialist, came out 
against new legislation on Islamic dress, saying France had already gone far enough in 
imposing restrictions on wearing veils in government offices and schools.  
 
The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and right.France’s 
Muslim council however accused lawmakers of wasting time by focusing on a fringe 
phenomenon and said it would stigmatise Muslims. “To raise the subject like this, via a 
parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France,” said 
Mohamed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). “We are 
shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue,” he said, 
saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the thousands of jobs being lost in the 
economic crisis. 
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GT2 
 
 
Burqa not welcome in France    
 
Sarkozy says the burqa is a symbol of subservience, of submission, a problem of  
the dignity of women. 
 
In a speech he himself called “an important moment”, French President Nicolas  
Sarkozy said yesterday that women wearing the burqa would not be accepted on  
French territory.“The problem of the burqa is not a religious problem, it is a problem of the 
dignity of women. It is a symbol of subservience, of submission. “The burqa will not be 
welcome in our French republic, “ Sarkozy said during his address before a joint session of 
the two houses of Parliament in Versailles. 
 
Sarkozy became the first French head of state to address lawmakers in 150 years. The last 
French head of state to do so was Charles-Louis Napoleon, in 1848.His appearance was 
made possible by a July 2008 amendment of the French constitution, which had prohibited a 
sitting president from addressing lawmakers. Sarkozy’s comments on the burqa were 
inspired by a resolution introduced last week, and now signed by 80 lawmakers, calling for 
the creation of a parliamentary committee of inquiry into the wearing of the burqa on 
French territory.A burqa is the most concealing of all Islamic veils as it covers the entire face 
and body, leaving only a mesh screen to see through. 
 
In his address, the French president also pledged to implement a form of affirmative  
action to do away with social inequality.“Who does not see that our model of integration no 
longer works?” Sarkozy said. “To achieve equality, we must know how to give more to those 
who have less.”To attain that goal, a form of affirmative action would be put into effect that 
was “not based on ethnic criteria but on social criteria”, Sarkozy said. 
 
When US President Barack Obama came to Paris as a presidential candidate in July 2008, 
Sarkozy had vowed to implement affirmative action as had been done in the US. But he has 
run up against widespread opposition to the idea.The project for equality would be a “top 
priority” of his new government, Sarkozy said, and announced that a ministerial re-shuffle 
would be announced tomorrow.If in the first part of his address Sarkozy sounded like a left-
wing social reformer, with his defence of women’s rights, his call for equality and a vow to 
improve prison conditions, he soon returned to his favourite subject, the reduction of public 
spending and the reform of the country’s bureaucracy. 
 
The question of pension reform would be tackled by mid-2010, he said, including a  
possible increase of the retirement age. He also vowed to continue to reduce of the number 
of civil servants by replacing only one of two retiring public sector workers. Sarkozy also 
addressed the problem of France’s growing budget deficit, which Budget Minister Eric 
Woerth said late on Sunday would balloon to 7-7.5% of GDP (gross domestic product) in 
2009 and 2010. The EU’s Stability Pact sets a deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP. Sarkozy said that 
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the part of the deficit based on structural inefficiency “must be reduced to zero” while 
thatto the economic crisis would be reduced by investment. There would be no austerity 
programme and no tax increase, Sarkozy vowed. 
 
The French president’s appearance before lawmakers, in the context of the pomp of  
Versailes, was severely criticised by the opposition Socialists and their left-wing allies. 
Many lawmakers also criticised the cost of the event, which was estimated about 400,000 
euros ($556,000). The Green Party and the Communists boycotted the event, while the 
Socialists refused to participate in a debate that took place after Sarkozy left the 
chamber.They charged that the speech was merely one more step in the French president’s  
plan to broaden his authority and influence over every branch of government, and was 
additional evidence of what they called his “monarchical regime”. 
 
 
 
GT3 
 
 
French parliament sets up inquiry into burqa 
 
Lawmakers will examine the issue for six months, starting from next month 
 
The French National Assembly has decided to set up an inquiry into the rising number of 
Muslim women who wear the burqa after President Nicolas Sarkozy spoke out against the 
full Islamic veil. 
 
In a historic address to parliament Monday, Sarkozy said the burqa was not a symbol of 
religious faith but a sign of women’s “subservience” and served notice that the head-to-toe 
veil was “not welcome” in staunchly secular France. Speaker Bernard Accoyer said the 
inquiry made up of 32 lawmakers from right-wing and leftist parties will be examining the 
thorny issue for six months beginning in July and report on its findings. 
 
The lower house of parliament was responding to a call from a group of lawmakers, many of 
whom are from Sarkozy’s right-wing UMP party, for a panel to look at ways of restricting the 
wearing of the burqa. Home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority, France has been engulfed 
in debate over whether women’s rights and the nation’s strong secular tradition are under  
attack when Muslim women cover themselves fully. Some ministers have suggested that a 
law should be enacted banning the burqa in public places, but critics argue that a better 
approach would be to resort to education and outreach. 
 
French party leaders decided to set up the fact-finding mission during a meeting, but they 
did not opt for a full commission of inquiry which has a broader mandate, as called for by 
the MPs. During his address to both houses of parliament, Sarkozy waded into the raging 
debate and made clear he supported measures to discourage Muslim women from fully 
covering themselves in France. “We cannot accept to have in our country women who are 
prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity,” Sarkozy said in the 
speech delivered at the Chateau de Versailles. “That is not the idea that the French republic  
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has of women’s dignity.” 
 
France, home to an estimated 5mn Muslims, passed a law in 2004 banning headscarves or 
any other “conspicuous” religious symbol in state schools to defend secularism. 
 
In a landmark address to the Muslim world in Cairo this month, US President Barack Obama 
urged Western countries to avoid “dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear”. 
Sarkozy picked up on his comments when they met in Normandy a few days later and 
argued that France, as a secular state, had set acceptable limits on headscarves at schools 
and in government offices. The French leader made clear yesterday that he drew a 
distinction between women who feel faith-bound to respect the code of Islamic dress and 
the hardline conservatives who enforce the head-to-toe veil. 
 
“We must not wage the wrong battle,” he said. “In the republic, the Muslim faith  
must be respected as much as other religions.” France has been caught up in a debate over 
how far it is willing to go to accommodate Islam without undermining the tradition of 
separating church and state, enshrined in a flagship 1905 law.Last year a Moroccan woman 
was refused French citizenship after social services said she wore a burqa and was living in 
“submission” to her husband.Communist MP Andre Gerin spearheaded the drive for a 
parliamentary panel that would look at ways to restrict the burqa, which he describes as a 
“prison” and “degrading” for women. The MP is also mayor of the southern city of 
Venissieux, home to a large north African immigrant population, where he says the sight of 
covered women is not a rare occurrence. 
 
France’s official Muslim council however has accused lawmakers of wasting time  
on a fringe phenomenon. Mohamed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim 
Religion (CFCM), said last week that such an approach risked “stigmatising Islam and the 
Muslims of France”. 
 
It is not known how many women wear the burqa in France, but estimates have  
varied between a few thousand and several hundred. 
 
 
 
GT4 
 
 
Dressing down  
 
Muslim countries should ban the Western-style dresses worn by women from Western 
nations living on their territories in case France barred Muslim women from wearing the 
Niqab (the face veil), a renowned scholar said in Doha yesterday. Sheikh Mohamed Hassan 
al-Mraikhi, the imam of Omar bin al-Khattab mosque, said that Muslim countries should 
respond to the potential French ban on Muslim women’s face veil by outlawing the 
Western-style dresses which are not in compliance with the Islamic dress code. “We have to 
deal with them in same way in our countries by imposing a similar ban on their citizens 
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wearing Western-style dress and jeans which violates the Islamic teaching on dress,” he 
added.  
 
Last week, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a policy speech, spoke out against the 
Islamic Niqab branding it as a symbol of subservience that suppresses women’s identity.  
Sarkozy backed a proposal to ban the Niqab in public.  Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude 
of the French president, saying it was “violating the personal freedom of Muslims”. 
 
 “There is no doubt that Niqab (a face-covering and loose body-length gown) a mandatory 
dress for all Muslim women wherever they are. So France or any other nation has no right to 
bar Muslim women from complying with the Islamic dress code ordained by Islam,” he said.  
Asked about the controversy over whether the full face veil is mandatory or not, Sheikh al-
Mraikhi criticised scholars who described the Niqab as a “social custom or non-obligatory”, 
saying that such fatwas gave adherents of other religions the opportunity to step into the 
debate.  “The Niqab is obligatory and this was confirmed in the Holy Qur’an,” he added.  
However, another Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning the face 
veil in France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, should leave the country if it was 
outlawed by the government.  “As long as you accepted to be a French citizen, then you 
have to comply with the laws of the country in which you stay. Muslim women in France 
should even give up their citizenship and return to Muslim countries if they found 
themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. If they have to choose between the 
face veil and their citizenship, they have to go the face veil and return to Muslim countries,” 
he added.    
 
About the remarks made by Sarkozy in which he described the niqab as “subservience for 
women”, Sheikh Helal said such statements were mainly triggered by “Islamophobia” trend.  
“Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women’s rights. It is just a 
disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European politicians 
speak out against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe,” he added.    
 
Sheikh Ahmed al-Buainain, a Qatari imam of Suhaib al-Romi Mosque at Al Wakrah, also 
stressed that the French government had no right to ban the face veil, saying that the veil 
should be part of the personal freedom which they cherish. “In Islam, women are requested 
to cover their faces. I wonder why they condone nudity in Europe as a personal freedom, 
but when it comes to the Niqab, then it does not apply. I believe that the current attack on 
the Niqab is just a way to distorting the image of Islam,” he added.   
 
However, the scholar was of the view that there are two different opinions about women’s 
face covering among Muslim scholars.  “The Niqab is a controversial issue. While some 
scholars see it as mandatory, others regard it as non-obligatory. But women in France who 
don it should not remove it just to comply with the proposed ban since Muslims should not 
comply with any law that is violating the Islamic teachings,” he added. 
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GT5 
 
Dress row opens bitter divisions   
 
In the northern Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, with its busy market, fast-food joints and 
bargain clothes shops, Angelica Winterstein only goes out once a week - and only if she 
really has to.  “I feel like I’m being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a 
smart area west of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: ‘Why don’t you go back to 
where you came from?’ But I’m French, I couldn’t be more French,” said the 23 year-old, 
who was born and raised in bourgeois Versailles.  
 
Once a fervent Catholic, Winterstein converted to Islam at 18. Six months ago she began 
wearing a loose, floor-length black jilbab, showing only her expertly made-up face from 
eyebrows to chin. She now wants to add the final piece, and wear full niqab, covering her 
face and leaving just her eyes visible. “But this month, after Sarkozy announced that full 
veils weren’t welcome in France, things have got really difficult,” she said. “As it is, people 
sometimes shout ‘Ninja’ at me. It’s impossible to find a job - I’m a qualified childminder and 
get plenty of interviews because of my CV, but when people see me in person, they don’t 
call back. It’s difficult in this country, there’s a certain mood in the air. I don’t feel 
comfortable walking around.”  
 
France has plunged into another bitterly divisive national debate on Muslim women’s 
clothing, reopening questions on how the country with western Europe’s biggest Muslim 
community integrates Islam into its secular republic. A parliamentary inquiry is to examine 
how many women in France wear full Islamic veils or niqab before a decision is made over 
possibly banning such garments in the street. More than 50 MPs from across the political 
spectrum have called for restrictions on full veils, called “degrading”, “submissive” and 
“coffins” by politicians. Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so 
small that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film.  
 
Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering 
themselves out of a Muslim population of more than 5mn - often young French women, 
many of them converts.  That such a marginal issue can suddenly take centre stage in a 
country otherwise struggling with major issues of mass unemployment and protest over 
public sector reform shows how powerful the symbol of the headscarf and veil remains in 
France.  
 
Human rights groups warned this week that the row over niqabs risks exacerbating the 
growing problem of discrimination against women wearing standard Muslim headscarves. 
Five years on from the heated national debate over France’s 2004 law banning headscarves 
and all conspicuous religious symbols from state schools, there has been an increase in 
general discrimination against adult women who cover their heads. “Women in standard 
headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving lessons, barred from their 
own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from university classes and in one case, a 
woman in a bank was not allowed to withdraw cash from her own account at the counter. 
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This is clear discrimination by people who wrongly use the school law to claim that France is 
a secular state that doesn’t allow headscarves in public places. It’s utterly illegal and the 
courts rule in our favour,” said Renee Le Mignot, co-president of the Movement Against 
Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples. “Our fear is that the current niqab debate is 
going to make this general discrimination worse.”  
 
Samy Debah, a history teacher who heads France’s Collective against Islamophobia, said 
80% of discrimination cases reported to his group involved women wearing standard 
headscarves.  He had rarely seen any instances of women wearing niqabs, even in the 
ethnically mixed north Paris suburb where he lives. “From our figures, the biggest 
discriminator against Muslim women is the state and state officials,” he said. “What people 
have to understand is that the concept of French secularism is not anti-religion per se, it is  
supposed to be about respecting all religions.”  
 
The current initiative against full Islamic veils began in Venissieux, a leftwing area on the 
industrial outskirts of Lyon. Its communist mayor, Andre Gerin, led proposals for a 
clampdown, saying he saw increasing numbers of full veils in his constituency. “I call them 
walking prisons, phantoms that go past us, it’s that visual aspect that’s an issue,” Gerin said. 
“There’s a malaise in the general population faced with the proliferation of these garments. 
I sense that on the part of Muslims, too.” Gerin said women in niqab posed “concrete 
problems” in daily life. “We had an issue in a school where a headteacher at the end of the 
school day didn’t want to hand back two children to a phantom,” he said.  
 
Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a woman wearing niqab. Another 
woman wearing a full veil was refused social housing by a landlord in the area. The mayor 
said that when women haven’t removed their face covering, it has resulted in conflict with 
public officials who often felt insulted or under attack. But he denied stigmatising the wider 
Muslim population. “The current situation (where women wear niqabs) is stigmatising 
Muslims,” he said. His aim was to “establish a debate with the Muslim community, integrate 
Islam properly into French life” and expose fundamentalist practices.  
 
Two previous calls for a law restricting full veils have been left to gather dust. This time, the 
debate is gathering force. There are divisions in the government itself - the feminist Muslim 
junior minister, Fadela Amara, supports a niqab ban while the immigration minister, Eric 
Besson, warns it would create unnecessary tension.  
 
Horia Demiati, 30, a French financier who wears a standard headscarf with her business 
suits, said: “I really fear an increase in hatred.” She recently won a discrimination case after 
she and her family, including a six-month baby, were refused access to a rural holiday 
apartment they had booked in the Vosges. The woman who refused them argued that she 
was a secular feminist and didn’t want to see the headscarf, “an instrument of women’s 
submission and oppression”, in her establishment. Demiati said: “This niqab debate is such a 
marginal issue, yet it risks detracting from the real issues in France.”  
 
France’s secular separation  
France’s history of republicanism and anti-clericalism goes back to the revolution of  
1789. The secular republic fiercely protects the rigid separation of the state from  
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organised religion, established in 1905. In 2004, after a heated national debate, a law 
reasserted France’s cherished religious neutrality in public schools, banning the wearing of 
conspicuous religious symbols in state schools - including Muslim headscarves, Jewish caps 
and Sikh turbans.  French civil servants and public sector staff cannot wear religious symbols 
while working in state offices. But there is no law preventing headscarves or religious 
symbols being worn by members of the public in public spaces. The current debate over 
whether to ban full veils from being worn in public places intensified after Barack Obama’s 
recent Middle East speech hit a raw nerve in France. He said it was ``important for Western 
countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit - for 
instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear’’. This was seen by some 
politicians as a jibe at France.  
 
 
GT6 
 
Al Qaeda warns France over burqa stance  
 
Al Qaeda’s north African wing threatened revenge against France for launching a “war” 
against Muslim women who wear full burqas that cover them from head to toe, according 
to a Web statement posted in the group’s name.French legislators expressed concern this 
month that more and more Muslim women were wearing a burqa or a niqab which cloaks 
the entire body, sometimes leaving a gap for the eyes. 
 
President Nicolas Sarkozy said the garments were not welcome in France because they are a 
symbol of the subjugation of women.“Here is France mustering all her capacity, mobilising 
all her institutions and organising her ranks to wage a perfidious new war against our sisters 
who wear the niqab,” said the statement posted on a website used by Al Qaeda supporters. 
It said the French were committing these injustices “at a time when their denuded women 
... flock to our land and occupy our beaches and streets, outrageously defying the feelings of 
Muslims”. It said France’s campaign against the burqa was tantamount to “religious 
terrorism” and was an incitement to a hatred that would only grow.“This is why we call 
upon all Muslims to respond to this hatred by another that is more ravaging, we call upon 
them to confront this French obstinacy,” the statement said. 
 
It said Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb vowed “before God not to be silent in the face of 
these provocations and injustices and do all in our power and take revenge at the first 
opportunity against France and its interests wherever they may be found, for the honour of 
our daughters and our sisters”.Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the remnant of an Islamic 
insurgency that raged through former French colony Algeria for most of the 1990s. 
 
The group was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), itself 
a spin-off of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) which was blamed for a series of bombings in 
France in 1995.France is the home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority and is strongly 
attached to its secular values and ideals of gender equality. 
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The Saudi Gazette (SG1-SG3) 
SG1 
 
France open to banning Muslim veil: Spokesman  
 
France could impose curbs on wearing the full Islamic veil if a parliamentary commision 
finds the burka or niqab degrading for women, a government spokesman said Friday. 
A goup of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether Muslim women who cover 
themselves fully in public undermine French secularism and women’s rights. 
“If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to 
republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to draw the necessary 
conclusions,” said spokesman Luc Chatel.Asked whether that would mean introducing 
legislation, he said: “why not.” 
 
Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would 
look at ways to restrict the burka which he describes as a “prison” and “degrading” for 
women.The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north 
African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare 
occurrence. Home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority, France passed a controversial law in 
2004 forbidding girls from wearing veils in state schools as part of the government’s drive to 
defend secularism. “We are facing a major debate,” Chatel told France 2 television. 
The spokesman voiced support for a parliamentary commission, saying: “I think it’s 
important because it will allow us to have a better view of the issue.” 
 
The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and right, but 
France’s Muslim council accused lawmakers of wasting time focusing on a fringe 
phenomenon. “To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of 
stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France,” said Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the 
French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). 
 
“We are shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue,” he 
said, saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the hundreds of thousands of jobs being 
lost in the economic crisis. 
 
A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French converts who 
choose to cover themselves to assert their faith, according to Le Figaro newspaper.  
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SG2 
 
Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty  
 
I THINK French President Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he 
would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by nuns “a 
sign of subservience, a sign of debasement?” 
 
In the first presidential address to the French parliament in 136 years, Sarkozy chose to call 
a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of 
subservience and degradation. 
 
The burqa or abaya, as it is known in Saudi Arabia, is a body robe. What covers the head and 
face is called niqab. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy meant a head-to-
toe dress when he referred to the burqa. 
 
Sarkozy was right when he said the burqa – the particular type of dress – was not a religious 
issue. Islam asks its followers – men and women – to dress modestly, and so do all religions. 
The Islamic concept of hijab is not only physical but also moral. It tells men to lower their 
gaze in front of women other than their wives and other close relatives. It tells women to be 
mindful of their gait and garments. 
 
The debate here is on two counts: the issue of morality and the freedom of choice. 
Who is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini? Those 
who are brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not maintain that 
they are not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display, will 
say a woman in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up seeing scantly-clad 
women around them, will find a woman in a burqa objectionable. 
 
So it all boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral values. There is no 
point praising a Picasso painting in front of a visually-challeneged person. However, we can 
discuss the issue of a person’s freedom of choice. France is a liberal country. Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité (Liberty, equality, fraternity) is the French national motto. So how can a country 
which prides itself on protecting liberty and equality discuss in its parliament an issue which 
is an infringement on one’s freedom? If a woman in a mini skirt is not an issue of debate in 
France, then why is a woman in a burqa objectionable so long as she does not affect public 
order?Ask any woman covered head-to-toe in the black robe, whether the dress has been 
forced on her or she is wearing it by choice? The answer in all cases will be the latter. 
Women of high moral values prefer to cover their modesty. 
 
In his speech Sarkozy said: “In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners 
behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity.”How can Sarkozy pass 
judgement on others? The burqa does not curb freedom. Covered women do go about daily 
chores unhindered. Hindered are those who look at the burqa as a symbol of 
subservience.The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives 
her an identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of boldly 
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following her choice amidst a howl of protests, an identity of being true to her faith and 
culture. It is strange that something which is moral is being looked down upon while 
immorality and indecency are being promoted!  
 
 
 
 
SG3 
 
Mufti Sarkozy’s ‘fatwa’ not amusing  
 
AS a leading member of the Global Coalition Against Allowing Muslim Women Freedom of 
Sartorial Choice based on their religious obligations and convictions, Nicholas Sarkozy’s 
latest salvo declaring the burqa ‘’not welcome’’ in France, has, I feel, irrevocably forfeited 
his right to be taken seriously. 
 
Within minutes of his speech, internet forums, social networking sites and blogs – the 21st 
century’s version of the village grapevine – erupted with hoots of laughter and derision at 
his feeble attempt to deflect his nation’s attention from more pressing matters to the 
quintessentially French preoccupation with women’s clothes. 
 
His ill-timed, clumsily worded, two-minute tirade against the ‘’burqa’’ could have fitted right 
into the current international climate of dividing Muslims into two groups: moderates 
(‘’good’’) and fundamentalists (“evil” – “abaya and beard wearing”), had he not taken it 
upon himself to assert that wearing an outer covering garment when outdoors is not a 
religious obligation upon Muslim women. 
 
“The burqa is not a religious sign, it’s a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement – I want 
to say it solemnly,” he said, addressing members of both parliamentary houses gathered at 
the Palace of Versailles for his speech. You could have knocked me down with a feather: 
since when did Sarkozy become an authority on Islam? 
 
Has he read the verse of the Qur’an (Surah Ahzab, Verse 59) which explicitly enjoins 
believing women to wear an outer garment when outdoors, so that they are identified as 
Muslim women and not harassed? If so, how is he qualified to offer a different conclusion 
from centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars who affirmed that such a garment is 
undoubtedly a religious obligation? Has he ever spoken to any of the thousands of Muslim 
women who willingly choose to wear the burqa/abaya/jilbab and asked them the rationale 
behind their choice of that garb? 
 
If you look at his words from an extremely liberal point of view, Sarkozy might be forgiven 
for his views on the abaya/burqa/jilbab as being a symbol of servitude: It is a sign of 
subservience – not to human beings, fickle fashion trends and social mores – but to the 
Higher Wisdom of the One who decreed it an obligatory protection for Muslim 
women.What is unforgivable though, is his labeling the garment “a sign of debasement.” As 
the head of a nation that is self-confessedly proud of its “laissez-faire attitude towards 
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casual sex” and all the debauched trappings that go with it, one would expect him to be 
better acquainted with ‘debasement’. A visit to just one among the thousands of proudly 
advertised, government-licensed “adults-only entertainment spots” in France would suffice 
for him to write a detailed dissertation on human debasement and what it comprises. 
Debasement is trading in the bodies of women, displaying them and using them as a means 
of provoking and gratifying unnatural biological urges in strangers. Debasement is the 
deliberate, systematic dehumanization of women and their relegation to being sexual toys 
in the hands of profiteers – not the covering of a woman’s body in public, that protects her 
from precisely such predators. 
 
By calling for a “ban” on the burqa in the first-ever address to lawmakers by a French head 
of state in over a century, Sarkozy tried to juggle several items on his agenda: projecting 
himself as both an agent provocateur and a fearless knight in shining armor who is unafraid 
to save France – more specifically French “laïcité” – from the menacing specter of Muslim 
“fundamentalism”; appeasing MPs who had urgently pressed for the motion in Parliament, 
and rallying other bigoted members of the public around his desperately flailing persona as 
President.Incidentally, this is not the first time Sarkozy has indulged in ‘God-talk’ – dragging 
theological issues center-stage in a country where a majority of the citizens believe that the 
State should hold a neutral position in religious matters, and that freedom of conscience 
and religion are inalienable rights of individuals. The French concept of “laïcité” (‘laicity’) 
necessitates that the State should “foster emancipation by giving each citizen the 
opportunity to learn to think freely without being locked in the ideas of his native social 
group.”  
 
This emphasis on “freedom of thought” has a historical basis: France was subjected to the 
religious and cultural monopoly of the Catholic Church for several centuries, and when the 
Republic came into being, it assumed the role of an “emancipator,” helping citizen widen 
their views – sometimes even against their will.That Sarkozy has had to take recourse to the 
marginalization of Muslim women in his attempt to defend the French ideal of “an open 
mind” is an irony that would have been laughable, were it not for the ominous sense of 
foreboding that overshadows the future of Muslims in France today. 
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Kuwait Times (KT1) 
KT1 
 
France divided over calls to ban burka 
 
The French government was split yesterday over whether a law should be enacted to 
restrict the wearing of the full Islamic veil by Muslim women in Europe's most staunchly 
secular country.A group of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether women 
who wear the burka or the niqab undermine French secularism and women's rights. The 
government's spokesman welcomed the proposal for a parliamentary commission that 
could lead to legislation, but Immigration Minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir 
tensions in France, home to some five million Muslims. 
 
Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would 
look at ways to restrict the burka which he describes as a "prison" and "degrading" for 
women. 
The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north African 
immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare occurrence. 
If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to 
republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to drawn the necessary 
conclusions," said government spokesman Luc Chatel. Asked whether that would mean 
introducing legislation, he said, "why not. 
 
Home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, France passed a controversial law in 2004 
forbidding girls from wearing veils in state schools as part of the government's drive to 
defend secularism. 
 
Besson, a former Socialist, came out against new legislation on Islamic dress, saying France 
had already gone far enough in imposing restrictions on wearing veils in government offices 
and schools.We need to counter the wearing of the burka with education and dialogue. A 
law would be inefficient and create tensions that we don't need at this time," Besson told 
Europe 1 radio.The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and 
right including urban affairs minister Fadela Amara, who was born to Algerian immigrants 
and is an outspoken advocate for Muslim women's rights. 
 
France's Muslim council however accused lawmakers of wasting time by focusing on a fringe 
phenomenon and said it would stigmatize Muslims. "To raise the subject like this, via a 
parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatizing Islam and the Muslims of France," said 
Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). 
We are shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue," he 
said, saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the hundreds of thousands of jobs being 
lost in the economic crisis. 
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A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French converts who 
choose to cover themselves to assert their faith, according to Le Figaro newspaper. If the 
lower house agrees to set up the commission, it would draft a report to be released no later 
than November 30, said Gerin.  
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Appendix 7 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ CDA Analysis - UK 
Articles 
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The Times (TTC6-TTC15) 
TTC6 
Drawing the Line: Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned 
Some two decades ago, political relations between Europe and the Islamic world were 
convulsed by the controversy surrounding the publication of the book The Satanic Verses. It 
is depressing that cartoons first printed in a Danish newspaper last autumn appear to have 
had much the same effect now. It should also not, alas, be surprising. The cultural chasm 
has, if anything, grown in the past 20 years. Many in Europe today think nothing of mocking 
the most revered aspects of Christianity — often in a crass, tasteless manner — while the 
corruption and failure of secular regimes in the Middle East have helped to inspire a revival 
of Islam, including an extremist strain.  
None of which excuses a situation in which the governments of France and Denmark have 
felt obliged to advise their citizens to avoid areas such as the Gaza Strip where the offices of 
the EU were stormed yesterday. There is undoubtedly a sizeable aspect of domestic politics 
surrounding events in the Palestinian Authority and elsewhere. It would also, though, be 
folly to deny that many individual Muslims have been aggrieved by the very fact of images 
of the Prophet Muhammad.  
This newspaper has had anguish of its own over whether to reproduce the pictures at the 
centre of this saga. At one level, their appearance might be seen as an appropriate response 
to the fanatics who have demanded their prohibition and could help the reader to 
understand both their character and the impact that they might have on believers. But to 
duplicate these cartoons several months after they were originally printed also has an 
element of exhibitionism to it. To present them in front of the public for debate is not a 
value-neutral exercise. The offence destined to be caused to moderate Muslims should not 
be discounted.  
On balance, we have chosen not to publish the cartoons but to provide weblinks to those 
who wish to see them. The crucial theme here is choice. The truth is that drawing the line in 
instances such as these is not a black-and-white question. It cannot be valid for followers of 
a religion to state that because they consider images of the Prophet idolatry, the same 
applies to anyone else in all circumstances. Then again, linking the Prophet to suicide 
bombings supposedly undertaken in his honour was incendiary. The Times would, for 
example, have reservations about printing a cartoon of Christ in a Nazi uniform sketched 
because sympathisers of Hitler had conducted awful crimes in the name of Christianity.  
Muslims thus have a right to protest about the cartoons and, if they want, to boycott the 
publications concerned. To move from there to holding ministers responsible for the 
editorial decisions of a free press in their nations, to urge that all products from a country be 
ostracised or, worst still, to engage in violence against people or property is to leave the 
field of legitimate complaint and enter one of censorship enforced under threat of 
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intimidation. That free speech is misunderstood in much of the Islamic realm shows how 
much progress has yet to be made.  
Consistency would also be a virtue. The anger directed at these cartoons by certain Muslims 
would carry more weight if pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians were not found 
regularly in the Middle East. To contend that faiths of many forms merit a degree of 
deference, but not absolute protection, is one notion. To insist that this principle be applied 
selectively is another, quite indefensible, assertion.  
 
TTC7 
Muslim Cartoon 
On the satirical Christian Ship of Fools website there is a regular caption competition. It 
pokes fun at Christian icons, bishops and so on. My favourite entry so far to the latest 
competition is from Lawrence: "Fr. Smith was just adding fuel to the fire in his latest 
attempt to explain what he meant when he was overheard saying he was 'going to blow 
some hose'." Not only do Christians not protest at this sort of thing, but they positively 
relish it. Recently, ShipofFools also ran a contest to find the funniest and most offensive 
religious jokes that would fall foul of the unamended incitement to religious hatred 
legislation. Some Chrisians did find the resulting winners offensive when we ran the results 
in the newspaper. But the furthest they went in protesting were some miffed emails to me, 
or to the letters page editor. You can judge the jokes for yourself here. 
Muslim leaders have been appealing for calm, and the consensus from other religious 
leaders, including the Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks, is that restraint is necessary, both to 
guarantee freedom of speech and freedom from religious hatred. Read their comments 
online here. 
Lord Carey of Clifton, former Archbishop of Canterbury, has also sent me a strong comment 
in simiolar vein. 
In a joint statement with Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Director of the Cordoba Initiative and a 
leading Muslim teacher in the US, he says: "As Muslim and Christian leaders, and as 
members of the C-100 Coalition of the World Economic Forum, we are saddened and 
appalled by the cartoons, and the irresponsible action of the papers in Denmark and France 
in allowing the cartoons to be published. We recognise the importance of free speech and 
we agree that religions should not expect any favours or privileges against other groups in 
society. However to publish such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world 
as an attack on a world faith and only deepens the suspicion between the west and the 
Muslim world. We call for calmness and peace. Such actions only prove the necessity to 
deepen the dialogue between our faiths and cultures." (The C-100 was set up three years 
ago to bridge the worlds of the west the Muslim world. Prince Turki, ambassador to the US, 
is co-chairman along with Lord Carey.)  
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Now look at this page, from Tom Gross's Mideast Media Analysis site.  
It shows a selection of cartoons from the media of seven Arab countries, Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Syria and Egypt, and from the Palestinian Authority. "A 
number of these countries are regarded as moderate or allied to the West," writes Gross. 
"Most print media in the Arab world are under the full or partial control of the ruling 
regimes. One picture can sometimes be deadlier than a thousand words."  
One cartoon depicts the railroad to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau – but with Israeli 
flags replacing the Nazi ones. It is taken from the Jordanian newspaper Ad-Dustur. The sign 
in Arabic reads: “Gaza Strip or the Israeli Annihilation Camp.” Gross writes: "This 
accentuates the widespread libel that Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians have been 
comparable to Nazi actions towards Jews." 
Where is the condemnation from and of those in the Arab world responsible for these 
atrocious anti-Semitic images? Melanie Phillips has written a good, robust comment here.  
As she says: "More heartening was the reaction by the Jordanian independent tabloid al-
Shihan which reprinted three of the cartoons on Thursday. As the BBC reported: ‘Muslims of 
the world be reasonable,’ wrote editor Jihad Momani. ‘What brings more prejudice against 
Islam, these caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his victim in 
front of the cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding ceremony 
in Amman?" 
Irene Lancaster, historian and academic based in Manchester, is among the many 
intellectuals from all faiths and none throughout this country and abroad who are deeply 
and increasingly concerned by present events. She says: "If God/Muhammad is great, they 
can rise above all this. In Judaism God is not only transcendent, but a verb not a noun and 
therefore unable to be pinned down. In addition, Moses is regarded as all-too-human. All 
prophets in Judaism are human and fallible and by the way, Mohammad is not regarded as 
one of our prophets. 
"What is worrying about the anti-Semitic cartoons by the Arab and Muslim world is that 
they lead to physical attacks on the Jewish community, with repercussions in church and 
mosque sermons, inciting people to beat up Jews, which the Archbishop of Canterbury has 
recently condemned. 
"The fact is that at the moment something very nasty has happened to Islam world wide and 
the point of the Danish cartoon is that it has become an instrument of violence. This was 
what it was like in the past as well, although philosophers and scientists were influenced by 
Jewish thought and enjoyed discussing ideas with others. This did not prevent them from 
supporting the extremism of their governors and soldiers, however, as exemplified by Al 
Ghazzali the great Muslim mystic, also a supporter of the Almohade regime which was 
extremely violent. 
"As far as the West is concerned, Jews, Muslims and other ethnic minorities and minority 
religions, not to mention Catholicism in this country, would not have the freedoms they do 
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have without the rise of democracy and even secularism. Societies have to balance the 
rights of the majority (in Denmark, probably secular and liberal) against those of the 
minorities and no minority has the right to demand the implementation of its own rules for 
all." 
She quotes the Jewish law brought in very early in diaspora, that "the law of the land is the 
law" and in any dispute between Jewish law and secular law, the latter must be followed. 
"This is why the Dalai Lama has stated that ‘the Jews have found the secret of salvation in 
exile’ and feels that we are very adept at treading the fine line between retaining our 
religion whilst appreciating our status as a minority." 
Irene is not just an expert in Judaism and Jewish history. In her recent book, Deconstructing 
the Bible, about Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089-1164), who she has described in a lecture as "A 
Renaissance Man Before His Time", she emerges as expert in both Jewish and Sufi 
mysticism. She understands how positive the effect of Islam on civilisation can be.  
Personally I had not realised before all this blew up quite how wide-ranging the restrictions 
on Muslims are when it comes to pictures. Technically, nothing is allowed that shows an 
animate object. Not even photographs. 
It is the case that pictures of Mohammed and his court appear in museums in Islamic 
countries such as Turkey. 
But they would not be displayed in a country such as Saudi Arabia, due to Sharia.  
In Islam, just as in other religions, different communities will place different interpretations 
on the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet.  
Mohammed is recorded in the Hadith, one of the four arms of Sharia, or Islamic law, as 
having said: “And who is more unjust than those who try to create the likeness of My 
creation? Let them create an atom, or let them create a wheat grain, or let them create a 
barley grain.” He also said: “Angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog or a 
picture.” 
Taken together with the Koranic injunctions on respect for the Prophet, these sayings mean 
that in strict Islamic interpretations, any representation at all of any living thing is absolutely 
forbidden. Essential illustrations in academic text books under such jurisdictions might, for 
example, show a cow but with the head missing.  
Technically, the rulings forbid photographs of family members in the home, video cameras 
and mobile picture phones. But they remain the subject of intense debate in Islamic 
scholarly circles. 
And just as many young British Muslims today photograph their friends and family on their 
mobile telephones, the Prophet has appeared in art throughout the centuries, along with his 
court.  
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Where this has happened, concession is usually made to Muslim sensitivities by ensuring 
the features of his face at least are veiled or blanked out completely. 
Such pictures arose most often in cultures where it was a mark of respect to hang pictures 
of a reigning monarch or other leader in homes and galleries. 
Imam Ibrahim Mogra, of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: “This would happen where the 
hadith prohibiting it might be overlooked, or merely interpreted differently. For example, 
some scholars might argue that the intention of the hadith was to prevent worship of the 
image, and that it was permissible to have an image where the aim was not to worship but 
to show respect.” 
He said the debate continued in Muslim families today. “Some are very strict about it and 
will not have photographs taken except for official documents such as a driving licence or a 
passport. Others will say it is ok to have photographs taken because they do not intend to 
worship the pictures. In this country, most people take a relaxed view about photographs.” 
Yet in the Hadith there are detailed descriptions of what the Prophet looked like. One 
companion said: “He had a most handsome constitution. Some gave the smile of his beauty 
to that of the full moon. His nose was thin. His face was smooth. His beard was thick. His 
neck was the most beautiful. If the rays of the sun fell on his neck, it appeared like a cup of 
silver mixed with gold. The place between his shoulders was wide.” 
The writings continue: “The Messenger of Allah, was not excessively tall or short. He was 
not very pallid nor dark. He did not have curly hair or lank hair. Allah commissioned him at 
the age of forty. He stayed in Mecca ten years and at Medina for ten years and Allah the 
Mighty, the Majestic made him die when he was sixty. There were not twenty white hairs in 
his hair or beard, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.” 
What a shame the Turks took over Jerusalem in the 11th century and forbad pilgrimages, 
and that Pope Urban II launched the first crusade as a result. Communities have long 
memories. Even if the cartoon wars all blow over peaceably, and it by no means certain that 
theyl, it will be a long time before they are forgotten.  
 
TTC8 
West tries to calm tensions as militants threaten kidnaps 
Even moderate Muslims would regard cartoons as sacrilege, say scholars saddened by the 
breach of sacred boundary 
A LEADING Muslim scholar said that repeated publication of the cartoons would inevitably 
lead to more terrorist attacks in the West.  
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Mufti Abdul Barkatullah, senior imam at North Finchley Mosque in North London, said that 
editors who published the cartoons were “giving more fuel to al-Qaeda”.  
He said that one of Islam’s sacred boundaries had been crossed and even moderate 
Muslims would regard the cartoons as sacrilege. He cited verses of the Koran that rail 
against slander and mockery of Islam and prayer.  
Chapter 9 verse 12 urges all Muslims to “fight” any who “revile” Islam. Chapter 104 warns 
those who slander and defame that they will be hurled into “crushing disaster”.  
Mufti Barkatullah, a member of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: “In other religions, the 
sacred boundaries have been deleted. Not so in Islam. This is a no-go area at any cost. It will 
spur on suicide bombers.  
“However moderate one is, there can be no compromise on the person of the Prophet. The 
Prophet is held above everything in the Universe, over one’s own person, family, parents, 
the whole world. It is less offensive to condemn and vilify God.”  
A spokesman for the Muslim Council said that it was not necessarily offensive to publish the 
cartoons per se. It all depended on context. A television programme broadcast them two 
days ago in Britain to explain why they were controversial. He said that Muslims would not 
find their use insulting in that context. It was the provocative publication with the intention 
of stirring controversy that was offensive, he said.  
Muslims worldwide obey the Islamic injunction not to display pictures of any animal or 
human, anything with a “soul”, in their homes and mosques, never mind pictures of the 
prophet. This element of Sharia, or Islamic law, has become a hallmark of their faith, even 
though it does not appear in the Koran.  
It is in the Hadith — the collection of sayings of the Prophet — that pictures of living 
creatures are forbidden. The Arab word used for pictures is surah, which can mean anything 
from a two-dimensional drawing to a three-dimensional figure or statue.  
Hadith-Bukhari 5:338 has Abu Talha, a companion of the Prophet, quoting him as saying: 
“Angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog or a picture.” The scripture records that 
he meant the images of creatures that have souls.  
Imam Ibrahim Mogra, a leading Islamic scholar and senior member of the Muslim Council, 
said: “To depict the Prophet is unacceptable. To depict him as a terrorist is even more 
painful. It is extremely sad that they have not yet realised this.  
“They should have realised from the response to what the Danish paper did that this was 
not the right thing to do . . . I do not see how the idea of freedom of speech and freedom of 
expression gives people the licence to cause this kind of hurt to more than a billion people 
around the world.  
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“Muhammad is a very, very special person. To us he is more than our parents are. We can 
imagine, if someone was to make a mockery of our parents in this manner, how hurt we 
would be. Imagine that hurt, multiplied a million times.”  
He said that the teaching on this issue was strict and there were other verses in the Hadith 
that also supported the prohibition, although exceptions are made to the ban on dogs. For 
example, a blind man would be permitted a dog, as would a family living on a crime-ridden 
estate.  
There are four sources of Sharia. The Koran is the first, and the second is the Sunna or 
Hadith, the collection of sayings of the Prophet. The third source is analogy, so where a new 
difficulty arises, as with scratchcards, the injunction against gambling is extolled to prohibit 
their use. The fourth source is the “consensus of scholars”. 
 
TTC9 
World press opinion of cartoon row 
Newspapers around the world have published editorials this morning addressing the row 
over the Danish Muhammad cartoons. Here is a selection: 
Al-Akhbar, Egypt (translated by The Egyptian Gazette) 
“How can more than 1 billion Muslims worldwide be so weak compared to the 10-million 
strong Jewish community in standing up for their beliefs? That the Danish government 
refuses to make an apology is tantamount to condoning the newspaper’s behaviour, so no 
one can blame Muslims for their boycott of Denmark.” 
Al-Gomhurriya, Egypt 
“It is not a question of freedom of opinion or belief, it is a conspiracy against Islam and 
Muslims which has been in the works for years. The international community should 
understand that any attack against our prophet will not go unpunished.” 
Al-Shihan, Jordan  
(The newspaper published three of the cartoons before the editor was fired and copies were 
pulled from shops) 
“Muslims of the world, be reasonable... What brings more prejudice against Islam, these 
caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his victim in front of the 
cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding ceremony in 
Amman?” 
“Oh I ask God to forgive me,” editor’s apology. 
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Le Monde, France 
“Religions are systems of thought, spiritual constructions, beliefs that are respected but 
which can, by turn, be freely analysed, criticised and ridiculed... Secular, republican society 
is built on religious neutrality and tolerance. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish 
between religions and those who practise them: devotees must be protected against all 
discrimination and against all attacks motivated by their religious beliefs.” 
The Sun 
“The Sun believes passionately in free speech, but that does not mean we need to jump on 
someone else’s bandwagon to prove we will not be intimidated. It does seem ridiculous, 
though, that mayhem is breaking out over a handful of cartoons. Can we all get real.” 
The Daily Mail 
“While the Mail would fight to the death to defend those papers that printed the offending 
cartoons, it disagrees with the fact that they have done so. Rights are one thing. 
Responsibilities are another. And the newspapers that so piously proclaimed their right to 
freedom of speech were being - to put it mildly - deeply discourteous to the Islamic view.” 
The Daily Telegraph 
“Our restraint is in keeping with British values of tolerance and respect for the feelings of 
others. However, we are equally in no doubt that a small minority of Muslims would be 
offended by such a publication to an extent where they would threaten, and perhaps even 
use, violence. This is a problem that the whole of the Western world needs to confront 
frankly, and not sidestep.” 
The Financial Times 
“There is something dishonest, too, about the way Arab leaders defer in these matters to 
reactionary clerical establishments they rely on to legitimise their autocratic rule. That was 
for many, many centuries the way it used to be in Europe. The “Christian” west won through 
to modernity in the teeth of clerical reaction. As Arab and Muslim societies return to that 
road they will collide with their religious establishments on the way to repossessing their 
religion. Even Islamist reformers tend to believe this.” 
The Guardian 
“It is one thing to assert the right to publish an image of the prophet. As long as that is not 
illegal - and not even the government’s amended religious hatred bill makes it so - then that 
right undoubtedly exists. But it is another thing to put that right to the test, especially when 
to do so inevitably causes offence to many Muslims and, even more so, when there is 
currently such a powerful need to craft a more inclusive public culture which can embrace 
them and their faith.” 
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The Independent 
“There is... no doubt that newspapers should have the right to print cartoons that some 
people find offensive. Indeed it goes to the very nature of the political cartoon that it seeks 
to make a point through exaggeration, distortion and caricature - a process which is, by 
definition, intended to needle those being criticised, or their supporters. In a free society it 
is proper that speech, and other forms of expression, should be free.” 
 
TTC10 
Peter Brookes: Why the Muhammad cartoons fail  
Peter Brookes, award-winning Times Cartoonist, discusses the 12 Danish cartoons, first 
published by a newspaper in September, that have sparked a week of protests, flag-burnings 
and death threats across the Muslim world 
“I only saw the drawings yesterday. This week I was working on Iran and oil and the 100th 
British death in Iraq, which were much more important to me. But this escalated yesterday 
and I saw them. My first reaction, I have to say, was what feeble cartoons.  
“Perhaps I don’t understand Danish humour but there was only one out of the 12 - where 
Muhammad’s turban seems to be a bomb - that seemed to have any meaning.  
“But even that one is a poor cartoon. It’s ambivalent. You can read it one of two ways: 
either terrorism is using the cloak of Islam, is dressing itself as Muhammad, or that 
Muhammad himself is a terrorist. I hate that ambivalence in a cartoon, not knowing quite 
what the message is. We could be misreading the intentions of the artist entirely. 
“There is an awful duality about cartoonists: on the one hand, we feel we must be able to 
depict anything, we must be free. So as a rule, I try not to be too sensitive about these 
things - and all cartoonists are guilty of doing things when we have no idea what the 
reaction is going to be.  
“Last year, for instance, when the horse Best Mate died on the same day as David Blunkett 
resigned, I combined the two, and had no idea I would get hundreds of letters of complaint - 
all from horse lovers, of course, no one wrote to defend Blunkett.  
“And yet, as a cartoonist, I think there has to be a purpose. I can’t see any reason for these 
images, they just seem gratuitous. They’re meaningless. Depicting Islam, there is no need to 
show the Prophet.  
“It looks like the artists just didn’t think it through. And yet, they were asked to do it 
precisely because an author couldn’t find an illustrator who would portray Muhammad. 
They must have known it was a provocation, they should have been able to foresee 
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something of the reaction after the Dutch experience of the Theo Van Gogh film, and the 
Satanic Verses. 
“Of course now there’s so much happening, everything is moving so fast, that this looks like 
it will all go on and on. And, ironically, we will have to do cartoons about it.” 
 
TTC 11 
Muslim protest spreads to Danish butter 
The manufacturers of Lurpak butter have been forced to lay-off more than 100 staff in 
reaction to a boycott of Danish products in the Muslim world over the controversial 
publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. 
Arla Foods, Europe’s second-largest dairy company, said today that it would lay off 125 staff 
in its factories in Bislev, near Aalborg in the north of Denmark, adding that a further 40 
people would see their working hours reduced. 
Arla Foods, a co-operative owned by some 11,600 milk producers in Denmark and Sweden, 
is Denmark’s biggest exporter to Arab countries, accounting for one-third of total Danish 
exports there. 
Arla, for which 8 per cent of its total production is at stake, has been the group hardest hit 
by boycotts of Danish products across the Muslim world, where anger over the publication, 
originally in a Danish newspaper, of 12 cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammed continues to 
swell. 
Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have followed boycott calls, and the populous 
northern African countries have also heeded the call to shun Danish goods. 
Outside Europe, the Middle East is Arla Foods main export destination, with Saudi Arabia as 
the largest single market. 
Butter, feta, processed cheese and full-cream milk powder are the core products in Middle 
Eastern markets, the company said. 
“Our business out there has been completely undermined,” Finn Hansen, the head of the 
international division of dairy company Arla Foods, said. 
“Our products have been taken off the shelves in 50,000 stores. Without a quick solution, 
we will generate no more turnover in the Middle East,” he said. 
Arla said that no job cuts were planned in the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, where 
the company employs 800 staff in a Riyadh factory, where production has been halted. 
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Plans to extend the factory there have, however, been postponed. 
Denmark exported goods worth €1.2 billion (£815 million) to Arab countries in 2004, 
according to the foreign ministry. Although this represents just 1 to 1.5 percent of total 
Danish exports, the lost income is taking a big chunk out of the businesses concerned. 
“In turnover, this is costing us 10 million kroner [£800,000] a day,” an Arla spokeswoman 
told AFP. 
While dairy companies are worst hit, pharmaceutical companies are also big losers, 
accounting for 14 per cent of total goods hurt by the boycott. Egypt alone buys 33 per cent 
of Denmark’s drugs exports to the region. 
In Dubai branches of French hypermarket giant Carrefour, the shelves were empty of Danish 
butter and cheese products. 
“Carrefour no longer sells this garbage,” said an Emirati employee of the chain owned by 
local conglomerate Al-Futaim Group. 
In Kuwait City, signs were put up at many malls and shopping centres reading: “We have 
boycotted Danish products”. 
 
TTC12 
Incitement with little insight 
Publishing 12 indifferent cartoons a few weeks ago was justified. In today’s climate, it is 
plainly wrong 
PUBLICITY STUNT, courageous act of defiance, or vile anti-Islamic smear? The mocking 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad originally published in Denmark started as a hard-
edged joke and have since spread, erupting into the most serious cultural clash between 
Islamic religious beliefs and Western freedom of expression since Salman Rushdie’s Satanic 
Verses.  
In Britain, a series of contemporaneous but coincidental events have conspired to make this 
a defining moment for free speech in Britain. In London, an Islamic preacher is on trial for 
allegedly inciting racial hatred with his remarks about Jews and jihad. In Leeds, a jury failed 
to reach a verdict on two charges in the case of the leader of the British National Party 
accused of inciting hatred of Asians.  
In perhaps the most bizarre irony, if Tony Blair had stayed to vote on Tuesday on the 
Religious Hatred Bill, the Danish cartoons would be illegal in this country. The single vote 
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that protected the right to satirise religion in Britain is a measure of how close, and how 
confused, the issue of free speech has become.  
Can speech still be free if it denigrates an entire section of the population? How do you 
measure and quantify incitement? How do you define satire? Is it enough that a few people 
should find a cartoon funny when millions find it deeply offensive?  
In the miasma surrounding the issue, there are a few, clear standards. The first is that free 
speech, as I wrote here a few weeks ago, is an absolute in almost all instances, the 
safeguard of all other rights. The right to say only the right thing is not worth having, let 
alone fighting for.  
The cartoon showing the Prophet wearing a bomb turban is not only offensive but 
remarkably unsubtle, badly drawn and not very funny. It is also unfair, implying that an 
entire world religion is terrorist, rather a few fanatical adherents. The sentiments are crass 
in the extreme. But to silence and repress those opinions, however repellent, risks 
undermining the principle itself, as does the imprisonment of the historian David Irving for 
his revolting opinions about the Holocaust.  
That said, free speech must have limits in a free society. I am not free to encourage 
someone to harm someone else on any grounds, whether of race, religion or anything else. 
But the standard for proving incitement to hatred (one down from inciting physical violence) 
must be very high; in order to be punished for my words, surely it must be shown that I 
deliberately, knowingly and intentionally set out to foment hatred of another race. That 
appears to have been an issue that locked the jury in Leeds, and with which the London jury 
may now be wrestling.  
There is a universal right to be wrong. The cartoons in this case seem to be demonstrably 
wrong; as wrong, in their way as Irving’s hoary Holocaust denials. But that is not enough to 
warrant censoring either the cartoonists or the historian.  
Much depends on context. The demagogue who calls for attacks on other races in the public 
arena is prompting hateful action; the fulminating historian presenting crackpot 
reinterpretations of history is not. Similarly, when the cartoons were first published this was 
a defensible act; to publish them today, amid bomb threats, boycotts and armed gunmen, 
could be seen as inflammatory provocation. This is not a matter of kowtowing to pressure, 
nor, indeed, of respecting religious belief; it is a question of finding the crucial but shifting 
dividing line where free speech tips over into deliberate provocation, a line that changes 
with changing events.  
The Bill to outlaw religious hatred was flawed. It is possible to insult, slander and denigrate a 
person; it is not possible to insult an idea. Religion is, above all, an idea, and a matter of 
choice, unlike the colour of one’s skin.  
Flippant as it may sound, God, Allah, Jesus and the Prophet all have a sense of humour 
(thank God, Allah, etc), unlike too many of their followers. These religions have been around 
for too long to be sensitive to ridicule. They can take a joke. Cartoons published four months 
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ago have suddenly been turned into an unnecessary battle, with both sides deliberately 
whipping up the furore, one side issuing furious death threats and demanding apologies and 
censorship, the other fuelling the flame by publishing the images in a way designed to stoke 
maximum anger. Free speech is essential, but not unrestricted when it foments crime; 
equally, demands for censorship, in the name of protecting religious sensibilities, are 
unacceptable.  
Both sides should get some perspective. Outraged Muslims should reflect that this is not 
wholesale assault on religion; no mosques have been burnt; no Muslims killed. And 
defenders of free speech might temper their high-minded outrage with the reflection that 
these are 12 not very good cartoons by non-Muslims scoring fairly obvious points as 
offensively as possible. At least Satanic Verses had artistic merit worth defending. Like 
Irving’s opinions, these cartoons are neither interesting nor original; they deserved to be 
published, and then ignored.  
Having looked at the cartoons, I do not think they meet the standard of inciting racial 
hatred. They are by definition concerned with religion, not race, and cannot therefore be 
racist. Some are horrible, most are silly and a few are anodyne. I have not seen or read 
anything that proves the Danish paper Jyllands-Posten deliberately sought to whip up anti-
Muslim feeling by publishing the cartoons (although republishing them today, in a far more 
febrile atmosphere, might do just that).  
I have no right to demand that my beliefs be treated with the same gravity and solemnity I 
accord them myself. But I do have the right to believe that anyone who pokes cruel fun on 
the grounds of religion is a fool, and anyone who deliberately repeats the insult, simply to 
offend, is motivated more by bias than freedom.  
There is a right to draw and publish religiously offensive cartoons. We have the right not to 
find them remotely amusing.  
 
TTC 13 
Foreigners flee as gunmen hunt ‘targets’ 
MILITANTS threatened yesterday to kidnap Western citizens in retaliation for the 
publication of the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.  
Western governments tried to ease tensions before today’s prayers in mosques, which they 
fear will increase anger.  
Diplomats, journalists and aid workers fled Gaza and the West Bank as Palestinian gunmen 
searched hotels for citizens of countries where newspapers had printed the pictures, 
declaring that they were legitimate targets.  
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The EU, the main financial supporter of the Palestinian Authority, stepped up security at its 
offices in Gaza after gunmen fired into the air outside and scrawled graffiti saying that the 
offices were “closed until an apology is sent to Muslims”.  
A leaflet handed out by the militant groups Islamic Jihad and Fatah warned “infidels” that 
there are Muslims who “are tough and ready to become a martyr for their religion” and that 
“European provocations have placed offices and churches under fire”.  
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the head of the extremist Hezbollah movement, said: “I am sure 
there are millions of Muslims who are ready to give their lives to defend our Prophet’s 
honour.” He said that people would not have dared to insult Islam if the novelist Salman 
Rushdie had been executed.  
However Hamas, the powerful Islamist group that won last week’s Palestinian elections, 
sought to reassure Westerners. Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas’s senior leader in Gaza, paid a 
visit to a Church to offer Christians his protection.  
He assured Father Manuel Musallam, of the Holy Family Church, that he was prepared to 
station gunmen from Hamas’s military wing to protect the building, telling him: “You are our 
brothers.”  
Mushir al-Masri, a Hamas spokesman, added: “Hamas rejects and condemns the insult to 
our great Prophet Muhammad. We think demonstrations and rejection are legitimate, but 
we should not meet abuse with abuse. Hamas rejects any targeting of any institutions, 
churches or citizens and those who do this do not represent the authentic beliefs of Islam.”  
But as tensions increased, France and Denmark issued warnings to their citizens about 
travelling in Muslim areas, and Denmark and Norway closed their Palestinian offices.  
A European Commission spokeswoman said: “Colleagues working in the region are usually 
there to try to improve the lot of Palestinian people, and those who make the threats 
should bear that in mind. We oppose all use of violence.”  
In Pakistan 400 Muslim students shouted “Death to Denmark” and “Death to France”. They 
burnt Danish and French flags and an effigy of the Danish Prime Minister. Maulana Fazlur 
Rehman, the chief of Pakistan’s main alliance of Islamic parties, said: “We have called for 
countrywide protests on Friday.”  
Per Stig Moeller, the Danish Foreign Minister, also gave warning of the risk of today’s 
sermons fuelling anger. “Now countries such as France, Germany and Austria have 
published the drawings. This could stir things up further,” he said.  
Leaders of Islamic nations stepped up their criticism of the cartoons. A spokesman for 
President Mubarak of Egypt said: “The President warned of the near and long-term 
repercussions of the campaign of insults against the noble Prophet. Irresponsible 
management of these repercussions will provide further excuses to the forces of radicalism 
and terrorism.”  
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Egypt’s state owned Al-Gomhurriya newspaper said: “The international community should 
understand that any attack against our Prophet will not go unpunished.”  
President Karzai of Afghanistan said: “Any insult to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is 
an insult to more than one billion Muslims and an act like this must never be allowed to be 
repeated.”  
As an economic boycott of Danish produce spread around the Middle East, Arla Foods, 
Scandinavia’s largest exporter of dairy products to the region, announced that it was laying 
off 125 employees.  
Carsten Juste, the editor-in-chief of Jyllands-Posten, who originally published the 12 
cartoons, said yesterday that he would not have printed them had he known that “the lives 
of Danish soldiers and civilians would be threatened”. He added: “No responsible editor-in-
cheif. 
 
TTC14 
‘Let the hands that drew be severed!’ 
Muslims from London to Jakarta today mounted vigorous protests against cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad which have appeared in European newspapers. 
Answering the call to mount an international “day of anger”, Muslim crowds spilled from 
Friday prayers into protest demonstrations, demanding apologies from newspaper editors 
and the governments of a half dozen European countries that have refused to block the 
publication of the images. 
The first protests took place in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, when 
around 150 members of the Islamic Defenders Front tried to storm the Danish Embassy in 
Jakarta after pelting the building with eggs. “Let’s slaughter the Danish ambassador!” Read 
banners carried by the crowd. “We’re ready for jihad!” They shouted. 
Denmark’s best-selling broadsheet, the right-of-centre Jyllands-Posten, has been at the 
heart of the controversy since publishing 12 cartoons depicting Muhammad last September. 
One of the offending drawings shows Muhammad’s turban as bomb with a lit fuse. In 
another he turns suicide bombers away from heaven because “We have run out of virgins”.  
Despite the best efforts of the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who 
appeared last night on Arabic satellite television to stress his country’s respect for Islam, 
anger has deepened this week after newspapers in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Belgium 
and the Netherlands reprinted at least one of the images. 
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Syria and Saudi Arabia have withdrawn their ambassadors in protest at the cartoons and 
Libya has closed its embassy altogether. According to the Hadith, the sayings of the prophet, 
all depictions of Muhammad, however complimentary, are considered idolatrous. 
Amid demonstrations in Singapore, the country’s senior Islamic organisation said that the 
cartoons had no purpose but hatred: “No one is allowed to ridicule or cast aspersions on the 
faith of a people under the cloak of free expression,” it said. 
Crowds gathered in Bangladesh and in cities across Pakistan, where the national parliament 
unanimously passed a resolution condemning the drawings. “I have been hurt, grieved and I 
am angry,” said President Pervez Musharraf. Last November, Islamic extremists in Islamabad 
issued death threats against the authors of the cartoons. Newspaper offices are frequently 
attacked in Pakistan for perceived slights against Islam. 
Across the Middle East, Danish dairy produce has been boycotted by an estimated 50,000 
shops since Saudi Arabian clerics asked shopkeepers to remove the items from their shelves. 
As Friday prayers ended in the region, thousands took to the streets to burn flags and 
threaten violence. 
“We must tell Europeans, we can live without you. But you cannot live without us,” said 
Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, a leading imam in Qatar. “We can buy from China, Japan, 
Thailand, Malaysia... We will not be humiliated.” 
The Palestinian Territories have been alive with marches and unrest since the victory of the 
Islamist group, Hamas, in last week’s parliamentary elections.  
Today a week of anti-Danish and anti-European protests reached its climax with 50,000 
people attending a rally organised by the group, which is yet to take power. Danish goods 
were burnt and the crowd chanted: “Let the hands that drew be severed!” 
Western diplomats have already been forced to abandon their missions in the Gaza Strip 
after reports of gunmen searching hotels for Europeans, declaring them legitimate targets. 
The Danish Red Cross has pulled out workers from Yemen and Gaza City after they received 
death threats. 
Arab newspaper editorials held no trace of the ambivalence that led a Jordanian newspaper, 
al-Shihan, to print three of the cartoons yesterday. Instead, Jihad Momani, the newspaper’s 
editor who was fired for his decision to publish, issued an apology: “Oh I ask God to forgive 
me and I announce to everyone my deep regret for the gross mistake I have committed in 
Shihan without intention, which I fell into in my enthusiasm to defend our religion and the 
life of the Prophet,” he said. 
By this afternoon, London also was witnessing furious demonstrations. After a small protest 
at the BBC television centre last night to complain about glimpses of the cartoons in news 
bulletins and on Newsnight, hundreds of Muslims gathered in Regent’s Park to march to the 
Danish Embassy on Sloane Street. 
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Placards reading: “Behead the one who insults the prophet” and “Free speech go to hell!” 
were carried by the protesters. Bushra Varakat, a 26-year-old student from Egham, Surrey, 
said: “This is our prophet, he did a lot of things for humankind, both Muslim and non-
Muslim. 
“We don’t know why these silly people use these cartoons unless they were showing how 
much they hate us. We have to defend our prophet otherwise Allah will punish us. We will 
not accept this ridicule.” 
So far, British newspapers have declined to reprint the cartoons. Most explained their 
reasons today. The Sun said it seemed “ridiculous... that mayhem is breaking out over a 
handful of cartoons. Can we all get real.” The Financial Times said that it found the images 
offensive, but warned autocratic Arab leaders against letting extremists take over the 
debate. 
In the most extended comment from a Government minister yet on the subject, Jack Straw, 
the Foreign Secretary, welcomed the restraint shown by the press in a strong denunciation 
of the Danish cartoons. 
“There is freedom of speech, we all respect that,” he said. “But there is not any obligation to 
insult or to be gratuitously inflammatory. I believe that the republication of these cartoons 
has been unnecessary, it has been insensitive, it has been disrespectful and it has been 
wrong.” 
Sir Iqbal Sacranie, secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, condemned the images 
too, but urged British Muslims to resist the entreaties of extremists seeking to hijack the 
controversy. 
“There may be elements that would want to exploit the genuine sense of anguish and hurt 
among British Muslims about the manner in which the prophet has been vilified to pursue 
their own mischievous agenda,” he said. “We would caution all British Muslims to not allow 
themselves to be provoked.”  
 
TTC15 
British imam warns against overreaction 
A leading British imam has urged Muslims in the UK to look to their own behaviour and see 
if they are following the Prophet’s commandments in their own lives before lashing out 
against the controversial cartoons. 
Imam Ibrahim Mogra, a preacher in Leicester and a senior member of the Muslim Council of 
Britain, said that British Muslims were “upset, distraught and angry” about the repeated 
publication of the offending cartoons across Europe. 
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“I am urging them to calm down and take stock of their own lives. We should all remain 
within the law and not be provoked by hot-heads on both sides,” he said. 
Imam Mogra, a theologian and expert in Islamic law or Sharia, explained why Muslims had 
been so hurt by the caricatures. He said that Muslims started from the position of loving 
God, which meant total obedience to his messenger, Mohammed. Even moderate Muslims 
took seriously the Koranic injunctions to listen to the Prophet, and not to be forward in the 
presence of God or his messenger.  
They also believe, from chapter 21, verse 107, that God sent Mohammed as his messenger 
as an act of “mercy” to the whole world. In addition, Mohammed is reported in the Hadith 
to have told his followers: “None of you is a true believer until I become more beloved to 
him than his child, his father and the whole of mankind.” 
Imam Mogra said: “Because of these teachings it is very easy for Muslims to feel hurt and 
pain when such an important person is vilified in this manner.” 
He said most Muslims believed Mohammed’s teachings were primarily about living in peace 
and harmony with the rest of the world. So to depict him as a terrorist with a bomb for a 
turban, as in one of the cartoons, was deeply distressing for Muslims. 
He said: “Our own claim to be Muslim depends on our love and respect for the Prophet. If 
our love and respect is not of the highest level, we are only partly on our way to attaining 
God’s pleasure.”But he urged Muslims not to over-react. 
“We must today stick to our own lives as Muslims as to how much we uphold the teachings 
of this great person who was a source of guidance and goodness and mercy to this world. 
Many times we forget some very important things he taught us. 
“The Messenger said we must love our neighbour, we must do unto others what we want 
done unto ourselves, we must care for the poor and needy, we must stand up for justice, we 
must stand against oppression, we must be honest in our dealings, we must not cheat, lie or 
swear.” 
He said every Muslim should be aware of these commands, every moment of the day. “This 
is where the true test lies. If we love Mohammed and we love our God, we will do our very 
best to carry out these teachings in our lives. 
“Islam is a positive force in our country. It is not something we should be afraid of or 
alarmed by. I would say Islam is for Britain a welcome thing, but we Muslims have to ensure 
we live like Muslims, that we live and breathe Islam.” 
He said he was praying that there would be no terrorist reprisals. 
“The Messenger taught that no matter what the wrong or injustice done to us, we do not 
lower ourselves to that level where we carry out revenge. To carry out a terrorist attack 
because of this incident would not be justified.” 
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Other religious leaders also urged caution and restraint on members of their own faith 
communities. The Bishop of Oxford, the Right Rev Richard Harries, said: “Those newspapers 
that have decided not to print the cartoons at this time have acted wisely and in the public 
good. Freedom of speech is fundamental to our society and all religions need to be open to 
criticism. But this freedom needs to be exercised responsibly with a sensitivity to cultural 
differences.” 
The Chief Rabbi, Sir Jonathan Sacks, said: “Civilization needs civility. Judaism says that 
putting someone to shame is like bloodshed. At the end of every prayer we pray, we ask 
God to guard our tongue from evil.  
“The only way to have both freedom of speech and freedom from religious hatred is to 
exercise restraint. Without that, we can have one freedom or the other, but not both. Law 
alone won’t solve the problem.” 
Father Allen Morris, the Secretary for the Department of Christian Life and Worship, Roman 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, said: “Freedom of speech is always 
something which is exercised in a context. If I know something is going to cause grave 
offence to someone, I think twice before saying it.  
“Others would perhaps be critical of the Christian Church in the West for having become too 
soft and tolerant to things which they feel ridicule or belittle the Christian faith. When it 
comes to freedom of speech, there is really no easy answer. It leads us into an area of 
dialogue. The difficulty is that when people’s passions are aroused, dialogue is not so easy.” 
Lord Carey of Clifton, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, issued a joint statement with 
Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, the director of the Cordoba Initiative and a leading Muslim teacher 
in the US. They said that they were saddened and appalled by the cartoons, and “the 
irresponsible action of the papers in Denmark and France” in allowing the cartoons to be 
published.  
They went on: “We recognise the importance of free speech and we agree that religions 
should not expect any favours or privileges against other groups in society. However to 
publish such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world as an attack on a 
world faith, and only deepens the suspicion between the West and the Muslim world. We 
call for calmness and peace. Such actions only prove the necessity to deepen the dialogue 
between our faiths and cultures.” 
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The Daily Telegraph (DTC16-DTC21) 
DTC 16 
 
Conscience or commerce: That is the question 
It has been quite a week for journalistic philosophers. The debate over the cartoons 
featuring the Prophet Mohammed have split the newspaper commentariat down the 
middle. 
Does one support the Danish free speech fundamentalists and their supporters across 
Europe as they proclaim "publish and be damned", or the vast majority of editors who 
believe that freedom is not absolute and should be circumscribed by a sense of 
responsibility and courtesy?  
The contentious nature of this debate over whether or not there should be limits to liberty 
became even more complicated when Muslim demonstrators invaded embassies, burned 
flags and, in London, took to the streets with placards advocating that people be beheaded 
for asserting their beliefs in freedom. 
Then the central question was re-cast. Does one support the freedom of speech of Muslim 
marchers who incite murder and terrorism or does one demand that the authorities arrest 
and charge them for overstepping the mark? If so, where is that mark to be drawn?  
There was Henry Porter in the Observer approvingly citing Voltaire as the champion of free 
speech. Though he did not quote Voltaire's famous maxim - "I disapprove of what you say, 
but I will defend to the death your right to say it" - its principle informed his general 
argument. 
Meanwhile, in the Sunday Times, Simon Jenkins reminded us that Hobbes did not conceive 
of freedom as an absolute right. Then William Rees-Mogg, in yesterday's Times, offered a 
treatise on "our greatest prophet of liberty", John Locke, to urge us towards toleration. He 
concluded that "Locke would not have believed in insulting publications or in violent 
response".  
Doubtless someone will soon mention another of the 17th century's greatest proponents of 
a free press, John Milton, to justify publication of controversial material. 
But the fascinating fact about this journalistic trip back to the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, and the scores of other articles which draw on similar arguments, is the 
underlying assumption in the purity of the freedoms which set us on the path towards a 
liberal society in the West. 
We in Britain have arrived in the 21st century without much concern, outside university 
tutorials, for either the concepts or practice of liberty. We take all sorts of things for 
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granted. We "believe in" free speech which, to employ the modern jargon, we view as a 
"human right". 
We are happy with the separation of church and state (even if its unity exists nominally in 
the person of the monarch). We see secularism as some kind of progress, though we also 
understand that our culture is imbued with Christianity. 
We avert our gaze from conflicts, such as that in the north of Ireland, which appear to be 
based on religious differences. For want of a better phrase, the problems faced by our 
ancestors have been "sorted".  
But this clash over the cartoons is a further wake-up call that our supposedly tolerant multi-
cultural society is more fragile than we imagined. Following 9/11, the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the July bombings, we are being confronted with problems, almost 
on a daily basis, that we find increasingly difficult to resolve. 
Newspapers, in various ways, are reflecting that fact. Senior journalists are struggling to 
cope with what amounts to a profound cultural challenge. They are not alone, of course, 
because politicians, police, lawyers, indeed everyone, is trying to do the same.  
The British press response to the cartoons controversy shows just how fundamental a 
change is occurring. Not one paper in this country has dared to publish the cartoons and the 
reasoning behind that decision has been patiently explained in various editorials. 
Most have referred to the cartoons being gratuitously offensive and have asserted, quite 
properly, that freedom must be curtailed on occasion. There is a widespread misconception 
that anyone in this "free country" can say anything they like, but that has never been the 
case. 
We have libel laws. We also have laws to curb hate speech, obscenity and blasphemy. Then 
there is common sense. We do not believe a person has a right to falsely shout "fire" in a 
packed cinema, rightly regarding it as an abuse of freedom.  
While it is true that we have become blasé about insulting Christianity, we have done so on 
the understanding that it is both the dominant religion and, paradoxically, that the major 
threat to its dominance is from non-believers (rather than a competing creed). 
Secularism is widely viewed as a form of progress. But Britain is not insulated from the rest 
of the world. Apart from the fact that we have a major economic and political presence all 
over the globe, we also have a substantial Muslim minority here which, for a variety of 
reasons (not least our current Middle East military role), feels alienated. 
Some complain of internal prejudice and some are upset at external oppression. Many 
therefore identify more with Muslims in Palestine and Iraq than they do with their fellow 
British citizens. 
Instead of becoming assimilated, and perhaps being drawn towards secularism, some of 
them - and, arguably, it is a minority of the minority - have deepened their Muslim faith. 
448 
 
This has resulted in them becoming unduly hostile to the British state and even the non-
Muslim British population.  
Quoting Voltaire, Hobbes and Locke is therefore largely irrelevant in the face of a Muslim 
fundamentalism which cannot countenance the Prophet being satirised. 
The hostility is even more complicated because Muslims do not recognise the split between 
church and state. Muslim clerics who have been interviewed on TV and radio cannot seem 
to grasp that the Danish government is not responsible for the decisions of its newspaper 
editors. In other words, Britain's notion of press freedom - freedom from the state - is seen 
as meaningless.  
What is so fascinating about this clash between their beliefs and ours is last week's united 
stand by Britain's editors. I am certain that, say 20 years ago, at least one newspaper, and 
probably more, would have republished those Danish cartoons, no matter how offensive. 
Editors have traditionally defended their freedom to offend, yet this time they stayed their 
hands.  
Does the restraint indicate sensitivity towards a minority community? Is it due to concerns 
over threats of violence, either within Britain or to Britons living, working and fighting 
abroad? 
Given also that a large percentage of newspapers are distributed by Muslims, is it due to 
fear of industrial sabotage? Whatever the case, the impact of this affair on our freedoms 
demands continuing attention. 
It is sobering to reflect that many British people were prepared to risk their liberty, and their 
lives, to attain press freedom. But did they do so for reasons of conscience or commerce? 
Though obscured by this row, that really is the key question. 
 
DTC17 
I'm sorry, says 'suicide bomber' 
 
Omar Khayam reads his apology to the press outside his home  
A Muslim protester who dressed as a suicide bomber apologised "wholeheartedly" 
yesterday to the families of victims of the July 7 bombings and said it was not his aim to 
cause offence. 
Omar Khayam, a convicted drug dealer, said he hoped that he would never have to make 
such a protest again. 
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Speaking outside his home in Bedford, he added that his protest remained valid because of 
the hurt caused to Muslims around the world by the publication of a series of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Mohammed. 
Accompanied by the chairman of his local mosque and Patrick Hall, the MP for Bedford, he 
said: "I found the pictures deeply offensive as a Muslim and I felt the Danish newspaper had 
been provocative and controversial, deeply offensive and insensitive. 
"Just because we have the right of free speech and a free media, it does not mean we may 
say and do as we please and not take into account the effect it will have on others. 
"But by me dressing the way I did, I did just that, exactly the same as the Danish newspaper, 
if not worse. My method of protest has offended many people, especially the families of the 
victims of the July bombings. 
"This was not my intention. What happened in July was a tragedy and un-Islamic. I do not 
condone these murderous acts, do not support terrorism or extremism and would like to 
apologise unreservedly and wholeheartedly to the families of the victims. 
"I understand it was wrong, unjustified and insensitive of me to protest in this way." 
Asked if he would make a similar protest again, he replied: "No, I would not do it again, it 
has caused offence to a lot of people. I did not want to provoke any violence, it was just to 
make a point." 
Mr Khayam, 22, was among demonstrators outside the Danish embassy in London on 
Friday. Some wielded placards threatening a repeat of the September 11 and July 7 attacks. 
 
DTC18 
'Suicide bomber' is freed drug dealer 
 
A Muslim protester who sparked outrage by dressing as a suicide bomber is a convicted 
drug dealer who was recently released from prison, it was disclosed last night. 
Omar Khayam, 22, was reportedly jailed for five and a half years in 2002 for dealing in Class 
A drugs, thought to include cocaine. 
Khayam, who wore the bomber's outfit during the demonstration in London on Saturday 
over the cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed, served around half of his sentence 
before being released on licence last year. 
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The building student is serving the remainder of the term under the supervision of the 
Probation Service, but could now be recalled to prison for breaching the terms of his parole. 
The Islamic faith strictly forbids the taking or selling of drugs - the latter offence is 
punishable by death in some Muslim countries. 
Khayam, from Bedfordshire, apologised yesterday to the families of the victims of the July 7 
London bombings for his "suicide bomber" protest. 
However, he insisted it remained valid because of the hurt caused to Muslims around the 
world by the publication of the cartoons. 
Scotland Yard officers travelled to Bedfordshire last night and had been expected to 
interview Khayam. 
However they returned to the capital without having spoken to him. 
 
DTC19 
Extremists in demonstration face inquiry by police squad 
A special police squad has been set up to investigate Islamic extremists involved in the 
protests over cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed, Scotland Yard announced 
yesterday. 
The move comes after growing protests over the failure to arrest the militant demonstrators 
who carried placards threatening violence and suicide bombings. 
Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, joined MPs in sending a strong signal to the 
Metropolitan Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions to bring prosecutions against 
the extremists involved in protests outside the Danish embassy in London on Friday. 
The Government believes that some of the protesters could be charged with incitement to 
murder. 
The police team will be headed by a detective chief inspector in the public order crime unit 
and will examine everything from video recordings made by officers to photographs 
published in newspapers. 
Senior detectives promised a "swift" inquiry and said quick decisions would be taken on 
whether to send files on any of the demonstrators to the Crown Prosecution Service to 
decide whether to bring incitement charges. 
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Pictures of Omar Khayam, a Muslim protester who dressed as a suicide bomber, will be 
among those studied by the Scotland Yard team. Others showed demonstrators wielding 
placards threatening a repeat of the September 11 and July 7 attacks and calling for the 
beheading of those responsible for the cartoons. 
Downing Street issued a forthright statement condemning as "completely unacceptable" the 
behaviour of the extremists, but saying it was up to the police to decide whether to 
prosecute. 
Mr Blair's official spokesman said the Government understood the offence caused by the 
cartoons but said this did not justify the violence seen over the weekend in Syria and 
Lebanon, including the burning of the Danish embassy. In an emergency Commons 
statement, Mr Clarke said the police and prosecuting authorities were carrying out "rigorous 
assessments" about the appropriate way to proceed in individual cases. 
"If the police conclude there have been breaches of the law and decide to take any action, 
we would, of course, support them," he told MPs. He joined Downing Street in expressing 
solidarity with the Danish government, which he said had done everything possible to 
handle a very difficult situation. 
David Cameron, the Conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take 
"appropriate action" against people who "break the law by inciting hatred or inciting people 
to violence or murder". He added: "Many of those people carrying the placards were clearly 
inciting violence or inciting hatred." 
David Davis, the Conservative home affairs spokesman, told Mr Clarke it was essential that 
action was taken against demonstrators who deliberately tried to stir up violence, for the 
sake of good community relations. He said Friday's demonstrations had "emphatically 
crossed" a line as to what was acceptable, civilised behaviour. 
"Placards carrying the slogans calling for people who insult Islam to be beheaded, or 
massacred, or annihilated are direct incitements to violence," he said. "Slogans like 'Europe 
your 9/11 will come' or 'Europe you will pay, Fantastic 4 are on their way', are, at best, 
indirect incitements to violence, as is dressing up as a suicide bomber." 
Ashok Kumar, the Labour MP for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, condemned the 
demonstrations. "Muslim extremists are poisoning the atmosphere in this country in what 
was, what has been, a great multicultural society," he said. 
Officials said Mr Clarke would convey the strong view of the Commons that action should be 
taken. 
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DTC20 
Protests cast cloud over IOC 
The Muslim world's outrage over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed printed in a Danish 
newspaper cast a shadow over the International Olympic Committee yesterday, as members 
decide whether to hold their next Congress in Copenhagen. 
The Congress is the most significant event for the IOC after the Olympic Games. The last was 
held in 1994, in Paris. At the 2009 Congress, Jacques Rogge, the IOC president, could be 
seeking re-election and will also be voting on which city will host the Games in 2016. 
The IOC session, starting in Turin tomorrow, has to choose between seven cities and until 
the Muslim protests worldwide, Copenhagen had looked a shoo-in. 
But the feeling is that the protests have put the IOC in a difficult position. If members vote 
for Copenhagen, this could be seen as a defiant message to the Muslim world, yet if they go 
against, it could look like capitulation. 
Rogge insisted the vote would have no relation to the international situation. "We are 
speaking of a sporting session in 2009 and it will not have an impact. If Copenhagen wins it 
will be from membership that is absolutely universal from 70 countries." 
Despite this, Copenhagen's supporters are despondent and there was talk of how 
Copenhagen may not have enough hotel beds. The chances for Singapore, which held a 
session last year, is now being raised. 
Tomorrow's session could also add two more sports to the London Games, baseball and 
softball, which could add £50 million to the cost of staging the Games. They were 
controversially dropped last year and although Rogge does not want them back, some 
members will try to force a vote. They know this is their last chance to do so in time for the 
London Games. 
 
DTC21 
This soft approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far Right 
Yesterday in Afghanistan the worldwide mob engaging in an engineered protest about the 
Danish cartoons claimed its first lives. Elsewhere, as extremists continue to burn flags and 
embassies, and demand executions, exterminations and beheadings because of the mocking 
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of their religion and their prophet, the British Government lurches slowly towards a 
realisation that its response to militant Islam during these frightening events might just have 
been incoherent and casual.  
As has been widely remarked upon, the Foreign Secretary found it much easier to condemn 
those who exercised (however unwisely and ignorantly) their free speech in publishing the 
cartoons than he did those who marched on the streets of London last Friday demanding 
that they be killed. 
Mr Straw did eventually catch up with reality, and see that most Britons (including, not 
least, most Muslim ones) were appalled that a man dressed as a suicide bomber could 
protest on the streets of London, or that placards should threaten Britain with the arrival of 
the mujahideen. 
Peter Hain who, only the other day, was keen to allow professed IRA terrorists to escape 
punishment as part of the "peace" process in Ulster, was then wheeled out to pronounce, 
with a startling lack of consistency, how those who merely threaten Islamic terrorism should 
now be prosecuted. Despite the strange silence over the weekend of the man who is 
supposedly in charge of handling these matters - the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke - the 
Government does appear to be waking up. 
It does so too late for the tastes of many people. Mr Straw's initial display of priorities 
reminded us that it is not the first time we have witnessed the Government's cultural cringe 
towards undemocratic, repressive and unstable forces.  
The whole concept of the Religious Hatred Bill derived from a desire that, even though it 
was Muslim extremists such as Omar Bakri Mohammed who were the most apparent 
offenders in whipping up religious bigotry in Britain, the Government was determined to 
pass a measure whose main beneficiaries would appear to be Muslims.  
Such sectarian lawmaking was designed to make Muslims feel better about any sanctions 
the state might take against rogue members of their community if those rogue members 
threaten or resort to violence. 
However, the Bill is not merely inimical to our freedom of speech, but is also deeply divisive: 
it was as well the Government was defeated on it last week. 
But, as the response to Friday's and Saturday's demonstrations by the police proved, the so-
called forces of law and order need far more guidance on how to handle such provocative 
protests, and a reminder that there are quite enough existing laws that can be applied to 
such behaviour without needing to pass any new ones. 
Sir Ian Blair, in particular, needs to be reminded that if the police are not seen to enforce 
the law impartially, a terrible poison will be injected into British life. 
The Metropolitan Police certainly seems selective in its "softly, softly" approach to dealing 
with protests. Only 17 months ago, before the rule of the present Commissioner, some of its 
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officers zealously cracked the heads of protesters from the notoriously dangerous group of 
psychopaths otherwise known as the pro-foxhunting lobby. 
The main offence perpetrated by these people appeared to be shouting, wearing tweeds in 
a public place, and waving placards saying that they didn't like Mr Blair or his Bill very much.  
Maybe Sir Ian, now he is in charge, would have his officers be as mild towards them as they 
were towards those who openly incited murder on Friday, and who took an infant out on 
the protest with them wearing a hat inscribed with the entirely reasonable statement "I love 
al-Qaida". 
It would be equally interesting to see how he would respond to a group of fundamentalist 
bigots from another religion marching on London's streets urging the death of Muslims: I 
suspect the response would be different to last Friday's, not least because Sir Ian's every 
move appears to be conditioned by that cultural cringe of his political masters, or by what 
he interprets to be that cringe. In any case, he has given more proof of his lamentable 
judgment, and of his sheer unsuitability to hold his present post. 
There are deeper and wider issues here, however, than simply why these advocates and 
inciters of murder were not immediately arrested and charged under existing legislation. 
Not the least sinister aspect of this whole exercise was that the police tried to restrain 
newspaper photographers from taking pictures of the protesters.  
Why? Was it that someone further up the food chain had decided it would in this case be 
helpful to have as little evidence as possible of such flagrant wrongdoing? 
This takes us to the heart of the problem that the Government has at home. It is its 
patronising and, I am sure, inaccurate supposition that the British Muslim community is so 
volatile, so unhinged and so downright unreasonable that any attempt to make some of its 
more violent members answer to the law when they commit serious crimes would cause a 
conflagration. 
In fact, as should now be apparent, the opposite is true. Many responsible Muslims have 
called for prosecutions, not least the admirable and immensely brave Labour MP Shahid 
Malik, whose courage in confronting the small minority of his co-religionists who wreck 
community relations in this country shames some of his party's leaders.  
Also, the Government needs to be aware that the impression it gives of influencing the 
police to shy away from confronting this evil is providing a recruiting sergeant for the BNP. 
That party has just had its best week ever, not simply because of Nick Griffin's acquittal for 
speaking his unpleasant mind about Islam and black people, but because of the 
encouragement given to racial hatred by the combined efforts of militant Islam and an 
ineffectual political and police response to it. 
Unless we are happy for the extreme Right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow 
this appeasing and unjust approach to continue. 
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The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary must urgently observe some harsh realities. 
They must remind the police that the law is to be enforced equally at all times. The failure of 
justice to be seen to be done so far after Friday's protests has been highly corrosive, and is a 
propaganda gift to the BNP on a scale equal to that of Mr Griffin's acquittal.  
Second, it must take note of the internationally co-ordinated and highly opportunistic 
nature of the protests, which clearly took some months to arrange - the cartoons were first 
published last September - and draw conclusions from them about the network of well-
organised extremists that threatens all Western society.  
How far do our security services have the measure of those who were waving their placards 
of death last week, and how much do they know of what else they do to advance militant 
Islam? Third, it must realise that its duty to protect our people is no longer commensurate 
with the soft line.  
Prosecutions, deportations of those with no right to be in Britain, and (however belatedly) 
an immigration policy that rejects those who seek to destroy the British way of life are all 
long overdue.  
These things are all within the legitimate and moderate exercise of power by a democratic 
government. The alternative is the inevitable resolve by the forces of unreason to fight fire 
with fire, and "rivers of blood". 
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The Guardian (TGC39-TGC52) 
TGC39 
BBC defends cartoon coverage 
BBC News executives have apologised for any offence they caused by showing the 
controversial Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad - but said the corporation 
had stopped short of using "excessively offensive" images. 
UK national newspapers decided not to publish the cartoons, which were originally printed 
in a Danish newspaper and sparked angry protests by Muslims in London, the Middle East 
and Asia over the weekend. 
The corporation used video featuring European newspapers that have published the 
cartoons on its news bulletins, News 24 and the BBC News website. 
"Obviously the BBC does not want to give offence to anyone on either side of this debate," 
said Peter Horrocks, the BBC's editor of TV News. 
"So if people - whichever side of the argument they fall within - have taken offence, I am 
obviously concerned and I apologise for that. 
"In reporting the story, we ourselves had to make a decision about whether we published 
the pictures in any form and inevitably that's made us part of the controversy. 
"[The BBC has] taken the view that still images that focus and linger on the offending 
cartoons would be excessively offensive so we haven't used those in our television news 
pieces. 
"We've used moving pictures of the newspapers where they've appeared to show people 
the context in which they've appeared and to give them some flavour of the type of imagery 
but without focusing closely on them." 
The BBC faced criticism from both British Muslims, who said the images were 
"disrespectful", and from viewers who said not shown enough of the cartoons were shown. 
"You cannot report a news subject relating to a visual matter without showing that matter," 
said Lawrie May, one of the complainants. 
"It appears that you are scared of the reaction from Muslims, while you were not concerned 
about the offending Christians when you screened Jerry Springer - the Opera," said Peter 
Arnold. "This is a case of double standards." 
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But Mr Horrocks said it was incorrect to make a direct comparison with the Springer 
broadcast, which prompted more than 60,000 complaints when it was shown on BBC2 last 
year. 
"The BBC is not the primary publisher of these cartoons so to some extent it's different from 
Jerry Springer where the BBC was responsible for commissioning the programme," he told 
the BBC's Newswatch website. 
Mr Horrocks denied accusations of censorship by the BBC. 
"I think if you compare the BBC's position to the whole of the UK printed press, where there 
hasn't been any publication whatsoever, we've clearly gone further ... 
"But we've taken a decision not to go further than that in order not to gratuitously offend 
the significant number of Muslims in Britain but also - because we make decisions for our 
pieces to be broadcast internationally - the very significant numbers of Muslim viewers of 
BBC World television." 
 
TGC40  
Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew images: a world of protests 
The ferocious Muslim protests at the publication of the cartoons in the European press 
escalated into a global phenomenon at the weekend. The violence appeared likely to 
intensify despite calls for restraint from some leading clerics. Denmark, where cartoons of 
the prophet Mohammed first appeared in September, was the main target of arson, threats 
and calls for an economic boycott. 
Syria 
On Saturday protesters in the capital, Damascus, set fire to the Danish and Norwegian 
embassies. The Swedish embassy, in the same building as the Danish mission, was damaged. 
Protesters also tried to storm the French embassy but were held off by riot police. No 
diplomats were injured. The Danish and Norwegian foreign ministries advised citizens to 
leave Syria as soon as possible. Last night the Syrian foreign ministry said it "expresses its 
regret regarding the violent acts which accompanied the protests and caused material 
damage at some embassies". 
Iran 
It has recalled its ambassador to Denmark, following the example of Syria, Saudi Arabia and 
Libya. "Insulting the prophet was unacceptable and a sign of barbarism," the Iranian 
spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, said, adding that Tehran planned to take further action. On 
Saturday, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ordered authorities to form a 
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committee to review the possibility of cancelling commercial deals with Denmark and other 
countries where the drawings were published. 
Palestine 
About 30 gunmen threatened to attack a French learning centre in Nablus yesterday. But 
after negotiating with police guarding the building, they were allowed only to scrawl on the 
building: "This place is closed" and "God is great". One of the gunmen, who did not give his 
name, said they would not allow the centre to be reopened until European leaders 
apologised for the caricatures. Student protests took place in Ramallah, West Bank. 
Iraq 
A militant group called for attacks on people from countries where the cartoons were 
published. Calling itself the military wing of the Army of the Right, its supporters handed out 
leaflets during a demonstration in the insurgent stronghold of Ramadi. The leaflets said: 
"The first target of upcoming attacks should be Danish troops. We demand that all clerics in 
Arab countries issue fatwas [religious edicts] against foreigners and shut all embassies." 
Denmark has more than 500 troops in Iraq. 
Afghanistan 
Thousands protested. In the Northern city of Fayzabad police fired into the air to disperse a 
group of rowdy protesters. The local deputy governor, Shams ul-Rahaman, said the police 
were preventing some 1,000 demonstrators marching to the offices of the United Nations 
and other aid groups. In the central Afghan city of Mihtarlam, 3,000 demonstrators burned a 
Danish flag and demanded that the editors of the Danish newspaper that first published the 
series of cartoons be prosecuted for blasphemy. More than 100 people gathered at a 
mosque in the southern city of Kandahar and demanded that the government sever 
diplomatic ties with Denmark. 
Saudi Arabia 
Violence was condemned by the world's leading Islamic body. "Overreactions surpassing the 
limits of peaceful democratic acts ... are dangerous and detrimental to the efforts to defend 
the legitimate case of the Muslim world," the 57-nation Saudi-based Organisation of the 
Islamic Summit said in a statement from its secretary general, Ekmelettin Ihsanoglu. He 
called the protests "regrettable and deplorable". 
Pakistan 
Demonstrators from Islamic groups set fire to Danish and French flags. 
Indonesia 
In Jakarta Muslim protesters ransacked the lobby of a building housing the Danish embassy. 
Jordan 
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Two newspaper editors who published the cartoons were arrested at the weekend. Jihad 
Momani and Hisham Khalidi are accused of insulting religion under Jordan's press and 
publications law. Mr Momani was fired from the weekly Shihan after publishing three of the 
cartoons and an editorial calling on Muslims to be reasonable. "What brings more prejudice 
against Islam, these caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his 
victim in front of the cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding 
ceremony in Amman?" he wrote. Mr Khalidi's al-Mehwar newspaper printed the cartoons 
over a week ago. 
Turkey 
An Italian Roman Catholic priest, Andrea Santaro, 60, was shot and killed in the courtyard of 
his church in the Black Sea port city of Trabzon, Turkish police said. Witnesses said a teenage 
boy carried out the attack. It is unclear whether the killing was related to the protests. 
Netherlands 
The controversy took an unusual turn with a Belgian-Dutch Islamic political organisation 
posting anti-Jew cartoons on its website on Saturday. The Arab European League's site 
carried a disclaimer saying the images were used as part of an exercise in free speech rather 
than to endorse their content. One showed an image of Anne Frank in bed with Hitler. Dyab 
Abou Jahjah, the party's founder, defended the action on Dutch television, saying: "Europe 
has its sacred cows, even if they're not religious sacred cows." 
 
TGC41 
Downing Street statement on the weekend's cartoon demonstrations 
Statement released by No10 on the behaviour of some of the demonstrators protesting 
about the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in European newspapers 
Tony Blair entered the controversy over the publication of cartoons of the prophet 
Muhammad in European newspapers and the subsequent London demonstrations, calling 
the behaviour of some protesters "unacceptable". After the weekend calls by the Tories for 
arrests of some demonstrators the government gave its full support to the police. Here is 
the full statement released by No10 Downing Street. 
"We understand the offence caused by the cartoons depicting the prophet and of course 
regret that this has happened. Such things help no one. 
It is always sensible for freedom of expression to be exercised with respect for religious 
belief. But nothing can justify the violence aimed at European embassies or at the country of 
Denmark. 
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We and our EU partners stand in full solidarity with them in resisting this violence and 
believe the Danish government has done everything it reasonably can to handle a very 
difficult situation. The attacks on the citizens of Denmark and the people of other European 
countries are completely unacceptable as is the behaviour of some of the demonstrators in 
London over the last few days. 
The police should have our full support in any actions they may wish to take in respect of 
any breaches of the law, though again we understand the difficult situation they had to 
manage. We also strongly welcome the statements of Muslim leaders here who are 
themselves tackling the extremists who abuse their community's good name." 
 
TGC42 
Threats that must be countered 
For centuries, English law has been crammed full of legal powers to arrest people who 
threaten violence or murder in public, or who go around terrifying ordinary people. On 
Friday, dozens of prima facie examples of such offences were committed during protests 
against Danish cartoons which offended Muslims by depicting the prophet Muhammad. One 
man was dressed in the garb of a suicide bomber, arguably an overt attempt to terrify of the 
kind that has been illegal in this country since at least the Statute of Northampton in the 
time of King Edward III, in the 14th century. Others carried placards demanding "Massacre 
those who insult Islam", "Butcher those who mock Islam", "Europe you'll come crawling 
when Mujahideen come roaring", "Britain you will pay: 7/7 on its way", several of which 
appear to breach the law dating from Victorian times that outlaws soliciting to murder. A 
toddler on the march was dressed in a hat that said: "I love al-Qaida." Many adults on 
political marches over the years have been convicted of breaches of the peace for much less 
than that. 
This country needs a strategy for dealing with campaigns of this kind. But it is not clear from 
the aftermath of these events that we really have one. In general, reflecting a strong 
tradition of tolerance and an adult pragmatic sense that things should be allowed to blow 
over, the approach here has mostly been the give and take that was reflected by cabinet 
ministers Peter Hain and Jack Straw in interviews yesterday. Having lost so much support 
among Muslim voters, Labour ministers have a strong partisan interest in not taking 
potentially inflammatory actions that become rallying points against them. What is more, in 
the short term, the public peace may indeed be best served by allowing the madness of 
Friday to burn itself out. In the long run too, the Islamist fanatics may have done themselves 
damage by revealing so much about themselves in public and handing valuable intelligence 
to the police and security services. 
But it is not enough to shrug one's shoulders about how difficult these things are, still less to 
give ourselves undeserved pats on the back. Serious things happened in our midst on Friday 
- and even more serious things are happening to Danes around the world. Ministers do 
nobody any favours by appearing to imply that the best thing is just to muddle through. 
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These threats are real, present and serious, and if ministers put their heads in the sand they 
will lose the argument. The Conservative front-benchers David Davis and Dominic Grieve 
were right to address the difficult issue of criminal charges at the weekend. It was 
encouraging that moderate Muslim leaders also stepped up to the plate too; much more of 
this is needed if there is to be an effective strategy against the advocates of violence. So far 
the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the fanatics because of the 
fear, which may have been well-judged, that it would make an already ugly situation even 
worse. But no society can allow the threats that were made on Friday's march to pass 
without further action. Those who threatened to kill should answer for their threats. They 
should be arrested, cautioned and placed under surveillance. If appropriate, the authorities 
must not be afraid of bringing charges. Those who are eligible for deportation should be 
deported. There must be no witch-hunt to feed further the ugly and exaggerated sense of 
victimhood surging through the otherwise legitimate protest against the cartoons' 
gratuitous insult. But public order and confidence require stronger recognition that limits of 
acceptable protest and public discourse have been crossed. White racists are rightly 
arrested and charged for their hate campaigns. Muslim fanatics have to face similar severity 
for their no less repulsive actions. Ours is a tolerant way of life; we must be robust in 
defending it against its enemies. 
 
TGC43 
Arrest extremist marchers, police told 
 Muslim organisations blame rogue factions  
 Mock suicide bomber defends protest costume 
Protesters in London who carried placards threatening suicide bombings and massacres in 
revenge for the Danish cartoons satirising the prophet Muhammad are to be investigated by 
Scotland Yard and could face arrest. 
Metropolitan police are considering the options after the demonstrations at the end of last 
week. A flurry of cross-party calls by MPs came at the weekend to pursue those responsible 
on the grounds that the threats were an incitement to murder. 
The slogans, written in the same style and in similar black felt-tip pen ink, urged Muslims to 
use violence. A protester was also photographed wearing a garment resembling a suicide 
bomber's jacket. The man, Omar Khayam from Bedford, said he had no regrets about his 
style of dress, telling the Daily Express: "I didn't go there to cause anyone any harm. I went 
along just to attend a protest. Yet I have been branded a suicide bomber overnight. Did I 
say, 'Kill Jews?' No. Did I have racist signs on me? No. So why this reaction?" He went on: 
"Yes, I would do it again to make a point. I could have gone along and held up banners or 
something, but this made the point better." 
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Most of the placards appeared on Friday, running through permutations on several themes. 
They read: "Butcher those who mock Islam", "Slay those who insult Islam", "Behead those 
who insult Islam", and "Kill those who insult Islam". Some evoked previous al-Qaida suicide 
bombings: "Europe you will pay, your 9/11 is on the way", or "7/7 is on its way", "Europe 
you will pay, fantastic 4 are on their way", and "Europe you will pay, Bin Laden is on his 
way". As well as the rhyming "Europe you'll come crawling, when the Mujahideen come 
roaring", there were splenetic varieties: "Freedom go to hell", "Liberalism go to hell", and 
"Freedom of expression go to hell". 
The only arrests were of two people carrying copies of the Danish cartoons which triggered 
the protests. They were escorted away by officers and released without charge. 
The shadow home secretary, David Davis, and the shadow attorney general, Dominic Grieve, 
urged the police to make arrests. "Some of these placards are incitement to violence, and 
indeed incitement to murder - an extremely serious offence which the police must deal with 
and deal with quickly," Mr Davis told the Sunday Telegraph. 
Mr Grieve, speaking on GMTV, said: "It is certainly not a happy state of affairs where such a 
demonstration takes place and those people who are acting in that way don't end up under 
arrest before the demonstration is ended." 
Several Labour MPs also called for action. David Winnick, on the Commons home affairs 
committee, said those carrying banners threatening violence should be prosecuted and, 
where possible, deported. "Those who are temporarily in Britain, the sooner they are out of 
the country the better," he said. "Those who have been given permission to live here, 
insofar as it is possible in law, it would be better for this country and indeed for the Muslim 
community if that right was removed." The Labour MP Shahid Malik, also on the committee, 
wrote to Sir Ian Blair, head of the Metropolitan police, calling for prosecutions. 
In a statement yesterday, the police said: "Those gathered [outside the Danish embassy] 
were well natured and in the main compliant with police requests. Arrests, if necessary, will 
be made at the most appropriate time. This should not be seen as a sign of lack of action ... 
The decision to arrest at a public order event must be viewed in the context of the overall 
policing plan and the environment the officers are operating in. Specialist officers were 
deployed on both days to record any potential evidence should it be needed at any point in 
the future. All complaints will be passed to the public order crime unit for further 
investigation." 
Anjem Choudary, spokesman for al-Ghuraba, the group which helped organise Friday's 
protests, told the Guardian: "There were a mixture of different people at the 
demonstration. They were expressing their freedom. The police had the opportunity to say 
the placards were offensive. I spoke to the ... control operation. I said, if there's any 
concerns, you can contact me at any time. They saw them at the begining of the 
demonstration. You can't take [the placards] literally. It's ridiculous to say we are intending 
to bomb [Denmark]." Mr Choudary said he did not know who wrote the placards. 
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Most Muslim organisations condemned the placard slogans as the work of 
unrepresentative, extremist factions. The general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, 
Sir Iqbal Sacranie, blamed "agents provocateurs". 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, which organised Saturday's protest, agreed. Its spokesman, Taji Mustafa, said 
yesterday: "We condemn those [placards], those are not acceptable. Many Muslim groups 
have condemned the Friday protests and the images that were used then ... we must not at 
this time stoop to the level of those who want to resort to insulting the prophet of Islam as 
a terrorist." 
 
TGC44 
A worm's eye view: Logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons. 
 
Major Charles Napier was wounded at the battle of Corunna. "His leg was broken by a 
musket shot, he received a sabre cut on the head, a bayonet wound in the back, severe 
contusions from the butt end of a musket, and his ribs were broken by a gunshot," says the 
Dictionary of National Biography, describing the events of January 16, 1809. 
He was captured by the French, and eventually exchanged. He resumed a military career 
under Wellington, when he was wounded twice more and fought the Turks in Greece with 
Byron (he was the first British governor of Cephalonia). The men who spread the Empire 
were tough. Eventually, he came to British India, and in the winter of 1842/3 this 
remarkable soldier conquered Sind, now part of Pakistan - thereby preparing the ground for 
the grievances of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and similar extremist organisations. 
The dictionary of National Biography does not mention the exchange for which he is now 
most famous, which apparently came after the conquest. When a group of Brahmins 
petitioned him for permission to burn a widow alive after her husband's death, explaining 
that it was the custom of their country, he replied that it was the custom of his country to 
hang those who did so, and if they followed their custom, his soldiers would build a gallows 
beside the funeral pyre and follow his custom as soon as they had followed theirs. 
All conversations about multiculturalism come back to this point sooner or later. In the end 
it is force, or the threat of it, which decides whose customs are followed and whose taboos 
are honoured. I'm not arguing for moral relativism here. I don't think that burning widows 
or unsatisfactory wives alive is ever anywhere a moral thing to do. But any attempt to 
impose one set of customs on the whole world is now going to require more force than the 
globe can safely contain. 
In the 19th century there was no question but that it was the customs of European 
countries which would be imposed on those of the rest of the world. In the second half of 
the 20th century, this very obviously stopped being true. The row over the cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad makes it look as if the present question is whether European countries 
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will be able to hang on to their own customs and to resolve their disputes within a 
framework of law that takes for granted that freedom of speech is part of a civilised society. 
Within that legal framework, it is possible to debate whether the papers that have done so 
should have exercised their right to print all or some of the cartoons - myself, I'd not have 
printed or reprinted the one showing the prophet with a bomb in his turban. But the 
question underlying all this is whose laws should apply to western newspapers in western 
countries. One of the origins of the whole row was a report, last autumn, that Danish 
illustrators were frightened to illustrate a book about the prophet in the wake of the 
Rushdie affair. The newspaper commissioned the drawings partly as a way of demonstrating 
against that fear, and some of the demonstrations are clearly intended to make Islam 
appear more frightening. 
But politics, good manners, and principle all suggest that if we must offend people, we do so 
as politely as possible. This is difficult for newspapers at the best of times, and almost 
impossible in a world of globalised religions and communications where every insult 
provokes a response which is itself insulting. 
Already one Dutch website has held a competition for the most offensive Photoshopped 
picture of Muhammad, and some of these are very offensive indeed. In London we have 
seen the disgusting demonstration with placards calling for fresh suicide bombers. And that 
has in turn ensured, I think, that the leaders of the fascist British National Party can never be 
successfully prosecuted. Last week they walked free when a jury could not agree to convict 
them of inciting hatred against Muslims. After the demonstrations in London, it will be 
difficult to find a jury whose members all find their views unreasonable. 
That's not the only bad news for liberalism. All the large, general principles involved in this 
row are going to end up as battered as Major Napier at Corunna. The questions must 
instead be decided by politics, which is to say by the intelligent self-interested use of largely 
unarmed pressure. In the end some compromise will be struck between the right of 
newspapers to offend and the right of Muslims not to be offended, but it won't be logical. It 
just may be better than that. It may be something that all Europeans of any religion can live 
with. We can hope. 
 
TGC45 
Jerusalem Post publishes Muhammad cartoons 
The Jerusalem Post today became the first Israeli newspaper to publish the controversial 
Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad that have sparked furore across the 
Muslim world.  
A facsimile of the original page from the Danish paper Jyllands-Posten, in which all twelve 
cartoons were published, on September 30, is featured in today's edition of the paper.  
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The image is one column wide and about two-and-a-half inches high, on page six of today's 
paper, in an article about the weekend protests against the cartoons across the Islamic 
world. 
It is also available on the Jerusalem Post digital edition, available to paying subscribers only, 
but not on the paper's free-access website.  
The Jerusalem Post did not wish to comment on its decision to publish when it was 
contacted today by MediaGuardian.co.uk. 
But in an editorial published today, entitled "The Prophet's Honor", the paper contrasts the 
outcry that the Danish cartoons are causing in the Muslim world, while "Arab cartoonists 
routinely demonise Jews as global conspirators, corrupters of society and blood-suckers".  
"Arab political 'humour' knows no bounds," the Jerusalem Post editorial said. "A cartoon in 
Qatar's Al-Watan depicted prime minister Ariel Sharon drinking from a goblet of Palestinian 
children's blood. Another, in the Egyptian Al-Ahram al-Arabi, showed him jackbooted, 
bloody-handed and crushing peace." 
The editorial added: "There are those who would argue that the controversy does not 
reflect a clash of civilisations. Yet it is precisely this persistent refusal to acknowledge the 
obvious that weakens the cause of tolerance and liberty. Must 'understanding' invariably 
result in the abdication of western values?  
"If anyone wants to appreciate why the west views with such suspicion the weapons 
programmes of Muslim states such as Iran, they need look no further than the intolerance 
Muslim regimes exhibit to these cartoons, and what this portends.  
"No one wants to add fuel to the fire. Mobs are more easily placated than reasoned with. 
But once this controversy passes it will be valuable to determine just who exploited the flap 
to foment anti-Western outrage, and to inquire what 'moderate' Muslim voices said.  
"Globalism demands that points of contact between Islam and the west be multi-cultural 
havens, not flashpoints. For that to happen, tolerance must be a two-way street." 
 
TGC46 
Danish paper rejected Jesus cartoons 
Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper that first published the cartoons of the prophet 
Muhammad that have caused a storm of protest throughout the Islamic world, refused to 
run drawings lampooning Jesus Christ, it has emerged today. 
The Danish daily turned down the cartoons of Christ three years ago, on the grounds that 
they could be offensive to readers and were not funny. 
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In April 2003, Danish illustrator Christoffer Zieler submitted a series of unsolicited cartoons 
dealing with the resurrection of Christ to Jyllands-Posten. 
Zieler received an email back from the paper's Sunday editor, Jens Kaiser, which said: "I 
don't think Jyllands-Posten's readers will enjoy the drawings. As a matter of fact, I think that 
they will provoke an outcry. Therefore, I will not use them." 
The illustrator said: "I see the cartoons as an innocent joke, of the type that my Christian 
grandfather would enjoy." 
"I showed them to a few pastors and they thought they were funny." 
But the Jyllands-Posten editor in question, Mr Kaiser, said that the case was "ridiculous to 
bring forward now. It has nothing to do with the Muhammad cartoons. 
"In the Muhammad drawings case, we asked the illustrators to do it. I did not ask for these 
cartoons. That's the difference," he said. 
"The illustrator thought his cartoons were funny. I did not think so. It would offend some 
readers, not much but some." 
The decision smacks of "double-standards", said Ahmed Akkari, spokesman for the Danish-
based European Committee for Prophet Honouring, the umbrella group that represents 27 
Muslim organisations that are campaigning for a full apology from Jyllands-Posten. 
"How can Jyllands-Posten distinguish the two cases? Surely they must understand," Mr 
Akkari added. 
Meanwhile, the editor of a Malaysian newspaper resigned over the weekend after printing 
one of the Muhammad cartoons that have unleashed a storm of protest across the Islamic 
world. 
Malaysia's Sunday Tribune, based in the remote state of Sarawak, on Borneo island, ran one 
of the Danish cartoons on Saturday. It is unclear which one of the 12 drawings was 
reprinted. 
Printed on page 12 of the paper, the cartoon illustrated an article about the lack of impact 
of the controversy in Malaysia, a country with a majority Muslim population. 
The newspaper apologised and expressed "profound regret over the unauthorised 
publication", in a front page statement on Sunday. 
"Our internal inquiry revealed that the editor on duty, who was responsible for the same 
publication, had done it all alone by himself without authority in compliance with the 
prescribed procedures as required for such news," the statement said. 
The editor, who has not been named, regretted his mistake, apologised and tendered his 
resignation, according to the statement. 
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Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over cartoons 
Political and religious leaders in Lebanon sought to calm sectarian tensions today, a day 
after Islamic extremists set fire to a building housing the Danish embassy and rampaged 
through a Christian quarter of Beirut. 
The demonstrations - which began, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, in protest against 
cartoons of the prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper - quickly developed 
into a sectarian crisis in a nation already fraught with religious differences. 
Lebanon's interior minister, Hassan Sabei, resigned late on Sunday after criticism of the 
failure of the security forces to curb the violence. He said that the protest got out of control 
because of a hardcore of "infiltrators".  
"The one remaining option was an order to shoot, but I was not prepared to order the 
troops to shoot Lebanese citizens," he said. 
Although much of the building housing the embassy was severely damaged by fire, reports 
suggested the embassy itself, which was on an upper floor, was still intact. 
Many people in Lebanon have accused Syria of instigating the violence, and said it was part 
of a broader campaign by Damascus to sow instability and sectarian division in Lebanon. The 
Syrian government ran the country as a puppet state until it was forced to pull its troops out 
last year.  
The authorities said that of 200 people arrested after the riot, 76 were Syrian and 35 were 
Palestinian. Many took this as further evidence of Syrian involvement. In the past year there 
have been a string of high-profile political assassinations in Lebanon, all blamed on Syria. UN 
investigators say they believe Syrian intelligence was behind the first and most prominent 
assassination last year, which killed the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. 
Walid Jumblat, a Druze leader and one of the most outspoken critics of Syria, directly 
accused the Damascus regime. "It seems that through sending weapons and men and using 
some Syrian workers they want to say that Lebanon will face chaos as a result of their 
departure from Lebanon," he wrote in a newspaper commentary. 
Sunday's protest was organised by Lebanon's Sunni clerical authority and by the 
Jama&iactute;a Islamiya, a conservative Sunni party linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Yesterday Asad Harmoush, the head of the party's political bureau, said he condemned the 
cartoons but had not intended the demonstration to end in violence.  
"We refuse the excuse that this is just freedom of expression. Freedom of the press 
shouldn't oppose freedom of belief," he told the Guardian. He said that a group of around 
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100 people out of a much larger crowd of several thousand were responsible for Sunday's 
violence.  
"We don't know who they were. But they obviously intended to cause destruction," he said. 
"Now we say to the Christians that they are a very dear part of our country and that what 
harms them harms us and that we sympathise and stand with them." 
But there is little doubt that the violence was a serious political setback. "It makes a difficult 
situation much more precarious," said Paul Salem, a political analyst in Beirut. "People are 
much more anxious than they were two days ago. This is a very fragile, divided and 
paralysed country. It is a sad kind of mess." 
Last night, a crowd of Christians and moderate Sunni Muslims, supporters of the late Mr 
Hariri, marched through the centre of Beirut to a Maronite church that was damaged during 
Sunday's riot. They said they wanted to dispel the fear that the divisions in Lebanese society 
were growing ever deeper. 
But some in the crowd were angry. "If Denmark attacked the people of the prophet why 
didn't the protesters go and attack them in Denmark? Why do they come here and destroy 
our churches?" said Roy Abu-Abdou, 19, a member of the student wing of the Lebanese 
Forces, a former Christian militia.  
"If they attack us again, especially our religious places, the consequences will be very 
serious," said Safwat Said, 22, another Lebanese Forces student. 
Others were more cautious. "No matter how hard others try to create tension, the Lebanese 
will never make war with each other again," said Charbil Moussa, 20, a student leader of the 
Christian Phalangist party. 
 
TGC48 
'Suicide bomber' protester apologises 
Omar Khayam, left, dressed as a suicide bomber during Saturday's protests in London, and 
outside his home in Bedford yesterday, right, apologising for his behaviour. 
A man who was photographed dressed as a suicide bomber at Friday's protest in London 
against the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad apologised "wholeheartedly" 
today to families of victims of the July 7 bombings. 
Omar Khayam said he had not intended to cause offence but added that his protest outside 
the Danish embassy remained valid because of the hurt caused to Muslims around the 
world by the cartoons, one of which depicted the prophet in a turban with a bomb sticking 
out of it. The cartoons first appeared in a Danish newspaper in September and have since 
been reproduced in papers around Europe, although not in Britain. 
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Speaking outside his home in Bedford, Mr Khayam, 22, said: "I found the pictures deeply 
offensive as a Muslim and I felt the Danish newspaper had been provocative and 
controversial, deeply offensive and insensitive.  
"But by me dressing the way I did, I did just that, exactly the same as the Danish newspaper, 
if not worse. My method of protest has offended many people, especially the families of the 
victims of the July bombings. This was not my intention." 
Downing Street today described the behaviour of some Muslim demonstrators in London 
over the last few days as "completely unacceptable". Some demonstrators carried placards 
calling for people who insult Islam to be killed. 
Tony Blair's spokesman said the police would have the government's full support in any 
actions they wished to take as a result of the demonstrations, but stressed it was for the 
police and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether arrests or prosecutions were 
justified. 
The statement was released this morning after Mr Blair spoke by phone to his Danish 
counterpart. 
"We understand the offence caused by the cartoons depicting the prophet and of course 
regret that this has happened. Such things help no one," Mr Blair's spokesman said. "It is 
always sensible for freedom of expression to be exercised with respect for religious belief. 
But nothing can justify the violence aimed at European embassies or at the country of 
Denmark.  
"The attacks on the citizens of Denmark and the people of other European countries are 
completely unacceptable, as is the behaviour of some of the demonstrators in London over 
the last few days. 
"We also strongly welcome the statements of Muslim leaders here who are themselves 
tackling the extremists who abuse their community's good name."  
The home secretary, Charles Clarke, told the Commons today that the response to the 
publication of the cartoons has "in general been respectful and restrained in the best 
traditions of British tolerance". 
"Decisions on any arrests are a matter for the police and proper authorities. They are taking 
rigorous assessments. If the police conclude there have been breaches of the law and 
decide to take any action, we would, of course, support them." 
David Davis, the shadow home secretary, who at the weekend called for the demonstrators 
to be arrested, today reiterated his call for action to be taken against those who deliberately 
tried to stir up violence, for the sake of good community relations.  
"Placards carrying the slogans calling for people who insult Islam to be beheaded or 
massacred or annihilated are direct incitements to violence," Mr Davis said. "I do expect 
that action should be taken, and taken soon. "We must continue with our traditions of 
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tolerance and respect but we must also draw a line as to what is acceptable, civilised 
behaviour. That line was emphatically crossed at the demonstration last Friday." 
The Islamic Human Rights Commission said today that calls for the prosecution of the 
protestors reflected the "double standards of the west". 
A statement from the group said that it did not condone the banners and chants on display, 
but "it is bemused as to why similar calls are not made to prosecute other irrational 
hotheads, the British National Party ... [The] IHRC strongly believes that there must be 
restrictions on freedom of speech but that these must not be selectively applied. Mockery 
of Jews, black and ethnic minority communities and women is condemned as anti-Semitism, 
racism and sexism respectively, yet mockery of Muslims is lauded as freedom of 
expression." 
The Metropolitan police announced today that it has set up a squad to investigate the 
extremists who demonstrated on Friday. The team will examine everything from video 
recordings made by officers to photographs published in newspapers. Senior detectives 
promised a "swift" inquiry. 
The exiled radical cleric, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, called for those behind the 
cartoons "to be tried and executed". 
The Syrian-born preacher, who left Britain last August and has since been banned from 
returning, warned that countries which refused to put people on trial for insulting 
Muhammad must "face the consequences". 
"The insult has been established now by everybody, Muslim and non-Muslim, and 
everybody condemns the cartoonist and condemns the cartoon," Mr Bakri told the BBC's 
Today programme. "However, in Islam, God said, and the messenger Muhammad said, 
whoever insults a prophet, he must be punished and executed. This man should be put on 
trial and if it is proven be executed."  
The cleric, who lived in Britain for 20 years and was the head of the radical group al-
Muhajiroun, which disbanded in 2004, added that Muslims in Britain were not allowed to 
kill people who insulted Islam because it was against the law of the country. 
Al-Ghuraba, an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun, organised the protest outside the Danish 
embassy in London on Friday, after which Scotland Yard received more than 100 complaints. 
Specialist police officers were understood to have taken film and photographic evidence and 
a Metropolitan police spokeswoman said any arrests would be made "at the appropriate 
time". 
Friday's demonstration was condemned by a range of Islamic organisations, from the 
moderate Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to the more radical Hizb ut-Tahrir, which Tony 
Blair is seeking to outlaw.  
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When freedom gives in to fear 
How do we resolve the row over newspaper publication of cartoons of the Prophet? 
Perhaps we should start with an apology. Many journalists on British newspapers dismiss 
their continental counterparts - possibly owing to our chronic inability to read foreign 
languages - as humourless and boring and ostentatiously politically correct. Their bravery in 
publishing those cartoons warms our hearts and makes us think again. 
From our earliest days as cub reporters it is drilled into us that, outside of the law, nothing 
stops a paper printing what it likes. The quickest way to get a story from the magistrates 
courts into a local newspaper is to ask the reporter to keep it out. 
So why didn't British newspapers pile in to show solidarity with Danes, French, Italians, 
Germans, Spanish, Dutch, Swiss and - bravest of the brave - Jordanians over this important 
issue of press freedom? The best Britain came up with was a web link in the Guardian 
directing curious readers to the cartoons. Shouldn't we at least have followed the lead of 
BBC and ITV news, which screened shots of the contentious foreign coverage in order to 
explain the row? 
The attractive explanation for our failure to do so is that papers do not print things that 
their readers may find offensive. Andreas Whittam Smith, the co-founder and former editor 
of the Independent, told BBC viewers on Friday that this was an issue not of press freedom 
but of taste and responsibility. 
The less attractive explanation is pure pragmatism. Do you want a protest greeting you next 
morning? Is it worth having production disrupted for the next few months? How will Muslim 
newsagents react to what you print? Freedom of the press is all very well, but newspapers 
are commercial operations. 
Not only that, but they should feel some responsibility for their actions. We might ask 
Danish workers whose jobs are threatened by Middle Eastern boycotts if they are happy to 
pay the price for press freedom. Is the principle behind publication of offensive cartoons 
important enough to have the Foreign Office spend the next few months clearing up the 
mess? 
Judgments are made at this pragmatic level all the time, sometimes for the greater good, 
more out of self-interest. When the Sun lost readers in Liverpool as a result of its coverage 
of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster, it did not defend the principle of free speech. 
It made a grovelling apology and spent the next 10 years sucking up to Liverpudlians in an 
attempt to win them back. 
Editors are conscious of the power of many groups, whether socially, politically or religiously 
motivated, to affect the circulation of their papers. All such groups have the right to voice 
whatever opposition - within the law - they like. All such groups can call for boycotts. The 
problem in this case is that you don't just get your newspaper boycotted: the editor of the 
472 
 
Norwegian newspaper Magazinet, which was first to reprint the cartoons, said on Friday he 
had received 30 death threats. 
It would be nice if we could dismiss all this, as Whittam Smith seemed to be doing last week, 
as a matter of good manners. Unfortunately there is a strand of Muslim opinion that 
questions not only our right to be offensive but also our right to explore and debate these 
issues. Some Muslim critics have differentiated between the publication of the cartoons as a 
provocative gesture and their reproduction as a means of explaining the row. But that was 
not a distinction that made much impact on the small crowd that descended on the BBC last 
week after it broadcast shots of the relevant continental papers. 
And we should remember that, while critics have emphasised the offensive nature of the 
cartoons at the centre of this row, many Muslims demand that no image of the Prophet of 
any kind be published. In 2001, for example, the Daily Mail commissioned the Cambridge 
academic John Casey to write an essay on Islam. Casey's piece was intelligent and 
sympathetic. Unaware, it seems, of the sensitivities, the commissioning editor asked the 
picture desk to find a picture of Muhammad to illustrate the piece. A handsome portrait 
appeared on the page, to the fury of sections of the Muslim population. 
At the Daily Telegraph, which produced a meticulously researched supplement on Islam, the 
then editor Charles Moore was aware of the sensitivities of picturing the Prophet. He was 
inclined to publish - here was an illustration of the central figure in an historical account - 
but decided the likely row would undermine the educational value of the supplement. 
That was another pragmatic decision, but we should worry that it had to be taken. We 
would not publish other historical pieces without illustrating the men and women 
concerned. 
I suspect the truth is that many British journalists feel uncomfortable with the 
accommodations we are already making, not because they think it is the role of a free press 
to cause gratuitous offence, but because we have accepted that a large group is to be 
treated with greater circumspection for fear of what it will do if we don't. 
This wasn't the time to go in for gestures, but there will be occasions on which papers must 
act. As the Daily Telegraph put it: "There might be circumstances in which the dictates of 
news left us with no choice but to publish - and where the public interest was 
overwhelmingly served by such an act, we would." 
In the meantime, we should assert our freedoms in whatever ways we can. I find I have 
spent a lot of time looking at the various images of the Prophet available on the Google and 
Yahoo internet picture sites. 
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TGC50 
Cartoon conflicts 
To describe the clash over the Danish depictions of the prophet as one between freedom 
and dogma will only fan the flames, says Tariq Ramadan 
In Copenhagen last October, as demonstrations provoked by the Danish satirical cartoons 
about Islam were starting, a reporter from the newspaper that published them told me how 
intensely the editorial staff had debated whether to go ahead, how uncomfortable many of 
them had been about the whole issue and, at the same time, how surprised they had been 
by the strong reaction from Muslims and the Arab embassies. At the time, however, the 
tension seemed likely to remain within Danish borders. 
To Danish Muslims denouncing this as an instance of racism - a provocation capitalised upon 
by the ever expanding far right in the country - my advice was to avoid reacting emotionally, 
to try to explain quietly why these cartoons were offensive and neither to demonstrate nor 
to risk activating mass movements that could prove impossible to master. At the time, a 
resolution seemed to be at hand. 
One might ask, then, why it is that three months later, some find it in their interests to pour 
fuel on the fire of a controversy, with tragic and potentially uncontrollable consequences? A 
few Danish Muslims visited Middle Eastern countries and ramped up the resentment: 
governments in the region, only too happy to prove their attachment to Islam - to bolster 
their Islamic legitimacy in the eyes of the public - took advantage of this piece of good 
fortune and presented themselves as champions of a great cause. On the other side, the 
controversy was just what some politicians, intellectuals and journalists needed to paint 
themselves as champions of the equally great struggle for freedom of expression and as 
resistance fighters against religious obscurantism in the name of western values. 
We are facing an incredible simplification, a gross polarisation: apparently a clash of 
civilisations, a confrontation between principles, with defenders, in one corner, of 
inalienable freedom of speech and, in the other, of the inviolable sacred sphere. Presented 
in such terms, the debate has unfortunately become a battle of wills, and the question 
becomes: who will win? Muslims, wanting apologies, threaten to attack European interests, 
even to attack people; western governments, intellectuals and journalists refuse to bend 
under threats, and certain media outlets have added to the controversy by republishing the 
cartoons. Most people around the world, observing these excesses, are perplexed: what 
sort of madness is this, they ask? 
It is critical we find a way out of this infernal circle and demand from those stoking this fire 
that they stop their polemics at once and create a space for serious, open, indepth debate 
and peaceful dialogue. This is not the predicted clash of civilisations. This affair does not 
symbolise the confrontation between the principles of Enlightenment and those of religion. 
Absolutely not. What is at stake at the heart of this sad story is whether or not the duelling 
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sides have the capacity to be free, rational (whether believers or atheists) and, at the same 
time, reasonable. 
The fracture is not between the west and Islam but between those who, in both worlds, are 
able to assert who they are and what they stand for with calm - in the name of faith or 
reason, or both - and those driven by exclusive certainties, blind passions, reductive 
perceptions of the other and a liking for hasty conclusions. The latter character traits are 
shared equally by some intellectuals, religious scholars, journalists and ordinary people on 
both sides. Facing the dangerous consequences these attitudes entail, it is urgent we launch 
a general call for wisdom. 
In Islam, representations of all prophets are strictly forbidden. It is both a matter of the 
fundamental respect due to them and a principle of faith requiring that, in order to avoid 
any idolatrous temptations, God and the prophets never be represented. Hence, to 
represent a prophet is a grave transgression. If, moreover, one adds the clumsy confusions, 
insults and denigration that Muslims perceived in the Danish cartoons, one can understand 
the nature of the shock expressed by large segments of Muslim communities around the 
world (and not only by practising Muslims or the radicals). To these people, the cartoons 
were too much: it was good and important for them to express their indignation and to be 
heard. 
At the same time, it was necessary for Muslims to bear in mind that, for the past three 
centuries, western societies - unlike Muslim-majority countries - have grown accustomed to 
critical, ironical - even derisive - treatment of religious symbols, among them the pope, 
Jesus Christ and even God. Even though Muslims do not share such an attitude, it is 
imperative they learn to keep an intellectual distance when faced with such provocations 
and not to let themselves be driven by zeal and fervour, which can only lead to undesirable 
ends. 
In the case of these cartoons - as clumsy as they are idiotic and malicious - it would have 
been, and it would remain, preferable if Muslims expressed their values and grievances to 
the public at large without clamour, better if they paused until such a time as calm was 
possible. Instead, what is welling up today within some Muslim communities is as 
unproductive as it is insane: the obsessive demands for apologies, boycotting of European 
products and threats of violent reprisals are excesses that must be rejected and 
condemned. 
However, it is just as excessive and irresponsible to invoke the "right to freedom of 
expression" - the right to say anything, in any way, against anybody. Freedom of expression 
is not absolute. Countries have laws that define the framework for exercising this right and 
which, for instance, condemn racist language. There are also specific rules pertaining to the 
cultures, traditions and collective psychologies in the respective societies that regulate the 
relationship between individuals and the diversity of cultures and religions. 
Racial or religious insults are not addressed in the same way in the various western 
societies: within a generally similar legal framework, each nation has its own history and 
sensitivities; wisdom requires acknowledging and respecting this reality. The reality is also 
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that the Muslim presence within western societies has changed their collective sensitivity. 
Instead of being obsessed with laws and rights - approaching a tyrannical right to say 
anything - would it not be more prudent to call upon citizens to exercise their right to 
freedom of expression responsibly and to take into account the diverse sensitivities that 
compose our pluralistic contemporary societies? 
This is not a matter of additional laws restraining the scope of free speech; it is simply one 
of calling upon everybody's conscience to exercise that right with an eye on the rights of 
others. It is more about nurturing a sense of civic responsibility than about imposing 
legislation: Muslim citizens are not asking for more censorship but for more respect. One 
cannot impose mutual respect by means of legislation; rather one teaches it in the name of 
a free, responsible and reasonable common citizenship. 
We are at a crossroads. The time has come for women and men who reject this dangerous 
division of people into two worlds to start building bridges based on common values. They 
must assert the inalienable right to freedom of expression and, at the same time, demand 
measured exercise of it. We need to promote an open, self-critical approach, to repudiate 
exclusive truths and narrow-minded, binary visions of the world. 
We are in dire need of mutual trust. The crises provoked by these cartoons shows us how, 
out of "seemingly nothing", two universes of reference can become deaf to each other and 
be seduced by defining themselves against each other - with the worst possible 
consequences. Disasters threaten that extremists on both sides would not fail to use for 
their own agendas. If people who cherish freedom, who know the importance of mutual 
respect and are aware of the imperative necessity to establish a constructive and critical 
debate, if these people are not ready to speak out, to be more committed and visible, then 
we can expect sad, painful tomorrows. The choice is ours. 
 
TGC51 
Danish embassy in Tehran attacked 
Iranian protesters burn Danish and French flags in front of the Austrian embassy in Tehran. 
Hundreds of angry protesters threw stones and firebombs at the Danish embassy in Tehran 
today to protest against the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. 
Police had encircled the embassy building but were unable to hold back up to 400 
demonstrators as they pelted the mission with stones and incendiary devices.  
So far the protesters have not breached the police cordon to get inside the structure, but 
they managed to throw a handful of firebombs over the building's high outer wall. The 
embassy had already been evacuated.  
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The Bush administration today condemned the violent protests against the cartoons that 
have taken place around the world and  urged governments to take steps to lower tensions.  
"We understand fully why people, why Muslims, find the cartoons offensive, and we've also 
spoken out about the importance of the right for people to express their views and freedom 
of speech in society," the White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, said. 
"Those who disagree with the views that were expressed certainly have the right to 
condemn them but they should be peaceful and we urge constructive dialogue about this 
difficult issue." 
The caricatures were first published in Denmark in September and have since been 
republished in other newspapers in Europe and elsewhere. Muslims consider any images of 
the prophet to be blasphemous. One of the cartoons featured Muhammad with a bomb in 
his turban. 
Some 200 Iranian student demonstrators also threw stones at the Austrian embassy in 
Tehran, breaking some windows and starting small fires. Austria was targeted because it 
currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU. Members of the Iranian parliament issued 
a statement warning that those who published the cartoons should remember the case of 
Salman Rushdie.  
The late Iranian leader issued a "fatwa", or religious edict, in 1989 calling for Rushdie's 
death following the publication of his novel The Satanic Verses, which some Muslims found 
blasphemous. 
Iranian radio and television also reported a series of boycotts of Danish medical equipment 
and consumer goods, and the suspension of trade negotiations with Denmark. 
In Afghanistan, two protesters were shot dead and three other people, including two police 
officials, were injured in the central city of Mihtarlam when police fired on hundreds of 
demonstrators, an interior ministry spokesman, Dad Mohammed Rasa, said.  
Meanwhile, Syria apologised to Chile after a mob set fire to the Chilean embassy in 
Damascus on Saturday while attacking the Danish embassy, which is in the same building.  
In Romania, the country's main press organisation today urged all media not to publish the 
cartoons, and in Chechnya, the pro-Russian government banned Danish humanitarian 
organisations from the war-torn Muslim region in protest against the pictures.  
Demonstrators threw stones at EU offices in the Gaza Strip and pulled down the EU flag. 
In Yemen, a small newspaper, al-Hurriya, was closed down and its editor arrested for 
printing the caricatures, while in Warsaw, the editor of Rzeczpospolita - a Polish newspaper 
that reprinted the images - said that he was sorry if the publication had caused offence to 
Muslims, but defended it as an act of solidarity.  
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In Jordan, a majority of parliamentarians demanded that the government cancel 
agreements with Denmark, Norway, New Zealand and other nations where the drawings 
were published. 
In Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, police fired warning shots to stop 
protesters from ripping a plaque from the wall of the US consulate in Surabaya, the 
country's second largest city, witnesses said. Hundreds of demonstrators threw rocks at the 
Danish consulate in the city before moving on to the US consulate.  
In India, riot police fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse hundreds of student 
protesters who burned Danish flags and chanted slogans in New Delhi. Dozens of protesters 
torched Danish flags, burned tyres and shouted slogans in several parts of Srinagar, Kashmir, 
police said.  
In Bangkok, about 400 members of Thailand's Muslim minority shouted "God is Great" 
outside Denmark's embassy, and some demonstrators stamped on a Danish flag.  
In Malaysia, an editor of a newspaper that ran one of the drawings to accompany an article 
about the lack of impact of the controversy inside the country resigned, according to a 
statement seen Monday. 
 
TGC52 
Rioting with well-planned spontaneity 
It was one of those unpredictable Lebanese Sunday mornings. The ski slopes in the 
mountains overlooking Beirut would have been crowded with skiers enjoying the brilliant 
winter sunshine. Walkers were out along the Corniche, strolling in designer tracksuits. 
Downtown, the chic restaurants were preparing for lunchtime. And there were a few men 
on scooters riding around town broadcasting an imminent protest. 
It wasn't long before the heavily-laden coaches and minivans began to arrive from Beirut 
and the rest of Lebanon. They were all full of young, often bearded men who wore 
headbands and carried identical flags with calligraphic inscriptions in Arabic such as: "There 
is no god but God and Mohammad is his Prophet" and "O Nation of Muhammad, Wake Up." 
There were soon as many as 20,000 of them filling the streets. They walked up past the 
Christian quarter of Gemmayze and into the even more genteel Christian area of Achrafieh, 
gathering not far from the Danish embassy, the target of their protest. One man waved a 
placard in English that said: "Damn your beliefs and your liberty." Another carried a sign 
saying: "Whoever insults Prophet Muhammad is to be killed." 
The police seemed to know the demonstrators were coming and had turned out in force 
with barriers, barbed wire fences and several large fire trucks. Just a day earlier, the Danish 
and Norwegian embassies in Damascus had been torched by a furious mob, repeating the 
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violent protests that have spread across the world from Gaza to Afghanistan to London. On 
Saturday night, anticipating trouble, the Danish diplomatic staff in Beirut flew home. 
The mob stood in the street, chanting their fierce condemnation of the Danish cartoons that 
spawned this rapidly-spreading crisis. By 11am, the Lebanese police and army were firing 
tear gas at the crowd. The protesters threw volleys of stones. Some stuffed cotton wool into 
their nostrils to stifle the effect of the gas. 
One group overturned a car and set it alight. Sunni clerics in robes tried to calm the young 
men down. They were ignored. One cleric, Ibrahim Ibrahim, said his pleas were met with 
stones and insults. "They are hooligans," he said. 
The mob grew fiercer, and finally the police withdrew. As they moved back, the crowd 
smashed their way into the building housing the Danish embassy and set it ablaze. From the 
burning building they hung a banner that read: "We are ready to sacrifice our children for 
you, O Prophet Muhammad." By now dozens of people had been wounded or arrested and 
at least one person was killed, a protester apparently caught up in the fire at the embassy 
building. 
The many politicians representing Lebanon's fractured sectarian society sensed this was 
suddenly a situation a long way out of control. "It is the work of infiltrators," said Saiad 
Hariri, a prominent Sunni politician. "These acts have nothing to do with the Prophet. They 
are harming Muslims." 
On the street, the riot began to take a more sectarian turn. Throwing the metal barriers and 
barbed wire aside they chased the police up into the narrow alleys of Achrafieh, well 
beyond the embassy and deep into the Christian quarter. They smashed dozens of parked 
cars and tossed bricks through the windows of the furniture boutiques and hair salons. 
Others overturned two police cars and threw rocks through the windows of the St Maron 
church. 
"What is the guilt of the citizens of Achrafieh for caricatures published in Denmark?" said 
Charles Rizk, the justice minister and a Christian. "This sabotage should stop." 
Asad Harmoush, a leader of Jamaía Islamiya, the conservative Sunni Muslim group that had 
helped organise the protest, tried to deflect the blame. "We can't control tens of thousands 
of people. We tried to limit the harm and we extend our excuses to our brothers in 
Achrafieh and to the security forces. There has to be an investigation. Obviously there were 
infiltrators." 
And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. The leaders of the 
mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it was time to leave. 
Obediently the crowd thinned out and began walking back to the buses, even as the Danish 
embassy continued to burn. By 3pm there wasn't a single protester left on the street. Later, 
the Lebanese interior minister, Hassan Sabei, announced his resignation. 
The police returned in force, and with nothing to do they began taking photographs of each 
other in front of the burned-out building. Firemen hosed down the blaze. Crowds of Filipino 
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maids returned from their day off back to their jobs in the homes of the wealthy, while the 
wealthy were out patching up their cars. Dozens of street sweepers hosed down the roads 
and collected the debris of the day. 
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The Independent (TIC16-TIC22) 
TIC16  
Authorities backed Damascus riots, say protesters 
Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus 
at the weekend were encouraged to organise by the Syrian authorities, and received text 
messages from Islamic study centres urging them to gather, according to participants in the 
riot. 
"The sheikhs told us to send five text messages to every true Muslim we knew urging them 
to participate," said a student from the conservative Abu Nour Islamic Institute in Damascus, 
who wished to remain anonymous. "The authorities gave a green light for us to organise the 
gathering in public and to participate in it." 
The Middle East has for months been a tinderbox of pent-up anti-Western anger, and the 
publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed was the spark that lit the fuse. But the 
fury displayed by crowds in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq may also have been exploited by 
some Muslim countries to settle scores with Western powers. Syria and Iran face growing 
pressure from the US and Europe on the issues of Iraq and on Tehran's nuclear programme. 
And Egypt, one of the first to publicly criticise the cartoons, has been critical of the Danish 
government for funding critics of human rights abuses. 
"This is an organised attempt to take advantage of Muslim anger for purposes that do not 
serve the interests of Muslims and Lebanon, but those of others beyond the border," 
Lebanese Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad, a Christian, said yesterday after riots in 
Beirut. 
Wael Bawabigy, a young Damascus trader, who took part in Saturday's violent 
demonstration, which the White House said could not have happened "without government 
knowledge and support", said security forces armed with tear gas and rubber bullets were 
taken by surprise. 
Iraq's Transport Ministry has frozen contracts with Denmark and Norway in protest. 
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TIC17 
Ministers appeal for calm 
Senior ministers appealed for calm as Conservatives demanded that police take action 
against Muslim demonstrators who threatened retaliation against countries whose media 
published the offending cartoons. 
The fallout from Friday's London demonstrations dominated political debate as MPs and 
Muslim leaders condemned protesters who carried placards with slogans such as "Massacre 
those who insult Islam". 
Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, said that he was 
"disgusted" by the protests while the group Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has been threatened with 
proscription, said the placards were "not acceptable." 
Peter Hain, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, appealed yesterday for all sides in 
the controversy to "cool it". 
But Dominic Grieve, the shadow attorney general, criticised police for failing to arrest radical 
demonstrators on Friday. "It is certainly not a happy state of affairs where such a 
demonstration takes place and those people who are acting in that way don't end up under 
arrest before the demonstration is ended." 
David Winnick, a Labour member of the Commons Home Affairs Committee, called for 
people carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism to be prosecuted or 
deported. 
Scotland Yard said police had received more than 100 complaints about the protests but no 
arrests were made. A spokesman said: "Arrests, if necessary, will be made at the most 
appropriate time. All complaints made to police will be investigated." 
Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, also condemned the placards, and described the attacks 
on the Danish embassy in Beirut as "absolutely outrageous and totally unjustified and what 
we want to see is this matter being calmed down." 
 
TIC18 
Bruce Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for our own values 
Those who insist on living in a theocracy must find their way to the nearest airport  
The embattled Danish newspaper has performed a valuable public service. It may have 
caused mayhem across several continents; is this the first globalised riot? But the cartoons 
did not create the tension. They merely highlighted it. They have forced Europe to face a 
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problem which most political elites would rather ignore, although it will be one of the major 
questions of the next few decades: How are we to achieve peaceful coexistence with Islam? 
A lot of soggy liberals now believe that if no one talked about the problem, it would just go 
away. Every day, people who used to think like that arrive, at last, in cancer specialists' 
waiting-rooms. In Christian-Muslim relations, such delay could be equally fatal. 
The problems go beyond religion. It is not necessary to be a vulgar Marxist to believe that 
many Muslims have economic and political reasons for hating the West. It is also true that, 
for many Muslims, Westophobia is a displacement activity, giving them an excuse to blame 
their misfortunes on others. No one can predict what the Muslim world will look like in 20 
years' time. There is only one point on which we can be certain. It will still generate many 
more grievances than it can consume. 
But religion is crucial, and Christians are handicapped in dealing with this, at least in Europe 
- where most of them have forgotten to take religion seriously. This is linked to the decline 
of belief in personal salvation; once people no longer fear hell or hope for heaven, there is 
less incentive to cling to the Church's teachings. There is a related development. Christians 
have stopped believing in the superiority of their own faith. 
Christians are surely obliged to believe that their faith is based on a unique and 
transcendent truth: Christ, His divinity, His sacrifice, His resurrection. A Christian in 
possession of such a truth ought not to be selfish. Indeed, he is enjoined not to hog it to 
himself but to share it with all mankind. Nor is he entitled to feel superior because he is 
fortunate enough to be a Christian. But he must believe in the superiority of his faith to the 
lesser doctrines professed by those who have not yet seen the light. 
Yet most European Christians would find that idea indecent; almost worthy of a bill 
proscribing religious hatred. For the body and blood of Christ, read a purée of live and let 
live, tolerance and ecumenism. Such Christians have lost contact with historical Christianity 
and with history. As a result, they not only fail to understand their own religion. They cannot 
understand other faiths, especially Islam. 
Islam has no concept of secularism and the division of authority between church and state. 
There are comparisons with the jurisdictional disputes between kings and popes during the 
Middle Ages. The Protestant/ Catholic conflict which had such influence on European history 
for several centuries is equally relevant (it is to be hoped that Christians and Muslims find a 
quicker, less bloody path to tolerance). 
There are plenty of Muslims today - including British subjects - who would regard 
Hildebrand, that most intransigent of Papal imperialists, as a moderate, and whose faith 
resembles Calvin's or Philip II's. If keeping them quiescent requires the suppression of a few 
cartoons, it might seem a cheap price. But there are two objections. The first is cowardice; 
the second, that the cowardice would not succeed. The cartoons would not be the only 
concession. As the Danes have realised, there is no point in paying Danegeld. Once you start 
ordering from the menu of cowardice, you lose control of the bill. The Muslim extremists 
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would be convinced that, stumbling between cowardice and cultural cringe, the West would 
always capitulate. 
There have already been covert capitulations, especially in Koranic scholarship. Muslims are 
obliged to believe that the Archangel Gabriel dictated the Koran to Mohamed. No serious 
free scholar now accepts that the text which we have today was written by one man during 
a brief period. It underwent changes for a century and a half. 
Although this is an interesting point, academics are curiously reluctant to publicise it. There 
are allusions in learned journals, which no doubt rely on their obscurity to protect them 
from fatwas (yet what could be more obscure than Salman Rushdie's prose?). The fear of 
Muslim reaction is already inhibiting Koranic scholarship. 
It is time for us to stop cringing and to stand up for our own values. Over the past few 
decades we appear to have decided that there is a basic entitlement to free speech. Short of 
the laws on libel and slander and the prohibition against shouting "fire" in a crowded 
theatre, there are virtually no constraints. 
Though we should always be restrained by the dictates of courtesy, we must be free to say 
what we like on public affairs. Those who find this intolerable and insist on living in a 
theocracy must find their way to the nearest airport. 
 
TIC19 
'Police must bear down on extremist protesters' 
Police should come down "heavily" on anti-cartoon protesters who broke the law, a Cabinet 
Minister demanded today as an extremist cleric called for the artist to face execution. 
The Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Hain said the actions of some Muslims in London at 
the weekend had been "completely unacceptable and intolerable". 
Placards threatened a repeat of the 11 September and 7 July atrocities following the 
publication of cartoons in Denmark depicting the prophet Mohammed, sparking calls for 
action. 
Amid violence in cities across the world - which has seen one death in Afghanistan and 
embassies torched - UK-based Muslim groups condemned extreme aspects of the 
demonstrations here. 
But radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed insisted on the BBC this morning that anyone who 
"insults a prophet" must be punished and executed. 
That did not mean a vigilante murder, he insisted, but warned that any country which 
refused to put people on trial for such insults would have to "face the consequences". 
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Reacting to the protests, Mr Hain said on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme: 
"Demonstrators on the streets over the weekend were doing things and saying things that 
are completely unacceptable and intolerable. 
"The police need to bear down on them very heavily and chase down those who have 
committed offences and prosecute them where they can get the evidence, because there is 
freedom of speech on the one hand - that is sacrosanct. 
"But on the other hand, incitement to terror, incitement to suicide bombing - all of those 
are clear infringements of the law. 
"And where there is evidence to back that up, then prosecutions will obviously follow and 
the police are investigating that now." 
The demonstration was condemned by a range of Muslim organisations, from the moderate 
Muslim Council of Britain to the more radical Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which Prime Minister Tony Blair 
is seeking to outlaw because of claims it backs terrorism. 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir organised a less incendiary protest in London on Saturday, which passed off 
without incident. 
The Shadow Home Secretary David Davis has called for a "no tolerance" approach from the 
police to banners whose slogans consisted of incitement to murder. 
Specialist police officers who attended the demo were understood to have taken film and 
photographic evidence, but no protesters were arrested. 
The Metropolitan Police spokeswoman has said any arrests would be made "at the 
appropriate time". 
Lord Harris, a board member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, backed the policing of 
the demonstrations, saying immediate public safety had to be the first consideration. 
"It is much more important to deal with that and to make sure that people in the immediate 
environment are physically safe and then to assess whether other offences have been 
committed. 
"That, I think, seems to have been the approach in this case, but we will need to look at it in 
some detail." 
Bakri Mohammed, who left the UK for Lebanon in August amid suggestions he might be 
charged with treason for allegedly praising the July 7 bombers, said on the programme: "The 
insult has been established now by everybody, Muslim and non-Muslim, and everybody 
condemns the cartoonist and condemns the cartoon. 
"However, in Islam, God said, and the messenger Mohammed said, whoever insults a 
prophet, he must be punished and executed. 
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"This man should be put on trial and if it is proven to be executed." 
Muslims around the world must not kill anyone who insulted Mohammed "by their own 
personal, individual initiative", he added. 
"We are not saying ourselves to go there and start to look to him and kill him, we are not 
talking about that. We are talking about Islamic rules. If anybody insults the prophet, he will 
have to take a punishment." 
One man who was pictured dressed up a suicide bomber at the protest has defended his 
actions and said he wanted to expose "double standards". 
Building student Omar Khayam, 22, of Bedford, said: "I would do it again to make a point. I 
could have gone and held up banners or something, but this made the point better. 
"If certain people have the right to do what they want and other people don't, then that is 
double standards." 
* Hundreds of Afghans clashed with police and soldiers today during a demonstration 
against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. One person was killed and 
four were wounded. Police fired on the demonstrators after a man in the crowd shot at 
them and others threw stones and knives during the rally in the central Afghan city of 
Mihtarlam, said a spokesman for the Interior Ministry. 
* Riot police in New Delhi fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse hundreds of students 
protesting against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in European 
newspapers. The protesters chanted slogans and burned a Danish flag before riot police 
broke up the demonstration. 
 
TIC20 
Robert Fisk: The Fury  
Religious fury threatens to wrest control from secular governments  
After Syria, the fires fanned by Denmark's anti-Prophet cartoons spread to Lebanon 
yesterday with sectarian intensity. 
Anger flashing through the Muslim world over the weekend saw protesters burn Danish 
flags and attack buildings from Lahore to Gaza. The Islamic Army in Iraq, one of the main 
insurgent groups, made a blood-curdling call yesterday for violence against citizens of 
countries where caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed have been published. 
"We swear to God, if we catch one of their citizens in Iraq, we will cut him to pieces, to take 
revenge for Prophet," it said in an unverified internet statement. 
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In Lebanon yesterday, 2,000troops fought demonstrators in the heart of Christian Beirut 
during the day as the Danish consulate was set on fire and a large church was attacked by a 
mob. Other demonstrators headed for the Lebanese foreign ministry. One protester at the 
consulate was trapped by flames and died after jumping from the third floor. 
Yestereday's violence may have been inspired by the previous day's assaults on the Danish 
and Norwegian embassies in Damascus - or were perhaps encouraged by the same Baath 
party which must have originally permitted the Syrian demonstrations to take place. 
More likely, the crowds in both cities were allowed by the authorities to stage protests, but 
the demonstrators quickly became overwhelmed as Sunni extremists - in Lebanon, perhaps 
from the Salafist Hezb al-Tahrir party in Tripoli, and equally Wahhabi-minded Palestinians 
from the Ein el-Helweh refugee camp - arrived with sticks and stones to assault the Danish 
property and then to attack the St Maroun church and march on the Lebanese foreign 
ministry. 
If this is true, it shows how quickly two nationalist Arab governments can be challenged by 
Islamists within their own countries. The 2,000-strong Lebanese security forces had to be 
deployed in east Beirut to fire tear gas and live rounds into the air to hold back the rioters. 
For Lebanon, divided along sectarian lines as it has been since its creation by the French in 
the 1920s, it was a grim and bitter day - perhaps the worst since ex-Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri was assassinated on 14 February last year - which brought Muslim demonstrators into 
the centre of Christian east Beirut where the Danish consulate is - or rather was - located. 
Burning fire engines and smashing cars parked in the streets, however, brought back ugly 
memories of the 15-year Lebanese civil war. 
Little wonder, then, that Charles Rizk, the Justice Minister, asked angrily: "What is the guilt 
of the people of Ashrafieh for cartoons published in Denmark?'' Ashrafieh, needless to say, 
is an almost entirely Christian sector of Beirut. 
Fouad Siniora, the Lebanese Prime Minister - who, under the country's unwritten 
constitution, must be a Sunni - insisted that this was not the way for Muslims to express 
their anger. One Sunni prelate who appeared on the streets in a vain attempt to calm the 
demonstrators remarked that "they have done more damage to the name of the Prophet 
today than the cartoons in Denmark''. 
Lebanon's Interior Minister, Hassan al-Sabaa, resigned yesterday, becoming the first political 
casualty of the crisis. 
At least 30 people were arrested and the Lebanese authorities later announced - predictably 
- that most were "foreigners". Whenever any civil unrest occurs in Lebanon, foreigners are 
always blamed - just as they were throughout the civil war - although it will be interesting to 
see if there are any Syrians among their number. Christian politicians complain that the 
Lebanese government, which knew that there would be demonstrations, should have dealt 
more "firmly" with the demonstrators - for "firmly", read "fatally". 
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But, in fact, the Lebanese troops managed to avoid shooting any of the protesters dead; 
"martyrs" would only have provided room for more violent demonstrations - and 
yesterday's battle in east Beirut was in marked contrast to the way Israeli soldiers deal with 
Arab demonstrators. The Lebanese, far from firing bullets into the surging crowds, pushed 
them back with water cannons. 
There is no doubting that those preposterous cartoons originally published in Copenhagen 
last September have lit a small inferno across the Middle East. In Nablus, Palestinian 
gunmen stormed the French cultural centre yesterday. In Qatar, the government announced 
it would no longer accept trade delegations from Denmark. Iran recalled its ambassador 
from Copenhagen. 
Muslim demonstrators could be seen on the streets of Beirut yesterday with green banners 
bearing the legend: "Oh Nation of Mohamed, Wake Up!'' The danger for the West - as well 
as the dictatorships and semi-democracies of the Middle East - is that rather a lot of 
members of the nation of Mohamed will do just that. 
Syria is a largely Sunni nation ruled by Alawites - a branch of Shiism - and it is not difficult to 
see how even minimum Baathist encouragement of Saturday's demonstrators quickly 
turned into a Sunni protest.The Norwegian embassy had demanded extra protection from 
Syria - but was not provided with the security forces it asked for. There will be many 
questions asked about this among Europeans in Damascus; for it is the same old problem: 
who runs Syria? 
 
TIC21 
Stephen Glover on the press: No News is Good News 
If d'Ancona gets the job, he'll have Neil as a very interested spectator  
It has taken longer to find a new editor of The Spectator than it did to find a new Pope, but 
the wait is nearly over. Almost everyone who has followed this saga assumes that the new 
occupant of this great office will be Matthew d'Ancona, the deputy editor of The Sunday 
Telegraph. If so, it will represent a setback for Andrew Neil, the chief executive of The 
Spectator, who was generally believed to be scouring the world for an abrasive, right-wing 
Scotsman in his own image. 
Mr d'Ancona, though not obviously a scion of the privileged and allegedly effete class which 
Mr Neil despises, is certainly the Establishment candidate. He is a fellow of All Souls and the 
author of theological books. Politically he tills ground to the left of Mr Neil, and has been as 
friendly towards the Blairite project as he is now towards the Cameroonian one. Unlike Mr 
Neil, he has shown little, if any, animus towards the forces of privilege which have 
supposedly been sucking the life-blood out of this country. Indeed, the interesting thing 
about Mr d'Ancona is that he seldom evinces a strong dislike of anyone or anything. 
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If this admirable man should be installed as editor, Mr Neil will claim the credit, and 
announce that The Spectator is in brilliant hands. So it may be, but they are not the hands 
he would have chosen given free rein. Now that the Scotsman titles have been sold, the 
magazine over which he presides is no more than a small outlying province of the Barclay 
brothers' empire, yet he is not allowed to rule even this slim parcel of land on his own. 
Aidan Barclay, son of Sir David, has taken part in the interviewing of some 12 candidates for 
the editorship, along with Mr Neil. Mr Barclay has been advised by wise voices of the merits 
of a respectable candidate such as Mr d'Ancona rather than an obscure ideologue. Murdoch 
MacLennan, the chief executive of the Barclay-owned Telegraph Group and the ruler of a far 
greater territory than Mr Neil could dream of, may also have added his counsel. 
None of this means that the magazine is bound to be safe from Mr Neil's depredations. Mr 
d'Ancona - and let me stress that the appointment is not made, and might still go elsewhere 
- is said by his detractors to be naturally emollient, and likely to defer to the assertive, 
crinkly-haired Scot. At the very least, Mr Neil will want a bigger say in the editorial affairs of 
The Spectator. 
Last week it was announced that the magazine had acquired two associate editors to 
improve its political and economic coverage. Fraser Nelson will join The Business (the little-
read but quite good Sunday newspaper of which Mr Neil is editor-in-chief) from The 
Scotsman, where he was a well-regarded political editor; Alastair Heath is already the 
economics editor of The Business. The point is that both men will be working for Mr Neil, 
and yet have been given extra responsibilities on The Spectator. He has actually made two 
important appointments which should by rights come within the purview of the magazine's 
new editor. 
Mr Neil has also announced that The Spectator will be moving from its charming house in 
Bloomsbury, which it has occupied since 1975, to premises in Westminster. He will be able 
to pop into the magazine's new office from an adjacent BBC studio, where he is often to be 
found, or nip across in his limousine from The Business's home in nearby Victoria. If I were 
Mr d'Ancona, the prospect of daily visitations from Mr Neil might make me think twice as 
my hand hovered over the contract. 
Mr Neil wants to change The Spectator - to make it less clubby and elitist (as he sees it), 
more global and hard-hitting - perhaps another version of The Economist. Some may think 
such a transformation a good thing, but it would certainly kill off the existing magazine, 
which has been pretty successful, gradually adding sales for more than 15 years while many 
newspapers have been losing circulation. Mr Neil does not like The Spectator as it is. In a 
letter to The Guardian last week, he derided the perfectly legitimate suggestion of my 
colleague Cristina Odone in that newspaper that he wanted to destroy the legacy of Boris 
Johnson, the last editor. The truth is that he did not have much time for Boris, and that Boris 
did not have much time for him. 
Mr d'Ancona's appointment would be well-judged. It is almost certainly not one that Mr Neil 
would make left to his own devices. The Barclays have seemingly listened to other voices, 
and we must hope that they continue to do so. For no one should doubt that in Mr Neil's 
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restless and driven mind the transformation - I would say probable destruction - of The 
Spectator is intended to be the consummation of his life's work. 
No news is good news  
The really interesting question about the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed is why some 
respectable European newspapers chose to publish them while (at the time of writing) all 
British titles chose not to. 
One reason might be that our own newspapers have a more finely developed sense of taste. 
Given the normally rumbustious character of our Press, this may be hard to accept. Many 
newspapers are happy to report details that might be offensive to Christians in what, after 
all, was once supposed to be a Christian country. 
So what explains their reticence this time? One possibility is that our papers are more 
commercially minded than many on the continent. Some of them have a fairly high 
proportion of Muslim readers, of whom even the most moderate might be appalled by 
these cartoons. In what is probably the world's most competitive market, no newspaper 
wants to face a boycott. There is also the risk that some of the many paper shops owned 
and run by Muslims might somehow discriminate against - or be urged to do so by more 
extreme Muslims - a newspaper which published the cartoons. 
This is not to deny that there may be good reasons for eschewing them. They seem stupid 
and extreme, and the Danish title which first carried them made a mistake, as it has 
subsequently admitted. A problem arises now because people want to know what has 
caused the furore. By withholding the cartoons our papers are in a sense suppressing a 
piece of news. This presumably explains why the BBC and Channel 4 decided to show 
fleeting images. 
Had it been my decision, I suppose I would not have published the pictures out of respect 
for Muslims, but I would not have been entirely proud of myself. There is a gigantic culture 
clash here. Free speech is under threat. And there are millions of Muslims who believe that 
western governments can and should tell newspapers what they can, and cannot, publish. 
 
TIC22 
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: The double standards over free speech  
This staged clash of fundamentalisms now has an audience of billions. The climax is likely to 
be grisly. European journalists have got the show fight they wanted, Flemming Rose, the 
culture editor of Denmark's Jyllands-Posten, sought out controversial cartoonists to create 
caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed, not because they had something bold and compelling 
to say, but simply to enrage, like bullfighters goading a bull. Other newspapers have 
reprinted the cartoons in a supposed act of solidarity. What they have done, in fact, is 
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belittle freedom of expression. They have taken something precious and turned it into a 
licence for the intelligentsia to behave like yobs. 
These liberal warriors, high on conceit, want to demonstrate that Muslims can never be a 
part of Europe, because, well, they are too backward to hoot aloud when their revered 
prophet is shown with a bomb for a turban. I am not amused either, so should I pack the 
bags? Many of these countries were infamous for their state terrorism against Jews. Since 
then they have systematically mistreated generations of Muslims. 
Right on cue, out came the dishcloths, Bin Laden surrogates with murderous banners and 
belligerence. A sweetheart baby is held aloft wearing a snug cap with a red heart 
proclaiming love of al-Qa'ida. Is their faith so uncertain that a few ink lines can shrivel it? 
Threats and deaths for stupid pictures; what kind of morality is that? 
Muslims live as abject prisoners of their dictatorial states. They flee to places where they 
can breathe easier and speak. Then, a minority turn into the vicious thought-dogs they left 
behind. Most of us Muslims detest them more than whites ever could. 
In an Arab coffee-shop this weekend, emotional arguments raged. I agreed with those who 
said neither publications nor writers should be harassed, but equally, that Muslims can 
protest, boycott goods, refuse to be defined by extremism, and question iniquitous double 
standards. 
Muslims are not the only enemies of free speech. Go to Singapore and speak with an 
unrestrained tongue. I have had death threats from from Americans and white racists who, 
like Nick Griffin, cherish their right to hate. 
And freedom of expression stands aside for money. Google capitulates in China, and 
Denmark will too, once the boycott of its goods cuts in. Where are the impassioned 
arguments against the Serious Organised Crime Act that stops people of conscience quietly 
protesting outside Parliament? 
Judgements are exercised daily by newspapers on what should be published. There are 
internalised restraints of decency and civil duties of care. A media lawyer wouldn't let me 
criticise Lord Winston because, I was told: "He is very powerful, and also Jewish. It could be 
taken the wrong way." She won the argument. 
In 2002, the New Statesman printed what was viewed as an anti-Semitic cover and the 
editor was deluged with protest. A cartoon of Ariel Sharon in this newspaper caused similar 
outrage. The Daily Mail caused offence when it printed a cartoon of the 58 Chinese 
immigrants who suffocated in the back of a truck. We do not abuse fat people or walk into 
pubs and announce to the gathered: "Wogs and niggers stink." 
Ordinary Muslims have convincingly argued against gratuitous provocation. Now they must 
reassert as powerfully how they value the freedom to be and to speak in the way Europe 
allows them to. That should confound and silence their liberal enemies. 
 
491 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 – The ‘2005 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ CDA Analysis – Arab 
Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
492 
 
 
 
The Gulf News (GNC20-GNC25) 
GNC 20 
Dismissed professor not reinstated: official 
A Zayed University professor who was dismissed over the cartoon row has not been 
pardoned, a university official said. 
Dubai: A Zayed University professor who was dismissed over the cartoon row has not been 
pardoned, a university official said. 
It was claimed by news reports in UAE English dailies that Professor Andrew Hirst, 
supervisor of the English Language Centre at ZU, was reinstated yesterday. A senior official 
at the University said: "Whatever you read was wrong."  
Students welcomed the university's decision. Mass communication student Nada Ali said 
that freedom of expression is bound by social responsibility. 
She said: "You can't just say anything and cite freedom of speech as an excuse." 
The Zayed University official clarified that Hirst will be allowed to complete the current 
academic year to prevent further disruption of student interests. 
The official said: "All links with him will be severed after June 14." 
Hirst and Claudia Kiburz, another university professor, were fired last week after Kiburz 
distributed prints of the cartoons in class. 
 
GNC21 
Violence erupts at cartoon protests 
At least two people were killed and dozens injured in Lahore when angry protesters 
attacked dozens of government and private buildings on the Mall road.  
They also set on fire the Punjab Assembly building, McDonald's and KFC restaurants and 
several bank buildings.  
According to Lahore police, those who were killed were shot dead by security guards of the 
Union Bank as the miscreants tried to set the LDA Plaza building on fire, which houses the 
Union Bank as well as the McDonald's restaurant.  
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The Senior Superintendent of Lahore Police Amir Zulfiqar has confirmed that two people 
were shot dead and several others wounded due to heavy stone throwing.  
Thousands of protesters had gathered on the Mall road in response to a strike call given by 
the six-party religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) that wanted to register its 
protest over the publication of blasphemous cartoons in some European newspapers.  
Most of the angry protesters were young students of local schools and colleges affiliated to 
several militant religious organisations, mostly the student wings of the political parties.  
 
The protesters, who were chanting slogans and carrying banners against some European 
countries as well as the US, forcibly closed shops on the Mall road and damaged property.  
In a bid to control the situation, local police fired tear gas and resorted to baton charge to 
disperse the mob which retaliated strongly and started pelting stones and crackers on the 
police force.  
A group of protesters made their way into the Punjab Assembly building and set ablaze the 
room next to the chamber of the leader of opposition in the Assembly.  
Most of the violent youth were carrying banners of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant wing of 
Jamaatul Daawa, headed by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed.  
The chief minister himself was confined to the Assembly building despite repeated attempts 
by his security staff to ensure his safe exit from the Assembly premises.  
The protesters had set up barricades of burning tyres to block off sections of the city, where 
most shops and markets remained closed in response to calls for a complete strike.  
 
The protestors also damaged over 200 private cars, three banks and dozens of shops, 
besides burning a large portrait of General Pervez Musharraf.  
 
The office of Telenor, a Norwegian mobile phone company, was looted and rioters were 
seen fleeing with computers, mobile phones and other equipment despite the presence of 
heavy police contingents.  
Asked why the protesters were not stopped from taking out the rally on the Mall road 
despite a ban, Punjab Law Minister Raja Basharat said the ban was lifted for the day after 
the protesting parties had assured the city district government that the rally would remain 
peaceful and would not resort to violence. 
Lawmakers stage march 
Pakistani parliament members staged a march here on Tuesday to protest publication of 
blasphemous cartoons in European newspapers while police cracked down on a separate 
student rally after it turned violent at the capital's diplomatic enclave.  
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Some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both the 
opposition and government marched from the parliament to the diplomatic quarters near 
the foreign ministry. 
The two-kilometre walk followed a debate in the assembly during which legislators 
demanded suspension of diplomatic ties with the countries where the cartoons were 
published and boycott of their products. 
The MPs were led by leaders of opposition Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) Islamic grouping 
and the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy.  
 
 
Many government legislators participated in the demonstration, though no top ruling party 
figure was present in the procession. 
Earlier hundreds of students rallied in the capital and trouble broke out when they 
dismantled the police barrier at the entrance to the diplomatic enclave and started pelting 
stones, damaging street lights and windows of buildings. 
Police fired teargas shells, used water cannons and also baton-charged to disperse the 
protesters. According to police more than a dozen demonstrators were taken into custody 
while some demonstrators and policemen were slightly hurt during the turmoil. 
 
GNC22 
I was maliciously set up - cartoonist 
One of Australia's best-known cartoonists, Michael Leunig, yesterday denied entering two of 
his works in an Iranian newspaper's contest for cartoons about the Holocaust 
Sydney: One of Australia's best-known cartoonists, Michael Leunig, yesterday denied 
entering two of his works in an Iranian newspaper's contest for cartoons about the 
Holocaust, saying they were sent maliciously by someone else. 
A media report out of Tehran had said Leunig had submitted the first entry in the contest, 
launched on Monday by Hamshahri, one of Iran's top five newspapers, in retaliation for the 
publication of drawings of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). 
Leunig vehemently denied the claim, saying he had been "set up horribly, maliciously". 
He said he had been contacted late on Monday by a concerned editor at Melbourne's The 
Age newspaper, which publishes many of Leunig's cartoons. 
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"I learned last night that some of my cartoons from a few years back have been submitted 
as an entry in that competition," Leunig told the Australian Broadcasting Corp radio. "This is 
a fraud and hoax emanating, we believe, from Australia." 
An Iranian web site allegedly ran quotes from Leunig saying he had contributed the cartoons 
to "express solidarity with the Muslim world", Leunig said. 
"These were not my words at all," he said. The two cartoons that were allegedly submitted 
on behalf of Leunig were rejected for publication by The Age in 2002. 
The first drawing shows a ragged-looking man with a Star of David on his back walking 
toward the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1942 with the words "Work Brings Freedom" 
over the entrance. 
The second drawing in the series shows the same man carrying a rifle walking toward 
another gate in Israel 2002 with the words "War Brings Peace" over the entrance. 
German caricaturist receives death threats 
A political cartoonist from a leading German daily has received death threats, the paper said 
yesterday, after publishing a caricature showing the Iranian national soccer team wearing 
belts of explosives next to four German soldiers. 
Caricaturist Klaus Stuttmann said the idea of the cartoon, published in the Friday edition of 
the Tagesspiegel daily, was to challenge calls from some politicians for soldiers to provide 
security during this summer's soccer World Cup in Germany.  
But since the cartoon was picked up by an internet site serving Iranian soccer fans over the 
weekend, Stuttmann has been flooded with hate mail, including death threats, and has 
received a letter of protest from the Iranian Embassy here, the paper said. 
 
GNC23 
Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes 
Police used teargas to drive out students who stormed into Islamabad's diplomatic enclave 
yesterday and pro-testers attacked Western businesses in Pakistan's most violent reaction 
yet to cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). 
Islamabad: Police used teargas to drive out students who stormed into Islamabad's 
diplomatic enclave yesterday and pro-testers attacked Western businesses in Pakistan's 
most violent reaction yet to cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). 
In Lahore, police fired tear gas, shot into the air and baton-charged protesters who 
ransacked a McDonald's franchise and set fire to outlets of KFC and Norwegian mobile 
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phone firm Telenor. Demonstrators set dozens of vehicles on fire and staged a sit-in near 
the assembly. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao said guards at a bank that came 
under attack shot dead two men. 
In Islamabad, up to 400 students stormed past armed police guarding the diplomatic 
enclave, before being driven back by volleys of tear gas 
 
GN24 
GCC calls for clear apology from Denmark 
Al Atiyyah seeks UN resolution to prevent defamation of all religions 
The Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General Abdul Rahman Al Atiyyah demanded that 
Europe, especially Denmark, come out with a clear apology to calm down the raging furore 
over the blasphemous cartoons.  
"There should be intensified efforts on the part of Europe to stop such an insulting of 
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). These efforts must begin with an apology by the Danish 
government for allowing to publish blasphemous cartoons," he said.  
The GCC chief was speaking at a joint press conference with the visiting European Union 
Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana at GCC headquarters in Riyadh.  
Al Atiyyah urged the United Nations to adopt a resolution prohibiting defamation of all 
prophets and religions. "It is imperative to include an operative provision prohibiting 
blasphemy in the statue of the new Human Rights Council presently being negotiated at the 
United Nations," he said.  
The GCC chief also deplored the violent acts that followed and warned the Muslims that 
"such acts would produce a negative impact on their just cause".  
Solana expressed deep regret over the publishing of cartoons. "You might have experienced 
some discomfort from our part on certain occasions ... These were perpetrated by a limited 
number of people and that can not be generalised," he said.  
Solana also favoured the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. Solana arrived 
here on Monday as the first stop in his five-country Middle East trip mainly aimed at 
repairing ties strained by the cartoon row. 
Solana meets Mubarak on ways to defuse row 
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak yesterday 
discussed mechanisms to protect religious symbols and beliefs, as part of efforts to defuse a 
row over cartoons.  
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On the second leg of a tour of the Middle East, Solana voiced his "profound desire to 
recuperate relations between the EU and the Muslim world". Solana told reporters he had 
discussed with Mubarak means to implement principles of a joint statement issued a week 
ago by the EU, the UN and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: "We believe freedom 
of the press entails responsibility and discretion and should respect the beliefs and tenets of 
all religions," said the statement. Solana said he had discussed means to ensure "religious 
symbols can be protected". Such steps could materialise through various mechanisms, "and 
may be inside the new human rights commission created in the UN." He also held talks with 
Shaikh Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi, head of Al Azhar University. 
 
GNC25 
Iran protests Jesus and Mary cartoons 
The Iranian Embassy in Azerbaijan yesterday protested the publication of cartoons of Jesus 
Christ and the Virgin Mary by an Azerbaijani newspaper. The Yeni Khabar newspaper 
published the cartoons in retaliation for the publication of the Prophet caricatures. While 
condemning caricatures of the Prophet, the Iranian Embassy also denounced the Azerbaijani 
publication as "rude and immoral insults" motivated by either ignorance or a desire to 
provoke discord between Muslims and Christians. 
'No proof against Syria' 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he has seen no evidence to back up US claims that 
Syria and Iran fuelled the demonstrations sparked by the cartoons. But Annan said the two 
Middle Eastern nations bore the same responsibilities shouldered by other nations and 
should have prevented rioters from attacking foreign diplomatic missions. 
The Danish Government should offer an official apology to Muslims over "irresponsible" 
cartoons to avoid a clash of civilisations, Syria's ambassador to London Sami Khiyami said. 
Denmark's foreign minister Per Stig Moeller said on Monday a government apology for the 
drawings printed in a Danish newspaper would be pointless. 
Troops must pull out 
Basra's provincial council yesterday demanded the withdrawal of Denmark's 530-member 
military contingent from southern Iraq unless the Danish Government apologises for the 
publication of the caricatures. 
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The Gulf Times (GTC59-GTC68) 
GTC 59 
 
Dutch MP defends European press 
 
Liberal Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali said here on Thursday that the European press had 
been right to publish contentious cartoons.Ali, a close friend of Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh, who was killed by a Muslim extremist in 2004, said media who “lacked the courage to 
show their readers the caricatures” should be ashamed. 
 
Somali-born Ali, who describes herself as “a dissident of Islam”, told journalists in Berlin: “I 
am of the opinion that it was correct to publish the cartoons in Jyllands Posten and it was 
right to re-publish them in other papers across Europe.” “Shame on those politicians who 
stated that publishing and re-publishing the drawings was ‘unnecessary’, ‘insensitive’, 
‘disrespectful’ and ‘wrong’,” she added, echoing the words of British Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw. 
 
Ali said that it was wrong to expect people from other cultures to abide by the Muslim ban 
on depicting their Prophet. “Demanding that people who do not accept Prophet 
Muhammad’s teachings should refrain from drawing him is not a request for respect but a 
demand for submission.” She listed numerous teachings of the Prophet which she rejected 
and said she believed there was a need to be critical of him to educate people. 
 
The Liberal Party MP praised Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for refusing to 
bow to pressure from Muslim leaders in firestorm triggered by the caricatures. “Today we 
should stand by him morally and materially. He is an example to all other European leaders. 
I wish my prime minister had Rasmussen’s guts.” 
 
Ali said there was some good in the furore over the cartoons, in that it exposed the fear 
among artists and journalists in Europe to “analyse or criticise ... aspects of Islam”.  
 
 
GTC60 
 
Editor charged with blasphemy 
 
Indonesian police said yesterday they had charged the chief editor of a weekly tabloid with 
blasphemy for reprinting cartoons depicting the Prophet. 
 
Imam Tri Karso Hadi, chief editor of Peta, could face a maximum sentence of five years in 
prison if convicted, said Suwignyo, a police officer in Bekasi, east of Jakarta. 
 
499 
 
The little-known tabloid has withdrawn 3,000 copies of the edition carrying the cartoons, 
which accompanied a story on the global controversy surrounding the drawings, first 
published in Denmark last year and since widely reprinted. 
 
Protests against the drawings continued yesterday in Indonesia with more than 1,000 
Muslims rallying in the town of Cirebon in West Java, urging the government to sever 
diplomatic ties with Denmark."Summon our ambassador in Denmark and immediately sever 
diplomatic relations with that country because the caricatures have hurt the feelings of 
Muslims," protest leader Hasan Bajri was quoted as saying by state Antara news agency. 
 
About 300 protestors picketed the Danish consulate in Medan city in North Sumatra. 
Denmark has temporarily closed its missions in Indonesia, the world's most populous 
Muslim nation, and has warned its nationals to leave the country amid protests staged over 
the past week.Security concerns over the safety of Danish nationals prompted the 
cancellation of a friendly badminton match between Indonesia and Denmark as part of 
preparations for the Thomas Cup championship. 
 
 
GTC61 
 
Warning on ‘chasm’ between West, Islam 
 
Thousands of Muslims protested in Malaysia yesterday over controversial cartoons as the 
prime minister warned of a "huge chasm" between the West and Islam.  
 
With Muslim anger boiling over across much of the world due to the drawings, first 
published in a Danish newspaper, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had strong words 
for the West as he hosted an international meeting on Islam."They think Osama bin Laden 
speaks for the religion and its followers. Islam and Muslims are linked to all that is negative 
and backward," said Abdullah, whose country heads the 57-member Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC). "The demonisation of Islam and the vilification of Muslims, there 
is no denying, is widespread within mainstream Western society," he said. 
 
Abdullah said Western nations wanted to control the world's oil and gas, and blamed that 
desire along with colonialism and "the imposition of Israel upon the Arab world" for a rift 
with the Muslim faith.The premier also said Muslims saw the "hegemony" of Western 
powers "manifested directly in the attack upon Afghanistan and in the occupation of Iraq". 
 
These "have all contributed in one way or another to the huge chasm that has emerged 
between the West and Islam", he told the gathering of religious leaders and scholars in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
 
The publication of 12 caricatures by a Danish newspaper in September, and since reprinted 
in other nations as well as on the Internet, has stirred up Muslim anger and raised questions 
about the limits of free speech.Muslims regard any portrayal of the Prophet as blasphemy.  
At least 13 people have been killed in demonstrations against the cartoons in mainly Islamic 
countries, and thousands rallied after prayers outside the Danish embassy in the Malaysian 
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capital.Chanting and holding banners saying "Down with Denmark!", the crowd marched on 
the embassy. 
 
A group of mainly young Muslim men wearing skullcaps, led by opposition Pan-Malaysia 
Islamic party (PAS) president Hadi Awang, handed over a petition to the embassy. "The 
Danish government are playing with fire," Hatta Ramli, a PAS central committee member, 
yelled as he punched his fist in the air. 
 
"There is definitely something rotten in the state of Denmark. You can insult anybody but 
not our beloved Prophet. If you insult our Prophet, we are ready to die," Hatta said. The 
protest later broke up peacefully, after PAS members handed out pamphlets calling for a 
boycott of exports from Denmark.  
 
Police said some 2,000 protesters took part while organisers put the number above 3,000.It 
was the first mass rally here against the cartoons, and came a day after Abdullah ordered 
the closure of a local newspaper, the Sarawak Tribune, which reprinted the caricatures -- 
the only paper in mainly-Muslim Malaysia to do so 
 
.It was believed to be the first newspaper anywhere in the world to be closed down for 
publishing the drawings."Sarawak Tribune's publication permit (was) suspended indefinitely 
with immediate effect," state news agency Bernama quoted him saying Thursday night. 
Malaysia has also slapped a blanket ban on circulating or even possessing the cartoons. A 
total of 60 religious leaders, government officials, academics and scholars have gathered in 
the capital to ponder the challenges facing the Muslim world. 
 
Former Iranian president Khatami is among the participants at the two-day International 
Conference on 'Who Speaks for Islam? Who Speaks for the West?"' which host Malaysia 
hopes will be an annual event.The conference will address ways to dispel mutual 
misperceptions through the media and how policymakers can develop policies to ensure 
that globalisation benefits Muslims and diffuse Muslim grievances towards the West. 
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Thousands march in Islamabad over cartoons 
 
 
Thousands of protesters burned Danish and US flags and chanted angry slogans during a 
march here yesterday against the publication of cartoons portraying the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
 
Around 4,000 people marched from a mosque in central Islamabad after the Friday prayers 
to the capital’s main Abpara commercial centre under the watchful eye of a massive police 
contingent, witnesses said.“Crush Denmark, crush America”, the protesters chanted as they 
also torched an effigy of US President George W Bush.It was the largest rally in the Pakistani 
capital since a wave of outrage over the cartoons swept across the Muslim world. An 
alliance of six Islamic parties called the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal organised the 
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rally.Religious parties also staged noisy demonstrations in the eastern city of Lahore and set 
ablaze flags of Denmark, France and Norway. 
 
Several hundred youths from the fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-i Pakistan (JUP) gathered 
outside the local press club building facing the US consulate, witnesses said.They demanded 
the government sever diplomatic ties with Denmark and called for boycott of products from 
the countries where media outlets published the controversial caricatures. 
 
Supporters of the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal also staged a similar protest in Lahore joined by 
students from the seminaries.Carrying white party flags and chanting “Death to Denmark” 
and “Friends of Jews and US are traitors,” they demanded the government sever ties with 
“anti-Islam countries.”“We will give our lives but we will not keep silence on defiling of our 
prophet,” a banner said while another called for unity in the Muslim world to “defend the 
sanctity of Islam and its prophet.”The authorities had deployed heavy police and the 
protesters   remained peaceful. Another group carried banners demanding “Cancel the visit 
of US president to Pakistan” and “Fight the crusaders.” 
 
Bush is due to tour Pakistan early next month as part of a regional tour.The White House 
has said that Bush is going ahead with his trip to Pakistan despite widespread outrage over 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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Danish paper sends editor on vacation 
 
 
The Jyllands-Posten editor who commissioned the cartoons which have angered Muslims 
worldwide has been sent on holiday after suggesting he would print Iranian cartoons of the 
Holocaust. 
 
“The editors have told Flemming Rose to take a vacation because no one can understand 
the kind of pressure he has been under,” Jyllands-Posten editor Carsten Juste told 
Berlingske Tidende newspaper.Juste was not available for comment.But the chairman of the 
foundation which owns the newspaper, Asger Noergaard Larsen, refused calls to sack Juste 
and Rose, saying that he fully backed the management and that there is no crisis at the 
newspaper.“I think you could say that the violence in the Middle East and the boycott of 
Danish goods looks like a crisis, but we do not have a crisis,” Larsen told Berlingske Tidende. 
 
Flemming Rose, Jyllands-Posten’s culture editor, told CNN on Wednesday that he would 
consider publishing proposed Iranian cartoons of the Holocaust.The newspaper later made a 
public apology and played down his comments.“Flemming Rose has expressed regret for his 
error of judgment that must be ascribed to the fact that, during the past four months, he 
has experienced inhumanly hard pressure and been besieged by Danish as well as 
international media almost around the clock,” Juste on his newspaper’s website. 
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In a challenge to Western values of free speech an Iranian newspaper has said it will run a 
competition for cartoons of the Holocaust during which the Nazis killed nearly 6mn 
Jews.“Under no circumstances will we allow ourselves to be latched onto the tasteless 
media stunt of an Iranian newspaper,” Juste said. It is unclear if the furore over the cartoons 
has hit Jyllands-Posten’s advertising revenues – a newspaper’s main source of income.“I 
know that some advertisers don’t want to be associated with Jyllands-Posten becuase of the 
trouble it has made for Denmark abroad,” Peter Ottesen, director of Mediabroker, said. 
“You see some reaction but it’s difficult to tell how much.”  
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Philippine Muslim leaders urge restraint 
 
Muslim leaders in the predominately Roman Catholic Philippines urged restraint yesterday 
as a group of 200 Muslims staged a rally outside a mosque in the capital to denounce the 
controversial cartoons. The protesters staged the rally after prayers outside a mosque in 
Manila's busy downtown Quiapo district."We are not afraid of America or Europe as long as 
we are fighting for our religion," one speaker in the rally yelled as he egged the crowd of 
mostly Muslim men into raising their fists and chanting. The group later broke up peacefully. 
 
But other Muslim leaders in Asia's biggest Catholic nation meanwhile, called on fellow 
Muslims to show tolerance and moderation in their protests."Mocking others, irrespective 
of religious affiliation, is provoking people to nurture hatred," said Taha Basman, president 
of the Philippine Islamic Council. "But we urge Muslims to exercise restraint and sobriety," 
he added. "Freedom of the press cannot trample upon the higher freedom of religion. 
Apologies are required," the Ulama forum, a group of Muslim scholars said in a resolution. 
The Muslim minority in this largely Christian nation have previously held small rallies against 
the cartoons. 
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Bukhari calls for campaign against Denmark over offending cartoons 
 
 
Tens of thousands of Muslims across India marched in protest against cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad yesterday, some showing their displeasure in silence, while others 
chanted “Denmark Die, Die!”In the capital New Delhi, thousands of demonstrators spilled 
out of the country’s largest mosque after weekly prayers and spat on Danish flags as police 
tightened security in the city’s diplomatic district. 
 
Organisers said 15,000 joined the rally of black flag-carrying protesters who also blamed 
France, Norway and Germany for reprinting the Danish newspaper cartoons. Police 
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estimated there were 3,000 protesters. Ahmed Bukhari, chief imam of the 17th century 
Jama Masjid mosque called on the Indian government to demand an apology from 
Copenhagen over the cartoons which sparked global Muslim anger.“For 1,400 years, Islam 
has fought its evil enemies and now it will not bow before the satanic designs of France, 
Germany, Norway and Denmark,” Bukhari told his Friday congregation. “Islam and Muslims 
have been challenged and we will not rest unless nations that humiliated us are punished,” 
he said as protesters set fire to a human-shaped effigy labelled ‘Denmark’. Police armed 
with rifles and teargas stood by. The protesters spat on giant Danish flags spread on the 
ground before the 20,000-capacity mosque in the congested old quarter. Several children 
urinated on the red flag before the cameras. Bukhari called on Indian Muslims to launch a 
nationwide campaign against Denmark. 
 
In the central city of Bhopal, thousands of men crammed the narrow streets around the old 
quarter’s mosques in silent protest, blocking roads for several hours.The city’s top Islamic 
leader, Qazi Abdul Lateef, said the turnout showed that “attempts by anti-Islam forces to 
defame Muslims... would not be tolerated.”Protests also took place in several other cities 
around the country, including in Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir. A shutdown strike 
took place in Kashmir on Monday against the cartoons.The protesters branded the 
publication of the cartoons “an act of terrorism” and said they were part of a plot by 
European countries to defame Islam.  
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Kenyan riot cops clash with cartoon protesters 
 
 
Kenyan security forces fired teargas at angry stone-throwing Muslim demonstrators 
attempting to march on the Danish embassy in Nairobi to protest cartoons depicting the 
Prophet Muhammad, witnesses said. 
 
Baton-wielding riot police launched teargas canisters to disperse about 300 protesters on a 
main thoroughfare in the capital after the crowd tried to break through a cordon by hurling 
rocks and other projectiles, they said. At least one person was injured in the melee, 
witnesses said. “I just saw something hit me and I fell down,” said demonstrator Shaban 
Kariuki, 18, who was bleeding from the hip.  
 
An AFP correspondent at the scene said the crowd involved had broken off from a larger 
demonstration and march through Nairobi that had been largely peaceful, although US and 
Danish flags were set afire.  
 
More than 2,500 people had earlier attended an organised demonstration at a sports 
stadium before joining up with hundreds of others to parade through the downtown 
business district, chanting anti-Western slogans.“Are you ready to stand up and fight for 
your prophet?” Sheikh Ibrahim Lethome of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
(SUPKEM) asked the raucous crowd at the stadium, which responded with a huge “yes”. 
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“Are we ready to die for the sake of the Prophet Muhammad?” he asked. “Yes,” the crowd 
replied. “Why is there freedom of expression to insult Muslims but not other religions?” he 
asked. “Are we ready to respond to our oppressors with peace?” “No,” shouted back the 
crowd, members of which carried placards pledging to die in the fight against the cartoons 
that first appeared in a Danish newspaper in September and have since been reprinted in 
other European newspapers.“We are ready for jihad”, “Denmark, you will see our action”, 
“We stand ready to defend our religion”, and “We are ready to fight for our holy Prophet”, 
read some of the banners. 
 
Protesters then set fire to the US and Danish flags, proclaiming that “freedom of expression 
is Western terrorism” before taking to the streets to denounce the cartoons .At the Kenyan 
foreign ministry, where the marchers paused briefly, another Danish flag was set alight. 
 
The drawings have sparked outrage throughout the Muslim world, attacks on Western 
diplomatic missions and several people have been killed in protests. Kenya has a sizeable 
Muslim minority that is not known for extremist tendencies and Muslim community leaders 
who organised the demonstration had appealed for the protest to be peaceful. The US, 
warning of potential violence, ordered the closure yesterday of some US diplomatic offices 
near the Danish embassy in Nairobi. No serious damage from the protests was immediately 
apparent. 
 
Apart from the one injured demonstrator, several European journalists were roughed up at 
one point by angry marchers who accused them of being Danish, witnesses said. 
Mohammed Idriss, an imam at a Nairobi mosque, said the demonstration was a sign that 
“we are not going to entertain any more desecration of our Prophet”.“This is the kind of 
content that has led the world to believe that all Muslims are terrorists,” he told AFP. 
“Sooner or later, we are not going to be peaceful if the West continues to use freedom of 
expression to say all kinds of nonsense about Islam and its Prophet.”  
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Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies erupt 
 
 
Nearly 20,000 people protested against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in Dhaka 
yesterday as the government condemned the caricatures as “extremely arrogant” and urged 
an apology.  
 
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s statement was the first official Bangladeshi response to the 
cartoons which have sparked Muslim fury worldwide since they were published in Denmark 
in September and reprinted elsewhere in recent weeks. Without naming Denmark or any 
other nation, Zia called for an apology, saying, “Such types of provocation at this moment 
are very undesirable.” “We hope the appropriate authority will tender an apology 
immediately,” she said. But she urged citizens of the world’s third-largest Muslim nation to 
refrain from violence. Zia’s call came as 4,000 police were deployed to monitor fresh 
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demonstrations that erupted in Dhaka outside the main mosque following Friday prayers. 
There were also protests earlier in the week. 
 
Police said nearly 20,000 demonstrators waving placards reading “Free speech symbolises 
war against Islam” and shouting “Down with Denmark” started marching towards the 
Danish embassy from Baitul Mukarram mosque. But riot police blocked the procession one 
kilometre (roughly half a mile) from the mosque, senior police official Mahbub Alam said. 
“The cartoons are part of the West’s crusade against Islam. No Muslim can tolerate these 
cartoons,” said Mohiuddin Ahmed, leader of the Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir which 
organised the biggest demonstration outside the mosque. “All should be ready to shed 
blood to preserve the dignity of the Great Prophet,” he told the rally. 
 
Other Muslim groups staged smaller protests and rallies were held by wings of the 
Bangladesh government’s two Islamist allies, Jamaat Islami and Islami Oikya Jote, with 
people burning Danish flags. Zia called the publication of the cartoons “extremely arrogant, 
irresponsible, and spiteful.” Islamic teaching forbids illustrations of the Prophet. “We 
believe limits of freedom and accountability have been violated by the publication of the 
cartoons,” Zia said following calls from her Islamist coalition partners to make a formal 
protest. “We have firm faith in freedom of speech ... but all should remain conscious about 
their responsibility so this freedom does not hurt anyone’s sentiment, faith (and) dignity,” 
she said. At the same time, she said, “We do not support any activity to foil peace.” 
Earlier, some 300 girls formed a human chain near a French cultural centre to protest the 
cartoons in France as well as a headscarf ban in French schools. 
 
Bangladesh witnessed a spate of small but deadly bomb blasts across the nation in 
November that Dhaka has blamed on Islamic extremists who are seeking to institute strict 
religious law in the country.The government says it is doing all it can to crack down on the 
radicals in South Asian country of 140mn people.  
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41 Pakistani workers detained in Afghanistan 
 
Afghan authorities have arrested more than 40 Pakistani workers for inciting violence during 
a protest against cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in which four people were killed, an 
official has said.The men were arrested with their Arab boss in Qalat in southern Zabul 
province where police opened fire to quell rampaging demonstrators on Wednesday.  
 
“The protests were supposed to be peaceful. But we have proof that these men were 
involved in turning it to violence,” provincial spokesman Gulab Shah Alikhil said. Alikhil said 
16 of the 41 arrested men had confessed to having had a “hand in violating the protests”. All 
would go on trial, he said. The Arab boss was a Saudi national, he said. Authorities in Qalat 
also planned to expel more than 100 Pakistani workers in coming days, Alikhil said. “We’ll 
not allow even a single Pakistani worker to work in Zabul any more,” he said. This included 
workers who entered Afghanistan with a visa. 
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The deaths in Qalat took to 11 the death toll from five days of protests in Afghanistan 
against the cartoons, which have appeared in several international newspapers, most of 
them European. 
 
Protesters in the city pelted police and US-led coalition soldiers with stones and set alight 
several vehicles and a school, witnesses said. Four protestors were killed in police shootouts 
and several people wounded. Defence ministry spokesman General Mohamed Zahir Azimi 
said Wednesday Pakistani workers had played a role in “sabotaging” the Qalat 
demonstration. A police spokesman said however that the cartoon protest had turned 
violent after being joined by Afghans who had been at a separate demonstration about jobs 
in the town going to nationals from neighbouring Pakistan.  
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ARAB NEWS (ANC28-ANC34) 
ANC28 
JCCI not to invite Danes for forum 
 The organizers of the Jeddah Economic Forum 2006 decided yesterday not to invite the 
Danish delegation at the annual event. 
The organizers made the decision in the wake of Muslim anger over the publication of the 
blasphemous caricatures published by a Danish newspaper on Sept. 30. 
The forum, scheduled to be held at the Jeddah Hilton from Feb. 11 to 13, features 
prominent local, regional and international personalities in business, politics, media and 
academia. 
The Council of Gulf Countries’ Chambers and the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & 
Industry have praised the positive reaction by businessmen in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in 
responding to the deliberate humiliation of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). 
Condemnation of the cartoons mocking the Prophet published in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten has been voiced throughout the Muslim world and in the past few days has 
taken the form of demonstrations and attacks on some Danish and other Western 
embassies. 
The JEF has assumed tremendous importance in the region and has been attracting the 
highest caliber of personalities from the United States, Europe and Asia. 
Nearly 2,500 businessmen and women from within and outside the Kingdom are taking part 
at the JEF. It will feature 60 speakers and discuss 32 working papers on promoting perpetual 
global economic growth. 
Makkah Governor Prince Abdul Majeed will preside over the inaugural ceremony on the 
opening day. The JEF, now in its seventh year, will focus on the theme “Seeding Potentials 
for Economic Growth: Honoring Identity and Celebrating Common Grounds.” The Jeddah 
Marketing Board, which operates under the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
(JCCI), is organizing the event. 
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According to JEF 2006 Chairman Hassan Enany, global speakers include Irish President Mary 
McAleese, Congo Brazzaville President Denis Sassou N’Guesso, Gambia President Al Hajji 
Jammah, Ghana’s former President Jerry Rawlings, former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder, former US Vice President Al Gore, human rights lawyer Cherie Blair, Forbes Inc. 
President & CEO Steve Forbes, Forbes Magazine Editor in Chief Peter Roberston, Vice 
Chairman of Chevron Corporation, Abdul-Salam Al-Majali, former prime minister of Jordan, 
Haifa Al-Kaylani, founder and chairman of Arab International Woman’s Forum, Mohamed 
Alabbar, director general of the Department of Economics Dubai and Chairman of Emaar 
Properties, Bahia Hariri, member of the Lebanese Parliament and sister of Rafik Hariri, 
Andre Azoulay, counselor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco. 
Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, and Thoraya Obaid, executive 
director of the United Nations Population Fund, will also speak at plenary sessions. 
 
ANC29 
Six die in global protests 
Global protests over cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) escalated 
yesterday, with six demonstrators killed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia and warning 
shots fired outside a US Consulate in Indonesia. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on 
Muslims to accept apologies offered. Demonstrators in Iran attacked Austrian and Danish 
missions and Tehran severed all economic ties with Denmark. 
The 12 blasphemous cartoons were first published last September by the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten. They have since appeared in newspapers in Norway, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. 
In Afghanistan, four people were killed and 19 wounded when hundreds of people clashed 
with police and soldiers during demonstrations against the publication of the cartoons. The 
worst of the violence was outside Bagram, the main US base in Afghanistan, with police 
firing on some 2,000 protesters as they tried to break into the heavily guarded facility. Two 
of the demonstrators were killed and five wounded. 
In the central Afghan city of Mihtarlam, police fired on the demonstrators after a man shot 
at them and others threw stones and knives, said Dad Mohammed Rasa, a spokesman for 
the Interior Ministry. Two protesters were killed, and three other people were wounded. 
At least one person was killed and seven were wounded in the Puntland region of Somalia 
as security forces clashed with hundreds of protesting Muslims. In Lebanon, a demonstrator 
involved in an attack on the Danish Consulate in Beirut on Sunday died from his injuries. 
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A 300-strong crowd — mainly student members of the Basij militia — torched the facade of 
a building housing the Austrian Embassy in Tehran and pelted the mission with stones, 
firecrackers and eggs, smashing all of its windows. Later at night, hundreds of protesters 
hurled stones and fire bombs at the Danish Embassy but nobody was hurt inside the 
building as the staff had evacuated. 
Denmark told its nationals to avoid Muslim countries. A Foreign Ministry warning, which 
affects thousands of holidaymakers and business executives, listed 14 countries travelers 
should avoid. They are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. 
Danish tour operators promptly canceled all trips to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. 
At a UN environment conference in Dubai, Annan said: “I understand and share their 
(Muslims’) anguish. But it cannot justify violence, least of all attacks on innocent people. 
Once again, I appeal to Muslims to accept the apology that has been offered.” 
The White House said it understands Muslim anger over the cartoons but that they must 
also condemn anti-Semitic and anti-Christian “hate speech.” “We would ... urge people who 
are criticizing these cartoons to speak out forcefully against all forms of hate speech, 
including cartoons and articles throughout parts of the Arab world which frequently 
espouse anti-Semitic and anti-Christian views,” said spokesman Scott McClellan. 
Thirty Muslim newspaper delivery employees went on strike in southern Austria after the 
country’s second-largest daily, Kleine Zeitung, printed the caricatures. About 1,000 readers 
did not get their newspapers, and the delivery personnel involved faced possible dismissal. 
Doctors in Pakistan vowed not to prescribe medicines from firms based in some European 
countries where the cartoons were published. 
 
AN30 
Defending ‘The life of Brian’ 
“Without this there would be no Life of Brian,” said Roger Koeppel, editor in chief of the 
German newspaper Die Welt, claiming that his decision to republish the Danish cartoons of 
the Prophet Muhammad that have caused such offense to Muslims was a free speech issue. 
“It’s at the very core of our culture that the most sacred things can be subjected to criticism, 
laughter and satire.” That is true, but it is not the only truth. 
There is no contradiction between asserting the right of free speech and condemning those 
who use it to inflict gratuitous pain on others. Particularly when it is the powerful abusing 
the vulnerable. 
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Jyllands-Posten, which originally published the series of twelve cartoons about the Prophet 
over four months ago, has the largest circulation of any Danish newspaper. Denmark’s 
Muslim community, only 170,000 strong, is one of the most marginalized and beleaguered 
in Europe, and the governing coalition includes a large party that is explicitly anti-immigrant 
and implicitly anti-Muslim. The cartoons were neither clever nor funny, and two of them 
were blatantly offensive. One depicted the Prophet himself as a terrorist, his turban 
transformed into a fizzing bomb; the other showed him speaking to a ragged queue of 
suicide bombers at heaven’s gate saying, “Stop, stop, we’ve run out of virgins.” They 
deliberately implied that Islam is a terrorist religion, and Denmark’s Muslims quite 
reasonably demanded an apology. It was still a storm in a very small teacup — but then the 
usual suspects got to work. 
The newspaper refused to apologize, and Denmark’s prime minister, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, sucked up to the anti-immigrant vote by refusing even to meet ambassadors 
from Muslim countries who wanted to protest about the cartoons. So a group of imams 
from the Danish Muslim organization Islamisk Trossamfund toured Middle Eastern in 
November and December with copies of the Jyllands-Posten cartoons, and included some 
others that were even more offensive. 
It took a lot of time and effort to build this into a real confrontation, but the Norwegian 
Christian monthly Magazinet helpfully republished the cartoons in January, Saudi Arabia and 
Libya withdrew their ambassadors from Copenhagen, and indignation built steadily in 
Muslim chat-rooms and blogs on the Internet. By the end of January Danish flags were being 
burned and Danish goods boycotted in the Arab world, and both the Danish prime minister 
and the editor of Jyllands-Posten went into reverse, publicly apologizing for the offense that 
had been caused. But it was too late. 
Various right-wing newspapers in Europe including Die Welt and France-Soir saw the Danish 
apologies as a failure to defend free speech, and republished the offending cartoons on 
their front pages. This gave radical Islamist fringe groups in European countries a pretext to 
stage angry demonstrations — the slogans at the London demo called for more terrorist 
bombs like those of last July and urged the faithful to “Butcher those who mock Islam” — 
and the confrontation finally achieved lift-off. 
Late last week mobs attacked the European Union’s offices in the Gaza Strip and the 
building housing the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. Incensed by text messages saying that 
Danish right-wingers were planning to burn copies of the Qur’an (though they didn’t, in the 
end), angry Muslims burned the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Syria and the Danish 
Consulate in Lebanon during the weekend. The idiots, the ideologues and the fanatics on 
both sides have the bit between their teeth now, and it will take some time for the fury to 
burn out. But it is important to remember that most people have not lost their heads. 
Inayat Banglawala, spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain, said of the demonstrators 
who had urged more bomb attacks in Britain: “It is time the police acted, but in a way so as 
not to make them martyrs of the Prophet’s cause, which is what they want, but as criminals. 
Ordinary Muslims are fed up with them.” The 57-nation Organization of the Islamic 
Conference warned that “Overreactions surpassing the limits of peaceful democratic 
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acts...are dangerous and detrimental to the efforts to defend the legitimate case of the 
Muslim world.” 
Similarly on the Western side — you can’t really say Christian any more, except for the 
United States and maybe Poland — the great majority of newspapers did not publish the 
cartoons. In Britain, in Poland, in Russia, in Canada and (with one exception) in the United 
States, none did. It is not self-censorship to refuse to publish these abusive images that link 
Muslims with terrorism; it is simply common courtesy. 
It does not mean that no Western cartoonist may ever use the Prophet again (though they 
will doubtless be more cautious about the context in future). The ban on images of the 
Prophet is a Muslim tradition, not a Western one. But we live in a joined-up world where 
everybody can see everybody else all the time, and being polite to the neighbors is a social 
obligation. Jyllands-Posten and its emulators were very stupid and very rude.  
 
AN31 
Gulf Muslimss step Up Danish boycott over cartoons 
People in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries intensified their boycott of Danish goods as 
the uproar over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) raged 
unabated yesterday. 
Scholars and regional trade groups also urged Muslims to use this economic weapon to 
punish other European nations whose dailies printed the inflammatory caricatures. 
Yemen shut down a weekly newspaper yesterday for republishing the cartoons. 
The official Saba news agency said Prime Minister Abdul Qader Ba-Jammal ordered the 
closure of the Al-Hurriya (Freedom) weekly after it reprinted four of the 12 drawings that 
originally appeared in Denmark’s Jyllands-Posten daily last September. 
The paper reproduced the cartoons on Feb. 2 as part of coverage on the protests and 
boycotts sparked by the drawings. 
Qatar’s Chamber of Commerce said it had halted dealings with Danish or Norwegian 
delegations, urging Muslim states to do the same. In Bahrain, Parliament formed a 
committee to contact Arab and Islamic governments to enforce the boycott. 
“I think a boycott is the decent way of responding to the attack. Anything that has to do 
with money is very effective,” said Ayman Abdulrahman, an Egyptian executive in Dubai. “I 
might expand my boycott to include other countries who insist on escalating the situation.” 
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Supermarket shelves remained void of Danish dairy products and Muslim scholars, social 
organizations and text messages rallied people to maintain their stand. Many scholars urged 
Muslims to stick to peaceful protest. 
The ban showed signs of harming more Danish firms as Novo Nordisk, the world’s biggest 
maker of insulin, said pharmacies and hospitals in Saudi Arabia had been avoiding its 
products. “Some customers ask about what’s Danish and avoid it,” said one pharmacy 
owner in Riyadh. 
“Not a single sachet of a Danish product is left on our shelves,” said the director of a Kuwaiti 
supermarket. 
“They have to respect our religion,” added Khaled Abdulrahman, a civil servant who was 
shopping at the store. 
Danish-Swedish dairy company Arla Foods said it is losing $1.8 million of sales a day in the 
Middle East. Its products were removed from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. 
Branches of French hypermarket Carrefour in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also 
stopped selling Danish goods. “Danish products have been removed from all (UAE) branches 
of Carrefour,” one official said. 
“I’ve joined the boycott from the first day ... economics affects politics,” said Bahraini trader 
Ghassan Al-Shehabi. 
Some Muslims, however, said the boycott was not the best way to resolve the crisis. 
“I think we should seek dialogue, not boycotting products or burning flags in the street 
which only escalates the problem,” said Suha Krimeed, a Lebanese marketing manager living 
in Dubai. 
 
AN32 
Europe’s uncivilized act 
There is no battle to be fought with those who indulged in the ugly act of deliberately 
insulting my Prophet (peace be upon him). I am numbed with outrage over this uncivilized 
act they have committed. I would simply say to them yours are no civilized ways. Whatever 
your claims to the contrary, they actually betray a people with a reactionary mindset. 
Those who become possessed by anger when confronted with difficult and challenging 
situations. Anger halts our ability to probe and to reflect. Instead, depending on our location 
in life, if we are advantageously placed, we self-righteously give ourselves the license to 
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pronounce verdict and take action to right a wrong. As many European publications have 
done. This is their crass response to the growing post-9/11 anti-Islamic sentiment. And for 
people in the business of opinion making to indulge in such reactive acts is extremely 
dangerous. It is highly irresponsible. These are people who must play the role of promoting 
greater understanding - pulling people away from extremist thought and action. Not join the 
vanguard of anger-prompted extremism.  
Policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West have opted to conduct the 
discourse on terrorism using a terminology that has unwittingly but dangerously indicted 
the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. Terms like Muslim terrorists, Islamic terrorists and 
Islamic terrorism have led to the demonization of the Muslims and of Islam. Whatever the 
European papers may claim they are upholding by ridiculing the Holy Prophet, they would 
have not contemplated doing so in a pre-9/11 environment. 
Social tensions may have existed in pre-9/11 Europe but in post-9/11 the tensions have 
vastly augmented. Muslims make for easy targets. So does their faith. This is how a section 
of the Europeans have opted to express their resentment against the terrorist attacks, as is 
evident from the contents of the cartoons. 
This is a season of acute polarization. For example if the on-line responses of the public are 
any guide, this act of insulting the Prophet has unfortunately received widespread public 
support in many European countries. The thrust mostly is that there is no reason to 
compromise on our value of freedom of expression, that if Muslims can't deal with this they 
must leave, that Muslims are hypocrites because they show no tolerance toward minorities 
but expect to be shown tolerance. 
In some cases individuals have argued that such cartoons should often be printed to get the 
Muslims to ultimately be more accepting of freedom of expression! They say this is what we 
do to our own. Sadly so, we would say. But please do not drag our revered ones in your 
messy notion of the freedom of speech. You have evolved into a culture which licenses 
unlimited permissiveness. In spite of our own mistakes, our many shortcomings, our morally 
and intellectually anemic leadership, there are some touchstones of our civilization. It 
includes the respect of religion and our faith in God Almighty. 
Deliberately defiling the Prophet is a highly irresponsible act. It is bound to have negative 
social and political fall-out. It exacerbates the existing social tensions among the locals and 
the Muslim population. Within the Muslims it is bound to create more alienation and 
resentment toward the Westerners who, have chosen to be completely indifferent toward 
the faith and feelings of the Muslims across the world. It is the arrogance of these 
Westerners they will resent. Like millions of Westerners who have opted to not view 
terrorists as a fringe phenomenon within the Muslims and instead referred to terrorism as 
Islamic terrorism, many Muslims too will wrongly implicate the Westerners across the board 
for this blasphemous act against the Prophet. 
At the popular level we require a rollback of the school that promotes the dangerous talk of 
clash of civilizations. For now the cartoon incident will merely serve to reinforce the worst of 
what many Muslims may believe of a growing intolerant Europe. 
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The framing and the discussion of the issue of terrorism has created a permissive 
environment which is responsible for this caricaturing of the Prophet; of hurting the feelings 
and ridiculing the faith of a huge section of the entire human race. They paid no heed to the 
protests. Instead they resented and condemned the nature of the protests. True the 
protests should have been calmer. Frenzied outrage was unnecessary and as were threats to 
kill. But nothing justified the reprinting of those insulting cartoons across many European 
countries including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland. 
The leadership in most of these countries has not been willing to contest the wisdom of 
publishing cartoons that are highly disrespectful to another people's faith. In fact the degree 
if insensitivity of the Danish prime minister can be gauged from the fact that when after the 
September publication the Muslims in Denmark sent repeated requests to meet with the 
prime minister, he repeatedly ignored their request. Essentially conveying "I really don't give 
a damn". Subsequently the Muslim leaders repeatedly went to the Middle East and other 
Muslim countries and showed them what the Danish papers had done. Subsequently the 
reaction acquired these proportions. 
In Denmark the anti-Muslim sentiment has been growing at a rapid pace for the past ten 
years. The Fogh Rasmussen government has actively sought to dispel and block Muslim 
residents from Denmark. The cartoon is just the tip of the iceberg. 
However that the notion of freedom of expression cannot be translated into unlimited 
freedom to abuse another's faith is basic common sense. But also the way many Europeans 
have selectively applied the principle of freedom of expression is intriguing. When the 
ancient Buddhas in Afghanistan were criminally destroyed by the Taleban, the Europeans 
screamed murder the loudest. We all did too in the Muslim world. 
What was that protest for? So destruction of history is blasphemous but the attempted 
destruction of a people's faith and deeply treasured symbols is not? This is the perversity of 
post-modernism which seeks the right to destroy and deconstruct selectively and give that 
right a sacred status. Also if the freedom of expression is so sacred how many European 
papers have dared to support what the Iranian president said about questioning the reality 
of the Holocaust? 
Clearly the principle of freedom has to be practiced within some rationale and egalitarian 
framework. It cannot be an elitist concept that a special color or creed will have more right 
to exercise. Why does this right not respect another's right to choose what is sacred to 
them, since that what is sacred is not at the cost of undermining another's interests. Islam 
abhors suicide bombings and terrorism. Increasingly Muslim leaders are condemning this 
openly. 
Are the Europeans so generous in applying their concept of freedom of expression at the 
cost of causing great pain and injury to Muslim world? Is it because their bohemianism has a 
method to it? The method is to attack and disrespect those who are generally viewed as the 
politically, scientifically and economically the downtrodden of the human race - the weak 
and the lambasted, the violated and the angry, the reactive and seething? 
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These are not the ways of a civilized people. These are ways toward pushing for a grand and 
mad conflict of civilizations. Will the European media see wisdom is stepping back and 
reviewing their dangerous notion of freedom of expression? 
For now the limited apologies that have come were perhaps prompted by the widespread 
anger and protests emanating from the Muslim world. But wisdom and true civilized 
behavior demands that we internalize the limits of our own freedoms where it begins to 
undermine the freedom of another. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
AN33 
Press freedom vis-a-vis fespect for the sacred  
The Independent once published a cartoon that gravely offended Muslim readers. It 
happened in the early 1990s when I was editor. The artist had placed some Arabic 
calligraphy on to a Saudi Arabian flag. Unfortunately it was read as an insult to the Prophet 
Muhammad. Very quickly our offices were picketed by distressed Muslims. I went out to 
apologize for inadvertently causing them distress and, very luckily, that was that. No brush 
fire of angry protests developed. No British embassies were attacked. But I had learned the 
hard way something about the sensibilities of Muslims I hadn’t known before. 
So as I now go through the events that have led to demonstrations of Muslim outrage across 
the world, looking for where we can learn from the mistakes made, I do so with sympathy 
for both sides. I feel for the editors of the Danish newspaper who started the conflagration, 
for I once myself caused a small fire. And I perfectly understand Muslim emotions because 
when the sacred images of Christianity such as the Last Supper or the Crucifixion are 
mocked in plays or films or used in advertising, I also feel offended and distressed. 
The match was lit by the editors of Jyllands-Posten who had noted that a local comedian 
said he didn’t dare make fun of the Qur’an. At the same time a Danish author who had 
written a children’s book about the Prophet Muhammad found that illustrators insisted on 
working anonymously. The editors saw this as self-censorship and decided to administer an 
antidote by publishing 12 cartoons that not only actually portrayed the Prophet, itself a 
taboo for Muslims, but showed him as a man of terror and violence. 
Newspapers should indeed expose self-censorship where they find it, though they should 
remember they are often guilty themselves in relation to the interests of their owners. 
Newspapers should also, at all times, respect their readers, and this includes not offending 
them unless the cause is of overwhelming importance. 
In its early days, The Independent published a picture of a French businessman gunned 
down in the streets of Paris, his corpse lying uncovered on the pavement, his blood running 
down into the gutter. I placed the image on the front page to make a point — that this is 
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what life has come to. But I received extensive criticism from readers, many of them 
worried that their children would see the gore. I took note. 
In the case of the Jyllands-Posten, I believe their editors should have found another means 
of highlighting self-censorship. However, they did what they did. And what happened next 
made matters worse. Some angry letters were sent to the editor but then, a few weeks 
later, two of the artists received death threats. Some 5,000 Muslims demonstrated in 
Copenhagen. And diplomats from Islamic states complained to the Danish Prime Minister, 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen. 
Here is the second turning point. A wise government could have found a way of calming the 
situation without in any way compromising press freedom or weakening the norms of 
mutual tolerance. But at the time the prime minister refused to meet the Islamic 
representatives. Later Rasmussen issued an apology, as did the editor of the Jyllands-
Posten. 
Too late. What happened next, the third turning point, I still find puzzling. On Jan. 10, a 
Norwegian publication that proclaims Christian values carried a selection of the cartoons. 
This seems knuckle-headed. 
Surely a Christian magazine should be preaching respect for the sacred rather than 
caricaturing the founder of a major religion. Nonetheless the Norwegian example was 
followed by a number of daily newspapers on the continent. They convinced themselves 
that they were fighting a major battle for press freedom.  
I take the words attributed to Roger Koppel, editor of Die Welt, as representative: “The fact 
that a European — one of us — had caved in was for us the trigger to say that this was a 
really important story.” Caving in was a reference to the belated Danish apologies. Koppel 
went on: “It is at the core of our culture that the most sacred things can be subjected to 
criticism, laughter and satire. We also know that moral double standards sometimes guide 
certain reactions in the Arab world. If we stop using our right to the freedom of expression 
within our legal boundaries then we start to develop an appeasement mentality.”  
Unlike Koppel, I see a difference between subjecting sacred things to criticism, which I 
accept, and to subjecting them to laughter and satire, which I don’t. For example, when I 
was president of the British Board of Film Classification, the American film Dogma, starring 
Matt Damon and Ben Affleck, came in for examination. Its mixture of religion, swearing, 
drugs and abortion had attracted a lot of criticism from Roman Catholics in the United 
States. I found the film thoughtful, and had no problem with its wicked satire of institutional 
stuffiness and abuses. It didn’t sneer at the sacred. It was passed at “15”, uncut, and 
categorized as “black comedy.” There was no adverse reaction. 
Why have no British newspapers followed the continental examples and published the 
offensive cartoons? Partly because we don’t see our European neighbors as being next door. 
Ideas and movements of opinion have to jump the Channel. Moreover, we have no tradition 
of anticlericalism, which is purely a continental phenomenon derived from the revolutions 
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of the 19th century that dismantled the privileges and political power of the Catholic 
Church.  
Nor do we have a far-right political party of substance generating resentment and hatred of 
ethnic communities as do our neighbors. 
I won’t give up an inch of press freedom and I will join whatever protests and take whatever 
actions are required to defend it. But I don’t think that this is the point so far as the Muslim 
reaction to the Danish cartoons is concerned. Rather I think it should be a principle of 
civilized society that the sacred in religion is respected. I don’t wish the law to enforce this 
principle, rather I hope that such respect just becomes a feature of a tolerant society. 
The decision by the BBC some months ago to screen Jerry Springer: The Opera was a test. I 
haven’t seen it, but it apparently depicts Jesus in a very poor light.  
In this context, television is in a different situation from theaters and cinemas. For when you 
go to see a play or a film, you have informed yourself of what kind of production you are 
going to see and won’t buy a ticket if you think you might find the show distasteful. But free 
television is different: In showing Jerry Springer: The Opera, the BBC was being just as 
disrespectful of its Christian viewers as continental newspapers were of their Muslim 
readers.  
In my ideal society, that wouldn’t happen.  
 
AN34 
Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations? 
Western countries look upon freedom of the press and free speech as somewhat of a sacred 
cow, which apparently must be defended no matter what. Currently the editor of a low-
circulation Danish newspaper is basking in his fifteen minutes of fame following his 
publication of a series of grotesque cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, even 
after expressing a lukewarm apology for the offense those have caused throughout the 
Muslim world.  
Some of his colleagues in Norway, France, Spain, Germany and Switzerland took the view 
that their papers should also be martyrs to the “freedom” cause and reprinted, while many 
more have published links to the caricatures on their websites. 
The questions people are asking now are these: Where does free speech end and incitement 
begin? When it comes to humiliation and insult, have Muslims become fair game since 9/11 
and is the West guilty of double standards purporting to hold free speech as an inviolable 
principle when in reality its media harbors its own red lines. 
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As many of my media colleagues have already pointed out, the greatest taboo in Europe is 
discussion of the Holocaust. In Holland, it’s a punishable offense to sell Hitler’s memoir 
“Mein Kampf” and the British Holocaust denier David Irving today sits in an Austrian jail 
awaiting trial for his views. When Prince Harry dressed up in a Nazi uniform to attend a 
fancy dress party, British and European papers were outraged. 
Certainly, anything which encourages the rise of neo-Nazi groups and right-wing fascist 
Fparties, demonizes an entire people due to their religion or race, or hurts the sensibilities 
of those who survived a policy of genocide and still have numbers tattooed on their arms 
should be a no-no. But the European media can’t have it both ways, and should admit it is, 
indeed, bound by certain restrictions. Free speech throughout the continent is, therefore, 
by no means absolute.  
Another taboo for the Western press is deviation from the official line over 9/11, about 
which there are still unanswered questions, and although such are hotly debated on the 
Internet, the mainstream press won’t touch them with a bargepole. Indeed, there is almost 
a reverence shown to the families of victims as was evident by the sickening deference 
shown by Oprah Winfrey to a woman who had lost her husband in one of the twin towers 
and had since got through millions in compensation monies buying designer clothes, cars 
and luxury items, which had angered contributors to 9/11 charities. 
Blair’s Britain showed its disdain for the concept of free speech when burly guards dragged 
an 82-year-old Holocaust survivor out of a Labour Party rally for calling out that obscenely 
offensive word “nonsense”, coincidentally just as the prime minister was telling his audience 
how lucky they were to live in a free country. 
More recently, the US peace campaigner Cindy Sheehan was rudely marched away from the 
presence of George W. Bush as he was giving his State of the Union address and arrested 
simply for wearing a T-shirt showing the number of US troops killed to date in Iraq. 
Moreover, the Western media and its governments, while trumpeting its own supposed 
freedoms, has criticized those of other countries. They have blasted Al-Jazeera for showing 
US troops captured in Iraq and bodies of limbless children lying in their own blood. 
And if there is any veracity to a recent memo leaked by the British press, George Bush 
actually contemplated the bombing of that network’s head office. In that case, the press 
was slapped with a gag order. At the same time, the Pentagon freely admits it has paid Iraqi 
newspapers to publish US propaganda under the by-lines of local journalists. Why aren’t 
Europe’s newspapers screaming about these infringements of their stated sacrosanct 
principles? 
The fact is Western networks and papers are influenced by government as well 
audience/reader sensitivities whether they like it or not. So, to my mind, their recent cause 
célèbre touting their freedom to publish over the deep hurt caused to Muslim communities 
is a red herring when the underlying issue is nothing more than a cover for old-fashioned 
bigotry and incitement. 
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Muslims have a right to be angry over the ugly characterization of their beloved Prophet, 
which many view as the last straw after years of being demonized, marginalized and viewed 
with suspicion, and they are correct in expressing this anger via the tools of peaceful protest 
and boycotts. 
Sadly, though, these demonstrations have become violent with attacks on Danish and 
European interests in Gaza, Damascus and Beirut, while there are calls to specifically target 
Danish troops in Iraq. These only serve as grist to the mill of Islamophobics out to paint 
Muslims as “terrorists in waiting”. 
Ironically, the Danes are some of the most tolerant and peace-loving people on earth and 
the majority are genuinely shocked that their flag is being burned on the streets of cities 
from Indonesia to Istanbul, while advisories put out by their government urge them to flee 
the affected regions. A middle-aged Danish woman interviewed on the BBC expressed her 
fear of events spiraling out of hand. 
It seems that for even moderate Muslims the cartoons represent the last straw. 
Unfortunately, the Danes are now unfairly shouldering the brunt of anger, which might be 
better directed at those big powers that have seriously and consistently humiliated Muslims 
in recent times. 
In truth, this contretemps doesn’t spring from Danish attitudes or European governments 
but is down to the irresponsibility of one man. The editor of Jyllands-Posten has succeeded 
in putting his paper on the map and defended his country’s press freedoms — which 
weren’t under attack in the first place — but at what cost? 
As Danish-owned dairy companies close down, their workers laid off; Danish expatriates quit 
their jobs in Muslim lands, embassies burn and Iraqi Christians fearing retribution flee to 
Syria, we are reminded of the power of the pen and the necessity for those who wield these 
weapons to show wisdom, sensitivity and restraint. Jyllands-Posten and the cretin who calls 
himself an editor should be ashamed.  
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The Kuwait Times (KTC12-KTC14) 
 
KTC12 
Cartoon protests turn deadly 
Afghan police shot dead four people protesting yesterday against cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) that have unleashed waves of rage and soul-searching across the 
Muslim world and Europe. Tens of thousands of Muslims demonstrated in the Middle East, 
Asia and Africa over the drawings, first published in Denmark, then Norway and then several 
other European countries. Some Muslim leaders urged restraint. In Iran, locked in a nuclear 
standoff with the West, a crowd pelted the Danish embassy with petrol bombs and stones 
for a second day. Protesters hurled a petrol bomb and broke windows at Norway's mission.  
 
Meanwhile, Denmark's national table tennis team yesterday said that they would not be 
competing in two Pro Tour tournaments in Qatar and Kuwait on the recommendation of the 
Danish government. "We will not be going to Qatar and Kuwait because we don't want to 
risk the lives of our players in the current climate of anti-Danish demonstrations which can 
deteriorate at any time," Danish table tennis federation president Aksel Beckmann told AFP. 
"It's a pity to have to pay for a newspaper's initiative, it's a pity for sports but the security of 
our players is the most important." The federation had planned to send Olympic men's 
doubles bronze medallists Michael Maze and Finn Tugwell and two other players to the Pro 
Tour events in Qatar and Kuwait, starting Feb 13, as part of their preparations for the World 
Cup.  
 
The 12 cartoonists whose work touched off the firestorm were reported to be in hiding, 
frightened, and under police guard. Iran's best-selling newspaper launched a competition to 
find the best Holocaust cartoon. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller called his Iranian 
counterpart "and demanded in clear terms that Iran does all it can to protect the embassy 
and Danish lives", a spokesman said. Tehran has cut trade ties with Denmark. Afghan 
crowds attacked a base of Nato Norwegian troops with guns and grenades and police 
opened fire, bringing the death toll in protests against the cartoons to nine.  
 
F-16 warplanes flew overhead in a show of force while the Norwegians fired teargas, rubber 
bullets and warning shots, managing to restore order by early evening. After rioters set 
Danish missions ablaze in Syria and Lebanon at the weekend, the European Union 
presidency issued a strongly-worded warning to 19 countries across the Middle East that 
they were obliged to protect EU missions. Iran's ambassador to Vienna said an attack on 
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Austria's embassy in Tehran on Monday was directed at "the EU presidency" rather than 
Austria itself, current holder of the presidency.  
 
Accusing "radicals, extremists and fanatics" of fanning the flames of Muslim wrath to "push 
forward their own agenda", Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen repeated a call 
for dialogue with offended Muslims. US President George W Bush called him to express 
support and solidarity, Rasmussen said. The White House said both leaders "reiterated the 
importance of tolerance and respect for religions of all faith and freedom of the press". 
Depicting the Prophet is prohibited by Islam. Moderate Muslims, while condemning the 
cartoons, have expressed fears radicals are hijacking debate over the boundary between 
media freedom and religious respect.  
 
Militants in Iraq have called for the seizure and killing of Danes and the boycott of Danish 
goods over the cartoons, one of which depicts Mohammad wearing a turban resembling a 
bomb with a burning fuse. In London, protesters have brandished placards demanding the 
beheading of those who insulted Islam. One dressed as a suicide bomber but later 
apologised. Copies of a British student paper which reproduced one of the cartoons were 
hastily shredded and the editor suspended from a student union. A French court however 
refused to order the confiscation of a magazine which planned to print the images.  
 
Echoing calls for calm by leaders, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: "I urge all who have 
authority or influence in different communities ... to engage in dialogue and build a true 
alliance of civilisations, founded on mutual respect." Further protests erupted yesterday in 
Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, Djibouti, Gaza and Azerbaijan. At least 10,000 people marched in 
the Bangladeshi capital and tens of thousands turned out in Niger's capital Niamey to vent 
their anger. State assembly members in mostly Muslim Kano, northern Nigeria, burned 
Danish flags. Croatia became the latest country where a newspaper printed the drawings. 
The cartoons have appeared in Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Fiji, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, 
Spain, Switzerland, United States, Ukraine and Yemen. Iran, which has withdrawn its 
ambassador from Denmark, said the cartoons "launched an anti-Islamic and Islamophobic 
current which will be answered". A radical Muslim group in Belgium put on its website a 
cartoon of Adolf Hitler in bed with Anne Frank, a Jewish girl who wrote a wartime diary of 
hiding from Nazi persecution.  
 
Saudi Arabia's Okaz newspaper rejected violence: "Violence, spreading chaos and destroying 
facilities ... only distorts Islam's image, especially after our enemies have tried to label us 
with so many accusations," it said. Some Danish Muslims agreed. "Fire and stones are taking 
things too far," said Copenhagen barber Farzan Khatami. Denmark's Jyllands-Posten daily 
has apologised for the cartoons, first published last September. The Danish government has 
refused to do so, saying it is the paper's responsibility. English giants Manchester United 
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also abandoned a plan to tour the Gulf in the week before the League Cup final. The Old 
Trafford outfit had been considering travelling to either Qatar or Dubai before facing Wigan 
at the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff on February 26. But with an English Cup tie against 
Liverpool scheduled on February 18, they felt the timespan, given the travelling, was not 
convenient. Club officials have now given up on the idea of and decided not to head east.  
 
KTC13 
Danish boycott 'success'  
 
Al-Qabas conducted a survey amongst citizens on their responses to calls to boycott Danish 
products. The survey showed that around 80 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens have already 
boycotted Danish products, responding to calls published in the local press. However, 
details of the questionnaire showed that 20 per cent of citizens boycotting Danish products 
have taken such a decision based upon Fatwas and the calls of clergymen and Imams. 
Meanwhile, 90 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens thought that a more comprehensive boycott 
should be implemented on various economic and political levels. Only 10 per cent were 
against the boycott and called for debate to settle the issue. These people also justified 
opposing to the boycott by the fact that the boycott affects not only Danes, but also Kuwaiti 
merchants and local agents of these products. The questionnaire also showed that 65 per 
cent of Kuwaitis have seen the cartoons that started the whole problem and while 35 per 
cent stressed they had not seen them. 
 
KTC14 
Violence and democratically-elected govts  
 
Fauzia Salem Al-Sabah mistrusts in Al-Rai Al-Aam (Feb 6) the United States. She says that 
America antagonises democratically-elected governments if these do not dance to its tunes. 
Instead, America prefers to work with US-friendly dictatorships. For example, Al-Sabah 
observes, America does not want to accept Hamas which democratically won the latest 
elections in Palestine. Al-Sabah does not understand why America is massively supporting 
Israel. At the same time, she is predicting that Israel would disappear as a state in a hundred 
years like ice in a hot summer day. My comment: Officials from the European Union and 
from the US have stressed on different occasions that they would co-operate with Hamas if 
this renounces violence . A peaceful Hamas would be an acceptable partner to all; to 
America, to the EU, to Israel, and to the rest of the world. Would Al-Sabah accept an Al-
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Qaeda-like organisation if it democratically won elections in Kuwait, before this organisation 
renounced violence ? Would she cooperate with Al-Zarqawi if his terrorist organisation 
democratically won elections in Iraq before this thug renounced violence ? The Iranian 
President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad wants Israel now to be exterminated. Al-Sabah is more 
generous with Israel and anticipates that it would disappear in a hundred years. Both 
predictions are wishful thinking. Ingratitude and treason Nabeel Al-Fadhel criticises in Al-
Watan (Feb 6) those Kuwaitis who cannot detach themselves of those Arab "genes" 
responsible for ingratitude and treason. They audaciously keep criticising America for siding 
with Israel and forget that this "undemocratic" and "partial" superpower has liberated 
Kuwait and is aiding lots of countries worldwide. Al-Fadhel stresses, "Kuwait comes first." 
My comment: Just two figures. The American taxpayers annually support Egypt with $2 
billion of aid. The European taxpayers annually support the Palestinian authority with 
almost a billion dollars of aid. Reaction to Danish cartoons Commenting on Muslim reaction 
to the Danish cartoons, Al-Fadhel also says, (Al-Watan, Feb 6), that as media men and 
women went to cover the demonstration in front of the Danish Commerce Centre in Kuwait 
City onto which Islamsits called, they (the media people) found a very few people gathered 
in front of the Centre, most of them were minors. Islamist leaders do not demonstrate 
themselves, they prefer to vent their venom on TV stations and in newspaper articles. They 
send simple-minded, violent fellow Muslims to do so. These "cows" (dumb people) do not 
want to accept any apology for the caricatures. They want to protest until the day of 
judgement. God and His Prophet (PBUH) are forgiving, but Islamists are not. What kind of 
Islam are they defending? My comment: Apart from the violent demonstrations in 
Damascus and Beirut, which obviously were instigated and organised by the Syrian regime, 
the other demonstrations in Jakarta, London, and elsewhere were very small, maximum a 
few hundreds. This shows that the majority of Muslims distance themselves from militant 
and violent Muslims. The majority of Muslims reject violence . 
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ARTICLE A 
France considering ban on burqas, spokesman 
says 
 
France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the 
growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a 
government spokesman said on Friday.  
 
Nearly 60 legislators signed a proposal on Wednesday calling for a parliamentary 
commission to look into the spread of the burqa in France, a garment that they said 
amounted "to a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory".  
 
France, home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, is strongly attached to its secular 
values and to gender equality, and many see the burqa, which covers the wearer from 
head to toe and hides her face, as an infringement of women's rights and is increasingly 
being imposed by fundamentalists.  
 
The country has been divided by fierce debates about how to reconcile those principles 
with religious freedom. 
 
"If it was proved after this inquiry that burqa-wearing was forced, in other words that it 
contradicted republican principles, then naturally parliament would take all the 
necessary decisions," Luc Chatel, who is the industry minister and government 
spokesman, said on France 2 television.  
 
Asked about the possibility of a law, he replied: "Why not?"  
 
President Nicolas Sarkozy has not yet spoken on the subject but promised to address 
the issue in a speech on Monday to members of parliament.  
 
More than 40 legislators from his ruling centre-right party signed the proposal. 
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ARTICLE B 
France searches its soul over the veil 
 
France's parliamentary inquiry into Muslim women's use of the veil looks set to 
provoke a vigorous national debate 
Even though I was active and outspoken during the 2004 debate on the ban on religious 
symbols in French schools, I have no definite opinions on the voile intégral — the burqa, 
sitar or khimar. But the French parliamentary inquiry has now been launched, and for 
the next six months, a debate will take place. The outcome is unknown. When the Stasi 
commission was set up, all the senior members (except for two) were opposed to 
legislating on religions symbols. During the hearings, young Muslims told them that if 
the veil was authorised in public schools, they would be forced to wear it. All the senior 
members, except one, subsequently asked for a law. But this debate is different: those in 
favour of the veil are not vocal in supporting the voile intégral. Dounia Bouzar, an 
anthropologist who is otherwise inclined to oppose any prohibition, refers to the 
"cultish practice" of burqa supporters. Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to 
them are protesting against the inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. And the 
debate was initiated by a communist deputé, but supported by the rightwing majority in 
parliament. 
So will we need a broad and all-encompassing law on Islamic garments, or various 
decrees addressing one issue after another, as they arise? In France, women who wear 
the voile intégral do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a 
political one. We're used to showing our faces on a daily basis, as part of our identity: 
picking up a parcel at the post office, collecting children from Kindergarten. But what 
then, for women whose face cannot be seen? In what case would a political position, 
even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law? This isn't a 
question of religious freedom, but of equality before the law. In other words, women 
wearing the burqa aren't asserting their right not to be discriminated against – they're 
asking for specific rights. 
If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to look 
at changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a herbal infusion: the 
flavours of many different plants are present, but by blending together they create 
harmony of sorts. It's possible that we could choose to make our tea by singling out 
some of those leaves for different treatment – we've never tried it, but why not? It 
would, however, mean that we'd be moving from universality to separatism. 
Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of racial 
hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how to deal 
with a different type of situation. An Algerian chef whose sister died when extremists 
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cut her throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman wearing a niqab, 
because she saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered her sibling. Today, 
her attitude could send her to court for racism and refusal to serve a client on 
discriminatory grounds. If the burqa was legitimised, there would be no reason to 
permit one political discourse and not two, something which would risk out social 
cohesion. 
Another point: how can we reconcile specific rights with universal ones? If by some sort 
of magic trick a woman maintained that she was consenting to her own discrimination, 
what would happen if she later changed her mind? 
A German judge recently ruled in favour of a violent man who beat his wife because, 
according to her, the woman knew what was in store for her since her husband had 
made his views clear on the question. 
Will we accept that some citizens are less equal than others? 
Finally, it would be wise to remember France and the UK are not one and the same – we 
really do not live in the same country. Some 79% of French Muslims are said to feel 
strongly attached to the French principle of secularism, also known as laïcité, whereas 
polls have suggested that 40% of British Muslims would prefer laws based on sharia. 
But Muslims who settled in the UK did it by choice, and often for economic reasons; they 
didn't flee anything. In France, Muslims are active at the grassroots level on the left. 
Many are political refugees who escaped from a form of politicised Islam. In the UK, Ken 
Livingstone could afford to welcome Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the man who, with reference 
to homosexuality, openly wonders whether it is best first to kill the "active" or the 
"passive" one. In France, this would be like spitting in the face of Algerian and Iranian 
political refugees. Given that women wearing the niqab do it by conviction, they can 
always do it in countries which tolerate such practices – such as Great Britain. But for 
many Algerian and Iranian women, France is their only refuge from political Islam. 
I am still unsure if a law prohibiting the voile intégral is necessary, or even possible. I am 
waiting to hear the different points of view that will be aired during the investigation. 
But because I am of the left, I will say that I will mainly listen to Muslim democrats. 
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ARTICLE C 
Women, West Brom, the burka and me 
 
 I think Sarkozy is wrong about the veil - and not just because I was a football mascot for 
55 minutes 
 
I was once asked if I'd like to be the mascot at a West Bromwich Albion football match. 
It involved me having to wear a large thrush costume. I mean, of course, the bird. It 
wasn't some tasteless promotional event where I was dressed as an irritating rash and 
then seized upon by a man dressed as a tube of Canesten. 
 
I agreed to be the thrush but only if no one knew that it was me inside. I'm world-
famous in West Bromwich so I thought that it would be novel to stroll around in front of 
20-odd thousand people and not be recognised. 
 
The outfit was quite heavy and hot, with just a small slit at eye level to stop me walking 
into things. Before the game, I wandered around, waving to the crowd and having my 
photo taken with small children. Such is the role of the mascot. 
 
For these photos, I adopted my regulation warm-hearted grin but after I'd posed for 
about 20 such shots, it occurred to me that this was completely unnecessary because I 
couldn't be seen. I was getting a bit bored and hot by now and it was a real treat to not 
have to look happy and enthusiastic. 
 
I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was a truly liberating experience and 
it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women are reluctant to give up the veil. 
It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the outside world with no obligation to 
smile or look interested - hidden in your own secret place. 
 
The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, took a much more negative view of the burka 
issue this week when he said: “We cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a 
screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity.” 
 
I assume that he wasn't a big fan of Blind Date. He seems to assume that Muslim women 
are always forced by others to wear the veil. I don't doubt that this is sometimes the 
case but it doesn't seem to be the whole story. One often hears Muslim women in 
interviews saying that they like wearing the burka, not just for religious but also 
practical reasons. 
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These views tend to be disregarded and seen as the product of indoctrination. Such a 
dismissive response seems to make these women and their opinions every bit as 
invisible as the burka does. 
 
The much-demonised garb is seen as a symbol of oppression, but oppression comes in 
many forms. Lots of British women have said to me that they resent being gawped at 
just because they're wearing a miniskirt or a low-cut top. I always apologise and say 
that I didn't mean any harm. 
 
Alternatively, a friend said to me recently that she was saddened to notice that, as she 
grew older, men had stopped staring at her. She felt that she was no longer desirable, no 
longer receiving approval. These are two very different problems, both by-products of 
our Western cult of physical attractiveness and both solved by the burka. 
 
I don't believe that any man should force his wife to wear a burka but I'm not sure that 
Mr Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife, is the best man to speak on the 
matter. Add to this that he was once seen to be checking his text messages during a 
private audience with the Pope and one might also ask whether religious sensitivity is 
one of his strengths. 
 
Either way, his call to actually ban the burka on French streets cannot be the answer. 
 
In the late Nineties, I went to Africa with Comic Relief. A group of us, mainly white 
middle-class liberals, sat in a village in Burkina Faso and spoke to the village elders. We 
asked about the distinctive scars that many of the men had on their faces and they 
turned out to be the result of some sort of initiation ceremony. 
 
Someone asked if we could see the ceremonial knife. I think that we were just trying to 
sound interested. Eventually a rather disappointing little penknife with a dirty wooden 
handle turned up, and we all passed it around as if it were a beautiful artefact. 
 
One of the women from the production team asked if it was used for any other purpose. 
“Female circumcision” was the reply. We all went silent and handed the knife back. 
None of us had the guts to register our disgust. 
 
I sat in a disused army barracks afterwards imagining what I should have said. “I'm 
sorry. It's one thing having respect for other people's cultures but some things are just 
objectively wrong.” Only the mosquitoes heard my indignation. 
 
Consequently, I do respect Mr Sarkozy for having the courage to speak out on the 
sensitive issue of cultural difference, but on this occasion I think that he's being too 
simplistic. It's not as clear-cut as he suggests. I'm not sure that the burka is objectively 
wrong. 
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Some Muslim women clearly feel oppressed by it, but then some clearly don't. To ban it 
is to remove women's choice, using oppression to combat oppression. 
 
Rigid rules that make no allowance for personal choice are more suited to the Taleban 
than to one of Europe's great democracies. So that's my take on the burka issue - all 
based on 55 minutes in a thrush suit. Next week: Silvio Berlusconi on why stockings and 
suspenders should be compulsory. 
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ARTICLE D 
Mr. Sarkozy, Burqa is sign of modesty  
 
 
I THINK French President Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he 
would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by nuns “a 
sign of subservience, a sign of debasement”? 
 
In the first presidential address to the French parliament in 136 years, Sarkozy chose to 
call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of 
subservience and degradation. 
 
The burqa or abaya, as it is known in Saudi Arabia, is a body robe. What covers the head 
and face is called niqab. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy meant a 
head-to-toe dress when he referred to the burqa. 
 
Sarkozy was right when he said the burqa – the particular type of dress – was not a 
religious issue. Islam asks its followers – men and women – to dress modestly, and so do 
all religions. The Islamic concept of hijab is not only physical but also moral. It tells men 
to lower their gaze in front of women other than their wives and other close relatives. It 
tells women to be mindful of their gait and garments. 
 
The debate here is on two counts: the issue of morality and the freedom of choice. 
Who is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini? 
Those, who are brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not 
maintain that they are not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for 
public display, will say a woman in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up 
seeing scantly-clad women around them, will find a woman in a burqa objectionable. 
So it all boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral values. There is no 
point praising a Picasso painting in front of a visually-challeneged person.  
However, we can discuss the issue of a person’s freedom of choice. France is a liberal 
country. Liberté, égalité, fraternité (Liberty, equality, fraternity) is the French national 
motto. So how can a country which prides itself on protecting liberty and equality 
discuss in its parliament an issue which is an infringement on one’s freedom? If a 
woman in a mini skirt is not an issue of debate in France, then why is a woman in a 
burqa objectionable so long as she does not affect public order? Ask any woman covered 
head-to-toe in the black robe, whether the dress has been forced on her or she is 
wearing it by choice? The answer in all cases will be the latter. Women of high moral 
values prefer to cover their modesty. In his speech Sarkozy said: “In our country, we 
cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, 
deprived of all identity.”How can Sarkozy pass judgement on others? The burqa does 
not curb freedom. Covered women do go about daily chores unhindered. Hindered are 
those who look at the burqa as a symbol of subservience. 
The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives her an 
identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of boldly 
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following her choice amidst a howl of protests, an identity of being true to her faith and 
culture.  
 
It is strange that something which is moral is being looked down upon while immorality 
and indecency are being promoted!  
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Post Reading (attached to article A-D) 
After reading the above article, please answer the following questions: 
1. I generally feel persuaded by the views in article (A,B,C,D)? 
 
 
 
Extremely Agree           Agree              Not sure                      Disagree             Extremely Disagree 
 
2. Summarize your general understanding of the article in 3- 4 lines: 
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Appendix 10 – Reader Interpretation Questionnaire and Research Consent 
Form 
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Questionnaire 
The following sections target two separate parts of the research. Please read the 
instructions presented at the top of each section and answer the questions accordingly. 
 
Background Information 
Please fill in the information requested or/and tick  the appropriate box: 
Age::     
Gender:   Female                Male 
Religion:  Muslim              Christian               Jewish          
                  Hindu                 Buddhist               Sikh 
                  Other                 Please state: ..............................                 
 
Article Analysis 
Please read article A, B, C and D and answer the following questions regarding each article 
by either ticking  the appropriate box or filling in the required information where 
necessary. 
1. In general, the writer of article A appears to be: 
 
       In favour of the burqa ban    
       Opposes the burqa ban 
       Neither  
 
2. In general, the writer of article B  appears to be: 
       In favour of the burqa ban 
       Opposes the burqa ban 
       Neither 
 
536 
 
3. In general, the writer of article C appears to be: 
       In favour of the burqa ban 
       Opposes the burqa ban 
       Neither  
 
4. In general, the writer of article D  appears to be: 
       In favour of the burqa ban 
       Opposes the burqa ban 
       Neither 
 
5. In article A, the representation of face veiling women is generally: 
 
       Positive                          Negative                         Both                        Neither 
 
      Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic  
      features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. In article B, the representation of face veiling women is generally: 
 
Positive                          Negative                      Both                               Neither 
      Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic  
      features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible: 
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7. In article C, the representation of face veiling women is generally: 
 
Positive                          Negative                       Both                             Neither 
      Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic  
      features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible: 
 
 
 
 
 
8. In article D, the representation of face veiling women is generally: 
 
Positive                            Negative                     Both                            Neither 
      Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic  
      features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. In your view, where was each article published: 
 
• Article A:   Arab newspaper                    British newspaper   
• Article B:   Arab newspaper                    British newspaper 
• Article C:   Arab newspaper                    British newspaper   
• Article D:   Arab newspaper                    British newspaper 
 
Thank you for your participation in the questionnaire. 
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Consent Form 
 
Dear Research Participant, 
 
I am a PhD Student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). I am conducting a 
study on how people read and understand newspaper articles written in English.  I would be 
extremely grateful if you could take the time and assist me reading some articles, 
completing this short questionnaire and taking part in the focus group that will follow. 
 
 
 
THE CONTENTS OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND FOR RESEARCH 
PURPOSES ONLY. 
 
 
 
 
 
I consent to participating in this study and to the questionnaire and focus groups responses 
being collected and analysed for research purposes. I understand that personal anonymity 
will be preserved in reports of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature:………………………………(initials)                                                Date:……………………………                                                                       
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Appendix 11: Focus Group Primary Topics and Questions – Articles A-D 
 
Introduction: How did you find reading the articles? Where they enjoyable, interesting? 
Were there any problems understanding the articles? 
 
(1) Primary Topic: General understanding of the article 
 
Q1. So what was the article generally about? 
Q2. Where do you think the article was published? What encourages you to have 
this view? 
 
 
(2) Primary Topic: Arguments for/against 
 
Q1. How does the article represent the face veil ban? Was it for or against, both, 
neither. What makes you have this view? 
 
(3) Primary topic: Social group representation 
 
Q1. What social groups are involved in the articles? How do you think social groups 
involved were represented? 
Q2. Face veiling women/Muslims? Neg/pos/neither/ both 
Q3. Other social groups? Neg/pos/neither/both 
Q4. Would you consider the article bias in anyway? 
Q5. Do you find yourself generally persuaded by the article? 
Q6. How convinced are you by these representations? 
 
(4) Primary Topic: Linguistic structures 
 
Q1. Regarding the previous question, is there any evidence in the text to support 
your view, the way the language is used, linguistic structures, can you provide 
examples? 
 
Final Remarks: Is there anything else that you found interesting, does anybody want to add 
anything? 
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Appendix 12– Rules of Critical Discussion (Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208-209) 
 
 
 
Rules of Critical Discussion 
 
 
Rule 1 
 
Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting 
doubts on standpoints 
 
Rule 2 
 
A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party 
asks him to do so. 
 
Rule 3 
 
A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed 
been advanced by the other party. 
 
Rule 4 
 
A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating 
to that standpoint. 
 
Rule 5 
 
A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left 
unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he himself has left 
implicit. 
 
Rule 6 
 
A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor 
deny a premise representing an accepting starting point. 
 
Rule 7 
 
A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defence 
does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is 
correctly applied. 
 
Rule 8 
 
In his argumentation a party may only use arguments that are logically valid or 
capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed 
premises. 
 
Rule 9 
 
A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the 
standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defence in the other party retracting 
his doubt about the standpoint. 
 
Rule 
10 
 
A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly 
ambiguous and he must interpret the other party’s formulations as carefully 
and accurately as possible. 
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Appendix 13 – Traditional Fallacies as Violations of Rules of Critical Discussion (Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 1992: 212-215) 
 
 
Fallacy Description 
1 Affirming the consequent Confusing necessary and sufficient conditions by 
treating a necessary condition as a sufficient 
condition 
2 Ambiguity Misusing referential, syntactic, or semantic 
ambiguity 
3 Argumentum ad baculum Putting pressure on the other party by threatening 
him with sanctions 
4 Argumentum ad consequentiam Using an inappropriate (causal) argumentation 
scheme by rejecting a descriptive standpoint 
because of its undesired consequences  
5 Argumentum ad hominem 
(direct personal attack, abusive) 
Doubting the expertise, intelligence, or good faith 
of the other party 
6 Argumentum ad hominem 
(indirect personal attack, 
circumstantial) 
Casting suspicion on the other party’s motives 
7 Argumentum ad hominem (tu 
quoque) 
Pointing out inconsistency between the other 
party’s ideas and deeds in past and/or present. 
8 Argumentum ad ignorantiam 1 Shifting the burden of proof in a nonmixed dispute 
by requiring the antagonist to show that the 
protagonist’s standpoint is wrong 
9 Argumentum ad ignorantiam 2 Making an absolute of the failure of the defence 
by concluding that a standpoint is true because 
the opposite has not been successfully defended 
10 Argumentum ad misericordiam Putting pressure on the other party by playing on 
his feelings of compassion 
11 Argumentum ad populum  1 
(populistic fallacy) (variant of 
argumentum ad verecundiam) 
Using an inappropriate (symptomatic) 
argumentation scheme by presenting the 
standpoint as right because everybody thinks it is 
right 
12 Argumentum ad populum  2  Defending a standpoint by using non-
argumentative means of persuasion and playing 
on the emotions of the audience 
13 Argumentum ad verecundiam 1 Using an inappropriate (symptomatic) 
argumentation scheme by presenting the 
standpoint as right because an authority says it is 
right 
14 Composition Confusing the properties of parts and wholes by 
ascribing a relative or structure- dependent 
property of a part of the whole to the whole 
15 Denying the antecedent Confusing necessary and sufficient conditions by 
treating a sufficient condition as necessary 
condition 
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16 Division Confusing the properties of parts and wholes by 
ascribing a relative or structure-dependent 
property of a whole to a part of the whole 
17 False analogy Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of 
analogy incorrectly by not fulfilling the conditions 
for a correct comparison 
18 Ignoratio elenchi (irrelevant 
argumentation) 
Putting forward argumentation which does not 
refer to the standpoint under discussion  
19 Many questions Falsely presenting something as a common 
starting point by wrapping up as standpoint in the 
presupposition of a question 
20 Petitio principia (begging the 
question, circular reasoning) 
 Falsely presenting something as a common 
starting point by advancing argumentation that 
amounts to the same thing as the standpoint 
21 Post hoc ergo propter hoc Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of 
causality incorrectly by inferring a cause-effect 
relation from the mere observation that two 
events take place one after the other 
22 Secundum quid (hasty 
generalisation) 
Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of 
concomitance incorrectly by making 
generalisations based upon observations that are 
not representative or not sufficient  
23 Shifting the burden of proof 1 
(argumentum ad ignorantium) 
Requiring the antagonist in a non-mixed dispute 
to show that the protagonist’s standpoint is wrong 
24 Shifting the burden of proof 2 Requiring only the other party in a mixed dispute 
to defend his standpoint due to the Principle of 
Presumption of the Criterion of Fairness 
25 Slippery Slope Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of 
causality (argument from consequence) 
incorrectly by erroneously suggesting that by 
taking the proposed course of action one will be 
going from bad to worse 
26 Straw man 1 Imputing a fictitious standpoint to the other party 
or distorting the other party’s standpoint 
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Appendix 14 - The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Analysis: Quantitative Data  
 
 
• Byline sources: UK press (Fig 4.1) 
 
Source UK Press 
Staff Writer 213 
Staff Writer (Special) 19 
Reuters 1 
Agencies 1 
IANS 3 
AP 1 
AFP 1 
PA 5 
Relax News  1 
Public 1 
Uknown 19 
 
 
• Byline sounces: Arab English language press bylined sources (Fig 4.2) 
 
Source Arab Press 
staff writer 75 
staff writer (special) 1 
Reuters 36 
Agencies 21 
IANS 5 
AP 41 
AFP 68 
DPA 9 
London Evening News 1 
Daily Mail 2 
Telegraph Group 1 
Guardian News&Media 5 
CG News 2 
Media Line 1 
Islam Way 1 
PA 0 
MCT 1 
Unknown  15 
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• Concordance Themes: Niqab/ Burqa/ Burka/ Burkha et al (Fig 4.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Burqa/Niqab negativisation theme analysis: UK and Arab Press (Fig 4.5) 
 
 
 
 
Arab Press Themes Frequency % 
Oppression 71 33.97 
Threat 63 30.14 
Different 30 14.35 
Other 22 10.04 
Not welcome 21 10.52 
Identity disguise 11 5.26 
Separate 10 4.78 
Attribute UK Press Arab Press 
Frequency % Frequency % 
 
Negativisation 
 
340 
 
22.00 
 
222 
 
14.34 
 
Physical 
description 
 
153 
 
9.90 
 
204 
 
13.17 
 
Religious/ 
Islamic 
 
32 
 
2.07 
 
148 
 
9.56 
 
Distancing 
religion 
 
85 
 
5.50 
 
91 
 
5.87 
 
Quantification 
 
67 
 
4.53 
 
116 
 
7.49 
Origin/ 
Background 
 
25 
 
1.614 
 
23 
 
1.48 
Total no of 
concordance 
lines 
 
1545 
 
100 
 
1548 
 
100 
UK  Press Themes Frequency % 
 Oppression 120 35.29 
Threat 89 26.17 
Other 77 22.64 
Different 39 11.47 
Separate 38 11.17 
Not welcome 10 2.94 
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• UK press: Quotation patterns – First, second and third quotes (Fig 4.6 ) 
 
 
 
UK Press 
Sources 
quoted 
First % Second % Third % Total % 
Non-
Muslim 
209 32.65 175 27.34 132 20.62 516 80.62 
Muslim 35 5.46 29 4.53 28 4.37 92 14.37 
Veil 
wearer 
12 1.87 13 2.03 7 1.09 32 5 
Total 256 40 217 33.90 167 26.09 640 100 
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• Arab English language press: Quotation patterns – First, second and third quotes 
 (Fig 4.6) 
 
 
Arab Press 
Sources 
Quoted 
First % Second % Third % Total % 
Non 
Muslim 
200 28.69 172 24.67 142 20.37 514 73.74 
Muslim 51 7.31 41 5.88 43 6.16 135 19.36 
Veil 
wearer 
14 2.00 21 3.01 13 1.86 48 6.88 
Total  265 38.02 234 33.57 198 28.40 697 100% 
 
 
 
 
• Total Frequency:  UK and Arab press quotation patterns – First, second and third 
 (Fig 4.6) 
 
Context/Sources Non-
Muslim 
% Muslim % Veil 
Wearer 
% Total % 
UK Press 516 80.62 92 14.37 32 5 640 100 
Arab Press 514 73.14 135 19.36 48 6.88 697 100 
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• Opinion quotation analysis: For/against face veil ban–Frequency analysis  
(Fig 4.7) 
 
• Muslim opinion quotation analysis: For/against face veil ban – Frequency analysis  
(Fig 4.8) 
 
Context/ 
Opinion 
For 
ban/Critical of 
Veiling 
 
% Against 
ban/for Veiling 
% 
 
Neither/ 
Unknown 
% Total 
 
UK Press 
 
20 
 
 
45.45 
 
16 
 
36.36 
 
14 
 
31.81 
 
44 
 
Arab 
Press 
 
9 
 
 
16.98 
 
32 
 
60.37 
 
12 
 
22.64 
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Context/ 
Opinion 
For Ban/ 
Critical 
of 
Veiling 
% Against 
Ban/ For 
Veiling 
% Neither/Unknown % Total 
 
UK Press 
 
 
150 
 
 
52.08 
 
72 
 
25 
 
66 
 
22.91 
 
288 
 
Arab 
Press 
 
100 
 
 
40.81 
 
80 
 
32.65 
 
65 
 
26.53 
 
245 
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Appendix 15 - The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ Analysis: Quantitative Data  
 
 
• Byline sources: UK press (Fig 4.9) 
 
Source CTT CDT CTG CTI Total 
Staff 94 41 177 57 369 
uknown 2 5 0 3 10 
AFP 1 
 
0 0 1 
Agencies 10 
 
22 0 32 
AP 0 
 
6 2 8 
PA 0 
 
1 3 4 
 
• Byline sources: Arab English language press (Fig 5.1) 
 
Source CGT CGN CAN CKT Total 
Staff 37 48 97 20 202 
unknown 5 0 0 2 7 
AFP 83 0 4 
 
87 
REUTERS 32 5 2 
 
39 
AGENCIES 16 17 9 5 47 
QNA 1 0 0 
 
1 
IANS 2 0 1 
 
3 
INTERNEWS 9 0 0 
 
9 
DPA 6 0 1 
 
7 
OXA 1 0 0 
 
1 
AP 0 13 1 
 
14 
WAM 0 1 0 
 
1 
WP 0 1 0 
 
1 
INDEPENDENT 0 0 2 
 
2 
GUARDIAN 0 0 7 
 
7 
LA TIMES 0 0 1 
 
1 
OBSERVER  0 0 1 
 
1 
JAZEERA 0 0 1 
 
1 
KUNA 
   
2 2 
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•  Protesters/demonstrators Analysis: UK and Arab English language press  
- Attribution frequency analysis (Fig 5.2) 
- Semantic position frequency analysis (Fig 5.3) 
- Semantic position attribute frequency analysis (Fig 5.4) 
 
UK press 
Category Freqency Neg Pos Neither Agent of neg 
action 
patient Of  
neg 
action 
Agent 
Deletion 
Demonstrators 166 104 1 61 109 90 33 18 7 
Protesters 223 136 0 87 132 91 65 23 12 
Total 389 240 1 148 241 181 98 41 19 
 
Arab English Language Press 
Category Freqency Neg Pos Neither Agent of neg 
action 
patient Of  
neg 
action 
Agent 
Deletion 
Demonstrators 84 37 1 46 60 31 22 16 10 
Protesters 217 101 5 111 152 88 52 37 6 
Total 301 138 6 157 212 119 74 53 16 
 
 
Attribution UK Press Arab Press 
Negative 61.69% 45.84% 
Positive 0.25% 1.99% 
Neither 38.04% 52.15% 
 
Semantic Role Agent Patients 
UK Press 61.95% 25.19% 
Arab Press 70.43% 24.58% 
 
Semantic 
role/attribute 
 
 
Agent/neg action 
  
Patient/neg action 
 
Agent Deletion 
 
UK Press 75.1% 41.83% 46.34% 
Arab Press 56.1% 71.62% 30.18% 
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• Muslim/s attribution frequency analysis: UK press (Fig 5.5) 
 
Attribute Frequency % 
Quantification 273 18.76 
Anger 140 9.62 
Threat 110 7.56 
Violent 104 7.14 
Extremism  97 6.66 
victmisation 87 5.97 
Type 84 5.77 
Separate/Different 50 3.43 
Position 42 2.88 
Oppressed/restrictive 18 1.23 
 
• Muslim/s attribution frequency analysis: Arab English language press (Fig 5.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attribute frequency % 
Victimisation 329 24.98 
Quantification 232 17.61 
Anger 149 11.31 
Position 100 7.59 
Violence 78 5.92 
Immigrates 65 4.93 
Relationship 60 4.55 
Threat 28 2.12 
Extremism 17 1.29 
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Appendix 16 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Analysis: Qualitative Data Examples 
 
 
UK Press: Referential and Predicational strategies - Muslims and face veiling women  
 
• Collectivisation  
This point of view, however, is not shared by everyone. Muslim leaders have  
urged politicians not to create more tension between communities. (TG1) 
 
Critics have already warned the government risks stigmatising Muslims over a  
minor and marginal issue. (TG7) 
 
During the hearing young Muslims told them that if the veil was authorised in  
public schools....(TG5) 
 
The measure was mainly intended to ensure the equality of Muslim girls and it   
      has worked smoothy (TT1) 
 
President Sarkozy threw his weight yesterday behind attempts to bar French Muslim 
women from covering their faces in public... (TT2) 
 
Many Muslim women are reluctant to give up the veil (TT4) 
 
Jack straw, who feels uncomfortable in the presence of women dressed from top to 
toe in black with only their eyes visible (DT2) 
The burka isolates women (DT3) 
Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban (DT3) 
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• Nouns denoting groups  
Muslim groups in Britain have supported Mr. Sarkozy’s claim (DT3) 
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) said Mr. Sarkozy claim....(DT3) 
Here, in France and in the Muslim world – are the best way to consign to the dark 
ages this symbol of darkness. (TT5) 
 
The burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been 
given dubious religious sanction by conservative societies. (TT5) 
 
Mr. Sarkozy was adding his voice to a strong consensus that has emerged this month 
against women in France’s five million strong Muslim community.... (TT2) 
 
France has Western Europe’s largest Muslim population...(TG4) 
 
              His aim was to ‘establish a debate with the Muslim community, integrate Islam 
              properly into French life’ ....(TG7) 
 
The conseil Francais du Calte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship), 
the Organisation responsible for Islam in France , explains ... (TG6) 
 
• Aggregation  
 
While many in France, home to more than five million Muslims (TT5) 
 
The different opinions generated by the debate reveal the difficulties face by the 
French state over the past 50 years in determining how best to accommodate its 5 
million Muslims. (TG6) 
 
...Muslim population of over 5 million (TG7) 
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...has divided France’s 4 to 5 million-strong Muslim community. (TI1) 
 
 
The head to toe costumes that cover all or most of the face – are said to be 
spreading as fundamentalist doctrines gain hold amongst a small minority of 
France’s five million Muslims. (TT1) 
 
Fadala Amara, a rights campaigner of Algerian background, who is a housing 
minister, said that was alarmed by the number of women ‘who are being put in a 
kind of tomb.’ (DT1) 
Women’s right campaigners, including some Islamic groups have backed the calls for 
measures to curb the small but growing trend of wearing burqas among France’s 
five million Muslims. (DT1) 
Many on the left disapprove of what is seen as a small rise in women adopting 
fundamentalist dress – they are said to number several thousand (TT2) 
 
President Sarkozy took issue with the proliferation of women wearing the burqa in 
France.  (TI3) 
 
It is estimated that some 100,000 women, mainly born in France, have taken to full 
outfits with face covering. (DT1) 
 
• Negative attribute 
Critics, including some government ministers, say a ban on the burqa and niqab 
would be unworkable and would only force greater isolation on the victims, as the 
wearers are seen’. (TT1) 
 
 
 
554 
 
 
Arab Press: Referential and predicational strategies - Muslims and face veiling women  
 
• Collectivisation  
 
President Nicolas Sarkozy is ‘not qualified to judge Muslim women’s dress code’ said 
Muslim clerics in Cairo. (GN6) 
“Most French Muslims , or Muslim residents of France...” (GN9) 
However, the scholar was of the view that there are two different opinions about 
women’s face among Muslim scholars” (GT4) 
Majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to do so for religious and 
cultural reasons. (GN1) 
refused to talk to veiled women. (GN1) 
By wearing the burqa, women are exhibiting their religion and culture. (GN7) 
That Sarkozy had to take recourse to the marginalisation of Muslim women in his 
attempt to defend the French idea... (SG3)  
France has been engulfed in a debate over whether womens rights and nations 
strong secular tradition are under attack when Muslim women cover themselves 
fully’ (GT3) 
• Aggregation: Large number population  
France’s parliament is currently split on the issue, with those against a proposed law 
that would make wearing the burqa illegal warning this could incite France’s five 
million Muslims. (GN10) 
..but Immigration minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir tensions in France, 
home to some 5mn Muslims. (GT1) 
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• Aggregation: Small number of face veiling women  
             It is not known how many women wear the burqa in France, but estimates  
             have varied between a few thousand and several hundred. (GT3) 
A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French 
converts (SG1) 
UK Press: Social Actions  
• Face veiling women in passive roles in the guardian highlighting victimisation (eith 
agent deletion) 
Women in standard headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving 
lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from 
university classes and in once case, a women in a banks was not allowed to 
withdraw cash from her own account at the counter. (TG6) 
Another women wearing the full veil was refused social housing by a landlord in the 
area. (TG6) 
Horia Demiati, 30, a French financier who wears a standard head scarf with her 
business suits...won a discrimination case after she and her family, including sin-
month babe, were refused access to a rural holiday apartment they had booked in 
the Vosges. (TG6). 
• Highlighting in-group actors as agents of negative actions towards out-group  
What’s striking in Sarkozy’s speech is that it is yet again a man who denounces 
women and presumes that they are cut off from social life. (TG3) 
Sarkozy now goes further, following revolutionary logic in not just chasing those who 
dress in ways he and French political culture finds intolerable out of public spaces, 
but pursuing those who dress in a way that is a rejection of Western values even into 
their private worlds. (TG3) 
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Arab press: Social Actions - Face veiling women  
 
• Active role in choosing to veil action: 
Supporters of veiling explain they choose to wear the Hijab because it provides 
freedom from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other women’s 
looks as well as from being sex objects for males to reject and approve. (GN8) 
Western societies should respect the rights of Muslim women who choose to wear 
the veil (GN8) 
And earlier, in 2001, Laura Bush and Cherie Blair led a brief assault on the burqa 
worn in Afghanistan, which is still being worn out of choice today. (GN10) 
• Passive role of face veiling women  as recipiants of negative actions by out-group 
(West): 
US president Barack Obama urged Western Countries to avoid ‘dictating what 
clothes a Muslim women should wear’. (GT3) 
Last year, a Moroccan women was refused citizenship after social services said she 
wore a burqa and was living in ‘submission’ to her husband. (GT3) 
As a leading member of the coalition against allowing Muslim women freedom of 
sartorial choice based on their religious obligations and convictions, Nicolas 
sarkozy’s latest salvo declaring the the burqa ‘not welcome’ in France, has, I feel, 
irrevocably forfeited his right to be taken seriously. (SG3) 
Britain secretary of state for Justice Jack straw caused a storm in 2006 when he 
refused to talk to veiled women at constituency surgeries. (GN10) 
• Passive role of in-group (positive/neutral) 
Islam asks its followers – men and women- to dress modestly, and so do all 
religions...It tells men to lower their gaze in front of women other than their wives 
and other close relatives. It tells women to be mindful of their gait and garments. 
(SG2) 
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Islam gives women the right to keep her family’s name after marriage, which is not 
the case in the West. (GN6) 
 
• Active verbal roles: Muslim scholars views connecting face veil to religious 
obligation and religious Implications of ban: 
Shaikh Fayez al Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is 
permissible for a Muslim woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing 
the burqa, not to wear it. ‘it would suffice her wear the Hijab...he told Gulf News if a 
Muslim woman wants to travel to such a country, which imposes a ban on wearing 
the burqa, for educational or treatment purposes, then she should respect the 
regulations of the country by simply wearing the Hijab. (GN6) 
However, the scholar was of the view that there are two different opinions about 
women’s face covering among Muslim scholars. ‘The niqab is a controversial issue. 
While some scholars see it as a mandatory, others regard it as non-obligatory. But 
women in France who don it should not remove it just to comply with the proposed 
ban since Muslim should not comply with any law that is violating the Islamic 
teachings’ he added. (GT4) 
...Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning the face veil in 
France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, should leave the country if it was 
outlawed by the government. ‘As long as you accepted to be a French citizen, then 
you have to comply with the laws of the country of which you stay. Muslim women in 
France should even give up their citizenship and return to Muslim countries if they 
found themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. If they have to choose 
between the face veil and their citizenship, they have to go [sic] the face veil and 
return to Muslim countries’ he added. (GT4) 
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• Active role: Muslim scholars critical comments towards ban: 
 
Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude of the French president, saying it was 
‘violating the personal freedom of Muslims’ (GT4) 
Sheikh Ahmed al-Buainain, a Qatari imam of Suhaib al-Romi Mosque at Al 
Wakrah, also stressed that the French government had no right to ban the face veil, 
saying that the veil should be part of the personal freedom which they cherish.....’I 
believe that the current attack on the niqab is just a way of distorting the image of 
Islam’ he added. (GT 4) 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy is ‘not qualified’ to judge Muslim women’s dress 
code, said Muslim clerics in Cairo, reacting to his branding of full-body veils as a sign 
of servitude.....‘First he [Sarkozy] does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly 
religion that holds women in high regard. Another reason is that he belongs to a 
culture, which is unfair to women’ Al Shaka told Gulf News. ‘One example, Islam 
gives women the right to keep her family’s name after marriage, which is not the 
case in the West.’ (GN6)  
UK Press: Argumentation 
• Topos of Threat 
The use of rhetorical ethos or topos of ‘authority’ to highlight the ‘threat’ face veiling poses 
towards Western society was also detected in a blog article ‘France considers a ban on full 
Muslim veil’ (TT1). In this argument against the face veil, Muslim actors were individualised 
as the authority to support this topoi of ‘threat’, where it includes direct and indirect quotes 
of two key French Muslim figures “Muslim born women ministers, Fadel Amara and Rama 
Yade”. Both of whom are described as having various trustworthy, positive and attractive 
credentials “Amara, a rights campaigner who is a housing minister” and “Yade, a minister 
for human rights in the foreign ministry”.  
 
“Amara, a rights campaigner who is a Housing minister, said she is alarmed by the 
number of women wearing veils. ‘We must do everything to stop burqas from 
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spreading, in the name of democracy, of the republic, of respect for women’. Yade, 
Minister for Human rights in the foreign Ministry, said today that she supported a 
prohibition in the name of women’s equality and human dignity. The wearing of veils 
‘is a phenomenon which is visibly spreading’, she said”  
 
The presupposed spread of face veiling is highlighted as a problem by the mental process 
‘alarmed’ attributed to Amara, emphasising concern. The practice of wearing the veil is also 
described as a ‘phenomenon’ that is spreading by Yade. More importantly, this face veil is 
portrayed as a direct threat, where both authoritative sources place it in direct opposition 
to democracy, respect of women, their equality and human dignity. Once again, a fallacious 
appeal to authority is committed, where there is no evidence to substantiate that face 
veiling as a practice is growing or is a threat to ‘democracy’ ‘respect of women’ and ‘human 
dignity’. 
 
• Topos of Difference  
In the Guardian’s news analysis piece “Why not ban the full veil, says French government 
spokesman” (TG1), which focuses on the parliamentary proposal for a face ban and the 
argument that the face veil is in conflict with France’s secular nature, a quote of the 
communist MP, Andre Gerin highlighted the topos of ‘difference’ between the practice of 
face veiling and the women who wear the face veil (out-group) and the French public (in-
group). 
The communist MP...he said ‘the sight of these imprisoned women is already 
intolerable to us, when they come from Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia...it is 
totally unacceptable on French soil’ 
A illustrated above, in addition to the negative referential strategies used, referring to face 
veiled women as ‘imprisoned’,  a hasty generalisation is committed depicting them as 
foreign, as ‘they’, the ‘out-group’, come from ‘Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia’. This is 
contrasted to the ‘in-group’ which is highlighted with the aggregated form ‘us’, who are un-
accepting of this practice in France.  
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• Topos of Separateness  
Women wearing the face veil are also argued to turn away from society in the op-ed 
‘France’s burka barrier’ (TG6). 
Increasingly, veiled women chose to look inward, withdraw from society and 
benefit from the networks of solidarity offered by Salafism, rather than fighting for 
their choice in the political sphere. 
In this case, women are withdrawing from society and turning to ‘Salafism’, which was 
negatively referred to earlier in the article as ‘a fundamentalist branch of Islam imported 
from Saudi Arabia’. This draws on the topos of ‘threat’, in addition, to the representation of 
face veiling women as ‘separate’. 
 
Arab Press: Argumentation 
• Topos of Discrimination 
The fear and loathing of any form of veiling sometimes expressed by those who 
object to what they see as a symbol of backwardness is not all that different from 
objections to the traditional religious garb and perceived life style of Catholic nuns 
in the past (and for some, still today). One could raise similar questions about the 
dress of Amish women and men, the practice and status of ultra-orthodox Jewish 
women, and others. Does the ‘medieval garb’ of the pope, patriarchs and other 
major religious leaders diminish their intellect or ability to negotiate life in the 
modern world? (GN8) 
In this excerpt, rather than argue against critics that describe the face veil as ‘degrading’ for 
women, the writer chooses to focus on the argument by critics which describes the face veil 
as ‘a symbol of backwardness’. The writer lists several analogies, where face veil wearing 
women and the practice of face veiling is compared to the traditional clothing worn by 
‘nuns’, ‘Amish women and men’, ‘practice of ultra-orthodox Jewish women’ and the 
‘medieval garb of the pope, patriarchs and other major religious leaders’. 
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Finally, other examples of argumentative analogies drawing on the topoi of ‘discrimination’ 
were found in the op-ed article “West must respect the Muslim veil” (GN8): 
Women who wear the scarf point out that women of many cultures and religions – 
Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women, and Catholic nuns – 
often wear head coverings. They ask why these women are not viewed as being 
oppressed. 
Here, the argumentative analogy focuses on the ‘Muslim scarf’, another item of clothing 
worn by some Muslim women that had also received similar objections to those brought 
against the face veil.  Women who wear the scarf are compared to other women who wear 
the scarf ‘Russian, Hindu, Jewish’ women among others in aim of pointing out that women 
from other cultures and religions had not received any form of criticism towards what they 
wear, hence, Muslim women are being discriminated against. 
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Appendix 17 – The ‘2009 Danish Cartoon Controversy’: Qualitative Examples 
 
 
UK Press: Protesters/Demonstrators referential and predicational strategies  
 
• Aggregation  
 
Some 200 Iranian student demonstrators also threw stones (TG51) 
 
...were unable to hold up to 400 demonstrators (TG51) 
 
Hundreds of Afghans (TIC19) 
 
• Referential strategies: Threat  
 
So far the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the fanatics 
because of fear...(TGC42) 
The metropolitan police announced today that it has set up a squad to investigate 
the extremists demonstrated on Friday’ (TGC48) 
‘Muslim extremists are poisoning the atmosphere in this country.....(DTC19) 
I am sorry says ‘suicide bomber’ (DTC17) 
• predicational strategies: Threat  
 
‘Arrest extremist marchers, police told’ (TGC43) 
 
A Muslim protester who sparked outrage by dressing as a suicide bomber is a 
convicted drug dealer’   (DTC18) 
 
A Muslim protester who dressed as a ‘suicide bomber’ (DTC17) 
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Arab press: Protesters/Demonstrators referential and predicational strategies  
 
• Predicational strategies: Aggregation (large numbers) 
 
Around 4,000 people marched from a mosque in central Islamabad after Friday 
prayers (GT3) 
 
Tens of thousands of Muslims across India marched in protest.. (GT8) 
 
More than 2,500 people had earlier attended an organised demonstration (GT9) 
 
Nearly 20,000 people protested against cartoons .....(GT10) 
 
With police firing on some 2,000 protesters as they tried to break into the heavily 
guarded facility (ANC29) 
 
• Aggregation: Death and injury toll  
 
Two protesters killed, and three other people were wounded (ANC29) 
 
Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes (GNC23) 
 
Afghan crowds attacked a base of NATO Norwegian troops with guns and grenades 
and police opened fire, bringing the death toll in protests against the cartoons to 
nine. (KTC12) 
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UK Press: Social Actions (indirect threat)  
 
This form of presentation was also highlighted in a lead article published in the 
Guardian ‘Threats must be countered’ (TGC42): 
For centuries, English law has been crammed full of legal powers to arrest people 
who threaten violence or murder in public, or who go around terrifying ordinary 
people. On Friday, dozens of prima facie examples of such offences were committed 
during protests against the Danish cartoons which offended Muslims by depicting 
the prophet Mohammed. One man was dressed in the garb of a suicide bomber, 
arguably an overt attempt to terrify of the kind that has been illegal in this country... 
• Protesters active role carrying carrying (threatening) placards: 
Some wielded placards threatening a repeat of September 11 and July 7 attacks. 
(DTC17) 
Protesters in London who carried placards threatening suicide bombings and 
massacres in revenge for the Danish cartoons satirising the prophet Muhammad are 
to be investigated by Scotland Yard and could face arrest. (TGC43) 
• Protesters passive roles (to be arrested) 
‘The police need to bear down on them heavily and chase those down who have 
committed offences and prosecute them where they can get evidence, because there 
is freedom of speech on the one hand – that is sacrosanct. But on the other hand, 
incitement to terror, incitement to suicide bombing – all of those are clear 
infringements of the law’. (TIC19) 
‘David Cameron, the conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take 
‘appropriate action’ against people who ‘break the law by inciting hatred or inciting 
people to violence or murder’. He added: ‘many of those people carrying the placards 
were clearly inciting violence or inciting hatred’ (DTC19) 
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David Winnick, on the Commons home affairs committee, said those carrying 
banners threatening violence should be prosecuted and where possible 
deported..‘Those who have been given permission to live here, insofar as it is 
possible in law, it would be better for this country and indeed for the Muslim 
community if that right was removed’ (TGC43) 
UK Press: Police vs. Protesters  
• Police not having control 
As they moved back, the crowd smashed their way into the building housing the 
Danish embassy and set it ablaze (TGC52) 
Others overturned two police cars and threw rocks through the windows of St. 
Maroun church (TGC52) 
Hundreds of angry protesters threw stones and fire bombs at the Danish embassy in 
Tehran today to protest against the publication of cartoons of the prophet 
Mohammed. Police had encircled the embassy building but were unable to hold back 
the 400 demonstrators as they pelted the mission with stones and incendiary devices 
(TGC51) 
• Police not directly attacking protesters 
said that the police were preventing some 1,000 demonstrators marching to the 
offices of the united nations and other aid groups. (TGC40) 
Lebanese troops managed to avoid shooting any protesters dead (TIC20) 
• Or allocated a second position after a negative action by the protesters: 
About 30 gunmen threatened to attack the French learning centre in Nablus 
yesterday, but after negotiating with police guarding the building, they were allowed 
only to scrawl on the building...(TGC40)   
Protesters also tried to storm the French embassy but were held off by police 
(TGC40) 
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Arab press: Social actions attributed to Protesters/Demonstrators  
 
• Active roles in negative actions  
Angry protesters attacked dozens of government and private buildings on the Mall 
road (GNC21) 
• Active roles in peaceful protest  
The protest later broke up peacefully...(GTC61)  
No serious damage from the protests was immediately apparent (GTC66) 
• Passive roles of death and injury (topos of victimisation) 
Four protesters were killed in Police shootouts and several people wounded (GTC68) 
At least one person was killed and seven were wounded in the Puntland region of 
Somalia as security forces clashed with hundreds of protesting Muslims. (ANC29) 
• Police in frontal position (topos of victimisation) 
Police fired teargas shells, used water cannons and also baton-charged to disperse 
protesters. (GNC21) 
Police used tear gas to drive out students who stormed into Islamabad’s diplomatic 
enclave...(GNC23) 
Police fired tear gas, shot into the air and baton-charged protesters who ransacked a 
McDonald’s franchise and set fire to outlets of KFC and Norwegian mobile phone firm 
Telenor. (GNC23) 
F-16 warplanes flew overhead in a show of force while the Norwegians fired teargas, 
rubber bullets and warning shots... (KTC12) 
Kenyan security forces fired teargas at angry stone-throwing Muslim 
demonstrators attempting to march on the Danish embassy in Nairobi  (GTC66) 
567 
 
Baton-wielding riot police launched teargas canisters to disperse about 300 
protesters on the main thoroughfare in the capital after the crowd tried to break 
through a cordon by hurling rocks and other projectiles...at least one person was 
injured. (GTC66) 
 
• Active role of Muslim speakers: highlighting Muslims and Islam under attack 
‘victimisation’  
‘The cartoons are part of the West’s crusade against Islam. No Muslim can tolerate 
these cartoons’ said Mohiuddin Ahmed, leader of the Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir.. 
(GTC67) 
Mohammed Idriss, an imam at Nairobi mosque..said.. ‘This is the kind of content that 
has led the world to believe that all Muslims are terrorists’ he told AFP. ‘Sooner or 
later, were are going to peaceful if the West continues to use freedom of expression 
to say all kinds of nonsense about Islam and its prophet’ (GTC66) 
 
UK Press: Argumentation Analysis  
• Topoi of ‘Threat’  
The topos of ‘threat’ highlighted with the use of a disclaimer was also found in the Times 
opinion piece headlined ‘Incitement with little insight’ (TTC12). However, rather than 
positive self description and negative other descriptions being allocated to the social actors 
involved in the conflict of views, the descriptions highlighted social actions. 
The cartoon showing the Prophet wearing a bomb turban is not only offensive but 
remarkable unsubtle, badly drawn and not very funny. It is unfair, implying that an 
entire world religion is terrorist, rather a few fanatical adherents. The sentiments are 
crass in the extreme. But to silence and repress those opinions, however, repellent, 
risks undermining the principle itself, as does the imprisonment of the historian David 
Irving for his revolting opinions about the Holocaust. 
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The writer begins by the use of an apparent concession, highlighting his agreement that the 
cartoons are negative, attributing with cartoons with the negative qualities being ‘not only 
offensive, but remarkable unsubtle’ and ‘badly drawn and not very funny’. It is also 
attributed with the negative action towards a ‘world religion’ meaning ‘Islam’. This works to 
positively represent the writer as analytically ‘fair’. However, this is immediately followed by 
representing how the action of ‘repressing or silencing’ these cartoons, which is what is 
being requested by some Muslims, poses a threat on the ‘principle’, referring to ‘freedom of 
speech’.   
The topos of ‘threat’ was also highlighted in the Times op-ed headlined ‘Drawing the line’ 
(TTC6) in discussing the reasons why the Times decided not to publish the cartoon: 
Many in Europe today think nothing of mocking the most revered aspects of 
Christianity – often in a crass, tasteless manner – while the corruption and failure of 
secular regimes in the Middle East have helped to inspire a revival of Islam, including 
an extremist strain. None of which excuses a situation in which government of France 
and Denmark have felt obliged to advise their citizens to avoid areas such as the 
Gaza strip where the offices of the EU were stormed yesterday. 
The Middle Eastern context is described as experiencing ‘a revival of Islam’, presupposing 
that Islam was in fact not as popular, and this revival is described as having an ‘extremist 
strain’, highlighting a threat. This premise is used as the basis on which EU offices were 
attacked in the Gaza strip.  
The topos of ‘threat’ and the exclusive connection of Muslim criticism towards the 
publication of the cartoons to extremists as a social group in particular, rather than various 
individual Muslims is made even more explicit further on the same article: 
This newspaper has anguish of its own over whether to reproduce the pictures at the 
centre of this saga. At one level, their appearance might be seen as an appropriate 
response to the fanatics who demanded their prohibition and could help the readers 
to understand both their character and the impact that they might have on believers. 
But to duplicate these cartoons several months after they were originally printed also 
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has an element of exhibitionism to it. To present them in front of the public for 
debate is not value-neutral exercise. The offence destined to be caused to moderate 
Muslims should not be discounted.  
Those specifically demanding the prohibition of the cartoons are referred to negatively as 
‘fanatics’. However, the article does acknowledge that other Muslims may be offended 
‘moderate Muslims’ and it is the offence to those Muslims that creates one reason why the 
Times have decided not to publish the cartoons, drawing on the topos of ‘responsibility’. 
The quality ‘moderate’ attributed to Muslims, once again, places them to be in line with 
‘good’, being on good terms with the ‘in-group’, in opposition to the other Muslims who 
may not describe themselves as ‘moderate’ and who’s views and opinions are not 
considered in the article. 
The topos of ‘threat’ was also used in the representation of Muslims an argument against 
anti-Semitic cartoons produced in the ‘Muslim world’ in the article headlined ‘Muslim 
cartoon’ (TTC7), which reviews reactions towards the publication of the cartoons. However, 
the victimised social group in this case are the Jews.  
What is worrying about anti-Semitic cartoons by the Arab and Muslim world is that 
they lead to physical attacks on the Jewish community, with repercussions in church 
and mosque sermons, inciting people to beat up Jews, which the Archbishop of 
Canterbury has recently condemned.   
This example follows a section in the article criticising Arab countries for their double 
standard, where they are described as responsible for ‘atrocious anti-Semitic images’ in the 
Arab media. This particular excerpt draws on the topos of ‘threat’ in representing Muslims, 
though the use of predicational strategies attributing the cartoons with the adjective 
‘worrying’, as well as causal argumentation, triggered by the phrase ‘they lead to’. 
Therefore, the generalised ‘Arab Muslim world’ are portrayed as the producers of cartoons 
which lead to threats on the ‘Jewish community’, who will be the objects of negative actions 
such as ‘physical attacks’ and being ‘beat up’, resulting from the encouragement of ‘church 
and Mosque sermons’. 
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The threat posed by Islam and Muslims is also highlighted in the Independent’s ‘Bruce 
Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for your own values’ (TIC18). The article argues for 
freedom of speech and is critical towards any application of censorship. The argument 
begins by the portraying Danish newspaper’s decision to publish the cartoons as having 
positive implications on the general public: 
The embattled Danish newspaper has performed a valuable public service. 
This ‘valuable public service’ is claimed to be the following: 
They have forced Europe to face a problem which most political elites would rather 
ignore, although it will be one of the major questions of the next few decades: How 
are we to achieve peaceful co-existence with Islam? 
The achievement of peaceful co-existence with ‘Islam’ is represented as a problem. The ‘wh-
question’ at the end of the excerpt draws on the topos of ‘difference’ and ‘threat’ in the 
representation of Islam, where it presupposes ‘Islam’ as a foreign entity which Europe has 
not achieved peaceful co-existence with and more importantly are still questioning how this 
can be done, hence, it being a problem or challenge they are faced with.  
The threat by Islam is emphasised more directly in the comparative argumentation 
presented further on in the article: 
A lot of soggy liberals now believe if no one talked about the problem, it would just 
go away. Every day, people who used to think like that arrive, at last, in cancer 
specialists’ waiting- room. In Christian-Muslim relations, such delay could be equally 
fatal. 
The current situation in Europe, where the challenge to find a way to co-exist with Islam 
peacefully is being ignored by ‘soggy liberals’ argued to lead to serious threatening 
consequences. This is done, by comparing those who are ignoring the current European 
‘problem’ to patients ignoring warning signs and finally being diagnosed with a potentially 
fatal illness, cancer. In fact, the article directly heightens the sense of threat by the use of 
the modal verb ‘could’ in the phrase ‘such delay could be equally fatal’. 
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Finally, towards the end of the article, the topos of ‘threat’ is highlighted yet again in the 
representation of Muslims. In this case, it is used in the argument against the newspapers 
making any acceptations and applying any form of censorship in relation to the publication 
of the prophet cartoons: 
If keeping them quiescent requires the suppression of a few cartoons, it might seem a 
cheap a price. But there are two objections. The first is cowardice; the second, that 
the cowardice would not succeed. The cartoons would not be the only concession. As 
Danes have realised, there is no point in paying Danegeld. Once you start ordering 
from the menu of cowardice, you lose control of the bill. The Muslim extremists 
would be convinced that, stumbling between cowardice and cultural cringe, the West 
would always capitulate.  
Criticism towards the act of censorship or the ‘suppression of a few cartoons’ is indicated 
first by attributing the act with the negative quality of being ‘cowardice’. This is followed by 
using a win/lose metaphor in portraying the situation, where censorship which is portrayed 
as ‘cowardice’ would not succeed. Using causal argumentation, indicated by the modal verb 
‘would’, it is argued that censoring the cartoons or ‘concession’ could lead to further 
compromises by the ‘West’. Furthermore, continuing with another metaphor, the argument 
highlights those taking the decisions to concede are at threat of losing control of the 
situation. The acts of concession or ‘cowardice’ are portrayed as being part of a list of 
concession choices on a ‘menu’ and by ordering from it, those making the order or 
‘concessions’ are leading themselves to losing control over the ‘bill’ or consequences 
resulting from these compromises. These concessions are also argued to lead to ‘Muslim 
extremists’ to expect the ‘West’ to surrender to their demands, highlighted again by the 
double use of the modal verb ‘would’. Also, the use of ‘Muslim extremists’ makes the 
generalised assumption, that those who were against the cartoons were either all or only 
made up of extremists, excluding all other members of Muslim communities around the 
world. Therefore, the article argues that the act of not publishing the cartoons would lead to 
future threats towards the future of decision making in Western society primarily by 
‘Muslim extremists’. 
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A ‘threat’ by the cartoon conflict on general social peace also takes form in a causation 
argument in the Guardian article headlined ‘A worm’s eye view: logic and principle can’t 
resolve the row over the Danish cartoons’:  
But politics, good manners, and principle all suggest that if we must offend people, 
we do so as politely as possible. This is difficult for newspapers at the best of times 
and almost impossible in a world of globalised religions and communications where 
every insult provokes a response which is itself insulting. 
Already one Dutch website has held a competition for the most offensive 
Photoshopped picture of Muhammad, and some these are very offensive indeed. In 
London we have seen the disgusting demonstration with placards calling for fresh 
suicide bombers. And that has in turn ensured, I think, that the leaders of the fascist 
British National Party can never be successfully prosecuted. Last week they walked 
free when a jury could not agree to convict them of inciting hatred against Muslims. 
After the demonstrations in London, it will be difficult to find a jury whose members 
all find their views unreasonable. 
As seen above, the cartoon publications which were considered an insult are argued to 
cause or ‘provoke a response’ of a number of negative consequences that are ‘insulting’ 
themselves. This claim is supported by listing a number of negative consequences following 
the adjective ‘already’, emphasising that they have already occurred. These consequences 
are highlighted as harming all social groups involved, as well as, other possible negative 
social consequences. An in-group member ‘Dutch website’ is given agency of negative 
actions in holding a competition producing offensive material. This is mitigated further with 
the predicational strategies attributing the images published by the website as being ‘very 
offensive indeed’. On the other hand, it highlights the demonstrations, held by Muslim 
demonstrators, as another negative consequence, where suicide bombings were advocated, 
although instead of referring to the protesters directly, a metonym was used , replacing the 
users, ‘the protesters carrying the placards’  with the objects used, the ‘placards’, as the 
agents of the negative action. However, the actions in the demonstrations are portrayed as 
directly leading to yet another negative consequence indicated by the phrase, ‘that has in 
turn’. The demonstrations are given as the reason why most likely the in-group members, 
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‘leaders of the British National party’, who are attributed with the negative quality of being 
‘fascist’, will not be convicted for their active role in the negative action of ‘inciting hatred 
against Muslims’.  
• Topoi of ‘victimisation’  
In an op-ed in the Independent titled ‘The double standards of free speech’ (TIC22), the 
writer argues against the publication as a result of their negative effects. In one part of the 
argument, Muslims are represented victims as a result of the publication of the cartoons 
and other ‘in-group’ or Western related actions. 
The argument begins by allocating various ‘in-group’ members or actors associated with 
‘West’ as agents of negative actions. ‘European Journalists’ are described as ‘getting the 
show they wanted’ and ‘Flemming Rose’, the culture editor of the Danish paper that 
published the cartoons is placed as going ahead with the act of publishing the cartoons 
‘simply to enrage, like bullfighters goading a bull’. In addition, ‘other newspapers’ that 
republished the cartoons are allocated with the negative action of ‘belittling freedom of 
expression’ for doing so. Following this platform emphasising the negative role of ‘Western’ 
media, the following section was added: 
These Liberal warriors, high on conceit, want to demonstrate that Muslims can never 
be a part of Europe, because, well, there are too backward to hoot aloud when their 
revered prophet is shown with a bomb for a turban. I am not amused either, so 
should I pack the bags? Many of these countries were infamous for their state 
terrorism against Jews since they have systematically mistreated generations of 
Muslims. 
In the above example, it is argued that ‘European journalists’ referred to as ‘liberal warriors’ 
and the given the negative quality of ‘being high on conceit’ aim to prove the incompatibility 
of Muslims and Islam in Europe, by their publication of the cartoons and Muslim reaction to 
it. This negative ‘European agenda’ against Muslims is highlighted further at the end of the 
excerpt by a symptomatic argument. The countries in which these cartoons were published 
are given the negative quality of being ‘infamous for their state terrorism against Jews’ and 
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this is connected to their subsequent negative treatment of ‘generations of Muslims’ who 
are positioned in the passive receiving end of the countries ‘systematic mistreatment’.  
However, a clear hasty generalisation is committed, where based on insufficient 
observation, a prejudiced generalisation is made that European countries are innately racist 
towards particular social groups, in this case ‘Muslims’.  
Interestingly, the topos of ‘victimisation’ in the representation of Muslims continues, but 
instead of European countries being the victimisers, the agency of this role is shifted to ‘the 
dictatorial states’ Muslims live in before they move elsewhere. 
Muslims live as abject prisoners of their dictatorial states. They flee to places where 
they can breathe easier and speak. Then, a minority turn into the vicious thought-
dogs they left behind. Most of us Muslims detest them more than whites ever would. 
By attributing ‘Muslims’  with the quality ‘abject prisoners’, they are highlighted as being 
‘victims’ being imprisoned by their ‘dictatorial states’. This forms the premise of the causal 
argument claiming ‘They flee’ these states to get away from the restrictions and have the 
freedom to ‘breathe easier’ and ‘speak’. 
• Topoi of ‘contradiction’  
This topoi of ‘contradiction’ was also shown to be drawn upon in the Guardian news report 
‘Jerusalem Post published Mohammad cartoons’ (TGC45), which covers the reprinting of the 
cartoons in an Israeli based paper, the reaction to it, and the papers explanation for its 
decision to go ahead with reprinting the cartoons. Quoting a Jerusalem’s post editorial 
commenting on its decision to republish the cartoon, the following was added: 
But an editorial published today, entitled ‘The Prophet’s Honor’, the paper contrasts 
the outcry that the Danish cartoons are causing in the Muslim world, while ‘Arab 
cartoonists routinely demonise Jews as global conspirators, corrupters of society and 
blood suckers’. ‘Arab Political ‘humour’ knows no bounds,’ the Jerusalem Post 
editorial said. ‘A cartoon in Qatar’s Al-Watan depicted prime minister Ariel Sharon 
drinking from a goblet of Palestinian children’s blood. Another, in the Egyptian Al-
Ahram al-Arabi showed him Jackbooted, bloody-handed and crushing peace.   
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Appendix 18 - Reader Interpretation Data   
 
• UK Muslim Groups: Views on lack of Muslim voices in all articles 
On article A: 
Hanan: The people in the parliament and you know not really the people that 
actually live there 
Amina: Not the Muslims 
Hanan: Not the Muslims at all  
Amina: Yeah like you haven’t asked any 
Hanan: Just people in power  
Lama: or even the Muslims in the French system  
 
On article B: 
Abdul: all this was aimed at liberating women from this oppression but a matter of 
fact their opinion and their choice hasn’t been taken into consideration..you know.. 
so it’s like me extending a hand of help to you but do you need the help or do you 
want the help..this is the question..the point of view..the people they were trying.. 
the very people they were trying to liberate..their views haven’t been taken into 
consideration..as a matter of fact their opinions haven’t counted and how do we 
know not just by the article but by the sheer number of women who came out on to 
the streets of France like opposing.. Muslim and non veiling women..even French 
women who consider themselves liberals and atheist, you know, they sided with 
them and they said this is their right 
 
On article D: 
Abdu: again their opinions and their desires and wishes are completely ignored 
again. None of the Muslim women who wants to wear it, we have none of that. We 
don’t have any sort of comments or statistics you know based on those people who 
veil given in any of the articles again you know their views are not taken into 
consideration..we are trying to liberate them and they don’t know what’s good for 
them..that’s the message that I got from all of the...  
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Hakeem: I think there is a viewpoint from a Muslim women who wears the burqa, 
but they are speaking umm for them, on behalf of them umm which may not be 
legitimate and certainly an assumption the answer in all cases will be the latter (by 
choice) is a massive assumption to make. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
